The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśesika and its Conflict with The Buddhist Dignāga School

(CRITIQUE OF INDIAN REALISM)

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FOREWORD

In his *Critique of Indian Realism*, Dr. Dharmendra Nath Shastri makes a refreshingly new approach to the age-old problems of Indian Philosophy. The book is best described as a full and persuasive account of the inside story of the *Nyāya-Vaisesika* Realism. Instead of giving an exposition exclusively from its own sources, Dr. Shastri presents this important system of Indian thought from a new perspective, from its long encounter with the Buddhist School of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Although the beginnings of the *Vaisesika* or the *Nyāya* are pre-Buddhistic and they belong to a different metaphysical background, it was in the course of the philosophical duel sustained for over six centuries with the Dignāga School of Buddhism that the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* attained its characteristic stamp as a consistent Realism closest to common sense. In this process, it also gained in clarity and depth. Many of its basic conceptions, such as Substance, Attribute, Universal (*Sāmānya*), Inherence (*Samavāya*), Causation and Perception underwent considerable modification and reformulation as a result of its conflict with Buddhism, and no less from the internal criticism of the schools of *Mimāmsā*. One of the chief merits of the present work is that Dr. Shastri shows, with a wealth of detail and sound reasoning, the nature of the changes made and why the changes were made. He has also

"भूतार्थपक्षपातो हि बुद्धेः स्वभावः"

वाचस्पतिमिश्र NVT. p. 80.

Knowledge by its very nature is disposed to Truth

"सर्वधियां यथार्थपरिच्छेदकत्वस्य कुलधर्मत्वात्"

श्रीधर NK. p. 200

Right comprehension is the genetic trait of all cognitions

नमः

"पूर्वेभ्यः पथिकृद्भ्यः"

ऋक् X. 14. 15.

स्व-लक्षणस्य सामान्य-लक्षणस्य च भेदकम् ।
तत्त्वं साक्षात्कृतं येन दिग्नागो बौद्धदेशिकः ॥ १ ॥

श्री-वाचस्पतिमिश्रेण सर्वशास्त्रार्थदर्शिना ।
टीकादीपैः समस्ताऽपि द्योतिता तर्कभारती ॥ २ ॥

पुनरप्युद्धृतं येन लुप्तं दिग्नागदर्शनम् ।
श्चेर्वात्स्की रूसदेशीयः बौद्धशास्त्रविचक्षणः ॥ ३ ॥

मुनित्रयमिदं नत्वा तद्ग्रन्थान् परिभाव्य च ।
न्यायबौद्धीयसिद्धान्तनिबन्धोऽयं विरच्यते ॥ ४ ॥

त्रिरत्नं भारतीयस्य दर्शनस्य विशेषकम् ।
तस्मै समर्पितो ग्रन्थः श्रद्धाऽऽर्जितचेतसा ॥ ५ ॥

PREFACE

The present work was planned in 1944-45 when I stayed for over a year at Banaras, the traditional seat of Sanskrit learning.

It had often struck me as a young student of Indian philosophy that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school had undergone some significant changes in the course of its development. There was, besides, the old tradition of a protracted conflict between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Dignāga school based on Uddyotakara's remark that he wrote his great work, *Nyāya-vārtika*, "in order to dispel the darkness caused by pseudo-philosophers (i.e., Dignāga and others)". I decided to work on the ambitious plan of attempting at a picture of that conflict between the two most important schools, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which stands at the base of the fabric of Indian philosophy and the Dignāga school which marks the culmination of the development of Buddhist philosophy. This conflict lasting for six long centuries (from the 5th to the 11th) is essentially one between Realism and Idealism which is the basic problem of all philosophy. It would be evident that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school developed and formulated most of its theories with a view to defending realism.

This study presenting the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, for the first time, in the light of its conflict with the Dignāga school, not

I wanted to study these texts with the help of pandits of orthodox traditional learning. The portions of these texts with which I was chiefly concerned were those which were related to Buddhist theories—their exposition and their refutation. The orthodox pandits having no background of the Buddhist theories could not make headway in the interpretation of these texts; and what was worse still, they honestly believed that they understood those passages and tried to explain them. I felt miserably disappointed. Sometime afterwards, I read in the preface to oné of the Buddhist works edited by the late Sri Rahul Sankrityayan that when he went to Banaras to study the basic Nyāya-Vaiseṣika works, he also found that none of the pandits was conversant with those works which had been outside the scope of traditional study. Had I read this before, I should have been spared so much waste of time and effort and strain on my nerves.

It then occurred to me that I should start the other way round and should study the theories of the Dignāga school first. I tried a number of expositions of Buddhist philosophy and especially those of Dignāga school, but I did not succeed in assimilating the theories of that system. At this juncture, I came across Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic*. Although that book has now been republished, it was not easily available in 1944, and it was with great difficulty that I could procure a copy of the first volume from one library, and that of the second volume from another.

The discovery of Stcherbatsky proved a red-letter day in my study of Indian philosophy. Although I had studied Indian philosophy on orthodox lines from my boyhood, for almost thirty years then, I realized only after the study of *Buddhist Logic* and other works of Stcherbatsky that orthodox Indian philosophy could not be properly understood without the back-ground of Buddhist philosophy. Especially, the study of the Nyāya-Vaisesika was meaningless without the understanding of the Dignāga school. I have unreservedly acknowledged my indebtedness to Stcherbatsky (p. 28). Not only did his works help me in grasping the theories of the Dignāga school, but they also paved the way for interpreting the difficult passages of the texts of the Nyāya-Vaisesika works. In the second volume of *Buddhist*

Logic, Stcherbatsky has appended an annotated English translation of some of the difficult portions of the texts of Sanskrit philosophical works relating to the controversy between the orthodox schools and the Buddhists, including some of the portions of the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* of Vâcaspatimiśra for the understanding of which I had formerly made desparate efforts with the help of the pandits. Now, with the help of Stcherbatsky's translation, I succeeded in grasping those parts of Sanskrit texts, and I decided to embark upon their study once again.

Despite my previous disappointment with the orthodox pandits, I felt that they could be of great help in making headway in the interpretation of these difficult texts; they were conversant with their peculiar idiom. Luckily, I met one scholar, Pandit Padma Prasad Bhatarai, the head Pandit of the Nyāya at Goenka Sanskrit Mahāvidyālaya, Banaras (now Principal, Government Sanskrit College Kathmandu, Nepal), who plainly confessed to me that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works in question were outside the scope of orthodox studies, but that he would be willing to try them studiously. This filled me with great hope. We made a plan of studying a particular portion of one of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika works separately, and then to meet and exchange notes. This went on for a number of months; I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to Pandit Bhatarai. I also studied some texts in collaboration with Pandit Raghu Nath ji, now Professor in Sanskrit University, Varanasi and Pandit Vibhuti Bhushan Bhattacharya of the same University. Later, I came to know that the same method of studying in collaboration with orthodox Pandits was followed more or less by Stcherbatsky also.

In order to present a picture of the conflict between the two schools, I made an exhaustive and extensive study of the four basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works already named. These works present a faithful picture of the Buddhist side as well. Besides, I have drawn upon some of the principal works of the Dignāga school, viz., *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* of Dignāga (*Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa* only), *Nyāya-bindu* and *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of Dharmakīrti, *Tattva-saṁgraha* of Śāntarakṣita with its commentary by Kamalaśīla,

and the *Six Buddhist Tracts* published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. I have also discussed the theories of Kumārila and Prabhākara whose contribution to the orthodox theory of realism is as great as that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholiasts. Other works on Indian philosophy, ancient as well as modern, to which reference has been made in the present work, are listed in the bibliography.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories having been presented here in a new perspective, I have arrived at some bold conclusions about which difference of opinion may naturally be expected. In the concluding chapter entitled, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theories in a New Perspective*, I have given a *résumé* of my conclusions. It might be advisable to read this chapter first to appraise how far these conclusions have been substantiated in the body of this work. Far from claiming any originality for this, I am reminded of the characteristic humility of the great Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writer Jayanta who said, "How should I be capable of striking an original idea? My work may be regarded merely as a new mode of exposition".[1] What I maintain is simply this, that, as a result of the study of the conflict between the two schools, these theories have been presented in a new light altogether.

The work is divided into thirteen chapters. The first chapter is in the form of an introduction giving the nature and scope of the work. The second and third chapters deal respectively with the problems of realism in general and its treatment in other Indian schools. The fourth chapter gives a brief historical survey of the literature of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school including a brief notice of the thinkers of the opposite camp of Dignāga school. The fifth chapter deals with the general problem of the nature of reality. The first five chapters may thus be regarded as of an introductory character; they have also been published in a separate volume for the general reader who is not likely to be interested in the abstruse polemic that follows. The conflict between the two schools has been presented in the order of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories. The sixth chapter deals with the defence of the substance, and the seventh with the theory

1 See *infra*, p. 114. n. 137.

of causation. The next four chapters, from the eighth to eleventh, deal with the problems associated with the remaining Nyāya-Vaisesika categories. The twelfth chapter deals with some epistemological problems which have a bearing on the theory of realism. The thirteenth and concluding chapter entitled *the Nyāya-Vaisesika Theories in a New Perspective* gives a *résumé* of this work. A Glossary of technical terms is also given at the end which will prove useful, especially to lay readers.

Indian scholiasts evolved for philosophical discourse a special idiom of Sanskrit which is marked by brevity and precision. To translate the abstruse polemic of Indian philosophy into English or for the matter of that in any other modern language presents, therefore, a peculiar difficulty. The idiom of a current language could be retained, in some cases, only at the cost of clarity. The author has cared more for clarity of the subject matter than for the idiom of the language. In some cases, these translations are, more or less, literal; in others, they are rather free; while in still others, only the substance of the passages has been given. As for the extracts from the Sanskrit texts, the smaller ones are given in Indo-Roman script with diacritical marks, but the longer ones from the sixth chapter onward (when we enter into the arguments of the two schools) are given at the end in Text-Appendix in Devanāgarī script in a serial order of the chapters and pages. In some cases, however, where Sanskrit texts are not quoted in full, references to them are invariably given.

Of the important Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works from which I have quoted copiously, the *Nyāya-kandalī* has been translated into English by Dr. Ganga Nath Jha; and some important passages of that book have also been translated by Faddegon, a Dutch scholar, in his *Vaiśesika System*. These translations were not of much help to me, and my own renderings are quite independent of them. At places, I found them inaccurate—which fact I have pointed out in some instances. Stcherbatsky's translation of two important portions of the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatīkā*, stands, however, on a different footing and is immensely helpful.

A great difficulty in the way of understanding these

abstruse philosophical texts is that they have been printed without being properly edited; there are mistakes practically on every page. Whosoever works on these texts intelligently should be able to suggest a number of emendations as Stcherbatsky has done. It appears that he had access to some manuscripts not hitherto utilized. A new edition of the *Nyāya-darśana*, with *Bhāsya*, *Nyāya-vārtika* and *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyatīkā*, appeared in 1936 A.D. from Calcutta. The editor of that work does not seem even to be conversant with the fact that Stcherbatsky has done so much work to improve the text. It is a pity that the work of that great Russian savant of Indian Philosophy has practically remained unknown in this country[1]. I have also made some emendations in the text which are pointed out at their proper places.

Besides expressing my indebtedness to the scholars already mentioned, I can hardly find words to express my gratitude to Dr. S. Datta, author and scholar (formerly Professor of English in Delhi University), who went steadily and meticulously through the whole of this work. I am deeply indebted to my friend Prof. Sadhu Ram who not only helped me in the revision, but also in the correction of proofs. My student, Sri G. S. Gupta also worked very hard, especially in preparing the Index. My students, Dr. Shiva Raj Shastri, Dr. Bharat Singh, Dr. Sri Niwas Shastri, and Sri K. N. Gupta were helpful in a number of ways. I also take this opportunity of expressing my indebtedness to the Agra University—to its former Vice-Chancellor, Dr. K. P. Bhatnagar and to its present Vice-Chancellor, Col. P. D. Gupta—for undertaking the publication of this work, and also to the University Grants Commission for making a grant for its publication. I am also grateful to the New Age Press which undertook the printing of this work despite its many preoccupations.

Kurukshetra University,
August 15, 1963.

Dharmendra Nath Shastri

1 *Infra*, p. 27.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

It was painful to me, as it would be to every author, that my life work, "Critique of Indian Realism" should not be available in the market, the first edition having been exhausted long before. The Institute of Indology Delhi was prepared to take up the publication of the second edition, but it was rightly felt that the sale of a work, published by the Institute could not be pushed up.

In this situation, Mr. Kishore Chandra Jain, Partner of the Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, came forward and offered to publish the Critique within two months. He actually got it printed by photostat method even before two months. I cannot adequately be grateful to Mr. Jain for filling with joy this last stage of my life.

23-4-76

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D.N. SHASTRI

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NB.	Nyāyabindu, edited by Peterson (Bibliotheca Indica Series, Calcutta, 1929).
NBT.	Nyāya-bindutīkā of Dharmottara included in NB.
NBh.	Nyāyadarsana with Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya- (containing Uddyotakara's Vārtika, Vācaspati-misra's Tātparyatīkā and Visvanātha's Vrtti—two volumes), Calcutta Sanskrit Series 1936, 1944.
NK.	Nyāya-Kandalī or Srīdhara with Prasastapāda-bhāsya (Banaras, 1895). Nyāyakosa, by M. M. Bhīmācārya Jhalakīkar Bombay, 1893). Nyāya-līlāvatī by Vallabhācārya (Nirnaya Sagar edition).
NM.	Nyāya-mañjarī of Jayantabhatta, edited by Pt. Surya Narayan Shukla (Banaras, 1936). Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña (Poona, 1922).
NSM.	Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī (Kārikāvalī) Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha.
NS.	Nyāyasūtra (See NBh.).
NV.	Nyāya-vārtika (See NBh.).

NVT. Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatīkā (See NBh.)

N-V. Nyāya-Vaiseśika School.
Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatīkā-parisuddhi of Udayanācārya (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1911).
Padārthatattva-nirūpana by Raghunātha Siromani.

PP. Prasastapāda-bhāṣya (Banaras, 1895, see NK.)

SDSm. Saddarsana-samuccaya by Haribhadra, with the commentary of Gunaratna.

SK. Sāmkhya-kārikā of Īsvarakrsna.
Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya of Vijñānabhiksu.

SPS. Sāmkhyapravacana-sūtra.

STK. Sāmkhyatattva-kaumudī with the commentary of Bālarāma Udāsīna.
Saptapadārthī edited by V. S. Ghate (Bombay, 1919).

SDS. Sarvadarsana-saṁgraha of Mādhava, edited by Abhyankara (Poona, 1924).

SBNT. Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts, edited by M. M. Har Prasad Shastri, M.A. (Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1910).

SV. Ślokavārtika by Kumārila Bhatta (Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series).

TB. Tarkabhāsā of Kesavamiśra (Poona, 1937).

TK. Tarka-kaumudī of Laugāksibhāskara (Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1928).
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Kusumāñjali (Calcutta).

MS. Mīmāmsā-sūtra.

NB. Nyāyabindu, edited by Peterson (Bibliotheca Indica Series, Calcutta, 1929).

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NBh. Nyāyadarsana with Vātsyāyana-bhāṣya- (containing Uddyotakara's Vārtika, Vācaspati-misra's Tātparyatīkā and Visvanātha's Vrtti—two volumes), Calcutta Sanskrit Series 1936, 1944.

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TB.	Tarkabhāsā of Kesavamiśra (Poona, 1937).
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	Tarkāmrta by Jagdīśa Bhattācārya.
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JAOS. Journal of American Oriental Society.

JBBRAS. Journal of Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.

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ILA. Keith, A.B.: Indian Logic and Atomism.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

1. THE ADVENT OF DIGNĀGA[1]

Sometime during the fifth century A.D., there appeared in the firmament of Indian philosophy a brilliant star in the person of Dignāga, the founder of Buddhist logic and epistemology. Regarded by the Tibetans as *an ornament of Jambūdvīpa*,[2] he was one of the greatest thinkers that India has ever produced. Subsequent philosophical thought in India was dominated by him directly or indirectly for six long centuries. He revolutionized Indian philosophy by introducing into it the theory of radical distinction between two mutually exclusive sources of knowledge—'direct sense-apprehension' (*grahana*) and 'intellect or 'thought' (*vikalpa* or *adhyavasāya*)[3], which may be compared

1 Both the forms 'Dignāga' and 'Diṅnāga' are correct. Although the latter is more in vogue amongst Sanskrit scholiasts, the form 'Dignāga' has been preferred being easy of pronunciation.

2 The trio, Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Asaṅga, together with the trio, Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakirti, are regarded by the Tibetans as the six ornaments of Jambūdvīpa (India), *cf.* Winternitz: *Indian Literature*, Vol. II. p. 363. n. 3.

3 The terms used for these two sources of knowledge by the Dignāga school are 'perception' and 'inference' (pratyakṣa and anumāna), but that is according to the usage in Logic. Epistemologically, however, 'pratyakṣa' of Dignāga is pure sense-apprehension or sensation, and 'anumāna' is used in a wider and broader sense than ordinarily understood by that term. It includes all forms of thought—all intellection (see pp. 62-63).

to *sensibility* and *understanding* of Kant. The new approach introduced by Kant in western philosophy was compared by Kant himself to the Copernican revolution in Astronomy. Before Copernicus, it was assumed that the heavenly bodies were in movement, and that the earth (from which a spectator observed these heavenly bodies) was stationary. Copernicus reversed the notion and declared that the earth itself was moving. Before Kant, it was assumed that our knowledge must conform to objects of experience, but Kant reversed the order and declared that it was the object that conformed to knowledge.

Kant holds that the formless sense-data are received *a posteriori* through the senses to which forms are given *a priori* by the intellect. These forms are of two kinds. In the first instance, the data supplied by the sense are presented in the form of Space and Time. Space and Time are not, according to Kant, objective realities, but are only the subjective ways in which we cognize realities. Realities in themselves are non-spatial and non-temporal. The other kind of subjective forms are the categories of understanding, which are classified under four heads—quantity, quality, relation and modality. We are here concerned, however, only with the broad fact that, according to Kant, the objects of our experience receive their form from the intellect, i.e., they conform to our thought. There does exist an external reality, but it is transcendent. The world of our experience does not exist externally in the form in which it appears to us. It is the result of the working of our thought on the material supplied from the external source, the transcendent external reality. Kant thus stands midway between the *naive* realist who holds that the external world exists exactly in the form in which it appears to us, and the idealist who holds that it is nothing but an external projection of our ideas.

Dignāga, likewise, holds that the external reality, which is in the form of unique particulars (*sva-laksanas*), has no extension in terms of *space*, and no duration in terms of *time;* it is devoid of all attributes, determinations or relations. It has no form, and is therefore transcendent (thing-in-itself). It is grasped through pure sensation, and in terms of our thought we are never conscious of it as it is *in itself*. But a pure sensa-

tion is immediately followed by another form of knowledge called judgment or determinate knowledge (*adhyavasāya*) which is of the form of the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). The universal is only a generalized form imposed by our mind on the data (*sva-lakṣaṇas* or unique particulars) grasped in pure sensation. Form is given to objects of experience by the intellect, for, according to Dignāga, the universal or the generalized form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) is no external reality, but a mere mental construction[4]. Comprehension of objects, as having extension in space and duration in time, is nothing but generalization (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). The extension of an object means imagining a 'whole' (*avayavin*) or a substance which is common to all its parts, i.e., many reals (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) which are contiguous. And the duration of an object means imagining an abiding object which is common to many reals (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) coming in momentary succession. There is, in both cases, a generalization which is purely subjective and has no counterpart in the external world. Similarly, all attributes such as qualities, movements, etc., are nothing but generalizations. A pure sensation (*pratyakṣa* or *grahaṇa*), that grasps the transcendent reality as it is in the form of unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*), is followed by determinate knowledge (*adhyavasāya*). And it is this that gives a generalized form to the data of pure sensation (*grahaṇa*) and converts it into a conscious experience. All our conscious knowledge, according to Dignāga, is thus restricted to the generalized form which is the work of the intellect. It never touches the reality which is transcendent.

4 Cf. the following extract from Kant with the one from Dignāga :

"There are two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding, which perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root. Through the former, objects are given to us; through the latter, they are thought." (*Critique of Pure Reason*, N. K. Smith's Translation, 1856 edition, p. 61.)

Atra pramāṇaṁ dvividham eva, kutaś cet, dvi-lakṣaṇaṁ prameyaṁ, sva-sāmānya-lakṣaṇābhyāṁ bhinna-lakṣaṇaṁ prameyāntaraṁ nāsti (PS. p. 4). The Ṭīkā of Jinendrabuddhi adds : sva-lakṣaṇa-viṣayakaṁ pratyakṣaṁ eva, sāmānya-lakṣaṇa-viṣayakaṁ anumānam eva. *Ibid.* p. 6. Dharmakīrti says : tasya (pratyakṣasya) viṣayaḥ sva-lakṣaṇam.....tad eva paramārtha-sat, anyat sāmānya-lakṣaṇaṁ so'numānasya viṣayaḥ. (NB. last portion of Chap. I.)

3

The so-called determinate perception (*savikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is for Dignāga only a pseudo-perception, because it comprehends a generalized form (which is merely a mental factor) as an external real object. Determinate perception, however, has a core of reality, for it follows immediately in the wake of a sensation[5] which grasps the external transcendent reality (*sva-lakṣaṇa*).[6]

It is thus clear that Dignāga, like Kant, occupies a position midway between the *naïve* realists (e.g., of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school) and the idealists (e.g., the Buddhist Yogācāra school). It would thus appear that, although in the details of their metaphysical analysis, Dignāga and Kant naturally differ, similarity between them is not superficial; it is based on the intrinsic structure of their epistemology. Surprisingly enough, even the terms used by both the thinkers for ultimate reality have a similar connotation; the term *sva-lakṣaṇa* used by Dignāga connotes, 'of its own kind' or 'as it is', and the expression *thing-in-itself* (*ding an sich*) also means 'as it is.' Such a striking similarity between the key-words used by two thinkers so remote in time and place is a proof positive that both of them had struck upon a great metaphysical truth. It shows how human mind moves in the same grooves in reaching an eternal truth. This striking similarity of the connotation of the two words escaped the notice of Stcherbatsky who was the first to point out the resemblance between the two thinkers.[7] Not only is there a close similarity in their epistemology, but even the background of the two thinkers, so remote in time and place, is strinkingly alike. Kant came when the subjective idealism of Berkeley had discarded the reality of the external world, and the scepticism of Hume had challenged all the basic human concepts such as those of Self, Substance and Causality. Dignāga was preceded by the schools of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika

5 Pratyakṣa-pṛṣṭha-bhāvitvāt.

6 The theory of Dignāga is further discussed in II. 1. (vi); IX. 12-13; and XII. 6.

7 Resemblance between the theories of Dignāga and Kant, which is quite obvious, was pointed out by Prof. Stcherbatsky, the modern exponent of Dignāga in his *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 200.

whose similarity with Berkeley and Hume respectively cannot be missed by any student of comparative philosophy.

On the ontological side, Kant and Dignāga differ with regard to the nature of ultimate reality. Dignāga, in conformity with the general Buddhist doctrine, maintains that reality or the unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa* or *kṣaṇa*) is being born every moment and dying the very next. His theory was diametrically opposed to the static conception of the realist schools which conceived the universe as composed of stationary and isolated objects. Against them, Dignāga posited his kinetic conception of the universe as a constant forward movement of interlinked and interrelated point-instants of reality (*saṁskṛta dharmas*). Thus, while in his theory of knowledge, Dignāga anticipated Kant who came thirteen hundred years later, in his ontology, he almost foreshadowed, in one of its aspects, modern Marxist materialism which holds that all things are interlinked and interrelated and are "in a constant state of coming into being and going out of being, in a constant flux, in a ceaseless state of movement and change."[8] So far as Indian philosophy is concerned, Dignāga's contribution is unique. Before him the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had developed a realistic structure based on common sense or rather common experience (see section 7 of this chapter). Dignāga focussed on it the search-light of criticism, and shattered it to pieces. In these pages it has been shown that the Buddhist theories of evanescence and causation are just a logical culmination of the basic principles accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The scholiasts of the latter school fought a desperate battle to defend themselves against the Dignāga school. The present work contains ample evidence to show that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school lost that battle.

The advent of Dignāga is indeed one of the greatest events in the history of Indian philosophy. He can as a matter of right claim a place among those pioneers of human thought who discovered an eternal truth and made a lasting contribution to human knowledge.

8 F. Engels: *Dialectics of Nature*, quoted in *Dialectical and Historical Materialism* by Stalin, p. 5.

2. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DIGNĀGA SCHOOL AND THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA REALISM

In his *magnum opus*, the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, Dignāga propounded his new doctrine and also attacked the *naïve* realism of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. He refuted the *Nyāya-sūtra* and the commentary of Vātsyāyana on it. For a time, the orthodox realism reeled before the onslaught of Dignāga and his successors. Uddyotakara Bhāradvāja, about the close of the sixth century, took up the gauntlet on behalf of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and wrote his famous work, *Nyāya-vārtika*, with "the object of dispelling the darkness caused by the pseudo-philosophers",[9] by which he meant those of the Dignāga school. Uddyotakara's defence of the Nyāya[10] was hailed as a great event, for Subandhu (seventh century A.D.), one of the pioneers among Sanskrit prose-writers, refers to Uddyotakara as "the embodiment of the defence of the Nyāya position."[11] A battle royal ensued between the Buddhists of the Dignāga school on one side and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the two Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā schools of orthodox realism on the other. It lasted for a long-period of some six hundred years, i.e., up to the eleventh century when the Buddhists practically disappeared.

Dharmakīrti, the great continuator of the work of Dignāga (first half of the seventh century), also one of *the six ornaments* of *Jambūdvīpa*, answered Uddyotakara. Dharmakīrti was followed by his commentator Dharmottara and by Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and a host of others. The Nyāya school, however, produced its greatest exponent, Vācaspatimiśra, roughly 250 years after Uddyotakara. During the interval, the crusade against the Buddhists was carried on by the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, an ally of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in the battle against the former. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school produced two of the greatest luminaries of Indian philosophy, namely, Kumārila and Prabhākara. Concerned mainly with sacrificial matters, this

9 Kutārkikājñāna-nivṛttihetuh. NV. opening stanza. Kutārkikair Dignāga-prabhṛtibhih. NVT. p. 2.

10 The term Nyāya stands for the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśesika school (see section 3 of this chapter).

11 Nyāya-sthitim iva Uddyotakara-svarūpām. (Vāsavadattā, Hall's edition, p. 235.)

school had not much to do with metaphysics or epistemology. Its realistic structure was more or less the same as that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from which it was adopted. There is little doubt that the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā developed its epistemology under the stimulus given by the Dignāga school, and that its object was to defend orthodox realism. Prabhākara and Kumārila, however, in the course of their defence of realism, evolved certain epistemological theories which were strikingly bold and original in conception. Of these two great thinkers, Prabhākara has been called a 'bastard son of Buddhism' by Stcherbatsky,[12] because he was influenced by the Buddhists to a great extent. He is, therefore, still more interesting for our study. For an understanding of the conflict of the orthodox realists with the Buddhists, the study of Kumārila and Prabhākara, so far as they deal with topics relating to the theory of realism, is essential.

During the ninth and tenth centuries, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school produced four or five eminent scholiasts. The greatest of them is Vācaspatimiśra who occupies the highest position as an exponent not only of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, but of all other systems of Indian philosophy, the Buddhist not excluded.[13]

Vācaspatimiśra laid the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism on a firm foundation. In his *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism reaches its high watermark. Jayanta, whose priority or posteriority to Vācaspatimiśra is uncertain, is marked, more than any other ancient writer on Indian philosophy, by his rare wit, sharp repartee and delightful lucidity. Next to them come two great masters, Udayana and Śrīdhara, both commentators on Praśastapāda. The former is also the author of several independent treatises. Both of them belong to the close of the tenth century. These thinkers are among the luminaries of the brightest period of Indian philosophy which covers some six hundred years, i.e., from the fifth to the tenth or eleventh century. During this period, as a result of protracted

conflict between the Buddhists and the orthodox realists, Indian genius reached its zenith in the development of metaphysics and epistemology. As far as the problem of realism *versus* idealism is concerned, the philosophers of the two schools left no possible avenue of thought unexplored.[14]

3 THE SYNCRETIC NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOOL

Of all Indian philosophical systems, the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is the chief exponent of realism. The two schools, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, were separate in their origin as well as in the early course of their development. The former, although a metaphysical school, was chiefly concerned with the method of debate and syllogism. The latter formulated its ontological structure on the basis of the six categories which have been accepted as the basis of realism not only by the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, but also by other orthodox realist schools with slight modifications. A close liaison between the two schools seems to have existed from the earliest times; they have always been held to be allied systems *(samāna-tantra)*. In formulating the six-fold division of sense-object-contact (*sannikarṣa*), Uddyotakara has freely used the Vaiśeṣika terminology.[15] From the tenth century onwards, we have treatises in which the subject matter of both the systems has been formally amalgamated.

The two schools were complementary to each other. While the Vaiśeṣika represents the positive, constructive or creative side of the combined school, the Nyāya represents its defensive side. As noted above, the Vaiśeṣika supplied the ontological structure to the syncretic system. So far as the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* and its earliest commentary by Praśastapāda (which is, in fact, an independent treatise) are concerned, they contain no controversial matter by way of refutation of other schools. Controversies with other schools make their appearance only in the

14 For detailed information about the authors of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and the allied ones, see Chap. IV.

15 For example, saṁyoga, saṁyukta-samavāya, and saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya, etc. (NV. pp. 94-95), are the terms of the Vaiśeṣika conception.

commentaries on Praśastapāda, such as *Nyāya-kandalī* and *Kiraṇāvalī*, which belong to a period when the Vaiśeṣika had already combined with the Nyāya school. On the other hand, in the case of the latter, we find the refutation of other schools right from the *Nyāya-sūtra*,[16] and the same continues in its great commentary by Vātsyāyana and in all the Nyāya treatises such as *Nyāya-vārtika, Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā, Nyāya-mañjarī* and Udayana's *Pariśuddhi*.

The syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is usually designated, specially in the later period, as *Nyāya*, and an adherent of the school as *naiyāyika*.[17] For example, Śrīdhara's commentary on Praśastapāda's treatise, a purely Vaiśeṣika work, is named *Nyāya-kandalī;* and likewise, the *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī* is primarily a manual of the Vaiśeṣika system. It should not, however, be overlooked that the realistic structure based on the six categories belongs to the Vaiśeṣika which, for that reason, is more important than the Nyāya for a study of realism of the combined school. It is therefore appropriate that the syncretic school should be designated as the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika—a term not much in vogue in Indian tradition.

The syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school occupies a unique position in the development of Indian philosophical thought. The terminology of this school has played an important rôle in giving shape to Indian philosophical thinking in general. A preliminary study of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika manual like *Tarka-saṁgraha* or *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī* is considered essential for introduction to any other system of Indian philosophy. Nyāya phraseology, and to some extent even ideology, seem to have influenced all other schools.[18] The study of Nyāya-Vai-

16 For example, there is refutation of the Buddhist Mādhyamika theory in the Nyāya-sūtra (NS. IV. i. 37ff.).

17 For the use of the term 'nyāya' in different senses, see *infra*, III.14.

18 As an instance of the domination of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ideology over other systems, the following may be pointed out : Vijñānabhikṣu, describing the nature of the three constituents of prakṛti, sattva, etc., says: 'sattvādini dravyāni, na vaiśeṣikā guṇāḥ' (SPB. I. 61). He is perfectly right that sattva, etc., are not the gunas (qualities) of the Vaiśeṣika conception, but to say that they are dravyas is to introduce a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception into the Sāṁkhya system to which it is quite foreign.

śeṣika realism is, therefore, of great importance for the understanding of Indian philosophy.

4. THREE-FOLD CONTENTS OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SYSTEM

There are three main divisions of the subject matter of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school: (i) logic and the method of debate, (ii) physico-chemical theories relating to the four atomic elements, and (iii) metaphysics based on the six categories. It would appear that the first of these divisions, viz., logic, is the principal subject of the Nyāya, while the remaining two chiefly belong to the Vaiśeṣika school. But in the manuals of the syncretic school, whether primarily belonging to the Nyāya or to the Vaiśeṣika school, all the three topics are treated.

Of the three divisions of the subject matter, logic alone has been in vogue in the traditional study of the syncretic school since the advent of Gaṅgeśa in the twelfth century. Ignoring metaphysics, he concentrated on logic and developed very subtle conceptions and definitions of the components of inference, such as 'inferential mark' (*liṅga*), or 'invariable concomitance' (*vyāpti*). It is only this line of development of logic called *Navya-nyāya* which, to the complete exclusion of metaphysics, has been in vogue since the time of Gaṅgeśa. It is primarily for this reason that the syncretic school came to be known as the Nyāya school, and the term *Vaiśeṣika* was dropped. The second branch of the subject matter, viz., the physico-chemical theories of the Vaiśeṣika, is in the nature of early attempts at the understanding of the physical world. Such attempts are now only of historical interest to us. There may be found some valuable data relating to this branch, which have been collected and assessed by Dr. Brajendra Nath Seal in his admirable work, *The Positive Sciences of Ancient Hindus*. We are, however, concerned only with the third division of the subject matter, viz., the metaphysics of the Vaiśeṣika as developed in the syncretic school. This branch, adopting western nomenclature, may be designated as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. It is this branch with which we are concerned in our present study. It has a lasting value and can make a positive contribution to philosophy in general. This branch has generally been neglected in traditional study. The

imperative need of Indian philosophy is that the pure metaphysics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school be separated from other material with which it is mixed.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there are four means of knowledge: (i) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (ii) inference (*anumāna*), (iii) analogy (*upamāna*) and (iv) verbal testimony (*śabda*). Of these, the last three are included in logic. But the first one, viz., perception, having a direct bearing on the theory of realism, will be dealt with in this work.

5. THREE PERIODS IN THE HISTORY OF THE NYĀYA-VAISEṢIKA

Historians of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, notably Bodas and Vidyābhūṣaṇa, have divided the history of the school in different ways. The division of periods, as accepted by them, is based not on the organic growth of thought, but merely on the extraneous factor of form; it is, therefore, unscientific. The question of proper and correct division of the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika will be discussed at some length in the chapter on the historical survey of the school. At this stage, we shall only state the conclusions arrived at there.

In accordance with the recognized dictum of Indian philosophy that every object passes through three stages, (i) origin, (ii) development and (iii) decay, the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school may be divided into the following three periods:

I. The Period of Origin or the Pre-Dignāga Period. Commencing from the earliest times (which cannot be definitely fixed), this period extends to the fifth century A.D., *i.e.*, the time of the advent of Dignāga. Placed in chronological order: (i) the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, (ii) the *Nyāya-sūtra*, (iii) Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra* and (iv) Praśastapāda's commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, belong to this period. Praśastapāda occupies a unique position in the history of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. Although a preliminary structure of realistic categories was laid down by Kanāda, it is Praśastapāda who is the real author of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. The development took place through an unfolding of the implications of the basic

principles enunciated by Praśastapāda. He flourished before Dignāga, but there seems to be little doubt, as we shall see in the sequel, that he was influenced by Buddhist ideas.

II. The Period of Development or the Period of Conflict with the Dignāga School. This period, extending from the fifth to the eleventh century, is the brightest period, not only in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, but also in that of Indian philosophy in general. To this period belongs the galaxy of thinkers such as Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and Śāntarakṣita of the Buddhist camp, and Uddyotakara, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta, Udayana and Śrīdhara on the orthodox realist side. Saṅkara, the founder of Vedānta monism, also belongs to this period. It was during this period that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism developed as a result of constant conflict with the Buddhist, and it is with this period that we are chiefly concerned in our present study.

III. The Period of Decay or the Post-Buddhist Period. This period commences from the eleventh century, or rather with the advent of Gangeśa in the twelfth century. Navya-nyāya founded by Gangeśa and its further development are the principal contents of the period. Further, a large number of manuals of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school to which reference will be made in this work belong to this period. These manuals are usually regarded as belonging to the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school (*prācīna-nyāya*) by the followers of the Navya-nyāya school. This period is unproductive so far as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is concerned.

6. DIGNĀGA SCHOOL

Philosophical thought in India has flowed mainly in two divergent channels: (i) the orthodox thought which has its source in the soul-theory (*ātma-vāda*) of the Upaniṣads, and (ii) Buddhist thought which springs from the no-soul theory (*anātma-vāda*) of Buddhist scriptures. The two camps had been influencing and reacting on each other, and in the process they grew richer and richer. The process continued up to the eleventh century or so, when the Buddhists as a force disappeared from this country. And with them also disappeared their sys-

tems of philosophy. Whatever may be the assessment of the consequences of their exit in regard to other spheres of life, it was undoubtedly a misfortune for Indian philosophy. All philosophical thought after their departure became stagnant and stereotyped, and all intellectual activity was concentrated on the hair-splitting jugglery of the Navya-nyāya. Something worse happened. In the absence of the stimulus provided by Buddhist thought, even the orthodox systems began to be neglected. It was but natural, for the full significance and deeper implications of the orthodox theories could be understood and appreciated only by a comparison with the counter-theories of the Buddhist systems. Seldom has it been realized that most of the important theories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, as they stand in their latest form, have been formulated as a result of their conflict with the Dignāga school.

As a matter of fact, what the Vedānta *monism* (*advaita-vāda*) owes to Nāgārjuna, the orthodox realist schools owe to Dignāga and his successors. There is, however, a difference. While the theory of the Void (*śūnyatā*) propounded by Nāgārjuna was adapted by Śaṁkara in such a way as to fit into the Upaniṣadic theory of *Brahman*, the epistemological theories of Dignāga were neither adopted nor adapted by the realist schools. The Dignāga school acted simply as a fillip which stimulated thinkers of the realist schools and effected changes in their epistemological doctrines.

The fact of modifications in the orthodox theories as a result of the Buddhist influence has been noted by the orthodox writers themselves. Although no orthodox school would acknowledge its own indebtedness to that influence, it would freely accuse other systems of having been influenced by it or of having adopted certain theories under the impact of the Buddhist attack.[10] It may be noted that the nature of this influence is radically different in the case of the two Pūrva-

10 Śaṁkara calls the Vaiśeṣika school 'ardha-vaināśika', i.e., semi-Buddhist (Śārīraka-bhāṣya II. ii. 18). But Śaṁkara himself, in turn, was dubbed as 'pracchanna-bauddha,' i.e., a *Buddhist in disguise* (*māyā-vādam asac-chāstraṁ pracchannaṁ bauddham eva ca*—a stanza from Padma-purāṇa quoted in the introduction to the Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣya.)

Mimāṁsā schools on the one hand and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the other. The former formulated their epistemological theories with the object of effectively *defending realism* against the Buddhists. Jayanta has actually flung cavils at Kumārila that it was through sheer fear of the Buddhists that he formulated his theory of cognition not being directly perceived but only inferred.[20]

Prabhākara, as already noted, was influenced by Buddhist ideology even more. In connection with Prabhākara's repudiation of non-existence (*abhāva*) as a reality, Śrīdhara addresses him thus: "What, according to you, is the object-support (*ālambana*) of the cognition of non-existence? If nothing, then you yourself have lent support to Mahāyāna Buddhists (idealist Yogācāra school) who hold that cognitions have no object-support."[21] The obvious hint is that a realist should not adopt a theory which may be helpful to the Buddhist opponent. In connection with Prabhākara's explanation of error as being due to non-discrimination between what is perceived and what is remembered (*akhyāti-vāda*), Jayanta, addressing Prabhākara, says, "We know, you have stolen this theory from the house of Dharmakīrti."[22] The strategy of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school was different. They stuck to their position with obstinate rigidity. Never did they condescend to adapt a Buddhist view in order to rationalize their own position. Yet modifications in their doctrines did occur under the influence of the Buddhists, but they occurred only indirectly.

Briefly stated, the reactions of the orthodox realist schools to the Buddhist opposition are as follows: (i) the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adopted a rigid attitude, but new ideas appeared and changes occurred in that school in the course of the unfolding of implications of its basic theories; (ii) Kumārila adopted a more rational attitude and formulated his epistemological theo-

20 Aho bata ime kebhyo bibhyatah śrotrivāh paraṁ kim api vaiklavyam upāgatāḥ. NM. part I. p. 16. For full discussion and context, see *infra*, IX. 17.

21 Nāstīti saṁvidaḥ kim ālambanam ? Yadi na kiñcid, dattaḥ svahasto nirālambanaṁ vijñānam icchatāṁ mahāyānikānām. NK. p 229. line 1.

22 Srutam idaṁ yad atra bhavadbhir Dharmakīrti-grhād āhrtam. NM. Part 1. p. 167 (For the full context and discussion of Prabhākara's theory of error, see *infra*, XII. 14).

ries in such a way that his school could meet the Buddhist criticism and (iii) Prabhākara, being not so orthodox, borrowed freely from Buddhist ideology.

The story of the protracted conflict between the realist schools and the Dignāga school, in which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is the chief combatant on the orthodox side, is one of the most fascinating chapters of Indian philosophy. The conflict lasted for some six hundred years, from the fifth century A.D. to the eleventh.

7. THE CORNER-STONE OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA REALISM

Belief in the reality of the external world independent of its knowledge by a knower is ingrained in the unsophisticated human mind. Whatever we experience directly must have an external existence. Starting from this fundamental idea, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika laid down a basic and guiding principle that 'experience is the sole criterion of our acceptance of the reality of external objects.'[23] It should not be the function of philosophy to challenge the common experience of all mankind which accepts the reality of the external world. The function of philosophy is rather to analyse that experience and evolve a coherent system out of that analysis. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics undertakes just that analysis and bases its metaphysical structure thereon.

Our common experience presents a world consisting of separate individual objects which are called substances (*dravyas*). They appear as substrata of certain properties. Substances being the substrata of properties, the two appear in the relation of the container and the contained (*ādhārādheya-bhāva*), and therefore the two cannot be identical; they must be different *in their essence. For instance, in the case of the experience of a white cloth,* the white colour is experienced as a property which resides in the substratum, cloth; and, therefore, white colour and cloth are different in their essence. *Essential* differentiation between the substratum and its properties (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*)[24] is the corner-stone of the structure of realism. The six

23 Saṁvid eva hi bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam. NVT. p. 506. For the origin of this dictum, see *infra*, IV. 8 (v).

24 Dharmaś ca dharmiṇo vastuto bhidyate. NVT. p. 843, line 18. It means that a property in its essence is different from its substratum.

categories accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika follow as corollaries from that basic principle.

Substratum (*dharmin*) is always in the form of a substance (*dravya*). But the properties (*dharmas*) residing in a substratum are found, on further analysis, to be of various kinds. Some properties like colour appear to be of the nature of stationary attributes of their substrata. They are called qualities (*guṇas*). Others are of an evanescent nature, for example, the motion of a body. They are called movements (*karman*). We, thus, arrive at the first three categories: (i) *dravya,* (ii) *guṇa* and (iii) *karman.* Of the numerous objects of our experience, some are so similar that they are designated by a common noun, and there must therefore be something common to all individuals of a class. That common thing was regarded as the universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*), which is the fourth category of the school. In the case of atoms of the same class, differentiation of one atom from another was assumed to be due to a special property called *viśeṣa* residing in the atoms, which was later on extended to other eternal substances also.[25] *Viśeṣa* is the fifth category of the school. Of the five categories, the last four, viz., quality (*guṇa*), etc., being of the nature of properties (*dharmas*), are only found to be residing in their substratum (*dharmin*) which is the first category, i.e., substance. The universal (*sāmānya*) is held to be residing in *dravya, guṇa* and *karman.* Although the properties, *guṇa,* etc., are different in essence from *dravya,* they cannot exist as separate from, or independent of, a *dravya.* Therefore, the relation between the former and the latter cannot be an ordinary one, called 'connection' (*saṁyoga*), which obtains between the two substances that can be connected and separated at will. A sixth category, therefore, in the form of a special relation called *samavāya* was assumed. To these six categories, originally accepted by the school, a seventh one, namely, *abhāva* (non-existence) was added at a later date.

The theory of causation is held in Indian philosophy to be the

25 *Infra,* IX. 4.

pivot theory of the metaphysical structure of a system. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation also rests on the same basic principle, the differentiation between the properties and their substratum (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*). An effect like cloth, which is experienced as produced in its cause,[26] viz., the threads, is like a property of the threads which are its substrata. It would thus appear that a property is not only in the form of qualities or actions, etc., but it may also be in the form of a substance. A substratum and its property being different *in essence*, according to the above-mentioned principle, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, true to its principle, declared that the *essence* of cloth was different from that of threads. Thus the principle of differentiation between properties and their substrata (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*) is the corner-stone of the structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics.

8. COROLLARIES FROM THE BASIC NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA PRINCIPLES

It has been stated that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school did not adopt new theories in order to meet the Buddhist argument as was done by the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. Changes, however, occurred in the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics in the form of acceptance of new propositions which were forced upon the school by its opponents as corollaries of the basic stand of that system. These propositions, howsoever absurd they may appear, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school accepted with its typical boldness. Bertrand Russell says, "Whosoever wishes to be a philosopher must learn not to be frightened by absurdities."[27] This is only too true in the case of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Vācaspatimiśra meeting a Buddhist objection in connection with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the universal gives expression to the same idea when he says, "Those who know that a reality is based on proof are not frightened by such objections."[28] With regard to this process of development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories, a characteristic observation by Stcherbatsky deserves mention:

26 According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system an effect is produced not *out of* its cause, but *in* its cause.

27 *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 31.

28 Vastugatiṁ prāmāṇikāḥ *vidvāṁso nāsmād dūṣaṇād bibhyati*. NVT. p. 512.

"Driven by the powerful logic of their opponents these realists retreated into the remotest recesses of consequent realism, into its quite absurd, but logically unavoidable, consequences. They thus with perfect *bona fides* reduced realism *ad absurdum*. They demonstrated practically that whosoever resolves to remain a realist to the end, must unavoidably people the universe with such a wealth of objective realities that life in such a realistic home must become quite uncomfortable."[29]

By way of illustration of what has been said above, the following Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories may be cited:

(i) Qualities and actions were conceived as entities separate from their substratum, i.e., the substance, even by Kaṇāda; but the fact that the two are so different in their essence that they have a separate set of causes, that they are not produced simultaneously, and that the production of a substance precedes, by a moment, the production of its qualities, was the conception of a later period. It would appear that the conception of the objectivity of qualities and actions became more and more rigid in course of time. Further, the universal (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*), which were conceived at the early stage only as intellectual entities,[30] were later on held as full-fledged external objective realities. The relation (*samavāya*) by which all these attributes—qualities, actions, the universal and the particular—reside in their substrata, was also held as a separate external objective reality. And at a still later period, in accordance with the dictum that whatever is experienced must have its counterpart in the external world, even the non-existence was held as a reality, i.e., existent. Throughout the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the number of objective realities continues to be on the increase.

(ii) The limit of heaping objective realities, one upon another, is, however, reached in the later development of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory of causation. According to it, the material cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*) of an effect is in the form of its 'parts'

29 *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 48.

30 Sāmānyaṁ viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam. VS. I. ii. 3.

(*avayava*), and the effect in the form of the 'whole' (*avayavin*) of those parts, the two being different in their *essence*, and existing simultaneously side by side. For example, the threads are the cause of a piece of cloth; threads and cloth are two different substances having separate essence and separate qualities, and both of them have simultaneous existence, but they occupy the same space. The idea of two material substances occupying the *same space*, however, militates against the very conception of a material substance. It is the very nature of matter to be resistant to another matter occupying the same space. The Buddhists point out that *sapratighatva*, which means impenetrability or resistance to another matter occupying the same space, is the nature of *rūpa* (matter). But, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, not only two substances, but innumerable substances, occupy the same space. Thus the space occupied by a piece of cloth is not only occupied by its material cause, the threads, but also by the material cause of the latter, i.e., the filaments of the threads, and so on. It means that from the state of atoms up to that of a piece of cloth, there are innumerable intervening substances all occupying the same space. This aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics has never been noticed in modern expositions of that system, although it is not only implied in the basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position, but explicitly given by pioneer writers like Udyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra.[31] The miracle of numerous substances occupying the same space is sought to be explained by means of the relation called *samavāya* (inherence) which is a unique Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept. But there arose insurmountable difficulties in maintaining the theory of many substances occupying the same space, which baffled the Nyāya-Vaiśesika writers. According to that theory, all these substances occupy the same space, and yet, having separate qualities, they have their separate weights. The weight of a piece of cloth and the weight of its cause, i.e., the threads, are separate, and so of others in the series of causes. The oppo-

31 Yad idaṁ bhavatā manyate dvipalaṁ pañcapalam iti nātra kāryakārana-gurutve avadhāryate kintv-ācaramād ā ca paramānor-dravyasamāhāra unmīyate. NV. p. 494. line 7. Commenting on this, Vācaspatimiśra says: Dravya-samāhāra iti kārya-kārana-dravya-samāhārah, mṛtkaṇamṛccūrṇa-śarkarā-kapāla-kumbha-samāhāra ity arthah. NVT. p. 494. line 22.

nents pointed out that, as soon as a new effect-substance is produced in a material cause, the weight should increase inasmuch as there are now two substances having separate weights. This predicament the Nyāya-Vaiśesika thinkers tried to meet in divers ways, but none proved satisfactory.[32]

(iii) The differentiation of qualities from their substratum, i.e., the substance, led the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school to many queer corollaries. If the colour of a jar is an entity different from the jar, the causes of the two should also be different. The threads, being the material cause (*samavāyi-kārana*) of the cloth could not be the material cause of its colour as well. Inasmuch as the colour of a cloth resides in it by *samavāya* relation, the cloth is itself conceived as the *samavāyi-kārana* of its colour, which implies that the cloth, being the cause, should precede its effect, i.e., colour, and for the matter of that, all other qualities. It means that a substance and its qualities are not produced simultaneously. The Nyāya-Vaiśesika school, undeterred by the obvious absurdity of the proposition, actually held that all effect-substances, in the first moment of their origin, were devoid of all qualities. It was pointed out by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika scholiasts that no practical difficulty would arise by holding that view because substances were devoid of qualities only *for a moment*, and their comprehension at the very first moment of their origin was not possible in any way. But the question is whether a substance devoid of all qualities can even be conceived.

If at the time of their origin substances had to be taken as devoid of qualities for one moment, by the same logic of differentiation of substances and their qualities (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*), the Nyāya-Vaiśesika was driven to the position that at the time of the destruction of substances also, the qualities exist for one moment without their substances. The destruction of a cause, e.g., of cloth, would be the cause of the destruction of its effect, e.g., the colour of cloth. The destruction of colour, being an effect, would come about one moment later than its cause, i.e., the destruction of cloth; it means that the colour of cloth would exist for one moment even when the cloth has already been destroyed.

32 *Infra*, V. 2.

(iv) One more corollary to which the Nyāya-Vaiśesika was driven by the force of its logic may be noticed here. It was held by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika that whenever a new constituent part was added to or subtracted from an effect-substance, the latter was destroyed, and a new substance was produced in its place. In the case of an embryo, Srīdhara declared that inasmuch as it was growing with additions of new parts, it was being destroyed, and a new one was being produced in its place every day.[33] Obviously, we have to say *every moment* in place of *every day*, because the process of growth goes on constantly. And this would apply not only to an embryo, but to all organic things which are subject to growth and decay.

Furthermore, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory, colour, etc., are qualities of such a nature that they last as long as the substance in which they reside lasts.[34] It implies that whenever there is any change in the qualities, colour, etc., the substance itself is destroyed, and a new one comes into existence in its place. It was for this reason that the Vaiśesika school maintains the theory of *pīlupāka* according to which a jar, when it is baked and changes its colour from blue to red, is destroyed and a new one comes in its place. It would imply that even in the case of an inorganic substance, whenever there is any change in its qualities, it is destroyed and a new substance appears. It is clear that, owing to the effect of heat or other factors, a change in colour and other qualities is constantly going on in the case of even inorganic substances. Of course, the change becomes apparent only after some time, but, as a matter of fact, the change has been going on constantly in an imperceptible manner. Secondly, even inorganic substances, in course of time, suffer loss of weight of their particles, howsoever infinitesimal it may be. This means the constant destruction of every existing substance and the substitution of a new one in its place, not only because some of its component parts have been subtracted, but also because a quality, i.e., weight (*gurutva*) which is co-existent with the substance has changed.

In the case of inorganic substances, the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school may contend that the change is not constant but

33 NK. p. 34, lines 1-4. Also *infra*, VI. 31 and VII. 14.

34 Yāvad-dravya-bhāvitvam. PP. p. 103.

only occasional. In organic substances, however, the change is going on every moment, and it is, therefore, evident that all organic substances are being destroyed and replaced by new ones every moment, and the notion of their identity is only an illusion. Similarly, in the case of inorganic substances also, granted that the changes have been only occasional, it will have to be admitted that they have been destroyed and replaced by new ones many a time, and the recognition of their identity is, therefore, a mere illusion. The main object of the scholiasts of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika was to demolish the Buddhist theory of evanescence (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-vāda*), and their main argument was the direct recognition of the continuous identity of objects. Now, it transpires from the corollaries which directly flow from the basic principle formulated by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika itself that the so-called stable substances are in fact constantly dying and being replaced by new ones, and the recognition of their identity is a mere illusion.

It would thus appear that the basic dicta of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika which started with common sense as their main plank, when worked out to their ultimate logical consequences, lead in many cases either to conclusions which are outrageous to common sense, or to the establishment of the theories of their opponents. Fuller implications of the basic principles of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were not worked out, because the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics came to an abrupt end with the disappearance of their chief opponents, the Buddhists, from the scene.

9. UNTENABILITY OF THE NYĀYA-VAISESIKA REALISM

Of the principal scholiasts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Jayanta is the only one who adheres to realism to the end, and is never swayed by the idealist systems. Of Vācaspatimiśra, who has given us perhaps the most authoritative exposition of all the principal systems of orthodox philosophy, it may be said that he becomes a faithful adherent of any one system at the time he expounds it. He realised like a true philosopher that there was no finality in philosophical thinking, and any one of the philosophical approaches might be most appealing in a particular setting. But other thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika

school, especially Srīdhara, who is second to none in upholding the realism of that school, could not resist the influence of the idealist systems.

In one of his introductory stanzas, Srīdhara offers salutation to the Divinity 'which has eternal consciousness as its nature',[35] or which is 'one without a second'[36]—pure Vedāntic ideas which should have no place in a treatise of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Speaking of the nature of self-realization which brings final emancipation, he quotes a verse from the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* according to which "true knowledge of self consists in realizing that the soul is free from all adjuncts of knowing, feeling and acting."[37] Obviously, this is in contradiction to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory. In the same context he declares, "One who thinks that the soul is an actor or enjoyer is ignorant,"[38]—again a Sāṁkhya idea which is opposed to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory. In the context of the means of freeing oneself from the feelings of attachment and hatred, he approvingly quotes a verse of Dharmakīrti which says, "If the theory of the soul (self) is accepted, there arises the idea of the *other*, and differentiation between the self and others causes attachment and hatred."[39] This is again a denial of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory of the soul, and that too by falling into the trap of the Buddhist, the hated enemy. Similarly, Udayana, the great champion of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika, in the course of his refutation of the Buddhist Yogācāra theory of idealism, declares that if somehow Yogācāra succeeds in proving that difference in cognition is not caused by the difference in the cognized objects, it will only lead to the establishment of the powerful Vedānta theory.[40] He forgets that the latter theory is as much damaging to the doctrine of realism as that of the Yogācāra.

35 Nitya-vijñāna-vigraham. NK. p. 1.

36 Kam api nirmalam advitīyam. Ibid.

37 Evaṁ tattvābhyāsān nāsmi na me nāham ity apariśeṣam.
Aviparyayād viśuddhaṁ kevalam utpadyate jñānam. SK. verse 64, quoted in NK. p. 279.

38 Yah kartā-bhoktā 'stity ātmānam abhimanyate.....so avidvān. NK. p. 281.

39 Ātmani sati para-saṁjñā sva-para-vibhāgāt parigraha-dvesau. PV. 1. 221, quoted in NK. p. 279.

40 Na grāhya-bhedam avadhūya dhiyo 'sti vrttis
Tad-bādhane balini vedanaye jayaśrīḥ. ATV. p. 529.

There is a reason why the Nyāya-Vaiśesika scholiasts felt shy of their realism, especially in the context of the theory of emancipation. According to the idealist systems of the Vedānta as well as of the Buddhists, it is held that our mundane state is due to ignorance, a kind of primordial error; and emancipation comes about when that error is set aside by true knowledge. The idea is so deeply rooted in the Indian mind that even a realist system, where it should have no place, succumbed to it. Such a theory cannot fit in at all with the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics according to which the world, exactly in the form it is experienced, is real, and all attributes like knowledge, desire, hatred, effort, etc., pertain to the soul as a matter of reality. But that theory of emancipation seems to have been adopted in the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school from the earliest times, for it is found in the *Nyāya-sūtra* and its commentary by Vātsyāyana.

10. THE NYĀYA-VAIŚESIKA SCHOOL AFTER GAṄGEŚA

Gangeśa, who belongs to the closing part of the twelfth century, must have realized, more than Srīdhara and Udayana, the futility of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics and the theory of realism. He turned the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school from metaphysics to logic and epistemology exclusively. The original contribution of that school is in the form of subtle, sharp and exquisitely minute distinctions in the connotations of logical terms. Gañgeśa was the pioneer of a unique system of logical subtleties without a parallel in any other system of logic. Gangeśa must be hailed as one of the greatest intellectual giants of our country. He is the hero of the post-Buddhist period of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school. He has practically dominated the intellectual activity of that school from his time up to date, i.e., for more than seven centuries. Dozens of commentaries and sub-commentaries were written on his work, *Tattva-cintāmani*, making the methodology of the school subtler and subtler. There is hardly any example of an intellectual activity protracted for such a long period but devoid of any positive contents. It is nothing but intellectual gymnastics; it is the typical product of a decadent people who still retained their intellectual acumen but were spiritually devitalized.

The new turn given to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika by Gangeśa put

an end to the development of the metaphysical theories of that school. So far as pure metaphysics is concerned, there is hardly any significant contribution of the post-Buddhist period to the thought of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika. With the exit of the Buddhist opponents, there was left no interest in disputation on Realism *versus* Idealism. The results of the previous period of development were crystallized and stereotyped in the numerous manuals of the school which continued to be studied as an introduction to the study of the Navya-nyāya. It seems, however, that some interest in the old works lingered up to the seventeenth century. Samkaramiśra wrote a commentary on the *Vaiśesika-sūtras* in the fifteenth century,[41] and Viśvanātha on the *Nyāya-sūtras* in the seventeenth. There is, however, no evidence to show that the significance of the theories of the Nyāya Vaiśesika metaphysics, which had developed in the conflict with the Buddhists, was appreciated during this period. The Buddhists, of course, totally disappeared not only from the physical environment, but also from the metaphysical arena. The writers of the post-Buddhist period of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school seem to have had no knowledge of the Buddhist systems, especially of the Dignāga school. It was, therefore, impossible for them to appreciate the full implications and intricacies of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics. A feature of the third period which clearly marks it off from the second period is that the principal adversary in all the disputations is no more the Buddhist, but the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā school, especially the Prabhākara school. In the second period, which was a period of conflict with the Buddhists, the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā school was regarded as an allied school.[42]

In the eighteenth century, however, all the works of the pre-Gaṅgeśa period seem to have gone out of vogue in traditional study, as evidenced by the despatches sent during that century by Portuguese Jesuits who were collecting manuscripts for the King's Library at Paris. Apart from the works of the Navya-nyāya school, most of the ancient works of Indian philosophy, especially those of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school, were not easily available, so much so that even the *Nyāya-sūtra* of

41 This is the oldest extant commentary on Kanāda's Vaiśesika-sūtra. Older Vaiśesika commentaries are all on Praśastapāda's commentary.

42 As 'śiva-tantra', NVT. p. 85.

Gotama could not be traced in that period.[43] The important Nyāya-Vaiśesika treatises have now been brought to light as a result of the efforts of the western scholars of Sanskrit during the second part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth.

11. DIGNĀGA SCHOOL AND THE ORTHODOX SCHOOLS

Indian philosophy is basically divided in two camps: the Vedic orthodox camp owing its inspiration to the soul-theory (*ātma-vāda*) of the Upanisads, and the heterodox Buddhist camp owing its inspiration to the no-soul-theory (*anātma-vāda*) of the Buddhist scriptures. Acceptance or denial of the soul being the line of demarcation, Jaina philosophy, although heterodox, should rather go with the former at least so far as it subscribes to the soul-theory. Although both camps had their primary inspiration from the authority of their respective scriptures, the orthodox systems had always an authoritarian bias, while the Buddhist systems a rational one. For that reason, it was the Buddhist thinkers like Nāgārjuna, Dignāga and a host of others who made a bolder and more original contribution to Indian philosophical thought, which, as already noted, directly or indirectly, influenced the orthodox systems too. With the exit of the Buddhists, their philosophy also disappeared from India. It was preserved in far-off lands, especially in China and Tibet, but it could not retain its vitality and vigour in an alien soil. Orthodox and Buddhist philosophical systems had grown side by side, reacting upon and influencing each other. One cannot be fully understood and appreciated without the background of the other. Hence it is that, although the treatises of Buddhist philosophy were current in China and Tibet, their full significance was hardly grasped in those countries. And, although there was an uninterrupted tradition of the orthodox systems in India, the background of many of their tenets was lost. This is even more

43 One of the missionaries wrote in these despatches, "The founder of the Nyāya School..... is called Gautama .....Whatever research I made, I could not get his principles or aphorisms." He further wrote, "Gangeśa's dialectics have caused people to forget all the other parts of philosophy and to neglect the best authors, who are almost unknown since the decadence of letters under the Mogols." HII . p. 488-9.

true of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school. Since the renaissance of Sanskrit towards the close of the eighteenth century, Buddhist works have been coming to light and have been placed against their original background of orthodox philosophy. When Buddhist philosophy is reconstructed, and when as a result thereof the full significance of the orthodox systems is also grasped, Indian philosophy will come into its own and will regain its rightful place in the philosophical thought of the world.

Although many important treatises of different schools of Buddhist philosophy have recently been published in India and abroad, information regarding the Buddhist systems is usually based on the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*, a compendium of Indian philosophy. This work belongs to the fourteenth century when Buddhist philosophy was already forgotten. The account of the Buddhist systems of philosophy as contained in that work is imperfect, and in many instances even erroneous. So far as the Dignāga school is concerned, its account in that work is wholly confused and mixed up with that of other schools.[44] The Dignāga school is not only the culmination of the development of Buddhist philosophical thought, but it is also the *sine qua non* for the understanding of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika. In the post-Buddhist period of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika, headed by Gangeśa and his Navya-nyāya, the metaphysics of the Dignāga school was entirely forgotten, and, as a natural consequence thereof, the pioneer works of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika itself were not properly understood and appreciated.

12. STCHERBATSKY AS AN EXPOSITOR OF THE DIGNĀGA SCHOOL

Fortunately, the hidden treasures of the Dignāga school have been laid bare in a monumental work, entitled *Buddhist Logic*,[45] by the late professor Stcherbatsky of Leningrad. His contribution to the elucidation of other systems of Buddhist philosophy is by no means inconspicuous,[46] but *Buddhist Logic* is his

44 *Infra*, III. 6.

45 *Buddhist Logic* in two volumes by Th. Stcherbatsky published in Bibliotheca Buddhica Series of Leningrad, (No. XXVI, vol. I. 1932 and vol. II. 1930).

46 In his short and pithy treatise, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the word Dharma* (published by The Royal Asiatic

principal work and it is a masterly exposition of the Dignāga school. As the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics is bound up with the Dignāga school, Stcherbatsky's work, throwing an illuminating and critical sidelight on the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system, has opened a new avenue for its understanding. The present writer acknowledges his indebtedness to Stcherbatsky without whose pioneer work this study of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system could not have been undertaken. According to several competent judges, his *Buddhist Logic* is the greatest work on Indian philosophy in recent years. It is unfortunate that this great work has not yet received the attention it deserves from students of Indian philosophy. I have seldom come across a reference to this work in books, theses or articles on Indian philosophy. In 1942, on the occasion of its Silver Jubilee celebration, the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute published an account of the *Progress of Indic Studies* during the preceding quarter century.[47] In the section dealing with Indian philosophy, many books, good and bad, have been noticed. Some of the books of Stcherbatsky also are mentioned. But his principal work, *Buddhist Logic*, is not referred to even by name, although it appeared during the period covered. His English translation of the *Nyāya-bindu* of Dharmakīrti and its commentary by Dharmottara, together with his masterly explanatory notes (included in *Buddhist Logic*, vol. II), is another great aid to the study of the Dignāga school. He has also critically edited the *Nyāya-bindu* (published in Russia), but unfortunately that edition is not available. There is evidence of Stcherbatsky's having studied and explored the principal works of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school like *Nyāya-vārtika*, *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭikā*, *Nyāya-mañjarī* and *Nyāya-kandalī*. These works have not received the same close attention at the hands of any other scholar. There is little doubt that the study of these works must have helped Stcherbatsky in

Society, London, 1923), he has given the quintessence of Vasubandhu's famous work, Abhidharma-kośa, and in his work, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna (published by the Academy of Science of the USSR, Leningrad, 1927), he has dealt with the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna.

47 *Progress of Indic Studies*, (1917-1942), Government Oriental Series, class B, No. 8. Bhandarkar Research Institute, Poona.

understanding the philosophy of the Dignāga school.[48] The study of these Nyāya-Vaiśesika works is as important for the understanding of the Dignāga school as that of the works of that school itself. While Stcherbatsky is the principal expositor of the Dignāga school, there have been some other attempts also for the study of that school.[49]

13. PRESENT CONDITION OF THE NYĀYA-VAISESIKA STUDIES

There has been in a sense an uninterrupted tradition of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school up to the present time. Although, as already stated, interest in the metaphysics of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school ceased since the advent of Gangeśa, the dialectics of the Navya-nyāya school founded by him grew within the framework of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. A basic study of a manual of the metaphysics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, like *Tarka-samgraha* or *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī*, has always been in vogue in the traditional study of the Navya-nyāya school. The manuals contain only bare outlines of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics. They are studied without much insight into the metaphysical structure of the school, or without adequate understanding of the implications of its theories. No doubt there has been an uninterrupted tradition of the school, but it has been a blind tradition. It could not have been otherwise, because when Buddhist philosophy, especially of the Dignāga school, was forgotten, interest in the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics which had developed in conflict with the Dignāga school could not be sustained. A drama from which all incidents relating to the counter-hero (*prati-nāyaka*) have been expunged is bound to be insipid. The same has been the fate of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school in its traditional study. The pioneer works of the school were

48 For fuller account of Stcherbatsky's work on Buddhist philosophy, see an article on *Stcherbatsky's Contribution to Indian Philosophy* by the present writer published in the *Modern Review*, Calcutta, Feb. 1953.

49 An important work dealing with the tenets of the Dignāga school is *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* by Dr. Satkari Mukherjee. Late Acharya Narendradeva has made an important contribution by writing a work on Buddhist philosophy in Hindi which includes a chapter on the Dignāga school. Pramāna-samuccaya of Dignāga (only one chapter) has been edited by H.R.R. Iyengar, Mysore, 1930. Dharmakīrti's Pramāna-vārtika with Manorathanandin's commentary has been edited by Rahula Sankrityayana.

neglected more and more during the Gaṅgeśa period, till in the eighteenth century, as already stated, those works, including even the Sūtras, went underground and were nowhere available.

Although the pioneer works of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school have now been published, they continue even now to be outside the scope of studies at the orthodox centres like Banaras. The philosophical portions of the works of Kumārila and Prabhākara have also suffered the same fate. In the first place, these works have not been properly edited, and their interpretation, already difficult on account of the break in tradition, is rendered all the more difficult, owing to mistakes occurring on every page of the printed text. Orthodox pandits, though conversant with the philosophical language of these works, cannot make headway in their study owing to complete ignorance of the system of the Dignāga school. There is not a single scholar to be met with in Banaras or elsewhere who can claim to have mastered the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works like *Nyāya-vārtika, Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatikā, Nyāya-mañjarī* or *Nyāya-kandalī* or the philosophical portions of the works of the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā school like *Sloka-vārtika* or *Brhatī*. There has, therefore, been an uninterrupted tradition of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika only in the sense that the school continues in the form of dialectics of the Navya-nyāya. But the tradition has been wholly broken so far as the metaphysics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as developed in the works referred to above, is concerned.

Besides the orthodox pandits, there are those who study the systems of Indian philosophy on modern critical lines. Some good progress has been made so far as other systems of orthodox philosophy are concerned. But the condition of the study of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school, even in this circle, is as deplorable as in the orthodox circle. Lack of acquaintance with the Dignāga school is as noticeable here as among orthodox scholars. Apart from the expositions of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system in the histories of Indian philosophy which, being bare outlines of the system, cannot be expected to be critical or deep, there have appeared some treatises exclusively dealing with the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school. It is not proposed to examine these works here, but a few words regarding their scope and nature are necessary in this context.

The earliest work dealing with the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school is that of Suali,[50] an Italian scholar. That work being in Italian, I am not in a position to assess its value. Another work written in English by a Dutch scholar, Faddegon, is *The Vaiśesika System*.[51] He studies the system by comparing the accounts of its various theories as found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* and *Nyāya-kandalī*. He has collected a good deal of material from these works, but he does not trace the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories, nor does he give a critical exposition of the structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics. He has translated some important portions of the *Nyāya-kandalī*. The translation is, however, unintelligible and inaccurate at some places.

Two other works dealing with the Nyāya-Vaiśesika by two scholars of the Calcutta University have appeared recently. One of them dealing principally with the epistemology of the school is *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge* by Dr. S. C. Chatterjee.[52] The work is not confined to the Nyāya system; it deals with the latest form of the theories which developed in the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. This work, as a lucid exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology, is indeed admirable and supersedes all the previous works on the subject. But the problems have been studied without reference to the Dignāga system. Another work, which seems to have been conceived as complementary to the former, is *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśesika Metaphysics* by Dr. Sadananda Bhaduri.[53] It deals chiefly with the material aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; it does not deal at all with metaphysics proper. So far as the pure metaphysics of the school is concerned, it has been just touched upon only in the last two chapters on *Whole and Part*, and *Causality*. Theories relating to these topics were developed in conflict with the counter-theories of the Dignāga school. The author does make some stray references to Buddhist theories, but when the structure of the Dig-

50 Suali. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (In Italian).

51 Dr. B. Faddegon: The Vaiśesikà System (Amsterdom 1918).

52 S. C. Chatterjee: The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge. (Calcutta University, 1939).

53 Sadananda Bhaduri: Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics. (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona 1947).

nāga system as a whole is not grasped, there occur errors not only in these references to Buddhist theories, but in the understanding of the corresponding theories of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika itself. This work is not free from such errors.[54] Of course, it is to be greatly commended as a neat and lucid exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika materialistic theories. Some other works on the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system have also appeared. It is not necessary to notice them all.

It would thus be clear that the study of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system by the modern type of scholars suffers as much from the

54 Dealing with the Buddhist theory that *extendedness* does not belong to atoms, but is only an attribute of the cognition of a large number of atoms (pratibhāsa-dharma), the author, in the first instance, falls into the error of rendering the term pratibhāsa-dharma as 'the characteristic of the presented sense-datum, or sensum', and this leads him to a palpably wrong conclusion that "an extended body, according to the Buddhist, is absolutely independent of a percipient." (Nyāya-Vaiśesika Metaphysics, p. 252.) In the treatise of the Buddhist scholar Pandita Aśoka to which the author refers (SBNT. p. 79), there is nothing to warrant this mistaken notion. The author seems to be under the impression that the term 'pratibhāsa' used by the Buddhist scholar means 'sense-datum or sensum' which is a wrong notion. That term in the context means 'understanding'. The author then proceeds to refute the Buddhist on the assumption that according to him *'extension is an objectively real* quality of an assemblage of atoms.' (Ibid. p. 254.) He indicates (p. 255) by referring to NVT. II. i. 36 (Lazarus edition p. 275) that his refutation of that assumed Buddhist theory is based on Vācaspatimiśra, which is wholly unwarranted. The latter never attributes that wrong view to the Buddhist.

Elsewhere, after himself giving the correct Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that the perception of many trees as *one* forest is false (p. 256), he gives a footnote to the effect that "to guard against a possible misunderstanding it must be stated that the Naiyāyika realist believes that a forest is a distinct entity. According to him, therefore, the perception of unity in a forest is veridical." (p. 256). This is all unwarranted and wrong. Every student of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system knows that according to that school a forest is not a 'whole' (avayavin) of the trees, but only an aggregate (samudāya) which is not different from trees, and hence the perception of unity in a forest can never be veridical. Again, with regard to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory of causality, the author says, "Causality is held to be a categorical and universal feature of reality. There cannot be anything which is real and yet incapable of exercising causal function in some way or other." (p. 271). Now, obviously this is the Buddhist idea, and not that of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system which holds reality as independent of causality. (See *infra*, V. 10.)

lack of understanding of the Dignāga system as that of the old orthodox Pandits. There is an additional disadvantage in the case of the former that they are not usually conversant with the abstruse technicality and phraseology of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system.

There is yet another difficulty. The doctrines of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika underwent considerable changes at different stages of the development of the system. The modern expositions of the system do not, as a rule, mention the period with which they are concerned. Ordinarily, they may be supposed to present the theories of the school in the latest form of its development, but it appears that in some of these expositions the views accepted at an earlier stage have been confused with those of a later stage without a specific mention of their relative periods; and thus, some of these expositions are a confused hotchpotch of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics of different periods.[55]

14. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NYĀYA-VAISESIKA THEORIES MISSED

It has been pointed out that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika studies in both the circles, that of traditional orthodox pandits and that of modern scholars, have been pursued without reference to the

55 The exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school by Dr. Dasgupta in his *History of Indian Philosophy* illustrates this point clearly. He begins his exposition as based on the Vaiśesika-sūtras and the Nyāya-sūtras, but then he mixes with them the theories that developed at a later period, not realizing that the two belong to two different periods, and they cannot make a coherent whole. Dealing with viśesa, he says, "through viśesa things are perceived as diverse" (Dasgupta: *History of Indian Philosophy, p. 318)*. This is the idea of Vaiśeṣika-sūtras where sāmānya and viśesa are regarded as co-relative, i.e., as generality and particularity. (*Infra*, IX. 3.) The author in the same breath proceeds to describe viśesa as the cause of differentiation in atoms, which is a later idea; and then in order to reconcile the two, he jumps to a wrong proposition that difference in the sensations of the two objects is "due to the existence of some specific differences amongst the atoms themselves". (Ibid.) Now this is not at all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika idea. (See *infra*, IX. 4.) Elsewhere in the course of the same exposition he says: 'Dravya is thus defined as that which has the characteristic of a dravya (dravyatva)'. (Ibid. p. 312.) But this is the view which developed in the later post-Buddhist period of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school; it does not belong to the Vaiśesika-sūtras with which the author is obviously dealing.

(iii) The Buddhist theory regarding restriction of the sphere of pramāṇas (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*) is opposed by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which holds the theory of intermixture of pramāṇas (*pramāṇa-samplava*). According to the latter theory the same object can be grasped by any of the *pramāṇas* under different conditions. These theories are usually mentioned in expositions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, but they can be fully understood only against the background of the basic structure of the metaphysics of the Dignāga system.[60]

(iv) The theory of the validity of determinate perception was maintained, against the Buddhist one, with great tenacity by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers.[61] Its significance for the theory of realism, and the fact that the acceptance of the objective reality of the universal (*sāmānya*) is the basis of the validity of determinate perception, are seldom explained in these expositions.

(v) The Nyāya-Vaiśesika holds that an external object is comprehended by senses only when they come in contact with the object. For instance, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the sense of vision actually goes out in the form of a ray to its object, and by reaching and contacting the object, our visual sense comprehends it.[62] The Buddhist refutes this view. There has been a lot of argument on this point between the two schools. The significance of this controversy can only be understood in the context of the theory of realism *versus* idealism, as we shall see.

(vi) The explanation of the psychological phenomenon of recognition, as expounded in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises, and the development of the theory of Transcendental Contact, (called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* in the latter period) can be understood only in the light of the controversy on the theory of evanescence. The process of the development of the theory of *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* can actually be seen at work in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises of the period of the conflict with the Dignāga school.[63]

60 *Infra*, XII. 2.

61 See for instance the remarks of Jayanta: Naiyāyikānāṁ ca savikalpa-pratyakṣamayāḥ prāṇāḥ. NM. Part I. p. 81. See also: Jivanty amī savikalpaka-prāmāṇya-vādinaḥ. NM. Part II. p. 32.

62 Indriyāṇāṁ vastu-prāpya-prakāśa-kāritva-niyamaḥ.

63 See *infra*, XII. 12.

Instances of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories, which developed in conflict with the Dignāga school, and whose significance is missed in the study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, may be multiplied.

15. THE AIM AND SCOPE OF THE PRESENT WORK

It has been made clear in the foregoing pages that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system can be studied and appreciated only in the context of its conflict with the Dignāga system. A picture of the nature of that conflict and the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories as a result thereof is presented in the principal works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Dignāga school, and also in the philosophical parts of the treatises of the two Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā schools. After the advent of Gaṅgeśa towards the close of the twelfth century, not only did the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, so far as its metaphysics is concerned, cease to develop further, but even the study of the works of the old masters was given up.

In this situation Stcherbatsky's exposition of the Dignāga system has thrown a most welcome sidelight on the problems of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, and has paved the way for a critical and comparative study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The present work may be regarded as a continuation or a complement of Stcherbatsky's work. His principal concern is the exposition of Buddhist logic and epistemology for which he has utilized not only the works of the Dignāga school, but has freely drawn on the principal Nyāya-Vaiśesika works. The object of the present work is a comparative study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system with the metaphysics of the Dignāga school. All the principal Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works have been thoroughly ransacked for a fuller exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system as it developed in conflict with the Dignāga school.

It may be said that the present study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system is the first of its kind in the sense that it is a comparative study of that system with that of Dignāga. It is also historical in that it traces the development of some of the principal Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tenets which chiefly took place in conflict between the two schools. The principal theories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, their beginning as found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, their initial development as represented chiefly by Praśastapāda, their conflict with the Buddhist epistemology as found

in the principal Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, as well as the works of the Dignāga school, and the form in which those theories finally emerged as a result of that conflict—all these aspects of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system have been presented in a comprehensive form. It is not only a reconstruction of the history of the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics, but it also throws a sidelight on the other systems of Indian philosophy, especially on the epistemology of the Dignāga school.

A hundred battles have been fought between Realism and Idealism at different times and in different places, and in divergent contexts, but the conflict between the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school and the Dignāga school protracted roughly over a period of six hundred years is a unique and fascinating chapter in the history of philosophy. The battle between Realism and Idealism in India was principally fought in the context of three topics (i) the theory of substance which implies the theory of *avayavin* (the 'whole' as different from its parts), (ii) the theory of *sāmānya* (universal) and (iii) epistemology principally based on these two theories. On these topics the thinkers of the two camps practically exhausted all the avenues in which human mind could possibly move. A complete picture of that conflict, besides being a reconstruction of a hidden chapter of Indian philosophy, should make no mean contribution to the theory of realism and epistemology in general.

Chapter II

REALISM VERSUS IDEALISM

1. THEORIES REGARDING THE NATURE OF REALITY

The foremost problem of philosophy is to enquire into the nature of reality. Broadly speaking, there are two approaches in philosophy fundamentally opposed to each other which are known as Realism and Idealism. Realism holds that the external world is real and exists in the form in which it is experienced, and that it exists in the same form independently of our experience. Idealism, on the other hand, holds that the external world as such does not exist independently of our knowledge, the objects of our experience are mind-dependent. In between these two doctrines, there are various theories, or rather various approaches to this problem.

Some of the principal theories with regard to the Nature of Reality are stated below:

(i) *Realism.* Realism holds, as already noted, that the mind apprehends an external object which exists irrespective of its being apprehended by the mind. It is not created in any way by the mind, nor is it modified by its act of perceiving. It is common to all perceiving minds. It exists even when it is not perceived. Moreover, the perception of it is direct and immediate, and not through the mediacy of an idea or *sensum* as the

representationist holds. Of the Indian systems of thought, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the two Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā schools, the Sāmkhya, the Mādhva and the Jaina represent the realistic approach. The Vaibhāṣika is also—although wrongly—supposed to hold this theory.[1] There are, of course, differences in the details of these theories regarding the nature of reality and its perception. For example, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, being a thorough-going realist, holds perception to be absolutely direct, whereas, according to the Sāṁkhya view, it is through the agency of a mental image called *buddhi-vṛtti*. But it may be noted that the Sāmkhya view has nothing in common with the representationist theory of western philosophy, for it is never suggested in the Sāṁkhya that the mind apprehends only a mental state (*buddhi-vṛtti*), and not the external object.

(ii) *Materialism.* Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that even the subject, the soul, is an *object* of knowledge, yet it emphatically maintains that the soul is not material (*bhautika*), but a non-material eternal substance having knowledge as its quality. Knowledge is not its essence. The soul, in its essential nature, is 'not-knowledge' (*ajñāna*)[2]. Knowledge, however, is a quality of the soul, and not the product of matter. Materialism, on the other hand, asserts that knowledge is as much an attribute of matter, as smell, taste, colour, or touch are. The knower as well as knowledge are therefore both material. According to the materialist, our physical body itself is the knower. The knower is not, as usually held by philosophers, something non-material and different from the body. Karl Marx, one of the latest exponents of the theory of materialism says: "The material, sensuously perceptible world, to which we ourselves belong is the only reality.... Our consciousness and thinking, however, supra-sensuous they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ, the brain. Matter is not a product of consciousness, but consciousness itself is merely the highest pro-

[1] See *infra*, III. 6.

[2] Although writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school do not hold soul to be ajñāna, it is really so according to their theory. Their critics like the Vedāntins often refer to the ātman of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception as ajñāna. Cf. Prābhākara-tārkikau . ajñānam ātmeti vadataḥ. Vedāntasāra, section 19.

duct of matter."[3] In Indian philosophy a similar theory was held by the Cārvāka school, also called the Lokāyata, i.e., based on the view of common people. This doctrine, being advocated by modern scientists and placed on a scientific basis, assumed great importance in the nineteenth century.

(iii) *Representationism.* This is a form of realism which stands midway between realism and idealism and paves the way for subjective idealism. According to this theory, external objects are not apprehended directly and immediately, but through the cognitions of these objects. The objects transfer their forms to their cognitions, and the cognitions, having thus acquired the forms of external objects, become their representatives. We have thus a representative perception of objects, and not a direct one. Hence the theory is called representationism. External objects, not being perceived directly, are only inferred from their cognitions to which they impart their forms. Orthodox Indian writers, in their compendia of philosophical systems, have ascribed this theory to the Buddhist Sautrāntika school.[4] According to that theory, "an object coming in contact with the sense produces a cognition to which the object transfers its form, and it is from this form of the object transferred to the cognition that the existence of that object is inferred."[5] This doctrine is called *nityānumeya-bāhyārtha-vāda,*[6] i.e., the theory which holds that external objects are only inferable. It is also called *sākāra-jñāna-vāda,*[7] i.e., the theory that cognitions have forms; and that it is the forms of cognitions which are directly apprehended in our perception. A cognition is thus both perception (*grāhaka*) and percept (*grāhya*).[8] It may be noted that no school of Indian thought

3 Karl Marx: *Selected Works*, Russian edition, Vol. I. p. 332, quoted in J. Stalin: Dialectical and Historical Materialism, p. 12.

4 The ascription of this view to the Sautrāntika school does not seem to be warranted by any original Buddhist authority. This point is further discussed in the next chap. III. 10-11.

5 Indriya-sannikṛṣṭasya viṣayasya utpādye jñāne svākāra-samarpakatayā samarpitena cākārena tasyārthasyānumeyatopapatteh. SDS. p. 38.

6 Cf. *Nityānumeya-bāhyārthavādi jñānam kva dṛṣṭavān.* NM. Part I. p. 15.

7 Arthas tu, sākāra-jñāna-vādino na samasty eva. NM. Part I. p. 15. Also, Sākāra-jñāna-vāda-nirākaraṇāt. TR. p. 79.

8 Cf. *Ekam eva sākāram jñānam grāhyam grāhakam ca.* NM. Part I. p. 15.

except the Sautrāntika (to which the theory is perhaps wrongly ascribed) subscribes to the theory of representationism. Even the Vedānta, according to which immediate apprehension (*aparoksānubhūti*) is possible only of the self, holds that the perception of an external object is direct and not representative. Of course, perception of an external object, according to the Vedānta theory, may not be direct and immediate in the same way as that of the self.

In western thought Locke is the chief advocate of the theory of representationism. His view may be succinctly stated in his own words:

"Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own immediate ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only conversant about them."[9] And further, "The mind knows not things immediately but only by the intervention of ideas it has of them".[10]

(iv) *Subjective Idealism.* Representationism as already observed leads inevitably to subjective idealism. Once it is conceded that in our perception of the external world, we are directly concerned only with our ideas, we lose touch with the external world, and its reality is jeopardised. If the form, size, shape and colour, which our common sense attributes to external objects, belong to our ideas or cognitions, as the *sākāra-jñāna-vāda* (the theory that cognitions have forms) holds, then the inference of the existence of external objects from these cognitions would be a far cry. Jayanta points out that for a *sākāra-jñāna-vādin*, it is not possible to prove the existence of external objects. They can neither be perceived nor inferred.[11] Representationism thus necessarily leads to the theory of subjective idealism. Subjective idealism consists in the assertion that there are no other things than thinking beings; that the things we believe ourselves to perceive are only the ideas of thinking beings. In short, the theory holds that there is no objective world independent of the perceiving mind. *Esse is percipi* is the basic dictum of this school. In order to distin-

9 *Essay*, IV. 1. 2.
10 Ibid. IV. 4. 3.
11 NM. Part I. p, 15.

guish it from objective idealism which we shall presently notice, this theory of idealism is designated as Subjective Idealism. In Indian philosophy it is represented by the Yogācāra school of the Buddhists. In western thought, Berkeley is the chief representative of subjective idealism. The theory known as *drsta-srsti-vāda*, developed in the post-Saṁkara Vedānta, is strikingly similar to the idealism of Berkeley.

(v) *Objective Idealism.* Usually the word *idealism* stands for Subjective Idealism which we have just noticed. But sometimes a theory which may be called *Objective Idealism* is also included in the category of idealism. According to this view, the external objects do exist, but they are the expressions of the universal mind. They are not material, but spiritual in their essence. This theory maintains that the universe is the construction or expression of the universal mind. The Upanisadic monism according to which *ātman* is the basis of all reality is a kind of objective idealism.

(vi) *Transcendental Idealism.* The common-sense view that our cognitions conform to external objects finds its expression in the theory of representationism which holds, as stated above, that external objects transfer their forms to their cognitions. Now, if the form reflected in cognitions belonged to themselves and not to the objects, there would be no need of those external objects. The result, as already noted, would be full-fledged idealism. It was in this context that Kant brought about a Copernican revolution to which a reference has already been made in the beginning of this work. Instead of assuming that our knowledge conforms to objects, as was done in all philosophical systems before him, Kant reversed the order and declared that the objects themselves conform to our knowledge. It is the knower who gives form to the world of appearance, but the material to which the knower gives form is an external reality, which Kant calls the *thing-in-itself*. According to the Kantian theory, the sense-data are given to us *a posteriori*, and they come from the things-in-themselves, while the forms or categories are *a priori*, i.e., already existing in the mind. Sense-data and forms are both essential factors of our knowledge. "Percepts are blind without concepts; concepts are empty without percepts." Kant

designated his theory as *Transcendental Idealism* because, according to him, the formal element in experience, the categories of thought, are transcendentally ideal, i.e., subjective. The theory is idealistic because the *forms* or moulds in terms of which alone empirical objects are experienced do not belong to *things-in-themselves;* they are subjective. These forms, however, are not derived from experience (as Hume wrongly supposed), because experience itself is not possible without these forms which are not *a posteriori*, but *a priori*, i.e., transcendental. But at the same time the theory is also realistic because the contents of experience, in the last analysis, are derived from *things-in-themselves* which are the ultimate reals. In a sense the theory is the opposite of representationism. According to the latter, the external world gives form to our thought, while according to the former, it is our thought which gives form to the external reality.

As already noted, the epistemology of Kant, in its basic principle, was anticipated in India by Dignāga in the fifth century. One of the greatest discoveries of all times in the domain of epistemology was made when Dignāga declared in his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* that there are only two types of comprehensible objects (*prâmeyas*) — the 'unique particulars' (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) which are the ultimate reals (*paramārtha-sat*) and the 'universals' (*sāmānya-laksaṇa*) which do not exist as external reals, but are only thought-forms which consist of generalization (*sāmānya*). The *sāmānya* is nothing but differentiation of one object from all others (*apoha* or *atad-vyāvṛtti*). The theory of Dignāga, like that of Kant, may be designated as Transcendental Idealism.

(vii) *Dialecticism of the Mādhyamika.* There is yet another line of approach which is radically different from all those mentioned above. It is that of the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna. According to this view, the nature of reality, so far as its phenomenal aspect is concerned, is refractory to all treatment, realistic or idealistic, and all the attempts of philosophy in this direction are therefore foredoomed to failure. Nāgārjuna demonstrated that all our basic concepts as those of substance, causality, etc., when closely examined, are found to be inherently contradictory to the principles of our reasoning,

and therefore whatever statement we make with regard to the nature of reality, would be self-contradictory. It is declared in the *Lankāvatāra-sūtra* that "as soon as the search-light of reasoning is directed to examine the nature of objects, they vanish out of existence",[12] and further "when objects are closely scrutinized by reasoning, their nature cannot be determined and they are therefore indescribable and void in their nature."[13] The object of the Mādhyamika is to show the futility of all philosophical systems in their attempt to determine the nature of reality. This Nāgārjuna does by a logical method, perfected by himself, which may be called dialectical, and hence the approach of the Mādhyamika has been designated here as *dialecticism*. Unfortunately, the approach of the Mādhyamika has not been properly appreciated; it was perhaps misunderstood even in ancient times. He is contemptuously called a *vaitaṇḍika*, i.e., one who without holding any position of his own is concerned only with the refutation of others,[14] and not anxious to arrive at truth. The fact, however, that he advances no theory of his own with regard to the nature of reality is quite consistent with the Mādhyamika position that the world of objective reality is a mere void and all theorising about its nature is futile. Criticism of philosophy is the very essence of the Mādhyamika school. A thinker holding such a view may be as great a votary of truth as any other thinker. The Mādhyamika's is a unique standpoint which has been usually misrepresented, because it has not been studied from the original sources.[15]

These theories are not, however, exclusive of one another.

12 Yathā yathārthāś cintyante viśiryante tathā tathā.

13 Buddhyā vivicyamānānāṁ svabhāvo nāvadhāryate.
Ato nirabhilapyās te niḥsvabhāvāś ca darśitāḥ.

This verse and the previous one (*n.* 12.) from Laṅkāvatāra are quoted in Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha in course of the exposition of the Mādhyamika doctrine. Laṅkāvatāra is presumably the Mahāyāna-sūtra on which the school of Yogācāra is based. But it appears that Laṅkāvatāra expounded the doctrine of void as well, and the general position accepted in this work is not different from that of the Mādhyamika school.

14 NBh. I. 1. 1.

15 Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna by Stcherbatsky may be regarded as the pioneer modern work of this school. Recently, Dr. T. R. V. Murti of the Banaras Hindu University has given a lucid exposition of the Mādhyamika system in his admirable work, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.*

For example, materialism is only a particular form of realism. Further, these standpoints are by no means exhaustive; there are numerous shades of difference even in the schools which have adopted one of the above seven standpoints. All these seven approaches may be grouped under the two main heads of realism and idealism—the first three under the former and the remaining four under the latter.

2. REALISM AND IDEALISM IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Although the theories covered under the terms idealism and realism are as much discussed in Indian philosophy as in the western, there are no exact equivalents in Sanskrit terminology for these two terms which carry the same connotation. As these terms are used for Indian theories, a clarification is necessary. *Bāhyārtha-vāda*, a theory upholding the reality of external objects, would be the exact Sanskrit equivalent for the term *realism*, while *vijñāna-vāda* is the term actually in use for *idealism* or rather for the *subjective idealism* of the Buddhist Yogācāra school. The term *vijñāna-vāda*, however, is not used in a wider sense like the term *idealism*, and does not cover, like the latter, the theory of objective idealism or of transcendental idealism. As for the term *bāhyārtha-vāda*, it is not in vogue at all, although it would be an appropriate designation for a realistic system. A common name designating the theories of the two realist Buddhist schools, the Vaibhāsika and the Sautrāntika, is *sarvāsti-vāda*,[16] a term denoting a well-known Buddhist sect of which the Vaibhāsikas were a branch. And for that reason the term *sarvāsti-vāda* cannot be used for an orthodox realistic system like the Nyāya-Vaiśesika or the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā. Neither are the theories of these schools designated as *bāhyārtha-vāda*, although, in their later development, they are principally concerned with the defence of realism against the Buddhists. Even on the Buddhist side, the term *sarvāsti-vāda* does not connote realism in its usual sense.[17]

16 In his Śārīraka-bhāṣya (I. ii. 18), Śaṁkara has used the term sarvāsti-vāda for both the schools as explained in Bhāmatī.

17 Sarvāsti-vāda literally means a theory of the existence of all objects (external as well as internal). Śaṁkara has used this term in that sense, i. e., in the sense of realism. But in reality the word sarvāsti-vāda was used in Buddhist philosophy in quite a different sense.

The question arises why there should be no term in Sanskrit having the same connotation as the term *realism*. The reason seems to be this: all the orthodox philosophical systems, with the exception of the Vedānta, are realistic. Even the Vedānta is realistic from the phenomenal standpoint of reality.[18] If they are all realists, the need for a special term to differentiate them does not arise. In western thought also, in the Greek and the mediaeval period, all the systems were realistic and there was therefore no problem of realism *versus* idealism. It was only since the time of Descartes that this problem came to the fore. Similarly, in ancient Indian thought the existence of the external world was taken for granted by all the systems. The need for proving the reality of the external world did not arise even after the appearance of *vijñāna-vāda*. It became an acute point of controversy only when the realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school was challenged by Dignāga. In the ancient period the difference between realistic and idealistic schools was, however, demarcated in another way. Usually the realistic theories are pluralistic, while the idealistic ones inevitably incline to monism. The term *advaita-vāda* (monism) is used to differentiate the idealistic Vedānta from the realistic systems which uphold *dvaita-vāda* (pluralism). But here again it may be noted that the term *dvaita-vāda* is specially used for the Mādhva school of the Vedānta in order to emphasize the fact that that school, although a Vedāntist one, is realistic. But surely, all the realist systems, using Indian terminology, may be designated as *dvaita-vādins*. Thus, while in the West they speak of idealism *versus* realism, we in India talk of *advaita-vāda versus dvaita-vāda*. But in accordance with the current western terminology, the Nyāya-Vaiśesika doctrine has been designated here as realism.

3. TWO DIFFERENT SENSES OF THE TERM REALISM

The word *realism* has been used in two different senses in western thought. In early Greek and mediaeval philosophy, the term stood for the theory that the universals residing in particulars have their independent reality. This is entirely different from the sense in which the term is at present used, viz.,

18 Vyāvahārikī sattā.

the theory that external objects have their reality independently of our knowledge of them. *Realism* in the sense of a theory upholding independent reality of the universals is contrasted with the theory of *nominalism* or *conceptualism* which holds that the universals have no independent reality, but exist only in the mind as general concepts. For instance, the universal cow-*ness* has no independent external reality, but it is only a mental concept produced by the repeated cognitions of a cow, and brought forth before our mind by the force of the word *cow*. Just as in modern thought the conflict is realism *versus* idealism, so in the Greek or mediaeval period of western philosophy the conflict was realism *versus* nominalism or conceptualism. Realism in the latter sense may not be opposed to idealism. For example, Plato holds that the universals (termed by him as *Ideas*) alone are real, while the particulars are unreal. This theory is realistic in the sense that it is opposed to conceptualism, but in the context of the conflict between realism and idealism, Plato's theory will come under objective idealism.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, strangely enough, the two meanings of realism coincide. The reality of external objects (the current meaning of the theory of realism) is, among other arguments, based on the theory that a universal has an external reality which is different from that of its particulars (i.e., the other meaning of the term realism). Whether a universal has an independent reality or not is one of the principal bones of contention amongst Indian schools, and especially between the Nyāya-Vaiśesika and the Buddhists. The latter are conceptualists or nominalists, and hold the view that universals have no external existence and consist only in the exclusion of other objects from the concept of one object, e.g., cow-*ness* means the exclusion of non-cows, i.e., horses, etc, from the cow[19] Exclusion which is the essence of the universal is a mere thought-construction.[20] The universal being only a thought-form, there can be no question of its being an independent reality.

19 Atad-vyāvṛtti or apoha.

20 Vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdāḥ vikalpāh śabda-yonayah.
Kārya-kāranatā tesām nārtham śabdāḥ spṛśanty api.
The verse widely quoted in the Buddhist and Nyāya-Vaiśesika treatises is attributed by Stcherbatsky to Dignāga. (Buddhist Logic, Vol. II. p. 405. n. 1)

Chapter III

SOME REALIST SCHOOLS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

1. SCHOOLS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY: TWO BROAD DIVISIONS

In order to bring Nyāya realism into its true perspective, it would be proper to make a brief survey of the Indian philosophical systems from the standpoint of their treatment of the problem of reality. Indian philosophical schools, as already pointed out, are not usually grouped as realistic or idealistic. Ancient Indian writers divide the systems of philosophy into two broad groups: the orthodox and the heterodox.[1] The division is based on the fact that the orthodox schools bow to the autho-

1 Āstika-darśana and Nāstika-darśana. Modern western writers, besides using the terms orthodox and heterodox for these two divisions, designate them as the Brāhmanic and non-Brāhmanic schools, which usage, although widely current, is not quite happy. Firstly, for a student of the history of Sanskrit literature, the term 'Brāhmaṇa' is associated with the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda (see n. 2. below) rather than with a caste, and therefore, the term 'Brāhmanic' should mean sacrifice and ritualism treated of in the Brāhmanas. But usually the term 'Brāhmanic' refers to caste, and it is further supposed that the orthodox systems originated amongst authors belonging to the first caste (Brāhmaṇa) as distinguished from the Jaina and the Buddhist systems which originated amongst the Kṣatriyas, the second caste, and were, therefore, called non-Brāhmanic. The two

advocates the theory of subjective idealism, drew inspiration from the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, one of the nine Mahāyāna sūtras called *Dharmas*. It was founded by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.[8] Maitreyanātha,[9] whose works were commented upon by Asaṅga, is said to be one of the pioneers of the school. The Mādhyamika school, which propounded the theory of critical dialecticism, owes its origin to *Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā Prajñā-pāramitā* which is also one of the nine *Dharmas* of the Mahāyāna. The school was founded by Nāgārjuna whose famous disciple Deva was another great exponent of the school.[10]

So far as the *Yogācāra* and the *Mādhyamika* are concerned, their position has been more or less correctly represented in the works of the orthodox writers, and it fairly agrees with the basic works of those schools which have now come to light. The orthodox writers even of a later period seem to be fairly acquainted with the doctrines of these schools. The reason perhaps was that Saṁkara and the post-Saṁkara writers of the Vedānta school freely drew upon the theories of these two schools. The position in regard to the first two schools, the Vaibhāsika and the Sautrāntika, is not, however, equally satisfactory. There is a good deal of confusion about their doctrines as set forth by the orthodox writers.

4. THE VAIBHĀṢIKA SCHOOL

It is now admitted on all hands that the Vaibhāṣikas were a branch of the *Sarvāstivādin* school which is one of the oldest

8 An important work of the Yogācāra school which sets forth the doctrine of the Vijñāna-vāda is Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi. It comprises two small works by Vasubandhu: (i) Viṁśatikā with the author's own commentary and (ii) Triṁśikā with Sthiramati's commentary edited by Sylvain Levi. Viṁśatikā has been translated into French by Poussin.

9 Maitreya or Pāli Metteyya is the mythical name given to a future incarnation of the Buddha. Hence the existence of a teacher of this name was regarded as doubtful; but now it is generally accepted that an historical person of that name did exist.

10 There are two principal works of the school: Mūla-mādhyamakakārikā (Mādhyamika-sūtra) by Nāgārjuna with the Prasanna-padā commentary of Candrakīrti, edited by De La Vallee Poussin, St. Petersberg, 1903. (ii) Catuḥśataka by Āryadeva. Fragments edited by H. P. Shastri; Chapter VII, reconstructed and translated by V. S. Bhattacharya; and Chapters (VIII-XVI) reconstructed and translated by P. L. Vaidya.

schools of the Hīnayāna. Sarvāstivādins seceded from the Theravādins at an early stage, and had their own canon in Sanskrit as distinguished from the Pāli canon of the latter. About 100 A.D., a Buddhist council was held under the patronage of Kaniṣka, which Sarvāstivādins regard as the third Buddhist council, although that claim is disputed by the Theravādins. At this council which was the most important event in the history of the Sarvāstivādin school, commentaries were prepared in Sanskrit under the guidance of Vasumitra on all the three parts, Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādin canon. The commentary on Abhidharma was called *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* or *Abhidharma-vibhāṣā-śāstra.* The original Sanskrit work is lost, but a Chinese translation by Hsüan-tsang survives. On *Abhidharma-vibhāṣā-śāstra* was based the *Abhidharma-kośa* of Vasubandhu, one of the most important works in the whole range of Buddhist literature. This work sums up from the Sarvāstivādin point of view all Buddhist activities in the sphere of philosophy up to the time of Vasubandhu. It is one of the principal source of our information on the doctrines of the Sarvāstivādin school. It is said that the Sarvāstivādins of Kashmir especially studied the *Vibhāṣās*, i.e., the commentaries on Abhidharma, and therefore they were called Vaibhāṣikas.[11] There is little doubt that the name of the school is associated with the *Vibhāṣās.*

5. THE SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOL

The Sautrāntikas, the second of the four Buddhist philosophical schools, were dissenters from the Vaibhāṣikas whom they opposed on the principal doctrine of the Sarvāstivādin, viz., *everything exists*, the implication being that all elements exist. "The emphasis which is put on the reality of elements refers to the conception that their past as well as their future transition represents something real. From this fundamental tenet the school derives its name".[12] "The Sautrāntikas denied the rea-

11 E. J. Thomas: *History of the Buddhist Thought*, pp. 175-76. Also note the last stanza of the Abhidharmakośa, p. 237.

Kāśmīra-vaibhāṣika-nītisiddhaḥ
Prāyo mayāyaṃ kathito'bhidharmaḥ.

12 *Central Conception*, p. 42.

lity of the past and the future in the direct sense, they admitted the reality only of the present"[13] There were other points on which they differed from the Vaibhāsikas, but the difference noted above was fundamental and had a bearing on their epistemological theory. The name of the school Sautrāntika stands in contrast with that of the Vaibhāsika. The former followed the *Sūtrānta* or the *Sūtra*, the original texts as opposed to the *Vibhāṣās*, the commentaries. The *Sūtrānta* may stand here for either the original Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādin school of which *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāsā-śāstra* was a commentary, or for the *Sūtras* as accepted by the Sarvāstivādin school. The fanciful explanation of the names of the two schools given in the *Sarva-darśana-samgraha* shows how much removed from Buddhist tradition the orthodox writers were in the fourteenth century and onward.[14]

6. ORTHODOX ACCOUNT OF THE VAIBHĀSIKA SCHOOL

The two schools, the Vaibhāsika and the Sautrāntika, are usually described as realists by the orthodox writers of the later part of the post-Buddhist period. According to these writers, the Vaibhāsika holds that the external objects are directly perceived, while the Sautrāntika holds that what is directly perceived is only our own idea which acquires the form of the object (*sākāra-jñāna*). Inasmuch as the diversity of forms in our ideas could only be caused by external objects, their existence is inferred from that diversity. In other words, the Vaibhāsika's view may be called presentationist, and that of the Sautrāntika representationist. This kind of exposition of the

13 *Central Conception*, p. 42.

14 The explanation of the term Vaibhāsika as given in the Sarva-darśana-samgraha, (p. 43) is that those who pointed to the conflict in the theories (viruddhā bhāsā) of the other three schools were called Vaibhāsikas (seyaṁ viruddhā bhāseti varnayantaḥ Vaibhāsikākhyayā khyātāḥ. SDS. p. 43). According to the same work, the Sautrāntikas were so called because they enquired about the end of the Sūtra, i. e., the final opinion (anta) in the continuity (sūtra) of the various doctrines, and therefore Lord Buddha declared that they would, for that reason, be called Sautrāntikas (bhavantaś ca sūtrasyāntaṁ pṛṣṭavantaḥ sautrāntikā bhavantu. SDS. p. 43).

theories of the two schools is met with only in the works of the orthodox writers of the post-Buddhist period.[15]

Now the question arises: on what Buddhist authority have these views been ascribed to the Vaibhāsika and the Sautrāntika? Does the literature pertaining to these two schools lend any support to it? So far as the Vaibhāsika is concerned, we have in *Abhidharma-kośa* of Vasubandhu an authentic source of information with regard to its doctrines. The theory of perception as set forth in that work has been admirably summarised by Prof. Stcherbatsky in these words:

"A moment of colour (*rūpa*), a moment of the sense-of-vision-matter (*caksuh*), and a moment of pure consciousness (*citta*), arising simultaneously in close contiguity, constitute what is called a sensation (*sparśa*) of colour. The element of consciousness according to the same laws never appears alone, but always supported by an object (*visaya*) and a receptive faculty (*indriya*)".[16]

It is clear that a system whose basic doctrine is the momentariness of objects, and in which the causal theory takes the form of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), cannot have anything like a realistic theory as conceived by the orthodox realist systems. With regard to the realistic position of these two Buddhist schools, Stcherbatsky observes:

"It has, in any case, a position of its own, very far from ordinary realism, resembling perhaps some modern theories which accept the reality of external as well as internal facts and a certain "co-ordination" between them, without the one "grasping" the other. The cinematographic representation of the world and the converting of all the facts of the inner and outer world composing an individual stream of life into a complex play of inter-connected momentary flashes, is anything but realism.[17]

15 This kind of exposition is found—to name only a few—in the following compendia of philosophy and in the works of other systems:—

(i) Saddarśana-samuccaya by *Haribhadrasūri*.
(ii) Sarva-darśana-śiromani ascribed to one Rāmānujācārya.
(iii) Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha.
(iv) Amalānanda: Vedānta-kalpataru. II. 2. 28.

16 *Central Conception*, p. 55.

17 Ibid. p. 65.

In the theory of perception as we find it in the *Abhidharma-kośa*, there is no room for anything like grasping or seizing of an object by the senses, as held in the realistic systems,[18] nor even for the *apprehending* of an object by the intellect. It would appear that the account of the Vaibhāṣika theory of perception as given by the orthodox writers is only a half-truth. Assuming that the Vaibhāṣika was a realist, the orthodox writers have ascribed to him a theory of perception which is, more or less, similar to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

A good deal of confusion is introduced in the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* where, in course of the exposition of the Vaibhāṣika theory of perception, the well-known definition of perception as given by Dharmakīrti is quoted.[19] Dignāga or Dharmakīrti cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to belong to the Vaibhāṣika school. It appears that the theory of perception of the Dignāga school was supposed by orthodox writers to have been held in common by all Buddhists. Some other orthodox writers also have committed the same error of confusing the theory of Dignāga with that of the Vaibhāṣikas. Guṇaratna, the commentator of Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*, seems, however, to be better conversant with the Buddhist schools and their doctrines. He must, for that reason, be regarded as earlier than the author of the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*. Guṇaratna also quotes Dignāga's definition of perception, but he ascribes it to Buddhist thought in general, and not to the Vaibhāṣika. This is, of course, less objectionable and less misleading. The author of the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*, it appears, has not even grasped the sense of Dignāga's theory of perception. The Vaibhāṣika is represented by him as pointing out to the Sautrāntika that, in order to prove its theory that the external objects are not directly perceived but only inferred, the Sautrāntika must admit some external objects as directly perceived even for the purpose of establishing the concomitance required for inference.[20] This, however, cannot lie in the mouth of the Vaibhāṣika if Dignāga's theory of perception be ascribed to him. According to that

18 Indriyāṇāṁ vastu-prāpya-prakāśa-kāritvam, is one of the cardinal dicta of the realistic schools

19 Kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam. NB. p. 1.

20 SDS. p. 43.

theory, external objects as they appear to us, far from being directly perceived, are the creation of our understanding (*kalpanā*). Flagrantly absurd as is the ascription of Dignāga's theory to the Vaibhāṣika, the author of the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* is not consistent even in that erroneous ascription. At the conclusion of his chapter on the Buddhist system, he gives an extensive quotation from the *Viveka-vilāsa* of Jinadatta (c. 13th century). In that quotation, the Vaibhāṣika is represented as holding the view that in the act of perception, external objects are accompanied by their cognition.[21] This may either imply a simple presentationist view, viz., that external objects are directly presented in our cognition, or it may suggest the theory of perception according to which the moments of colour and pure consciousness arise simultaneously. The latter, in all probability, seems to be the correct explanation of Jinadatta's words. It also shows that Jinadatta, belonging to an earlier period had a better grasp of the Vaibhāṣika theory. So far as the *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha* is concerned, it is clear that its author does not understand the meaning of the definition given by Jinadatta which he himself has quoted. His account of the Buddhist systems, particularly of the Vaibhāṣika school, is not only incoherent, but also an inconsistent jumble of various tenets, and it is exactly what is expected of a writer of so late a period as the fourteenth century A.D.

7. GUNARATNA'S ACCOUNT OF THE VAIBHĀṢIKA THEORY

Guṇaratna who shows better acquaintance with Buddhist thought gives a description of the Vaibhāṣika theory of perception which is more or less in agreement with the account of the *Abhidharma-kośa*. He says that, according to the Vaibhāṣika school (also called Ārya-sammitīya[22]), cognition which is formless and which is produced simultaneously with the object[23] is right knowledge with reference to that object. It is

21 Artho jñānānvito vaibhāṣikena bahu manyate. *SDS.* p. 46.

22 Ārya-sammitīya associated with Sarvāsti-vāda was a subsect of the Vaibhāṣika school. The Vātsiputrīyas who were known for their belief in some sort of abiding self were a subbranch of the Ārya-sammitīya school. HIL. p. 216, and n. 2. on p. 247.

23 Note that, according to the Buddhist, a cognition is produced not *from* but *along with* the object. The realist schools hold that a cognition

so because cognition is dependent on the same collocation of causes as the object itself.[24] This requires a little explanation. According to the Vaibhāsika (or the Sarvāstivādin) school, (i) object, (ii) sense and (iii) cognition are three simultaneous moments; and the question naturally arises as to why a particular cognition should refer to the object only, and not to the sense which is equally simultaneous with it. This difficulty is overcome in the *Abhidharma-kośa* by pointing to *sārūpya* between cognition and the object. But one cannot be too strongly warned not to take the word *sārūpya* to mean similarity between the object and the cognition.[25] It means a sort of "'co-ordination' (*sārūpya*), a relation which makes it possible that the complex phenomenon—the resulting cognition—is a cognition of colour and not of the visual sense."[26]

8. JAYANTA'S ACCOUNT OF THE VAIBHĀSIKA THEORY

Jayanta, while discussing how a cognition can be the right knowledge of an object sets forth the Buddhist position thus: Momentary objects sustain worldly existence by producing the continuity of the successive moments as dependent upon the material and accessory causes. In the production of a cognition the preceding cognition is the material cause, and the preceding object is the accessory cause; and in the production of an object, *vice versa*, the preceding object is the material cause, and the preceding cognition is the accessory cause. Thus, the cognition is produced by a cognition and an object, and the object is, similarly, produced by an object and a cognition. Inasmuch as a cognition is invariably produced by the same causes

is produced from an object which is a permanent entity. The orthodox writers who were in the habit of thinking in that way ascribed, erroneously, the same view to the Buddhist schools also.

24 Nirākāro bodho 'rtha-sahabhāvy-ekasāmagry-adhīnas tatrārthe pramānam. Tarkarahasya-dipikā, a commentary by Gunaratna on Haribhadra's Saddarśana-samuccaya, p. 46.

25 The word 'sārūpya' is a crucial word in the history of Buddhist thought. It appears again in the epistemology of Dignāga where it plays an important role. We would refer to it in our detailed examination of the Buddhist theory of perception. (*Infra*, IX. 12.)

26 *Central Conception*, p. 50.

as an object,[27] that cognition constitutes the right knowledge of that object.[28]

This is indeed an ingenious explanation which postulates a simultaneously running double thread of causality to explain the relation of a cognition with its object. This kind of explanation becomes necessary in view of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness and dependent origination. Although it seems difficult to point out the Buddhist source of this theory, there is little doubt that Jayanta, careful as he is in setting forth the theories of his opponents, must have taken it from some Buddhist source. It is not quite clear whether this is an alternative theory to, or an amplification of, the *sārūpya* theory of the *Abhidharma-kośa*.[29]

9. MISREPRESENTATION OF THE SCHOOL

It is now obvious that the orthodox writers of the later part of the post-Buddhist period are superficial, confused and even mistaken in their account of the Buddhist systems. The earlier

27 'Avyabhicarato jñānasya', literally means 'of the cognition which is never dissociated from the object'. See text below.

28 Ksana-bhaṅgisu padārthesu sahakāry-upādāna-kāranāpekṣa-ksanāntara-saṁtati-jananena ca lokayātrām udvahatsu, jñāna-janmani jñānam upādāna-kāranam, arthah sahakāri-kāranam, artha-janmani cārtha upādāna-kāranaṁ, jñānam sahakāri-kāranam iti, jñānam ca jñānārtha-janyam arthaś ca artha-jñāna-janyo bhavatity evam eka-sāmagry-adhīna-tayā tam artham avyabhicarato jñānasya tatra prāmānyam iti. NM. Part I. p. 14.

29 The relation of a cognition with the external object has been one of the most refractory problems of the realist schools, ancient and modern, eastern and western. The difficulty is not confined to the Vaibhāsika school alone. Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is confronted with the same problem. According to it, an external object is directly presented in its cognition which in itself is formless (nirākāra). Now, the question arises: how is it that the cognition of a jar refers to the jar, and not to a cloth? Inasmuch as the cognition is formless, and no specific change has been brought about in it by the jar or the cloth, it is equally unrelated to both. To this the Nyāya-Vaiśesika may reply that the cognition in question has been produced by the jar and not by the cloth, and that it refers, therefore, to the former and not to the latter. But the opponent would retort that, so far as production is concerned, the sense of vision has also been equally instrumental in producing the cognition in question, and the cognition should, therefore, refer to the sense as much as to the jar.

orthodox writers, however, exhibit a remarkable insight into the Buddhist theories. It is unfortunate that this fact has not been borne in mind by most of the modern expositors of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. There may be some justification for these orthodox writers of the later period for their failure to represent Buddhist thought properly, but there is none for those who live at the present time which may be regarded as a period of the renaissance of Buddhist studies. Yet we find that most of the modern writers on Indian philosophy do not refer to the original Buddhist sources, or even to the earlier writers of the orthodox fold such as Udyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta, Kumārila and Prabhākara. They pick up their information from the *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha* and other books of the later period. The misrepresentation of the Vaibhāṣika system found in writers of the later post-Buddhist period has almost bodily crept into the works of some of the modern writers on Indian philosophy.[30]

10. ORTHODOX ACCOUNT OF THE SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOL

It has been stated in the previous chapter[31] that, according to the later orthodox writers, the Sautrāntika holds the theory

30 Following the later orthodox writers of the post-Buddhist period, most of these modern writers also mix up the theory of perception of the Dignāga school with that of the Vaibhāṣika. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti had nothing to do with the Vaibhāṣika, nor were they full-fledged Sautrāntikas. Prof. Stcherbatsky holds, on the basis of their theory of transcendental idealism, that they belonged to a hybrid school of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāras. *(Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 529.) But the later orthodox writers without grasping the full implications of the idealistic theory of Dignāga regarded them as Vaibhāṣikas. Prof. S. N. Dasgupta, strangely enough, says that Dignāga was either a Vaibhāṣika or a Sautrāntika. *(Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 120.) Making a jumble of different theories on the basis of the Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, Prof. Hiriyanna makes an astounding assertion that "the chief exponents of the Vaibhāṣika views were Dignāga and Dharmakīrti". *(Indian Philosophy*, p. 198.) He makes this assertion on the authority of a very late treatise, the Nayana-prasādinī, a commentary on Citsukhī which has referred to Dignāga as 'Vaibhāsikānāṁ sūtrakṛto Dignāgasya'. (Quoted by Prof. Hiriyanna. Ibid. p. 198. n. 2.) The title 'sūtra-kṛt' may even suggest that Dignāga was the founder of the Vaibhāsika school! This only shows how totally ignorant the orthodox writers of the later period were of Buddhist doctrines. Still more astounding is the assertion of Prof. Hiriyanna that the Abhidharma-kośa is a great authority on the school of Yogācāra. (Ibid. p. 199.)

31 *Supra*, II. 1. (iii.)

of representationism which postulates that external objects are not directly perceived but are only inferred. Is there any Buddhist authority for it? We know that the Sautrāntika school was closely associated with the Vaibhāṣikas. Yaśomitra, the commentator on the *Abhidharma-kośa* which is a Vaibhāṣika work, was a Sautrāntika. The school, it appears, was a connecting link between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. Unfortunately, the original works of the school are not extant, or, at any rate, not accessible yet. But copious references to the doctrines of the school are scattered throughout Buddhist literature. Prof. Stcherbatsky holds the view that "there is no great disagreement between the Vaibhāṣikas (Sarvāsti-vādins) and the Sautrāntikas on the interpretation of the origin of cognition."[32] In a footnote in the same context, he adds that "the information about the Sautrāntika theory of cognition, contained in the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha* and similar works (bāhyārthānumeyatva), reposes on a confusion by Brāhmanical authors between Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda, not seldom to be met with."[33] It is, however, not clear how confusion between the Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda could lead the Brāhmanic writers to ascribe to the Sautrāntika the view that external objects were not directly perceived but only inferred. Does Stcherbatsky mean that there was a school of Vijñānavāda holding that kind of theory?

II. A PROBABLE EXPLANATION

It is a well-known fact that since his advent, Dignāga held the day in Indian philosophy. The orthodox writers were so much obsessed with his views that one of them, the author of the *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, as already noted, placed Dignāga's theory of perception in the mouth of the Vaibhāṣika;[34] and another made him the author of the aphorisms of the Vaibhāṣika school.[35] This being so, it is no wonder that the orthodox writers ascribed a theory of Dignāga to the Sautrāntika school also As already pointed out, Dignāga belonged to a sort of composite Sautrāntika-Yogācāra school. According to him, the world of our experience consisting of external objects is not grasped by a

32 *Central Conception*, p. 63.
33 Ibid. p. 63, n. 5.
34 and 35 *See supra*, III, n. 30.

genuine perception. Determinate perception, on which the Nyāya-Vaiśesika builds its whole structure of realism,[36] is, according to Dignāga, a pseudo-perception. The objects as presented in it are not as they exist in the external world, they are constructions of our imagination. Yet they are presented as *real* external objects. Of course, since a determinate perception follows in the wake of a sensation which grasps real external objects (*sva-laksana*), it may be said to be based on reality. If determinate cognition is not true perception, what else can this cognition be? According to the Dignāga school, whatever is outside the purview of pure sensation, belongs to the sphere of *inference*. But they do not call a determinate perception an inference, but give it the appellation *savikalpaka* (constructed by imagination).

When, however, the term *inference* is taken in a broad sense, all the generalized forms (*sāmānya-laksana*), all determinate ideas, all judgments and all discursive thought come under inference. A close observation will reveal that the term *anumāna* (inference) has been used in two different senses by the Dignāga school. Usually, it is used in the narrow sense of the inference of pure logic, as when fire is inferred from smoke. But it is sometimes used in a broad sense, as explained above, when it means all kinds of discursive thought, all judgments, all generalized forms. Stcherbatsky rightly observes: "The originality of Dignāga's system of logic consists in the doctrine which admits two distinct sources of knowledge, two only. He calls them perception and inference, but they differ very widely from what is usually understood by these terms in logic and psychology."[37] Further, "Every synthetic process of thought is contrasted with direct cognition by the senses, as indirect cognition or inference. Dignāga's inference thus embraces, besides our inference, all that we would call judgment, intellection, ideation, thought, reason, etc., every cognitive process, except pure passive sensation."[38] When the term inference is used in that broad sense, the determinate perception (*savikalpaka-*

36 Cf. Jayanta: Naiyāyikānām ca savikalpa-pratyaksamayāh prānāh. NM. Part. I. p. 81.

37 and 38 Nirvāna, p. 141. n. 1.

pratyakṣa) of the realist is also covered by the term *inference.*[39]

A welcome light on this complicated matter has come from a new source, *Hetubindu-ṭīkā* by Arcata, which has recently been published. In that work, the author refers to an objection raised by Kumārila to the Buddhist theory of *anumāna.* The objection is to the effect that in the act of inference of fire from smoke, the smoke which is the inferential mark (*liṅga*), being of generalized nature (*sāmānya-laksana*), is also grasped, according to the Buddhist, by an inference for which another inferential mark (*liṅga*) will be required, and it will lead to a *regress ad infinitum.*[40] Arcaṭa replies to this objection by saying that the Buddhist does not hold that a universal or a generalized reality is grasped through inference alone. Even a determinate knowledge (*vikalpa*) which comes in the wake of a pure sensation apprehends a generalized reality or a universal; and similarly, another kind of *vikalpa* (memory) also grasps a generalized form. What he really holds is that an inference apprehends only a universal or a generalized reality and never a particular. But, *vice versa,* he does not hold that all generalized reality (*sāmānya-laksana*) is grasped by inference alone.[41] It would appear that the statement of Arcata that all generalized reality is not grasped by inference alone runs counter to the theory of the Dignāga school. Dharmakīti says that "everything other than the extreme particular (*sva-laksana*) is generalization (*sāmānya-laksana*) which is comprehended by inference."[42] Devendrabuddhi makes it still more explicit when he says that, "it is *pratyaksa* alone which comprehends extreme

39 "When a fire is present in the ken and cognized by the sense of vision, for the realist it is a case of sense-perception. When the same fire is beyond the ken and its existence cognized only indirectly, because some smoke is being perceived, fire is cognized by inference. For the Buddhist there is in both cases a part cognized by the senses and a part cognized by inference. The latter term is in this case a synonym of intellect, of a non-sensuous source of knowledge." (*Buddhist Logic,* Vol. I, p. 73.)

40 SV. V. 140-53.

41 Tatra naivam avadhāryate sāmānya-laksana-visayam anumānam eveti, pratyakṣa-prsthabhāvino vikalpasyāpi tad-visayatvāt tad anyasya ca vikalpasya. Kintu sāmānya-laksana-visayam evānumānam ity avadhāryate svalaksana-visayatva-nisedhārtham iti. Hetubindu-ṭīkā, p. 23.

42 Anyat sāmānya-laksanam so'numānasya visayah. NB. last portion of chapter I.

particular, and it is inference alone which comprehends generalized reality."[43] Stcherbatsky's statement that all thought is covered under the term inference is in perfect accord with the statements quoted above. If determinate perception could not be regarded as inference, Kumārila, who was fully conversant with Buddhist logic, could not have raised the objection quoted by Arcaṭa. If, however, we take *inference* in a narrow sense of logic, a determinate cognition will not be included in inference, as Arcaṭa maintains.

It is now clear that our empirical world of external objects, which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds as cognized by determinate perception, is, according to Dignāga, constructed by our imagination, and may be said to be cognized by inference taken in a broad sense as explained above. It was, in all probability, in this sense that the Sautrāntika school (to which Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were supposed to belong) was regarded as holding the view that external objects were not directly perceived but only inferred (*bāhyārthānumeyatva-vāda*). The later orthodox writers, not realizing the real significance of the term 'inference' (*anumāna*) as understood by the school of Dignāga, interpreted the inference of external objects in the ordinary sense with which they were familiar. They thus made the Sautrāntika theory appear as a simple representationist view, and contrasted it with the presentationism of the Vaibhāṣika.[44]

It may be pointed out that the theory of representationism, which the orthodox writers have ascribed to the Sautrāntika, is in reality quite different from the doctrine of Dignāga which has a close similarity with the transcendental idealism of Kant. In a sense, that theory is just the opposite of representationism. According to the latter, the external objects give form to our thoughts, while, according to the former, it is our thought (intellect or understanding) which gives form to the external world. But the orthodox writers of the post-Buddhist period perhaps misunderstood the doctrine of Dignāga. Firstly, they misunderstood it to be a simple theory of representationism,

and, secondly, they wrongly ascribed it to the Sautrāntika school. Whether the original school of the Sautrāntikas held any epistemological doctrine similar to the theory of representationism is difficult to say in the present state of our knowledge.[45]

12. THE PŪRVA-MIMĀṂSĀ SCHOOL AND REALISM

Although the evidence of speculative thinking by Indians is met with in their earliest literary creation, the Ṛgveda, systematic thinking on metaphysical problems commenced in the age of the Upaniṣads. It has been stated that the systems deriving their inspiration from the Upaniṣads belong to the orthodox fold of Indian philosophy. One of them, which was directly concerned with the Upaniṣadic doctrines and which produced a coherent system of isolated metaphysical doctrines scattered in the Upaniṣads is known as the Vedānta. In fact, the term *Vedānta* which means 'the end of the Veda' is an appellation of the Upaniṣads, because they are the concluding portions of the Veda. Usually, the term *Vedānta* designates the system expounded in the *Brahma-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa. The *Brahma-sūtra*, besides systematizing the Upaniṣadic theories, also attempts to reconcile the conflicting passages in the Upaniṣads by construing them in such a way as to form a consistent system of doctrines.

While the Vedānta dealt with the Upaniṣadic theories, there was a sister school called *Mīmāṁsā*, or more precisely, *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, founded by Jaimini, which concerned itself with the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda. It dealt with sacrifices and rituals, and had nothing to do with philosophy. In the *sūtras* of Jaimini, there is not much philosophical matter. In the commentary of Sabara also the important philosophical polemic is contained only in a long passage which is a quotation from the *Vṛttikāra*. Regular metaphysics makes its appearance in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school only in the works of Kumārila and Prabhākara who belong to the seventh or eighth century. The question is, whether the metaphysics found in these two writers

45 The present writer has discussed this topic at length in a paper on 'The Sautrāntika Theory of Knowledge,' published in the *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Vol. XXXII. 1952.

is incidental, or there is some real relation of the school to metaphysical inquiry.

Of course, the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā school was directly concerned with sacrificial and ritual matters. In the age of the Brāhmanas, sacrifice had been the central point round which grew some of the sciences like Astronomy, Phonetics and Grammar. All these sciences were handmaids of the sacrificial science which could not be indifferent to metaphysics, the science of sciences. There was, in fact, a special reason for its interest in metaphysical inquiry. Ever since the sages of the Upanisads had revolted against the ritualism of the Brāhmanas, there had been going on a conflict between *karma-kānda* (ritualism) and *jñāna-kānda* (knowledge). The Upanisadic doctrine of monism was steadily tending towards the idea of unreality of the universe. If the world is unreal, where is the scope for sacrifices and enjoyments resulting therefrom in this and the next life? It was, therefore, a sheer necessity for the Mīmāmsakas to combat the idealism of the Upanisads. Implicit faith in the reality of the external world being ingrained in human nature, it would be enough if they formulated a realistic structure of metaphysics which could appeal to the common man.

13. THE VAISESIKA GREW IN THE PŪRVA-MIMĀṀSĀ FOLD

Is there any trace of systematizing a realistic metaphysics in the *Pūrva-Mīmāmsā-sūtras* of Jaimini? Surely none. Of course, there are some rudimentary principles of epistemology (*pramāna-vāda*) in the *sūtras* of Jaimini. But that is the *sine qua non* of every philosophical system in India. Of the structure of realistic metaphysics, as distinguished from epistemology, there is not the slightest trace in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-sūtras*. What did, then, the Mīmāmsakas do to meet the challenge of idealism? A probable explanation seems to be this by the side of many sciences which were subsidiary to the science of sacrifice, there was formulated within the fold of the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā school, a system of realistic categories. It was at some stage designated as the Vaiśesika system. The view that the system of Vaiśesika, which has absolutely nothing to do with sacrifice and ritualism, grew within the fold of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school would at first appear to be rather preposterous. But discerning scholars

have already suggested that the Vaiśesika represents an early school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. This becomes almost a certainty when we closely examine the first three aphorisms of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. These three aphorisms are typically Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-like in their form and spirit. The literal meaning of the first aphorism is: "Now, therefore, we shall explain *dharma*." The second aphorism defines *dharma*, and the third one lays down: "the authority of the Veda must be upheld because it treats of *dharma*."[46] Praśastapāda in his commentary leaves out altogether the first three aphorisms. It shows that Praśastapāda did not consider them as an integral part of the Vaiśeṣika proper. Even devout orthodox pandits, who are usually not inclined to criticize the writings of old sages, could not help feeling the incongruity of starting with *dharma*, and then treating of the six categories.[47] Bodas thinks that the fourth aphorism[48] which introduces the six Vaiśeṣika categories is a later interpolation.[49] If it be accepted, it will further corroborate that the original *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* must have proceeded in a Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-like manner. But the most important evidence on the point is afforded by the third aphorism of the *Vaiśesika-sūtra* just referred to. Śaṁkaramiśra interprets that aphorism to mean that the authority of the Veda must be upheld because (*tad-vacanāt*) it is the word of *tad* (that), i.e., God.[50] Obviously, the pronoun *tad* cannot refer to God. The

46 The first three aphorisms of the *Vaiśesika-sūtra* are:
(i) Athāto dharmaṁ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ.
(ii) Yato 'bhyudaya-niḥśreyasa-siddhiḥ sa dharmah.
(iii) Tad-vacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam.

47 The following stanza is current amongst orthodox pandits:—
Dharmaṁ vyākhyātu-kāmasya sat-padārthopavarṇanam,
Himavad-gantukāmasya sāgara-gamanopamam.
It means: "For one who intends to expound *dharma*, the description of the six categories is like the attempt of one who intending to go to the Himālaya directs his steps towards the sea."

48 Dharma-viśeṣa-prasūtād dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānāṁ padārthānāṁ sādharmya-vaidharmyābhyāṁ *tattva-jñānān niḥśreyasam*. VS. I. i. 4.

49 Bodas. *A Historical Survey of Indian Logic*, a paper originally published in JBBRAS. Vol. XIX, reproduced in his edition of Tarka-saṁgraha, p. xxxvii.

50 Upaskāra, I. i. 3.

word *God* does not occur at all in the context; it can only refer to *dharma* of the second aphorism. Saṁkaramiśra also realized the absurdity of introducing God, and proposed as an alternative that the pronoun *tad* might also refer to *dharma* which was proximate in the context.[51] He remarks: "The authority of the Veda must be upheld on account of the treatment of *dharma;* a statement which represents some truth (*prāmānikam artham*) is necessarily authoritative (*pramāna*)."[52] It would appear that Saṁkaramiśra missed the true import of his second interpretation which is correct. To say that a statement is authoritative because it expresses some truth is mere tautology. The real import of this aphorism is that the authority of the Veda must be upheld because it is the Veda alone which enjoins *dharma* which is capable of being known from the Veda only. No other means of knowledge (*pramāna*) can operate in the matter of *dharma*. This is clearly the meaning of the aphorism in question. It is rather strange that this meaning did not strike Saṁkaramiśra. Establishing the authority of the Veda on the basis of its being the source of *dharma* is typically a Pūrva-Mīmāmsā idea.[53] Praśastapāda says: "Final release is caused by merit (*dharma*) which is learnt from the injunction (*codanā*) of God".[54] He changes a crucial Pūrva-Mīmāmsā term *codanā* into *īśvara-codanā*, which only shows that the Vaiśesika is a Mīmāmsaka who accepts God also (*Seśvara-Mīmāmsaka*). The over-bearing influence of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* is clearly discernible in Srīdhara who takes pains to prove that the validity not only of the Veda but of *śabda-pramāna* in general is established independently of any other *pramāna*.[55] This is again a purely Mīmāmsaka idea which should not be countenanced by a writer of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school. According to the latter, the validity of the Veda is established on rational grounds,[56] or

on the analogy of the science of medicine.[57] This convincing evidence, coupled with the arguments already adduced by scholars,[58] unmistakably proves that the Vaiśesika system at first grew within the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā fold as its subsidiary branch.

14. PŪRVA-MIMĀMSĀ AND NYĀYA

While the connection between the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā and the Vaiśesika has been noticed, the close association of the Nyāya with the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā has not attracted the attention it deserves. If the sacrificial science required a metaphysical system as that of the Vaiśesika for its purpose, the need for some sort of logic for supporting its exegetical reasoning would be greater still. Although, so far as Gotama's *Nyāya-sūtra* is concerned, there seems to be no trace in it of any kind of link with the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā. The term *nyāya*, denoting some kind of reasoning, seems to be a word originally obtaining in the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā school. In the older literature, *nyāya* is the designation of the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā as shown by Bühler in two passages of the *Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra* (*II.4.8.13* and *II.6.14.13*).[59] It seems that primarily the rules of exegesis propounded in the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā school were called *nyāyas*. The term *nyāya*, as applied to popular maxims[60] (e.g., sūcīkatāha-nyāya),[61] seems to be used in the sense of the word current in the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā school, rather than in its later meaning, viz., inference or syllogism of logic.

It appears that among the principles of exegesis that were being developed in the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā school, inferential reasoning occupied an important position. Being of a general nature, as distinguished from a particular metaphysical system, the science of inferential reasoning as *illuminator of all sciences*[62] must have developed in other metaphysical schools also

57 *NS. II. i. 68.*

58 S. N. Dasgupta: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 280 ff.

59 Bühler: *Sacred Laws* (*S.B.E.*), Part I. Āpastamba, Introduction, p. XXVII.

60 These maxims have been collected by Col. Jacob in his work, Laukika-nyāyāñjali.

61 The maxim of 'the needle and the cauldron' implies that of the two things, a smith makes the needle (smaller and easier one) first.

62 Pradīpah sarva-vidyānām. (Kautilya's Artha-śāstra, p. I. ii.)

side by side with the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school. At first, it seems, it was known as *ānvīkṣikī* which was also an appellation of philosophy in general.[63] The term *mīmāṁsā* was another appellation of philosophy in general, as we shall presently see. As the science of inferential reasoning developed and became systematized, it branched off from the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, as it always happens in the case of subsidiary sciences. It appropriated from the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school the appellation of *Nyāya* for itself in place of the term *ānvīkṣikī*. The logicians probably thought that of all the *nyāyas* (as the principles of exegesis were called in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school), inferential reasoning was the *nyāya par excellence*. But the use of the term *nyāya* continued in the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā school even after its appropriation by the Nyāya school. Many of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā works bear that word in their title.[64] The Nyāya was not a system of pure logic or epistemology dealing with inference and means of knowledge (*prāmānya-vāda*) alone; it also had a metaphysics which it mostly borrowed from the Vaiśeṣika. Besides, the adoption of the term *nyāya* from the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, and the fact that the Nyāya is allied to the Vaiśeṣika (which, as stated above, originally grew in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā fold), there is a striking resemblance in the conception of the term *nyāya* in the two schools. In the Nyāya school, the word *nyāya* primarily means *anumāna* which is of two kinds: *svārthānumāna* (simple inference for one's own

63 Kautilya, for example, in the passage,—Sāṁkhyaṁ Yogo Lokāyataṁ cety ānvīkṣikī" (Arthaśāstra, I. ii.)—uses the term 'ānvīkṣikī' in the sense of general philosophy.

64 E. g., Nyāya-kaṇikā, Nyāya-ratnākara, Nyāya-ratnamālā, Jaiminiya-nyāyamālā, Nyāya-bindu (to be distinguished from the Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakīrti), and Nyāya-sudhā, are some of the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā works which bear the word nyāya in their titles. An interesting instance of how even good scholars forget this usage of the term (nyāya) has been pointed out by M. M. Pt. G. N. Kaviraj (*Saraswati Bhavana Studies*, Vol. III. p. 102). Dr. S. C. Vidyābhūsana in his *History of Indian Logic* makes a blundering statement with regard to the first of the works noted above. He says, "Vācaspati's Nyāya-kaṇikā, a work on Logic, is not now available." (p. 134). Nyāya-kaṇikā is, in fact, a Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā work, being a commentary on Vidhi-viveka of Maṇḍanamiśra. Besides, it is not a fact that the work is not available; it was published in the *Pandit* series long before Dr. Vidyābhūsaṇa made that remark.

sake) and *parārthānumāna* (full discussion in the form of a syllogism of five constituents). In the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, it means either a simple exegetic rule or an *adhikaraṇa* (full topical discussion) which also consists of five parts (of course quite different from those of the syllogism). In all this, we have an unmistakable evidence of an early connection of the Nyāya with the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school.

15. ORTHODOX SYSTEMS DIVIDED IN TWO GROUPS

It has been stated that the orthodox philosophical systems drew inspiration from the Upaniṣads. Of the six orthodox schools, the Vedânta, being directly concerned with the interpretation of Upaniṣadic passages, attempts to systematize the doctrines of the Upaniṣads. The Sāmkhya and the Yoga, the two sister schools, also drew inspiration from the Upaniṣads. The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school was, however, concerned with the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Veda. But what is the connection of the remaining two schools, the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya, with the Veda? Like all orthodox systems they also proclaim the supreme authority of the Veda from which they may be expected to have drawn some inspiration. But actually in their fundamental doctrines, they seem to have no connection with the Veda. These two schools seem to have been linked with it only indirectly, i.e., through the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school with which their close connection has just been pointed out. Thus the six orthodox systems may be divided in two groups:-

(i) The Vedānta, the Sāṁkhya and the Yoga which draw inspiration from the Upaniṣads, and

(ii) The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya of which only the first is concerned with the subject matter of the Brāhmaṇas, and the latter two are closely connected with the former.

The Vedānta and the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā thus stand at the head of the two groups, and it is indeed interesting to note that in Indian tradition they are regarded as prior and posterior parts of one general system called Mīmāṁsā. Jaimini's Mīmāṁsā system is known as the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, and the Vedānta

as the *Uttara-Mīmāmsā*.[65] The two schools, which not only have no affinity in their doctriñes, but are totally different in their subject matter, are held as if they were two parts of one and the same system. The obvious reason for this common appellation is that while the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā deals with the earlier part (the Brāhmana portion) of the Veda, the Uttara-Mīmāmsā deals with the later part (the Upanisads). The word *mīmāmsā*, which is derived from the root *man* (to think) and means 'critical thought' or 'close examination', seems to be a more appropriate appellation for philosophy than the term *darśana* derived from the root *drś* (to see), which means 'seeing' (directly), i.e., immediate and intuitive knowledge of a seer. *Thinking*, and not *intuition*, is the badge of a philosopher. It would therefore be not unreasonable to suggest that the term *mīmāmsā* was originally used in the sense of philosophy in general. But as the two systems in question are called the prior and posterior parts of the Mīmāmsā, they must have been two constituents of what is known as Mīmāmsā. The first group comprising the Vedānta, the Sāmkhya and the Yoga which base their doctrines on the Upanisads may be styled as the Upanisadic group, and the second, negatively non-Upanisadic. It would not be quite appropriate to call the latter group Brāhmanic, because the Vaiśesika and the Nyāya have nothing to do with the subject matter of the Brāhmanas. From the point of view of idealism *versus* realism, the systems of the two groups are:-

I.	(i)	Vedānta	Idealist.
	(ii)	Sāmkhya	Realists, but tending to idealism.
	(iii)	Yoga	
II.	(i)	Pūrva-Mīmāmsā	Realists.
	(ii)	Vaiśesika	
	(iii)	Nyāya	

It will thus be seen that while the first group is either idealistic and monistic or tending in that direction, the second group is realistic and pluralistic. The first group is spiritual in outlook

[65] It may, however, be noted that when the term mīmāmsā alone is used, it always stands for the Pūrva-mīmāmsā of Jaimini.

and metaphysical in method; the second, secular[66] in outlook and scientific in method.[67]

16. MĀDHVA, THE REALIST SCHOOL OF THE VEDĀNTA

Besides the five principal orthodox realist schools—(i) the Sāmkhya, (ii) the Yoga, (iii) the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā, (iv) the Nyāya and (v) the Vaiśesika, there is the Mādhva school which, although belonging to the Vedānta, is a staunch realist. In the Vedānta fold, besides the school of Saṁkara which is usually taken as the principal Vedānta school, there appeared others, viz., (i) the *Viśistādvaita* of Rāmānuja, (ii) the *Suddhādvaita* of Vallabha, (iii) the *Dvaitādvaita* of Nimbārka and (iv) the *Dvaita* of Mādhva. As all of them, except Mādhva, maintain monism, they are all, in the last analysis, idealists. Mādhva, however, is a full-fledged realist like the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā or the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. He does not propound any original metaphysical structure of realism, but mostly borrows the Nyāya-Vaiśesika ideology. His scheme of realistic categories is very comprehensive, and is a mixture of the views of other realist schools. The Mādhva school accepts ten categories which are mainly the Nyāya-Vaiśesika categories (with slight modifications) to which are added two categories accepted by Prabhākara, viz., *śakti* (power), and *sādṛśya* (similarity). In the enumeration of the first category, the *dravya* of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika, some of the *padārthas* of the Sāṁkhya school and a few others which are the Mādhva school's own concepts seem to be all mixed up. Mādhva's is a sort of eclectic realism. It lacks originality.

17. REALISM OF SĀMKHYA

The Sāmkhya school, as already stated, occupied an intermediate position between the idealist Vedānta and the realist

66 The use of the word *secular* in this context might appear rather queer, because the subject matter of the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā is sacrifice, and therefore religious; but the word *secular* is used here in contrast with *spiritual*, and not with *religious*.

67 The Pūrva-Mīmāmsā developed a new scientific system of interpretation; the Vaiśesika and the Nyāya also developed two sciences, viz., Ontology and Logic.

schools of the Pūrva-Mimāṁsā group. *Prima facie*, it is realistic and dualistic, for it holds matter (*prakṛti*) to be an ultimate reality by the side of *puruṣa* (pure consciousness). But a close examination of its tenets would reveal that its stand is very near to that of the Vedānta. It has been pointed out that the theory of causation (*kāraṇa-vāda*) occupies a pivot position in Indian philosophy; it is intrinsically related to the basic theory of realism or idealism as it is accepted in a system. According to the Sāṁkhya theory of causation (*pariṇāma-vāda*), an effect is not a new entity. It is already contained in its cause in an unmanifested state, and the production of an effect means merely its manifestation. Since an effect exists in its cause in an unmanifested state even before its appearance, it is said to be ever-existent (*sat*), and hence the Sāṁkhya theory of causation is known as *satkārya-vāda* (the theory of ever-existent effect). The manifestation of an effect is brought about by a change in the cause, and as this change is conceived as a *real change*,[68] the causal theory of the Sāṁkhya is called *pariṇāma-vāda* or *vikāra-vāda*, i.e., the theory of change, transformation or evolution from the cause. In other words, the cause-stuff persists, but a phase different from the previous one arises. The question arises, whether the so-called abiding stuff (*dharmin*) is identical with its phases or not? At this point the Sāṁkhya stumbles. Vyāsa, the commentator of the *Yoga-sūtra*, says that in the changed phase, although the existence becomes different, the substance does not change.[69] Can there be any difference, according to the Sāṁkhya school, between existence and substance? As the Sāṁkhya does not differentiate, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, between *dharma* and *dharmin*,[70] the change in the last analysis, will be unreal or illusory. We would thus easily glide from the *pariṇāma-vāda* of the Sāṁkhya to the *vivarta-vāda* (the theory of unreal causation) of the Vedānta.[71] We shall revert to this topic in our detailed examination of the theory of causation.

68 Satattvato 'nyathā-prathā vikāra ity udīritaḥ. Vedānta-sāra, Sec. 21.

69 Bhāvānyathātvaṁ bhavati na dravyānyathātvam. Vyāsa's commentary on the Yoga-sūtra, III. 13.

70 Dharma-dharmi-bheda.

71 Atattvato 'nyathā-prathā vivarta ity udīritaḥ. Vedānta-sāra, Sec. 21.

Suffice it to say at present that the Sāṁkhya theory of causation in the final analysis runs counter to the theory of realism.

A theory with regard to the nature of *self* held by a system is equally important in connection with the problem of realism *versus* idealism. The self (*puruṣa*) in the Sāṁkhya, is pure consciousness. All cognitions and mental states pertain to *buddhi* (or *mahat-tattva*) which is the first superfine evolute of *prakṛti*. *Puruṣa* remains completely unaffected by the changing mental conditions. It is the *buddhi* which is in reality the doer of actions and enjoyer of fruits thereof. The function of the *puruṣa* is to illumine the *buddhi* which being a matter-stuff is by itself unconscious (*jaḍa*). But the function of illumination does not require any activity on the part of the *puruṣa*. It comes about by the very existence of the *puruṣa* who illumines the *buddhi* without himself undergoing the slightest modification or change. The later Sāṁkhya, as represented by the *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtra* and its commentary by Vijñāna-bhikṣu, and distinguished from the earlier one (represented by the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*),[72] tends more and more towards the Vedānta. *Puruṣa*, in the later Sāṁkhya, is as immutable and unaffected by phenomenal operations (*saṁsāra*) as the *Brahman* of the Vedānta. The only difference is that according to the Sāṁkhya, there is plurality of *puruṣas*, while Brahman of the Vedānta is one indivisible Being. Now, if all the functions of phenomenal life belong to the *buddhi*, and if they only *seem* to belong to the *puruṣa* on account of illusion, the diversity of individuals can well be accounted for by the plurality of *buddhis*; and the assumption of the plurality of *puruṣas* becomes absolutely unnecessary. The plurality of *puruṣas* being dropped, the position of the Sāṁkhya becomes almost identical with that of the Vedānta. Again, the later Sāṁkhya, following in the footsteps of the Vedānta, holds that the *puruṣa*, being absolutely and eternally pure even in the phenomenal state, his bondage is only an illusion. It is held that the *puruṣa* in reality is eternally pure, eternally enlightened,

72 The earliest extant work of the Sāṁkhya school which is quoted by the ancient writers is the Sāṁkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The Sāṁkhya-sūtra called Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtra seems to be as late as the fourteenth century.

and eternally free.[73] *Prakṛti*, which is the cause of the bondage of *puruṣa*, can cause only a *seeming* bondage which being unreal is no bondage. It would thus appear that the realism of the Sāṁkhya school is only half-hearted.

18. CONTRIBUTION OF THE PŪRVA-MĪMĀṀSĀ TO REALISM

As already stated, it was comparatively late in the history of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school that Kumārila and Prabhākara emerged as champions of realism. It is noteworthy in this connection that they defend realism only against the Buddhist, and not against the idealism of the Vedānta. The reason perhaps was that from the phenomenal standpoint,[74] the Vedānta itself was realistic, its idealism being confined only to its ultimate standpoint.[75] The defence of realism against the Buddhist school of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, who had attacked the basic logic and epistemology of realism, was a crying need of the Realist camp. Kumārila and Prabhākara, as defenders of realism, are second to none in the history of Indian philosophy. In certain aspects, at any rate, their realism appears to be more radical than even that of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika.[76] But it will have to be admitted that the structure of realism on the basis of realistic categories was built by the Vaiśesika school, and the same realistic structure was adopted with some modifications by the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā and other realist schools. Both the schools of the Pūrva-Mīmāmsā accept the first four categories (i.e., *dravya*, *guna*, *karma* and *sāmānya*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system. The fifth category, *viśesa*, has been discarded by both of them. *Samavāya* (under the name *para-tantratā*) is accepted only by Prabhākara, but in his view it is not one and ubiquitous reality as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school. The seventh category, viz., *abhāva*, was accepted by Kumārila, but not by Prabhākara. The Pūrva-Mīmāmsā is principally concerned with the interpretation of the passages of the Brāhmanas and sacrificial pro-

73 Na nitya-śuddha-buddha-mukta-svabhāvasya tad-yogas tad-yogād rte. Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtra, I. 19.

74 Vyāvahārikī dṛṣti.

75 Pāramārthikī dṛṣti.

76 Cf. Kumārila's theory of 'jñātatā' or Prabhākara's theory of error. For full discussion on their implication on realism, see *infra* XII. 13-14.

cedure. The categories or even the epistemological theories of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, which occupy such a significant position in the history of realism, have not been mentioned at all in popular manuals of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, such as the *Mīmāṁsā-nyāya-prakāśa* or *Artha-saṁgraha*. As far as the categories are concerned, they do not find a systematic place even in such authoritative treatises of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, as *Śloka-vārtika* of Kumārila and *Bṛhatī* of Prābhākara. Their views regarding the categories are to be culled from scattered statements in their works. Strangely enough, they have been found in a systematic form in a later compendium of philosophy, *Sarva-siddhānta-sāra-saṁgraha*,[77] wrongly ascribed to Saṁkarācārya. Dr. Ganganath Jha, on the basis of a reference in *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*,[78] has suggested that there might have been a chapter in that work entitled *Prameya-pārāyaṇa* containing a discussion on the categories, like the chapter on *pramāṇas* with the title *Pramāṇa-pārāyaṇa*.[79] But this chapter, even if it ever existed, has been irretrievably lost. We therefore conclude that a structure of realistic categories was no serious concern of the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*. It was borrowed in that system from the Vaiśeṣika.

19. REALISM BASED ON DHARMA-DHARMI-BHEDA

It has been stated that the basic point in the formulation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories is a clear-cut and sharp differentiation between properties and the substance in which they inhere. The substance and its properties are held to be two distinct and different entities with separate essences and separate sets of causes. Properties are subordinate to the substance only in the sense that the former are always found only as inhering in a substance. They cannot exist without the substratum of a substance; but despite this dependence, the properties are entities different from the substance *in essence*. Thus, the basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is the theory of *dharma-dharmi-bheda*, i.e., the differentiation *in essence* between the substrata and their properties. In Indian philosophy, there are certain characteristic theories which fundamentally differ-

77 Edited by Rangācārya, published from Madras, 1909.
78 Prakaraṇa-pañcikā (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series), p. 110.
79 Dr. G. N. Jha: *The Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, p. 89.

entiate a system or a group of systems from others. Theories of causation and of the nature of the self, as already noted, are such characteristic theories; but the fundamental one on which the theories of causation and self, and, in fact, the whole structure of a system rests, is the relation of *dharma* and *dharmin*, (the substance and its properties) as accepted in a system.

The Nyāya-Vaiśesika maintains *difference between dharma and dharmin*. It is the corner-stone of its structure. This basic conception once accepted, all the theories of the school follow as its natural corollaries. The dualism of *dharma and dharmin* is the dividing line between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* on the one hand, and all the idealistic schools, the Vedānta, the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika on the other. While the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there are two entities, *dharma* and *dharmin*, which are different in essence, the Vedānta refuses to accept them as two different entities. According to the Vedānta, only *dharmin* (substratum of attributes), which is *Brahman*, exists; all its attributes (*dharmas*) in the form of manifold phenomenal world (*prapañca*) are unreal. Thus only *dharmin* (substratum) exists, *dharmas* do not. Hence it is that the theory of causation held by the Vedānta school is called the theory of unreal causation (*vivarta-vāda*). The effects that emerge as the attributes (*dharmas*) of the *dharmin* (*Brahman*) are unreal. The Buddhist position, as held by the Dignāga school, is just the opposite. Only *dharmas*—the discrete moments (unique particulars)[80]—exist. *Dharmin* is only a mental construction and is unreal. As without substratum (*dharmin*), there can be no connection between these discrete bits of reality, called *dharmas*, and as without connection—causal connection—there can be no theory of causation at all, the Buddhist actually discards that theory, and replaces it by the theory of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*),[81] which means that there

80 They are actually called 'dharmas' in the Buddhist philosophy. 'Dharma,' in fact, is the central conception of Buddhist thought. *(Central Conception*, Chap. I.)

81 The theory of causation takes the form of pratītya-samutpāda in Buddhism. It is regarded as one of "the most precious jewels' of Buddhist philosophy. Its meaning developed with the growth of the Buddhist thought. For four meanings of this term, see *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. 1. pp. 131. ff.

being one thing, the next one follows, but the previous moment is not the cause (in the usual sense of the term) of the subsequent moment. The Vedānta and the Buddhist agree in holding that there is only one thing—*dharmin* according to the former, and *dharmas* according to the latter. They both are opposed to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that the *dharmin* and the *dharmas* are two entities which are different *in essence*.

The position of the Sāṁkhya is midway between the two. Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the Sāṁkhya holds that there are two things, *dharmin* and *dharmas*, both of which are real. But unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Sāṁkhya declares that *dharmas* are only different states or phases of the *dharmin*, their essence being identical. *Dharmas* change, but the *dharmin* is a sort of abiding stuff running through all the different phases.[82] It would appear that according to the Sāṁkhya, the *dharmas* and the *dharmin* are two aspects, though different, yet not different *in essence; they* are identical. From this follows the Sāṁkhya doctrine of causation, called *pariṇāma-vāda* (causation through change) or *satkārya-vāda* (causation of the effect already existent). One cannot, however, fail to note the contradiction involved in the theory that the *dharmin* and the *dharmas* are two *different* things (aspects) and yet they are *identical*. Therein lies the weakness of the Sāṁkhya position. It was pointed out that the Sāṁkhya theory of *pariṇāma-vāda* (causation through change) glides inevitably into the Vedānta theory of *vivarta-vāda* (unreal causation), and consequently, the Sāṁkhya realism leads to the idealism of the Vedānta.

It will thus be seen that the theory of causation of a system is based on the relation conceived in that system between *dharma* and *dharmin*, which is a pivotal concept of the schools of Indian philosophy. The position of different systems in regard to the relation of *dharma* and *dharmin* may be summarized thus:

I. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school: *dharmin* and *dharmas* are two entities different *in essence* from each other.

II. The Sāṁkhya school: *dharmas* are the changing phases of *dharmin*, though different, yet identical.

82 Dharmi-svarūpa-mātro hi *dharmo, dharmi-vikriyāvaiśā dharma*-dvārā prapañcyata iti. Vyāsa's commentary on the Yogā-sūtra, III. 13.

III. The Vedānta school: only *dharmin* (which is *Brahman* and only one) exists; *dharmas* are merely unreal superimpositions on the *dharmin*.

IV. The Buddhist school: only *dharmas*, which are point-instants (*ksanas*) and unique particulars (*sva-laksanas*) exist. The *dharmin* is unreal—a mere mental construction.

Chapter IV

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE NYĀYA-VAISESIKA LITERATURE

1. PAUCITY OF CHRONOLOGICAL DATA

It is neither feasible nor necessary for our present purpose to attempt a full history or to discuss and formulate a definite chronological theory of the development of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school. Scholars like Jacobi,[1] Bodas,[2] Suali,[3] Stcherbatsky,[4] Faddegon,[5] H. Ui,[6] Keith,[7] S. C. Vidyābhūsana,[8] G. N. Kavi-

1 Jacobi: (i) Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of the Brāhmanas, JAOS. 1911. (ii) *Indische Logik* (German). (iii) A contribution towards the *Early History of Indian Philosophy*, translated from original German in the *Indian Antiquary*, April, 1918.

2 Bodas: *A Historical Survey of Indian Logic*, JBBRAS. Vol. XIX. reproduced in the introduction of Tarka-saṁgraha edited by the same author.

3 Suali: *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Italian).

4 Stcherbatsky: (i) *Epistemology and Logic as Taught by the Later Buddhists* (Russian), 1909.

5 Faddegon: The Vaiśesika System, 1918.

6 H. Ui: The Vaiśeṣika Philosophy according to the Daśapadārthaśāstra with Chinese Text, Introduction, Translation and Notes, 1917, Tokyo.

7 Keith: *Indian Logic and Atomism*, 1921.

8 S. C. Vidyābhūsana: *A History of Indian Logic*, 1921.

presently see, is earlier than the two schools represented by the *Brahma-sūtras* and the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtras*. As for the Nyāya, it is posterior not only as a school to the Vaiśeṣika school, but the *Nyāya-sūtras* also are later than the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. Thus, the chronological order of the philosophical schools and the *sūtras* stands as given below:

The Philosophical Schools

(i) Sāṁkhya
(ii) Yoga
(iii) Vaiśeṣika
(iv) Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā
(v) Vedānta
(vi) Nyāya

The Philosophical Sūtras

(i) Mīmāṁsā-sūtras
(ii) Brahma-sūtras } probably contemporary.
(iii) Vaiśeṣika-sūtras
(iv) Nyāya-sūtras
(v) Yoga-sūtras
(vi) Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtras

3. EARLY AGE OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA AS A SCHOOL

In the Chinese collection of the Buddhist *Tri-piṭaka*, only two works of the orthodox systems of philosophy are included. One is the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* of Iśvarakṛṣna and the other is a Vaiśesika treatise, *Daśapadārtha-śāstra*.[14] Although none of these works is of a very early date, the fact of their inclusion indicates that the two schools represented by these works, viz.,

Bādarāyana's Brahma-sūtras, whereas the Nyāya-sūtras were written later." (*Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 279). Bodas does hold that the Vaiśeṣika doctrines are noticed in Bādarāyaṇa's Brahma-sūtras, and on that ground he concludes that some Vaiśeṣika doctrines at least were promulgated before the composition of the Brahma-sūtras. But Bodas never says that the Vaiśesika-sūtras were composed before the Brahma-sūtras. On the contrary, Bodas has taken pains to prove that the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras are posterior to the Brahma-sūtras. Obviously, Prof. Dasgupta was confused between the Vaiśesika doctrines and the Vaiśesika-sūtras.

41 See chap. IV. n. 6.

the Sāṁkhya and the Vaiśeṣika, were held in great esteem by the Buddhists, and that they were, in all probability, pre-Buddhistic. Some of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines, more notably the theory of the non-existence of an effect before its production (*asatkārya-vāda*), appear to be pre-Buddhistic. The latter might have suggested the Buddhist theory of 'dependent origination' (*pratītya-samutpāda*) which is, in a way, only a fuller and more rational corollary of the former.[15] It is also noteworthy that the Vaiśeṣika, like the Buddhists, accepts only two *pramāṇas*, perception and inference, and it seems to be less orthodox and more rational than its ally, the Nyāya school.

Buddhist tradition itself regards the Vaiśeṣika school as very old. Ci-tsān's commentary on the *Śata-śāstra* of Deva states in reference to the Vaiśeṣika: (The founder's name) Ulūka means an 'owl'. The time when he lived was 800 years before the Buddha. By day he composed a work, and by night he wandered about for alms.... The *sūtra* composed by him is called the *Vaiśeṣika* (*sūtra*) and consists of 100,000 *ślokas*".[16] The earliest reference to the Vaiśeṣika school in Buddhist literature is met with in the *Milinda-pañha* where the king Milinda (Menander of Bactria, c. 150 B.C.) is said to have been versed in Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Nīti and Vaiśeṣika.[17] The date of *Milinda-pañha* cannot be later than 100 A.D.[18] The next reference to the Vaiśeṣika school as maintaining five kinds of actions, ('throwing upwards', etc.,) is made in the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra* which was composed at the Buddhist council held under the patronage of Kaniṣka.[19]

Jaina tradition as preserved in *Āvaśyaka* (or *Āvassaya*), the second of the four *Mūla-sūtras* of Jainas, attributes certain theories to Rohagutta, which, as given there, are more or less the same as found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*.[20] Rohagutta was the teacher of the sixth schism of Jainism, who lived 544 years after Vardhamāna. To credit him with the origination of the Vaiśe-

15 *Infra*, VII. 12.
16 H. Ui, p. 3.
17 Randle, p. 12.
18 Winternitz: *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II. p. 175.
19 H. Ui, p. 38-39.
20 *ILA*. p. 14, and H. Ui, p. 35.

ṣika theories suggests that these theories must have been time-honoured. Further, in the *Kalpanā-maṇḍitikā* of Kumāralāta which work under the name of *Sūtrālaṅkāra* was wrongly ascribed by Chinese scholars to Aśvaghoṣa, a story is related of a discussion between a Buddhist and a follower of the Vaiśeṣika. In that story the Buddhist compares the Buddha to the sun, and the Vaiśeṣika to an owl, the comparison obviously suggested by the word *Ulūka*, the name of the originator of the system.[21] Nāgārajuna whose doctrine of *Śūnya-vāda* is refuted in the *Nyāya-sūtras*, and who, for that reason, must be earlier than the *Nyāya-sūtras*, has referred to the Vaiśeṣika along with the Sāmkhya and the Yoga in his *Daśabhūmi-vibhāṣā-śāstra*.[22] Much cannot be made out of a reference to the Vaiśeṣika doctrines in the *Caraka-saṁhitā* of Caraka who lived at the time of Kaniṣka. The *Caraka-saṁhitā* underwent, at a later stage, a redaction at the hands of Dṛḍhabala, and therefore the reference to the *Vaiśeṣika* doctrines might be a later accretion.

The fact that Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra* includes under *ānvīkṣikī* (philosophy), only the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga and the Lokāyata systems,[23] has been adduced by Jacobi to show that the Vaiśeṣika or the Nyāya as a school is later than 300 B.C., the date of the *Artha-śāstra*.[24] But as the date of the *Artha-śāstra* itself is doubtful, and many authorities hold it to be much later, exclusion of the Vaiśeṣika in that work must be due to other reasons. We have thus ample evidence to prove the antiquity of the Vaiśeṣika as a school.

4. THE ORIGIN OF THE NYĀYA SCHOOL

It has been stated that amongst the principles of exegesis that were developed in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, inferential reasoning occupied an important place,[25] and being of a general character, it must have developed as the principal part of

21 H. Ui, p. 41. Of course, Ui labouring under the usual error has named the work under reference as Sūtrālaṅkāra of Aśvaghoṣa.

22 Ibid. p. 46.

23 Sāṁkhyaṁ yogo lokāyataṅ cety ānvīksikī. Artha-śāstra, I. 2.

24 Jacobi: A contribution towards *The Early History of Indian Philosophy*, translated from original German in the Indian Antiquary, April, 1918, p. 109.

25 *Supra*, III. 14.

pramāṇa-vāda (theory of knowledge) in other metaphysical schools also. Every philosophical school in India has its own theory of knowledge. The chief ingredient of the Nyāya school, viz., inferential reasoning, was at first designated as *ānvīkṣikī*. As the science of reasoning developed and was systematized in a separate school of metaphysics, it appropriated the term *nyāya* from the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* school where this term was in use for general exegetical rules. Some sort of metaphysics and a theory of *summum bonum* (*niḥśreyasa*) was the *sine qua non* of every philosophical school in India. The metaphysical structure of the Nyāya school was adopted from the allied school of the Vaiśeṣika, and there arose a full-fledged school of Nyāya having a separate individual entity. There is hardly any doubt that the Nyāya as a school is posterior to the Vaiśeṣika school.

Much confusion with regard to the origin of the Nyāya school has centred chiefly round the word *ānvīkṣikī*, and it has led to many unwarranted conjectures. Jacobi holds that according to Kauṭilya, *ānvīkṣikī* means philosophy, and the essence of philosophy lies in systematic investigation and logical demonstration.[26] He says, "All the later writers are agreed, *as opposed to Kauṭilya* (italics mine), viz., in demanding that the *ānvīkṣikī* is at the same time *ātma-vidyā*."[27] He further remarks, "The author of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* requires of the *ānvīkṣikī* that it should not be merely an *ātma-vidyā;* but should have subject-matter peculiar to itself. Nevertheless he (author of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*) claims..... that the *Nyāya-śāstra* is not only the *ānvīkṣikī* but also *adhyātma-vidyā*.... The idea obviously is that only that philosophy which at the same time is *ātma-vidyā* has a claim for recognition."[28] Jacobi has further shown that according to *Manu-smṛti* and *Kāmandaki-nīti-sāra*, *ātma-vidyā* was an essential part of the *ānvīkṣikī*, while it was not so at the time of Kautilya.[29] Thus, according to Jacobi, the sense of the term *ānvīkṣikī* underwent a change after the time of Kauṭilya, viz., 300 B.C. Prof. Dasgupta refers to the views of Jacobi,

26 Jacobi: A contribution towards the *Early History of Indian Philosophy*, Indian Antiquary, April, 1918, p. 102.

27 Ibid. p. 107.

28 Ibid. pp. 107-108.

29 Ibid. pp. 108-109.

and, after criticizing him on some points, remarks: "I do not dispute Prof. Jacobi's main point that the metaphysical portion of the work was a later addition, for this seems to me to be a very probable view. In fact, Vātsyāyana himself designates the logical portion as a *pṛthak-prasthāna* (separate branch)."[30] He further says, "Probably even in Kauṭilya's time, Nyāya was composed of two branches, one as *adhyātma-vidyā* and another as a science of logic or rather of debate.... it is not improbable that the metaphysical portion was added to increase the popularity of the logical part, which by itself might not attract sufficient attention."[31]

The view expressed by Jacobi seems to be unwarranted, and Prof. Dasgupta has made confusion worse confounded. What is there to show that in Kauṭilya's time *ānvīkṣikī* did not include *ātma-vidyā*? Jacobi admits that *ānvīkṣikī* in the quotation from Kauṭilya means philosophy. And philosophy always includes *ātma-vidyā* (metaphysics). There is nothing to prove that in Kauṭilya's time *ānvīkṣikī* did not include *ātma-vidyā* which it did at a later period. If the word *ānvīkṣikī* underwent any change at all in its meaning, it was rather in the opposite direction. Far from the sense of *ātma-vidyā* being added to its connotation at a later stage, it was rather the sense of logical reasoning which came to be more and more emphasized in course of time. The word *ānvīkṣikī* continued to mean philosophy in general, but emphasis was laid on the other sense of the word, viz., *science of logic or inferential reasoning* which, of course, was always interlinked with philosophy. According to Vātsyāyana, *anvīkṣā* means *inference*, and *ānvīkṣikī*, science of reasoning.[32] Vātsyāyana says, "The categories, doubt, etc., are its peculiar subject matter; if they were not given separately, it (science of reasoning) would be merely *ātma-vidyā* like the Upanisads."[33] Emphasis is thus clearly on inferential reasoning of which the categories—doubt, etc.,—are essential constituents.

30 S. N. Dasgupta: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 278.

31 Ibid.

32 Pratyakṣāgamāśritam anumānaṁ sānvīksā...tayā pravartata ity ānvīkṣikī nyāya-vidyā nyāya-śāstram. NBh. I. i. 1. p. 39.

33 Tasyāḥ pṛthak-prasthānāḥ saṁśayādayaḥ padārthāḥ, tesāṁ pṛthag-vacanam antarenādhyātma-vidyā-mātram iyaṁ syād yathopanisadah. NBh. I. i. 1. p. 35.

The statement attributed by Jacobi to Vātsyāyana that the *Nyāya-śāstra* is not only *ānvīkṣikī*, but also *adhyātma-vidyā* is wholly unwarranted and even misleading. Jacobi seems to ascribe this statement to Vātsyāyana on account of a remark in his *Bhāṣya* which means a different thing altogether. The remark in question is to the effect that "the nature of real knowledge (*tattva-jñāna*) for attaining the ultimate object differs according to the nature of different sciences; but here in *adhyātma-vidyā* (which is more or less a synonym used by Vātsyāyana for *ānvīkṣikī*), real knowledge consists in the knowledge of soul, etc., and the ultimate object is the attainment of *mokṣa*."[34] Uddyotakara explains this remark by pointing out that in the other three sciences, viz., *trayī* (scripture), *vārtā* (agriculture, etc.,) and *daṇḍa-nīti* (politics), real knowledge and ultimate objects are of different kinds, but in *ānvīkṣikī* (philosophy), real knowledge is that of the *ātman*, etc., and the ultimate object is the attainment of *mokṣa* (summum bonum). Thus, far from holding that "the *Nyāya-śāstra* is not only ānvīksikī but also adhyātma-vidyā" and differentiating *ātma-vidyā* from *ānvīkṣikī*, Vātsyāyana has actually used the word *ātma-vidyā* as a synonym for *ānvīksikī*, and that use is quite correct because both words mean the same thing, viz., philosophy.

If Jacobi has attributed to Vātsyāyana something which he does not say, Prof. Dasgupta has attributed to Jacobi an opinion which he has never expressed. Jacobi does nowhere say that the metaphysical portion of *Nyāya-śāstra* was a later addition. What Jacobi has said is simply this: the conception of *ātma-vidyā* as an essential part of *ānvīkṣikī* was a later development, which is not found in Kauṭilya's *Artha-śāstra*. But Jacobi has never suggested that the metaphysical portion of the *Nyāya-śāstra* was a later addition in the *Nyāya-sūtras*. Prof. Dasgupta's statement that Vātsyāyana himself designates the logical portion as a *pṛthak-prasthāna* (separate branch) is again grossly misleading. Vātsyāyana's remark which has already been quoted is to the effect that *ānvīkṣikī* (philosophy with special emphasis

34 *Tadidaṁ tattva-jñānaṁ niḥśreyasādhigamārthaṁ yathā-vidyaṁ veditavyam, iha tv adhyātma-vidyāyām ātmādi-jñānaṁ tattva-jñānaṁ, niḥśreyasādhigamo 'pavarga-prāptiḥ.* NBh. I. i. 1. p. 63.

on inferential science of logic) has categories, doubt, etc., as its peculiar subject matter. Vātsyāyana has nowhere said that *ānvīkṣikī* is a separate branch of the *Nyāya-śāstra*.[35] On the other hand, he has emphasized that *ānvīkṣikī* and *Nyāya-śāstra* mean one and the same thing.[36] Prof. Dasgupta's statement that in Kauṭilya's time, the Nyāya was composed of two branches, *adhyātma-vidyā* and the science of logic, is based on a gross misunderstanding of the well-known quotation from the *Artha-śāstra* in which three systems of *ānvīkṣikī* are enumerated.[37] Prof. Dasgupta goes to the extent of discovering a reason for this supposed later addition of the metaphysical portion to the Nyāya. It was done, according to him, in order to increase the popularity of the logical part. Such conjectures are not only unwarranted but also erroneous. There is no instance of a metaphysics being added, at a later stage, to a system of science. On the other hand, it is an historical truth that a science usually develops within the fold of metaphysics, and it is only after some time that it extricates itself from the latter and develops as a pure science. It has already been pointed out that the principles of inferential reasoning must have deve-

35 Pṛthak-prasthāna does not mean 'a separate branch' but a 'separate subject matter.'

36 Ānvīksikī nyāya-vidyā nyāya-śāstram. NBh. I. i. 1. p. 39.

37 Kauṭilya enumerates four sciences (vidyās): "ānvikṣıkī trayī vārtā daṇḍa-nītiś ceti vidyāḥ" (Artha-śāstra, I. 2). Thus, according to Kauṭilya, the sciences are: (i) philosophy, (ii) three Vedas, (iii) science dealing with agriculture, etc., and (iv) politics. Then he enumerates the systems which are included in philosophy (ānvīkṣikī) "Sāṁkhyaṁ Yogo Lokāyataṁ cety ānvīksikī" (Artha-śāstra. I. 2). It means Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata are the systems covered under philosophy (ānvīksikī). It is a simple unambiguous statement of four sciences, one of which is ānvīkṣikī, and then of the three systems which are included in the ānvīkṣıkī. That such a simple and oft-quoted statement should have been misunderstood by Prof. Dasgupta, is surprising. He interprets the simple sentence, 'Sāmkhyaṁ Yogo Lokāyataṁ cety ānvīksikī' to mean that Sāṁkhya, Yoga, Lokāyata and ānvīksikī are four systems of philosophy. With this erroneous interpretation in his mind, he goes on to observe, "The fact that Kauṭilya was not satisfied by counting ānvīkṣikī as one of the four vidyās, but also named it as one of the philosophies side by side with the Sāmkhya seems to lead to the presumption that probably even in Kauṭilya's time Nyāya was composed of two branches, one as adhyātma-vidyā and another as a science of logic or rather of debate." (Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. p. 278.)

loped, in the first instance, in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school and probably in other metaphysical schools inasmuch as *pramāṇa-vāda* (a theory of knowledge) was an essential part of all philosophical schools in India. Later on, it was systematized as a separate metaphysical school which was much influenced by the Vaiśeṣika theories. Metaphysics must have been its essential part from the very beginning. Only, it was in the post-Dignāga period, and perhaps under the influence of Dignāga and other Buddhist logicians, that a pure system of logic developed in the orthodox fold.

5. LIAISON BETWEEN THE NYĀYA AND THE VAIŚEṢIKA

Although the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika were separate in their origin and in their early development, a link between the two schools seems to have existed from the very beginning, and might have even existed prior to the redaction of their doctrines in the form of *sūtras*. The earliest indication of their alliance is met with in the Mahābhārata, where Nārada is mentioned as proficient in the Nyāya; and although the Vaiśeṣika is not named, the subjects of Nārada's proficiency, besides those of the Nyāya proper, include such topics as unity, plurality, conjunction and inherence which belong to the Vaiśeṣika school. It means that they were regarded as included in the Nyāya.[38] The principles of the Nyāya and the categories of the Vaiśeṣika as given in the *Caraka-saṁhitā* indicate that the two systems were regarded by Caraka as supplementing each other.

There are good many *sūtras* in the Nyāya, especially relating to physical theories, which appear to have been borrowed from the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*.[39] On the other hand, there are some *sūtras* in the latter which seem to have been suggested by the

38 Nyāyavid dharma-tattvajñaḥ ṣaḍaṅgavid anuttamaḥ
Aikya-saṁyoga-nānātva-samavāya-viśāradaḥ.
Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, Chap. 5. 3. Quoted in HIL. p. 43.

39 H. Ui has pointed out the following examples where the Nyāya-sūtras are based on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras:

NS. 3.1.36 =VS. 4.1.8.
NS. 2.1.54 =VS. 7.2.20.

Ui gives many other parallel sūtras. See H. Ui, p. 16.

Nyāya-sūtras.[40] The instances of mutual influence should not, however, be taken to suggest that the two *sūtras* are contemporary. The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* are definitely anterior to the *Nyāya-sūtras*, which explains the borrowing in the *Nyāya-sūtras* from the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. Besides, the description of perception and other *pramāṇas* in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, when compared with that of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, unmistakably shows that the *Nyāya-sūtras* are later. The explanation of the fact that some of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* are suggested by the *Nyāya-sūtras* is that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* have been, more or less, in a fluid state. Discerning scholars have discovered in them later interpolations. There are some *sūtras* in the Vaiśeṣika which have not been explained by Praśastapāda—a fact which clearly indicates that they did not exist in his time.[41] The fact that some of these interpolated *sūtras* of the Vaiśeṣika were composed under the influence of the *Nyāya-sūtras* indicates the syncretic spirit existing in the two schools. Deva, the successor and disciple of Nāgārjuna, who probably belongs to the close of the second century A.D., has given many Vaiśeṣika theories which he has quoted from the Nyāya-sūtras, of course, without mentioning the latter.[42]

The same spirit of alliance continues and further develops at the time of Vātsyāyana who regards the Vaiśeṣika as an allied system. For instance, he says that the *manas* should be regarded as one of the senses in accordance with the theory of the other system (the Vaiśeṣika).[43] The two schools are technically said to be *samāna-tantra*, i.e., allied systems.[44] Furthermore, Vātsyāyana has approvingly quoted the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika school.[45] In Uddyotakara the practice of introducing the Vaiśeṣika ideas and phraseology into the Nyāya seems to have been carried

40 Bodas thinks that the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras, III. 2. 4. (i. e., Prāṇāpāna-nimeṣa, etc.) is clearly an amplification of the Nyāya-sūtra, I. I. 10 (Icchā-dveṣa-prayatna, etc.). See Bodas, p. xxviii.

41 Bodas. p. xxix.

42 H. Ui, pp. 53-54.

43 Tantrāntara-samācārāc caitat pratyetavyam iti. NBh. I. i. 4. p. 129.

44 Cf. NS. I. i. 29.

45 Asty anyad api dravya-guṇa-karma-sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyāḥ prameyam. NBh. I. i. 9. p. 183.

further.[46] In the writings of Vācaspatimiśra, the process of developing the Nyāya position in collaboration with the Vaiśeṣika ideology is in full swing. Indian tradition regards Udayana as the first writer who conceived the idea of formally combining the two schools. The first work, however, in which the two systems are actually amalgamated is *Sapta-padārthī* by Śivāditya who probably belongs to the tenth century. The fact that Śrīdhara, whose work is dated 991 A.D., gives to his Vaiśeṣika work the title of *Nyāya-kandalī* indicates that the two schools were so much allied that the work of one system could bear in its title the name of the other system.[47] It is thus clear that the two schools had a close connection from the beginning. In the course of their development, they came closer and closer till they were amalgamated into a single syncretic system.

6. THREE PERIODS IN THE HISTORY OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA.

According to Bodas, the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is divided into three periods. The first period is of the *sūtras* in which he includes the work of *Praśastapāda* also; the second, of the commentaries beginning with Vātsyāyana and ending in the thirteenth century; and the third, of the independent treatises and commentaries thereon.[48] Obviously, such a division, based on an external factor like the form of the works and not on the development of the ideas, does not give a correct historical perspective. Moreover, the periods in this division overlap each other—a fact admitted by Bodas himself. For instance, Saṁkaramiśra's commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*

46 Phrases like 'saṁyukta-samavāya' or saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya' used by Udyotakara (*NV.* I. i. 4. pp. 94-95.) in naming the six kinds of sense-object-contact clearly belong to the Vaiśeṣika system.

47 Bodas advances rather a strange view that in the first period (viz., of the sūtras) the two schools were allied. "In the second period, (viz., of the commentaries), however, they become somewhat antagonistic, partly owing to an accumulation of points of difference between the two, and partly on account of alliance of the Vaiśeṣikas with the Buddhists. The third period saw the amalgamation of the two systems." (Bodas, p. xxi.) Bodas has not elaborated this matter, and there is no evidence of any kind of antagonism between them in the period of commentaries. On the contrary, we notice the spirit of syncretism developing at every stage.

48 Bodas, p. xx ff.

belongs to the fifteenth century which is the period of independent treatises. Independent treatises like Jayanta's *Nyāya-mañjarī* or Udayaṅa's *Kusumāñjali* were written during the period of commentaries. Even the work of Praśastapāda, which Bodas assigns to the first period, is an independent treatise. This division of Bodas is, therefore, unscientific and arbitrary.

Vidyābhūṣaṇa divides the history of Indian logic into three periods in a different way.[49] He calls the three periods as ancient, mediaeval and modern schools of logic. But here also the periods overlap each other. Under the ancient school by which he means orthodox logic, he includes treatises which are as late as the fourteenth or the fifteenth century.[50] The mediaeval school in his scheme exclusively stands for the Jaina and the Buddhist logic under which he includes Jaina logicians like Umāsvāti belonging, according to himself, to the first century A.D., and the Buddhist pioneers of logic such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu of the third or the fourth century A.D. He traces the origin of these two systems of logic even to centuries before Christ. The modern school commencing about the eleventh century covers, on the one hand, manuals (*prakaraṇas*) like *Nyāya-sāra, Tārkika-rakṣā, Nyāya-līlāvatī, Tarka-bhāṣā, Tarka-saṃgraha, Bhāṣā-paricchedа*, etc., and on the other, the Navya-nyāya school founded by Gangeśa. In the first place, naming the schools as ancient, mediaeval and modern is wholly misleading. The Buddhist and the Jaina schools cover more or less the same period as the orthodox schools. Only the beginning of the latter may be traced to a somewhat earlier age. The real objection to this division, however, is that it has no relation to chronology. It also fails to take note of the constant conflict between the orthodox and the Buddhist logic as well as developments of thought in both the schools. The Buddhists and the orthodox scholars did not live in watertight compartments; their ideologies vitally influenced and interacted on each other. It is, therefore, unscientific to divide the history of Indian logic or philosophy crosswise.

The rational division would, however, be to treat the contemporary systems of the orthodox and the Buddhist thought

49 HIL. Introduction, pp. xiii-xiv.

50 E. g., Śrīkaṇṭha (before 1409 A.D.); HIL. p. 151.

under the same period. The division should be based not on any extraneous factor but on the development of thought. After the earliest beginnings of logic, the science was systematized by Gotama, and later on, rudimentary treatises of logic were also attempted by the Buddhist writers Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and others, and also by Jaina writers like Umāsvāti. The greatest event after the systematization of logic which revolutionised Indian logic and epistemology was the advent of Dignāga. Since his time, Buddhist logic and epistemology flowed in a radically different channel cut out by him. For a protracted period of six centuries, a battle raged between the two camps, the orthodox and the Buddhist, with unabated tempo. As a result of that conflict, the period in question is the most glorious in the history of Indian philosophy. In the eleventh century, the Buddhists disappeared from India, and their disappearance synchronises with the stagnation and sterility of Indian intellect. The typical creation of the post-Buddhist age is the Navya-nyāya school of Gaṅgeśa. With this picture of the historical development of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school before us, the most rational and scientific division of the history of that school would be as given below:

I. The period of origin or the pre-Dignāga period.

II. The period of development or the period of conflict with the Dignāga school.

III. The period of decay or the post-Buddhist period.

In the present work we are chiefly concerned with the second period, the most brilliant one, not only in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school but in that of Indian philosophy in general.

7. THE PRE-DIGNĀGA PERIOD

The first period of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school ended in the fifth century A.D., i.e., with the advent of Dignāga. As to its beginning, we can hardly make any conjecture. Only four works of this period have come down to us. In chronological order, they are:

(i) The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* of Kanāda.

(ii) The *Nyāya-sūtras* of Gotama or Gautama.

(iii) The commentary of Vātsyāyana on the *Nyāya-sūtras.*

(iv) *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha* by Praśastapāda, better known by the name of the author himself.

(i) *Kaṇāda.* The dates of the *sūtras* of both the schools cannot be fixed with any degree of certainty. The founder of the Vaiśeṣika school, whom tradition identifies with the author of the *sūtras,* is known as *Kaṇāda, Kaṇabhuj* or *Kaṇabhakṣa* which all mean the same thing, i.e., *the eater of kaṇas.* The word *kaṇa,* according to Śrīdhara, means a grain. The founder was given this name because he was living on grains picked up from the road side.[51] Or more appropriately the word *kaṇa* may mean an atom, and the atom-eater as the nick-name of the founder would suggest his close association with the atomic theory.[52] *Aulūkya* is another name of the Vaiśeṣika system,[53] and, for that reason, according to the tradition preserved in Buddhist writings, the founder's name was *Ulūka* (owl). This name was given to him because "in the day-time he meditated in a dense forest, ... and at night, when people went to rest, he wandered about for food."[54] Rājaśekhara, a Jaina commentator of the *Nyāya-kandalī,* however, records another tradition which is to the effect that God himself, being pleased with the penances of the founder, appeared before him in the form of an owl and taught him the six categories. Hence the system is called *Aulūkya.*[55] *Aulūkya,* meaning 'son of *Ulūka*', has also been suggested as a name of Kanāda himself[56] instead of the system founded by him. Praśastapāda has referred to the founder as *Kāśyapa* which seems to be his family name.[57] Besides this

51 NK. p. 2.

52 Cf. H. Ui, p. 6. n. 1.

53 Amara-kośa gives 'Aulūkya' as a synonym of Vaiśeṣika. Kumārila (Śloka-vārtika, verse, 59 on I. i. 4.) has also used it in that sense. In the Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha. 'Aulūkya-darśana' is the title of the chapter on the Vaiśeṣika system.

54 H. Ui, p. 5.

55 V. P. Dvivedi: Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī, p. 11. Praśastapāda also tells us that Kaṇāda wrote his system after having propitiated lord Maheśvara (PP. p. 329).

56 V. P. Dvivedi: Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī, p. 7.

57 PP. p. 200.

scrappy information, we know nothing of the personal history of the founder of the system.[58]

Vaiśeṣika, the name of the system, has been interpreted in two different ways. According to Chinese tradition, "the origin of the name is in the fact that the system is distinguished from, and superior to, the Sāṁkhya."[59] One of the explanations is that the name is derived from the fifth category *viśeṣa* on which the conception of the atomic theory, one of the cardinal doctrines of the system, is based. A more probable explanation is that the name of the system is derived from *viśeṣa* used in the sense of *particularity*.[60]

(ii) *Gotama or Gautama.* He is the celebrated founder of the Nyāya school. He is also known as Akṣapāda or Akṣacaraṇa, both meaning 'having eyes on his feet'.[61] It has already been noted that the science of inferential reasoning, under the name of *ānvīkṣikī*, developed as a part of metaphysics which was also

58 Pandit V. P. Dvivedi in his Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī (p. 10) quotes the Vāyu-purāṇa, pūrva-khaṇḍa (Chap. XXIII. 202-203) in which the god Maheśvara says to Brahmā that in the 27th cycle of caturyugas, he would be incarnated at Prabhāsakṣetra (near Dvārakā) as a Brāhmaṇa, named Somaśarmā, to whom four sons—Akṣapāda, Kaṇāda, Ulūka and Vatsa—would be born. Obviously, this is a myth in which the two founders of the two allied systems have been bracketed together. The only useful hint suggested by this myth is that at the time of its author, Ulūka was supposed to be one of the pioneers of the Vaiśeṣika, and he was believed to be different from Kaṇāda. This confirms the Buddhist tradition referred to above. It is a pity that a scholar like Prof. Dasgupta should have based his account of Kaṇāda (*Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 306) on such a worthless myth. Besides mentioning Prabhāsa as the birth-place of Kaṇāda, he mentions Kaṇāda as a disciple of Somaśarmā, and not as his son as given in the Vāyu-purāṇa. In the same breath he also says that Kaṇāda was a son of Ulūka, forgetting that the Vāyu-purāṇa mentions Ulūka as a brother of Kaṇāda.

59 H. Ui, p. 4.

60 *Infra*, IX. 4.

61 One of the fanciful legends to explain this name or epithet is that the sage, once being absorbed in meditation, fell into a well, whereupon God taking mercy upon him provided him with an eye on his foot. According to another legend, the sage became so angry with his disciple Nyāsa, that he would not see him, but being propitiated by the latter, he condescended to see him, not with his natural eyes, but with the newly created eyes on his feet.

known by the same term.[62] When Gotama redacted the science in the form of systematic *sūtras*, it was given the appellation of Nyāya which term was appropriated from the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa advanced a conjecture that Gotama, the founder of *ānvīkṣikī*, was different from Akṣapāda, the author of the *Nyāya-sūtras*. He has not, however, given any reason to disregard the time-honoured tradition that the two are identical.[63]

For fixing the probable date of the *Nyāya-sūtras*, the most important data are in the form of extensive references in the *Nyāya-sūtras* to the doctrines propounded in the *Mādhyamika-vṛtti* of Nāgārjuna[64] whose date would, therefore, be the *terminus a quo* for the *Nyāya-sūtras*. The date of Nāgārjuna has been fixed in the middle or at the close of the second century

62 See *supra*, IV. 4.

63 Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa thinks that Gautama Medhātithi or Medhātithi Gautama were the names of the same person who was different from Aksapāda, and who founded the ānvikṣiki. He flourished about 553 B.C. and belonged to Mithilā. For this, he mainly relies on a line in the Mahābhārata—Medhātithir mahāprājño Gautamas tapasi sthitaḥ (Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, 265. 45—reference as quoted in HIL., but reference according to Bhandarkar Institute edition, Śāntiparva, 253. 42), and a passage in Bhāsa's Pratimā-nāṭaka—Medhātither nyāya-śāstram, Act V. (HIL. p. 18). But there is nothing to show that the stanza in the Mahābhārata refers to the founder of the Nyāya school; and Bhāsa's reference, as suggested by Barnett, may be to a commentator of Manusmṛti of that name (Randle, p. 12). Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa says that Gotama lived in Mithilā, and that Aksapāda at Prabhāsa in Saurāṣtra (Kathiawad). Both the ascriptions are baseless, the latter, as already noted, is based on the unreliable evidence of the Vāyu-purāna, and the former on the fanciful evidence of a village, named Gotama-sthāna in Mithilā, which is still believed to be the birthplace of Gotama. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa actually visited that place, and found there a mud-hill supposed to be the hermitage of Gotama. On such a flimsy evidence he based his conclusion!

It is not improbable that the two names Gotama and Akṣapāda may even be identical. If 'pāda' in Aksapāda, which may be honorific as in Bhaṭṭapāda, and the superlative affix 'tama' in Gotama be dropped, it would appear that the remaining portions 'aksa' and 'go' mean the same thing, i.e., 'sense organ'. The term might have been associated with the founder of the Nyāya who was the propounder of the theory of perception as based on sense organ or the sense-object-contact.

64 HIL. p. 46.

A.D.[65] Vātsyāyana who was criticized by Dignāga could not have lived later than 300 A.D., because he must be earlier than Vasubandhu whom he does not mention. Vātsyāyana refers to Gotama as a ṛṣi, and offers, at places, alternative explanations of the *sūtras* of the Nyāya.[66] The time of Gotama must, therefore, be sufficiently removed from that of Vātsyāyana. In fact, this circumstance suggests an earlier age for Nāgārjuna also, i.e., the early part of the second century rather than the close of that century. In that case, the date of the *Nyāya-sūtras* may be put at the close of the second century.

Reference in the *Nyāya-sūtras* to the theory of *vijñāna-vāda* which was founded by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu in the fourth century A.D., has been pointed out to prove a later date for the *Nyāya-sūtras*.[67] But the same can with better reason be interpreted as referring to the Mādhyamika doctrines. Secondly, it is now admitted that views similar to those of *vijñāna-vāda*, in some form or the other, existed at a much earlier period, and flourished side by side with *śūnya-vāda*. When, therefore, an authority like Vācaspatimiśra interprets a *sūtra* of Nyāya (IV. ii. 26) as referring to *vijñāna-vāda*, he might have been referring to an earlier school of *vijñāna-vāda*, and not to that of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. It is also possible that Vācaspatimiśra, living at a time when *vijñāna-vāda* held the day, might have mistaken the refutation of *śūnya-vāda* for that of *vijñāna-vāda*, there being much similarity between the two doctrines. Jacobi has almost conclusively proved that the *Nyāya-sūtras* do not refer to the *vijñāna-vāda* of Asanga and Vasubandhu.[68]

(iii) *Vātsyāyana.* The third great figure of the first period is Vātsyāyana, also known as Paksilasvāmin.[69] He is the first commentator on the *Nyāya-sūtras*. His date (about

65 H. Ui, p. 43, and Winternitz: *A History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II. p. 304.

66 N. Bh. I. i. 5. p. 152.

67 Stcherbatsky: *Epistemology and Logic as Taught by the Later Buddhists*, p. 29.

68 Jacobi: Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras of Brāhmaṇas, JAOS. 1911.

69 The name Pakṣilasvāmin for Vātsyāyana has been used by Vācaspatimiśra in the introductory remarks of the Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā (p. 1), and also in the Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha.

300 A.D.) has already been discussed. On the question whether or not he was preceded by some older commentators on the *Nyāya-sūtras*, there is a difference of opinion. His identification with Kauṭilya, on the strength of a stanza in Hemacandra's *Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi*,[70] is unwarranted, nor can he be held to be a Dravidian on the basis of the same unreliable source. Vātsyāyana, the author of the *Kāma-sūtra*, must also have been a different person. Dr. Vidyābhuṣaṇa's view that the passages in the *Nyāya-sūtras* which are parallel to the *Mādhyamika-sūtra* or the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* were interpolated by Vātsyāyana,[71] is without any ground. Of course, the *sūtra* of the Nyāya (IV. ii. 26),[72] supposed by him as referring to a *sūtra* in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, may in fact be referring to the Mādhyamika theory. The date of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* in its present form may be as late as the close of the fifth century A.D., and therefore reference to it in the *Nyāya-sūtras* is not possible.[73]

(iv) *Praśastapāda.* Importance of Praśastapāda for the Vaiśeṣika school is even greater than that of Vātsyāyana for the Nyāya school. While Vātsyāyana is the most authoritative and perhaps the first commentator on the *Nyāya-sūtra*, Praśastapāda is a reformer of the Vaiśeṣika school who almost rivals Kaṇāda, the founder. The *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* of Kaṇāda were practically superseded by the work of Praśastapāda called *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha*. This work, although called a commentary, is not a running commentary in the usual sense of the word. It is an independent treatise based on the *sūtras*. The arrangement of this work was followed in the manuals (*prakaraṇas*) of the later period. In this arrangement, knowledge, being a quality of the soul, is treated under the section on qualities. The last

70 Vātsyāyano Mallanāgah Kauṭilyaś Canakātmajah.
Drāmilah Paksilah svāmi Visnugupto 'ngulaś ca sah.
Abhidhāna-cintāmaṇi, Martya-kāṇḍa, 517-518.

71 HIL. p. 46.

72 Buddhyā vivecanāt tu bhāvānām yāthātmyānupalabdhis tantv-apakarṣane paṭa-sadbhāvānupalabdhivat tad-anupalabdhih.

73 The earliest edition of the Nyāya-bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana, which was edited by Jayanārāyaṇa Tarkapañcānana, appeared in 1865 in Bib. Ind. Series. Another edition with extracts from the Nyāya-vārtika and the Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭikā edited by Gaṅgādhara Shāstrī appeared in 1896 in Vizianagram Sanskrit Series.

three categories, *sāmānya, viśeṣa* and *samavāya,* which appear to be only subjective entities in the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda,[74] get in Praśastapāda the status of external objective realities. He also introduced twenty-four qualities instead of the original seventeen. In the theory of inference, too, he effected many improvements.

A comparison of the logical topics treated by Vātsyāyana and Praśastapāda would at once reveal that Vātsyāyana was earlier than Praśastapāda.[75] Bodas, however, holds that Praśastapāda was earlier than Vātsyāyana.[76] This view has been controverted by Suali and Faddegon; the latter has quoted the former.[77] Bhīmācārya, the author of the *Nyāya-kośa,* also holds Praśastapāda to be later than Vātsyāyana.[78] Thus, there is preponderance of opinion in favour of Vātsyāyana being earlier than Praśastapāda. Praśastapāda is, however, definitely earlier than Uddyotakara (belonging to the close of the sixth century) who has frequently referred to him.[79] The Buddhist writers, Paramārtha (499-569 A.D.) and Dharmapāla (539-70 A.D.), have quoted the Vaiśeṣika doctrines from Praśastapāda.

The most disputed point, however, is the chronological position of Praśastapāda in relation to Dignāga. Stcherbatsky, in one of his early articles, tries to prove that Praśastapāda borrowed many ideas from Dignāga and unfairly tried to conceal his obligation.[80] Keith has also accepted Praśastapāda's indebtedness to Dignāga and discussed it at length in connection with the theory of *anumāna.*[81] Jacobi, on the other hand, holds just the opposite view, and says that Buddhist logic borrowed certain theories from the Vaiśeṣika. Later on, Stcherbatsky also changed his views on many points, and admitted the existence of a systematic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika work long before

74 *Infra,* V. 8.

75 Randle, p. 27. n. 4.

76 Bodas, p. xl.

77 Faddegon, p. 605.

78 Bhīmācārya in the Introduction to his Nyāya-kośa, p. 25.

79 Jacobi points out that Praśastapāda's theory of dvy-anuka has been referred to by Uddyotakara. (*Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics,* Vol. II. p. 201, and H. Ui, p. 17.)

80 le Museon, Vol. V. 1904, quoted by Faddegon, p. 15.

81 ILA. p. 27-28.

Vasubandhu's time.[82] H. Ui had already pointed out that Vasubandhu had refuted the Vaiśeṣika theory of sound in his work *Buddhagotra-śāstra*.[83] Stcherbatsky pointed out that the Vaiśeṣika doctrine of sound as comprising three moments, which was refuted by Vasubandhu, was not found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, but found only in the work of Praśastapāda, and therefore he concluded that Praśastapāda was either a predecessor or a contemporary of Vasubandhu.[84] In the light of this, the whole position changes altogether. Praśastapāda, far from being a borrower from and posterior to Dignāga, is proved to be either a predecessor or a contemporary of Vasubandhu, the teacher of Dignāga. Usually Dignāga is held to belong to the fifth century A.D., and Vasubandhu to the close of the fourth century A.D. Praśastapāda, therefore, will have to be assigned to the fourth century. This date for Praśastapāda, which may appear to be rather early, fully accords with the Indian tradition which places Praśastapāda in the line of old sages (*ṛṣis*).[85]

Whatever the chronological position of Praśastapāda in relation to Dignāga, it seems certain on the basis of internal evidence that he remodelled the Vaiśeṣika in the light of Buddhist ideas. The present structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika is more or less the same as was given to it by Praśastapāda. It seems almost certain that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika structure of realism was formulated by him in order to meet the Buddhist without entering into any controversy. All polemic was relegated to the Nyāya school. Although Praśastapāda is anterior to Dignāga, some of the ideas formulated by Dignāga must have been current at the time of Praśastapāda. Affinity with the Buddhist ideology may be seen, amongst others, in the

82 Stcherbatsky's Introduction to the German translation (by Otto Strauss) of his work "*Epistemology and Logic as Taught by the Later Buddhists*" (1924), quoted by Randle, p. 29.

83 H. Ui, p. 73.

84 See n. 81 above; also Randle, p. 31.

85 Vācaspatimiśra refers to a quotation from Praśastapāda as 'paramārṣa-vacana' (i. e., the statement of a great sage), NVT. IV. ii., 25. p. 1065. Pandit Dvivedi, in his Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī (Vizianagram Sanskrit series), has given many references (pp. 12-13) to show that Praśastapāda was regarded as an ancient sage by Indian tradition.

asatkārya-vāda theory of Praśastapāda.[86] The last three categories (*sāmānya*, etc.,) were accepted as external realities perhaps in order to meet the Buddhist.

(v) *Predecessors of Vātsyāyana.* Besides these, there must have been many other writers in both the schools during the first period. And it is no wonder if, after a lapse of some fifteen centuries, only four works of that period have survived. As to the other works of this period, the first theory deserving our notice is that of Windisch who holds that there are in the Nyāya-bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana certain *sūtra*-like sentences[87] which Vātsyāyana comments upon. They appear like citations from some older commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtras*.[88] But this view is hardly tenable, because it was a typical practice of ancient prose-writers to express an idea first in a pithy sentence, and then to explain it. We find the same style in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali and in Uddyotakara's *Nyāya-vārtika* itself.

(vi) *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya on the Vaiśeṣika-sūtras.* A Chinese tradition names Pañcaśikha as the first disciple of Ulūka or Kaṇāda. There is one Pañcaśikha, the disciple of Āsuri, in the Sāṁkhya tradition also. But in the Chinese tradition, there is no mention of any Vaiśeṣika work by Pañcaśikha. Keith thinks that Praśastapāda had many predecessors, and that probably it was from one of them that Dignāga borrowed the passages which have been cited by Stcherbatsky from Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*.[89]

A sure evidence of a Vaiśeṣika work older than that of Praśastapāda is that of *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* about which two references have been found. One of them is in the *Kiraṇāvali-bhāskara* of Padmanābhamiśra, which is a commentary on the *Kiraṇāvali* of Udayana. Padmanābhamiśra lived in or about the sixteenth century. While explaining the prefix *pra* in *pravakṣyate* in the introductory stanza of the work of Praśastapāda, Udayana points

86 *Infra*, V. 2.

87 For example, the very opening sentence of the Nyāya-bhāṣya—Pramāṇato'rtha-pratipattau pravṛtti-sāmarthyād-arthavat prāmāṇam—is sūtra-like.

88 Randle, p. 19.

89 ILA. p. 27. n. 1.

out in his *Kiraṇāvalī* that Praśastapāda composed his work because he wanted to introduce three excellences into it. Unlike the *sūtras* his work is lucid, and unlike a commentary it is concise, and unlike *prakaraṇas* it deals with the whole subject and not merely with a part of it.[90] The question is what commentary is referred to here? The answer is provided by Padmanābhamiśra who says that the commentary referred to here is that of Rāvaṇa.[91]

The other reference to *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* is found in the *Prakaṭārtha*, a commentary on the *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, where a statement of *Rāvana-bhāṣya* is actually quoted. In course of setting forth a Vaiśeṣika theory, Śaṁkara says that a *catur-aṇuka* (aggregate of four atoms) is produced from two *dvy-aṇukas* (aggregate of two atoms).[92] The theory, as propounded by Praśastapāda and accepted by all the later Vaiśeṣika writers, however, is that after the production of a *dvy-aṇuka*, three *dvy-aṇukas* combine to form a *try-anuka* (aggregate of three *dvy-aṇukas*). The measure of a *dvy-aṇuka* is minute (*aṇu*), but that of a *try-aṇukā* is large (*mahat*), i.e., having magnitude. The measure of a *try-anuka* cannot be produced by that of *dvy-aṇukas*, because in that case the former would be without magnitude like the latter. It is an accepted principle that the effect is similar to its cause. The measure of a *try-aṇuka* is held to be produced by plurality (*bahutva*, meaning the number three or more) residing in the three component *dvy-aṇukas*. Now, if, as given in Śaṁkara's account of the Vaiśesika, the two *dvy-aṇukas* produce a *catur-aṇuka*, the question arises as to how the large measure of a *catur-aṇuka* can be caused without plurality which can reside only in *three* or more and not in *two dvy-aṇukas*. To get over this difficulty, *Ratna-prabhā*, a commentary on the *Śārīraka-bhāsya* makes the following reference to *Prakaṭārtha*: "The author of the *Prakaṭārtha* says that, according to the commentary written by Rāvaṇa, the cause of the magnitude (*mahattva*) of an effect produced from two *dvy-aṇukas* is *pracaya*, i.e., the

90 Kir. p. 5.

91 Kiranāvalī-bhāskara, p. 12.

92 Yadāpi dve dve dvy-anuke catur-anukam ārabhete. Śarīraka-bhāsya, II. ii. 11.

loose connection of parts. Therefore, the view in Śaṁkara's commentary is based on an older school of the Vaiśeṣika."[93]

Recently, the commentary called *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa* which is another name of *Prakaṭārtha*, has been published,[94] and the passage quoted in *Ratna-prabhā* is actually found there with the addition, "the modern school, however, holds that a *try-aṇuka* is produced from three *dvy-aṇukas*."[95] As already stated, this is the view of Praśastapāda. He, therefore, belongs to the modern school. But Śaṁkara has set forth the Vaiśeṣika doctrine according to the commentary of Rāvaṇa which belongs to the older school.

A serious error, leading to the opposite conclusion in connection with this matter, has crept in amongst many writers for which Bodas is originally responsible. He says, "The opinions ascribed by Śaṁkarācārya to the Kanāda school are all found in Praśastapāda's work. *Śrīcaraṇa*,[96] in his commentary on *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* called *Prakaṭārtha*, says that a particular view criticised by Śaṁkara belongs to the older school of Vaiśeṣikas though opposed to that contained in *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*. The view referred to is propounded by Praśastapāda who must, therefore, be older than Rāvaṇa."[97]

It appears that Bodas, without caring to study Praśastapāda, took it for granted that the doctuine of the Vaiśeṣika, as given by Śaṁkara is from Praśastapāda. Labouring under that error, he twisted and misconstrued the passage of *Ratna-prabhā* so as to give it the opposite meaning.[98] It is indeed a great pity

93 Prakaṭārthakārās tu yad dvābhyāṁ dvy-aṇukābhyāṁ ārabdhaṁ kārye mahattvaṁ dṛśyate, tasya hetuḥ pracayo nāma praśithilāvayava-saṁyoga iti Rāvaṇa-praṇīte bhāṣye dṛśyata iti cirantana-vaiśeṣika dṛṣṭyedaṁ bhāṣyam ity āhuḥ. *Ratna-prabhā, II. ii.* 11.

94 Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa edited by T. R. Cintāmaṇi, published by Madras University, 1935. In the colophons it is named as Prakaṭārtha as well as Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa. Its age seems to be 1000-1200 A. D.

95 Ādhunikās tu *varṇayanti* tribhir eva dvy-aṇukais try-aṇukam ārabhyate. *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa, II. ii.* 11.

96 The author's name as Śrīcaraṇa is wrong. In the expression occurring at some places as 'Prakaṭārthakāra-śrīcaraṇa', the last part is only an honorific title.

97 *Bodas, p.* xl.

98 The passage of *Ratna-prabhā quoted above first gives the view of* Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya and then says 'iti cirantana-vaiśeṣika-dṛṣṭyedaṁ bhāṣyam'

that other scholars blindly followed Bodas. For example, Keith suggests that *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* might have been a commentary on *Kaṇāda-sūtras* or on *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*.[99] But references in *Kiranāvalī* as well as in *Prakaṭārtha* or *Ratna-prabhā* make it clear, beyond a shadow of doubt, that *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*, far from being a commentary on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, was older than the latter; and the two differed in their views. H. Ui has also followed Bodas in his error and remarks, "Śrīcarana in his *Prakaṭārtha* says that some of the Vaiśesika doctrines discussed by Śaṁkarācārya in his *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* represent an older school and agree with the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, but they are not in harmony with *Rāvaṇa-bhāsya*. Consequently, Rāvaṇa is held to be later than Praśastapāda."[100] Needless to point out that the fact is quite the opposite, and the *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* was older than the work of Praśastapāda. It shows that at the time of Saṁkara, Praśastapāda's work did not occupy so dominant a position in the Vaiśeṣika school as it did from the close of the tenth century, i.e., from the time of the three great commentaries on it. With the dominance of Praśastapāda, it appears that *Rāvaṇa-bhāsya* came into disuse, and that in the fifteenth century and onwards only its name was known. Thus, although Padmanābhamiśra in the sixteenth century mentions the name of *Rāvaṇa-bhāsya*, Saṁkaramiśra of the fifteenth century, the author of *Upaskāra*, the oldest extant commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, expressly says that for his work he got no help from any other commentary and had to depend on the *sūtras* alone.[101]

Another erroneous idea has gained currency amongst scholars that, according to Padmanābhamiśra, Udayana made use of

which sentence is simple enough and means, 'this part of the commentary (of Śaṁkara) is in accordance with the theory of the older school (cirantana) of the Vaiśesika, i.e., Rāvana-bhāsya. Bodas, however, wrongly supposed that the view quoted from Rāvaṇa-bhāsya is different from the one given by Śaṁkara and, therefore, he construed the passage to mean that the view set forth in Rāvaṇa-bhāsya is different from the one stated by Śaṁkara, and, therefore, that part of the commentary (of Śaṁkara) is in accordance with the older school, i.e., that of Praśastapāda.

99 ILA. p. 27.

100 H. Ui, pp. 13-14.

101 Sūtra-mātrāvalambena. Upaskāra, introductory verse 3.

Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya. There is no statement by Padmanābhamiśra to that effect. In fact, *Kiraṇāvalī*, while explaining the word *pravakṣyate* of the first stanza of Praśastapāda, says, as already noted above, that the work of Praśastapāda is not prolix like a commentary. Padmanābhamiśra, commenting upon this statement of *Kiraṇāvalī*, says that the commentary referred to in *Kiranāvalī* is *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*. From the statement of *Kiraṇāvalī* itself, however, it does not follow that Udayana knew of any commentary on the Vaiśesika, much less the commentary of Rāvaṇa. To jump to the conclusion that he made use of *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* is unwarranted. It is extremely surprising that scholars like Bodas, Keith and H. Ui should all have fallen into an error for which there is hardly any justification.[102]

(vii) *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti*. That there existed a commentary on *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* named *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti*[103] is a sheer myth based on a strange confusion and perhaps a little deliberate exercise of imagination. There is no trace of it anywhere. *Upaskāra* of *Śaṁkaramiśra* does refer to a *vṛttikāra* or *vṛttikṛt* several times. But it is not known whether it was a running commentary on the *sūtras*, or an independent treatise. Śaṁkaramiśra's statement that he wrote his commentary without any help goes to suggest that it was an independent work. And there is nothing to show that the same had any connection with Bhāradvāja. There is a work named *Bhāradvājavṛtti-bhāṣya* by Gaṅgādhara Kaviratna Kavirāja.[104] The title of this work gives an impression that it might be a sub-commentary on *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti*, but an examination of the work shows that it is an independent commentary. And there is no trace in it of any passage of the *Vṛtti*[105] quoted in the *Upaskāra*. The only other reference to the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti* is in a foot-note of the Sanskrit introduction to *Nyāya-kandalī* by Pandit V. P. Dvivedi. It is to the effect that he once saw at Banaras in the possession of

102 Bodas, p. xl; ILA. p. 27; H. Ui, p. 15.

103 V. P. Dvivedi: Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī, p. 12; Dasgupta: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. p. 306; Radhakrisnan: *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II. p. 180.

104 Published at Behrampur (Murshidabad), 1778-79 A.D. It was perhaps the earliest published Sanskrit text of Indian philosophy.

105 Faddegon, p. 35 ff.

a saṁnyāsin a copy of *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti* on palm leaves written in Maithila script which was extremely tattered and soiled.[106] Can any reliance be placed on the evidence of a manuscript of which there is no trace? This kind of baseless evidence and the confusion caused by Gaṅgādhara's *Bhāradvājavṛtti-bhāṣya* have created the fiction of a commentary of Bhāradvāja on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* which, strangely enough, finds a place in the histories of Indian philosophy.

8. PERIOD OF CONFLICT WITH THE DIGNĀGA SCHOOL

(i) *Dignāga.* The second period opens with the advent of Dignāga somewhere in the fifth century. He is the dominating figure in Indian philosophy during the period extending from the fifth to the tenth century. This period is undoubtedly the most glorious period of Indian philosophy. The date of Dignāga, which is closely connected with that of Vasubandhu, has been discussed by eminent scholars. Without entering here into the merits and demerits of the various theories, it may be stated that overwhelming opinion places him in the fifth century A.D.[107] His principal work is *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* in which he included some of his shorter works.[108] In this work he laid the foundation of his realist-idealistic epistemology, and threw a challenge to the realism of the orthodox schools. It is a tragedy that this work, which is one of the brightest gems of our literary treasure, is irretrievably lost in its original Sanskrit text. Fortunately, a Tibetan translation[109] is preserved from which Vidyābhūsana has given a brief synopsis of its subject matter in his *History of Indian Logic* Stcherbatsky's *Buddhist Logic* in two volumes, is an excellent guide to a proper understanding of the epistemology and logic of Dignāga. Besides, there are copious extracts from Dignāga scattered in Sanskrit philosophical treatises. Randle collected the extracts which are found in *Nyāyavārtika, Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatika* and *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha.*[110]

106 V. P. Dvivedi Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī, p. 12. n. 2

107 *Supra*, IV. 7. (iv).

108 Cf. Pramāna-siddhyai svakrti-prakīrnanāt
Nibadhyate viprasṛtaṁ samuccitam.
PS. Introductory stanza.

109 It is surprising that Pramāna-samuccaya is unknown in China.

110 Fragments from Dignāga, published by the Royal Asiatic Society London, 1926.

H. R. R. Iyengar has edited such extracts from Dignāga found in Pārthasārathimiśra's *Nyāya-ratnākara*, a commentary on the *Śloka-vārtika*.[111] *Tattva-saṁgraha* and its commentary *Pañcikā* are a mine of information for the views of Dignāga. Recently H. R. R. Iyengar has also restored the Sanskrit text of the first chapter (on perception) of *Pramāna-samuccaya* with extracts from Dignāga's own *vṛtti* and from the commentary by Jinendrabuddhi.[112]

(ii) *Uddyotakara.* The challenge of Dignāga was met on the orthodox side by Uddyotakara in his *Nyāya-vārtika*. His family name was *Bhāradvāja*, and in the colophon of the *Nyāya-vārtika*, he is styled as Pāśupatācārya. With regard to his date, there is fortunately a good piece of evidence in the form of a reference to his name in Subandhu's *Vāsavadattā*,[113] which work, in turn, has been referred to in the *Harṣacarita* of Bāna. The latter was a junior contemporary of King Harṣavardhana, and belonged to the middle of the seventh century. If, therefore, Subandhu is placed in the beginning of the seventh century, the close of the sixth century would be the *terminus ad quem* for Uddyotakara. This will accord with the date of Dharmakīrti who has most probably referred to Uddyotakara.[114] The date of Dharmakīrti may be suggested to be the first part of the seventh century. The Jaina *Śloka-vārtika* held that Uddyotakara was attacked by *Dharmakīrti*.[115] But the definition of *Pratijñā* as quoted in the *Nyāya-vārtika* from the *Vāda-vidhi* has been identified with that in the *Vāda-nyāya* of Dharmakīrti. On that ground, Vidyābhūṣana has suggested that *Vāda-vidhi* was only another name of *Vāda-nyāya*. Uddyotakara and Dharmakīrti, who thus seem to have referred to each other were, in the opinion of Vidyābhūṣaṇa, contemporaries.[116] But that is not pro-

111 His article on Kumārila and Dignāga. *IHQ.* Sept. 1927.

112 Published by the Mysore University.

113 *Nyāya-sthitim iva Uddyotakara-svarūpām.* Vāsavadattā, Hall's edition, p. 235.

114 Vidyābhūsaṇa thinks that the śāstra and the śāstrakāra referred to in the Nyāya-bindu (pp. 110-11, Peterson's edition) are the Nyāya-vārtika and *Uddyotakara*. HIL. p. 124.

115 *Randle*, p. 34. n. 3.

116 HIL. p. 124 "Yad api (wrongly printed in Cal. edition 'yadyapi') vādavidhau sādhyābhidhānaṁ pratijñeti pratijñā-lakṣaṇam uktam." NV. I. i. 33. p. 282.

bable because in that case, we should expect many more references to Dharmakīrti. For instance, Uddyotakara when dealing with Dignaga's definition of perception,[117] must have referred to that definition as revised by Dharmakīrti,[118] had he known it. Secondly, *Vāda-vidhi* is a work proved to have been written by Vasubandhu, and not by Dharmakīrti.[119] The definition referred to above might, therefore, have been borrowed in *Vāda-nyāya* from *Vāda-vidhi*, and there is no reason to suggest that *Vāda-vidhi* was only another name of *Vāda-nyāya*. Besides, the contemporaneity of Uddyotakara with Dharmakīrti militates against the sure evidence of *Vāsavadattā*. There are, however, scholars who hold that Uddyotakara, Subandhu and Bāṇa might all have been contemporaries.[120] This is possible, but not probable. That the close of the sixth century is the lower limit of Uddyotakara is almost a certainty. But with regard to his upper limit, we have no evidence except that he flourished later than Praśastapāda and Dignāga. The fact that Vācaspatimiśra (841 A.D.) refers to Uddyotakara's work as very old[121] goes to suggest rather an earlier date for him. His reference in the *Nyāya-vārtika* to *Srughna*,[122] a town situated near Thanesar, the capital of Harṣavardhana, can give us no clue either to the place of Uddyotakara's residence or to his patronage by Harṣavardhana as suggested by Vidyābhūṣana.[123] The reference in question might also be due to the fame of that place.

Subandhu's tribute to Uddyotakara that he was 'an embodiment of the Nyāya defence', is fully justified. In his defence of the Nyāya, he brings in a polemical fervour which is all his own. Uddyotakara was fortunate in having a commentator of the calibre of Vācaspatimisra who has added lustre to Uddyotakara's work. But he himself lacked the philosophical grasp and depth of Vācaspatimiśra. The latter is marked for his meticulous fairness to his opponents, but for Uddyotakara no stick was too big to beat his opponent with. Very often he argues by

117 NV. I. i. 4. p. 130.
118 Randle, p. 34; NV. I. i. 4. p. 102.
119 Winternitz: A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II. p. 360: n. 5.
120 Randle, pp. 32-33; HIL. pp. 123-24; ILA. p. 28.
121 Uddyotakara-gavinām atijaratinam. NVT. p. 1.
122 NV. I. i. 33. p. 273.
123 HIL. pp. 124-25; ILA. p. 28.

verbal twists which even Vācaspatimiśra, otherwise so reverent to him, feels constrained to criticize.[124] Sometimes he tries to silence his opponent by mere tricks of debate.[125] At times he does not reproduce the full argument of his opponent which Vācaspatimiśra feels obliged to do.[126]

(iii) *Dharmakīrti.* The position of the Nyāya school as established by Uddyotakara was assailed by Dharmakīrti, the great successor of Dignāga, who not only continued his work, but also improved upon it. That he lived in the first part of the seventh century is well-nigh certain. He was initiated as a Buddhist monk by Dharmapāla whom Hsüan tsang met in 633 A.D. But he is not mentioned by the latter who travelled in India between 629-45 A.D. He must have been rather young at the time. He is, however, mentioned by I-tsing (671-95 A.D.) as one who introduced reform in logic.[127] *Pramāṇa-vārtika* is his principal work. He wrote six other works of which *Nyāya-bindu*[128] is the most important. *Nyāya-bindu* with the commentary of Dharmottara is extant in original Sanskrit, and is at present the principal source of our information about the school of Dignāga.

(iv) *Kumārila and Prabhākara.* The exact dates of Kumārila and Prabhākara are a matter of controversy, but there

124 *Infra*, X. 8.

125 With reference to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika position that the objective reality of 'connection' (*saṁyoga*) should be accepted because it is an essential cause in the production of an effect, an opponent points out that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, connection itself is produced by an action without requiring any connection. To this Uddyotakara addresses his opponent thus "You say there is no such reality as 'connection' and yet you say that connection is produced by action; this is a contradiction." (NV. II. i. 33. p. 483.) Uddyotakara does not realize that the opponent has quoted a case which is accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school, and not by himself. Several instances of Uddyotakara's crude method have been noted at many places in this work.

126 *Infra*, VI. 17.

127 Randle, p. 34.

128 Nyāya-bindu was edited by Peterson and published in the Bib. Ind. Series 1889. In 1918 an excellent edition of this work by Stcherbatsky was published in the Bib. Buddhica Series, Leningrad. The same author has published an English translation with explanatory notes in Vol. II. of *Buddhist Logic*.

is little doubt that they both flourished some time during the seventh or eighth century. They both commented upon Śabara's commentary. The commentary by Kumārila on the first part of the first chapter (called *Tarka-pāda*) is known as *Śloka-vārtika*, and may be regarded as one of the most remarkable contributions to Indian philosophy. It has been widely quoted and commented upon by many writers. Another independent treatise on *Tarka-pāda*, belonging to the Kumārila school, is Pārthasārathimiśra's *Śāstra-dīpikā*. *Bṛhatī*[129] is a commentary by Prabhākara on *Tarka-pāda*. There is a sub-commentary on *Bṛhatī* by Śālikanātha who also wrote an independent work named *Prakaraṇa-pañcika*.[130] *Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā* by Dr. Ganganath Jha is an illuminating source of information regarding that school.

Simultaneously with Kumārila and Prabhākara, we find intense activity in the Buddhist field too. To the eighth century probably belong Śāntarakṣita, the author of the great Buddhist work *Tattva-saṁgraha*, and his commentator Kamalaśīla, and also Dharmottara who commented on the *Nyāya-bindu*. Dharmottara has been referred to by Vācaspatimiśra by name.[131]

(v) *Vācaspatimiśra.* Vācaspatimiśra of Mithilā is decidedly the greatest scholiast of Indian philosophy. Fortunately, his age is definitely fixed in the first half of the ninth century. The colophon of his *Nyāyasūcī-nibandha*, a short work concerned with the arrangement of *Nyāya-sūtras*, gives the date of that work as the year 898[132], which must be the Vikrama era corresponding to 841 A.D. Trilocana appears to have been his teacher from whom he learnt the theory of indeterminate perception (*nirvikalapaka pratyakṣa*).[133]

129 This important work which was known only in manuscript has recently been edited with Rjuvimalā commentary, and published by the Madras University.

130 Published in the Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Banaras.

131 Yathāha bhadanta-Dharmottaraḥ. NVT. II. ii. 66. p. 682.

132 Nyāyasūcī-nibandho 'sāv akāri sudhiyāṁ mude
Śrī-Vācaspatimiśrena vasv-anka-vasu-vatsare.

133 Trilocana-gurūnnīta-mārgānugamanonmukhaiḥ
yathā-mānam yathā-vastu vyākhyātam idam īdṛśam. NVT. I. i. 4. p. 114.

Another thing deserves our notice. It used to be held that Tātparyācārya, a great name in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, is identical with Vācaspatimiśra, the author of the *Tātparya*, i.e., *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*. Pandit Kavirāja rejected this view on the ground that the *Nyāya-līlāvatī* expressly mentions 'Tātparyācārya' as a follower of Bhāsarvajña and as the author of the famous dictum of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, viz., 'saṁvid eva hi bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam'.[134] When Pandit Kavirāja expressed that view, the dictum in question was found only in the later works like *Upaskāra*, *Nyāya-siddhānta-mālā* and *Khaṇḍanoddhāra*, etc. But now I have found this dictum in the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* itself.[135] In the light of this, the reference in the *Nyāya-līlāvatī*, far from disproving the old view, will rather suggest that Vācaspatimiśra was probably the author of this dictum and that 'Tātparyācārya' was his designation.

The *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* is his masterpiece in which the conflict with the Buddhist reaches its climax, and, as a consequence thereof, a firm foundation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism is laid. By his versatile genius and encyclopædic learning, he enriched all the orthodox systems of Indian philosophy.[136] His exposition of every philosophical system is so faithful that it appears as though he were a follower of the school which he expounds for the time being. This shows his grasp and depth of understanding. There have been giants like Nāgārjuna, Dignāga, Kumārila and Prabhākara who may be deemed greater than Vācaspatimiśra as original thinkers. But in one respect, he ranks supreme in the whole range of Indian philosophy; he

134 SBS. III. p. 94.

135 NVT. II. i. 36. p. 506. Also *supra*, I. 7.

136 The following is the list of the known works of Vācaspatimiśra:

Nyāya	(i)	Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā and
	(ii)	Nyāya-sūcinibandha
Sāṁkhya	(iii)	Sāṁkhyatattva-kaumudī
Yoga	(iv)	Tattva-vaiśāradī
Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā	(v)	Nyāya-kaṇikā (vi) Tattva-bindu
Vedānta	(vii)	Bhāmatī
	(viii)	Tattva-samīkṣā or Brahmatattva-samīkṣā (still unrecovered) is referred to in the Bhāmatī (Nirṇaya Sāgara edition p. 1020 concluding stanza 3). Tattva-samīkṣā is also referred to in NVT. (I. i. 2 p. 76) where the author says that he has discussed the *theory of error* at length in that work. These are his principal works which he has himself

It may be said of Jayanta that he is a Naiyāyika *par excellence*. Vācaspatimiśra can be claimed by any one of the orthodox systems of philosophy as its own. Śrīdhara and Udayanācārya, although primarily scholiasts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, show leanings towards the Vedānta.[143] But Jayanta stands alone in adhering to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system to the last. He puts up the most vigorous defence of the Nyāya against all other systems including the Vedānta.[144]

(vii) *Bhāsarvajña.* To the close of the ninth century or the beginning of the tenth century belong the two great writers, Bhāsarvajña and Śivāditya, who stand at the head of the two types of works which were usually written in the third period of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The former was the fore-runner of Gangeśa in treating the Nyāya as pure epistemology (i.e., dealing only with *pramāṇas*) and in divesting the system altogether of metaphysics. He seems to have been a bold and original thinker. He discarded the *upamāna-pramāṇa* which was a vulnerable point of the Nyāya school His work, *Nyāya-sāra*, seems to have acquired great popularity because Guṇaratna mentions as many as eighteen commentaries upon it.[145] One of them, according to him, was *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa*, perhaps also called *Bhūṣaṇa*. Vāsudeva, an old commentator of the *Nyāya-sāra*, says in the colophon of his commentary that he wrote it for the benefit of those who could not plunge into the ocean called *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa*. This shows that it was the commentary *par excellence*, and it was, in all probability, by Bhāsarvajña himself. *Nyāya-līlāvatī* refers to him as Bhūsaṇakāra.[146] If it be so, reference by Ratnakīrti (of about 1000 A.D.) to *Nyāya-bhūṣaṇa*[147] would help us in determining the date of Bhāsarvajña. If Jayanta also wrote a commentary on *Nyāya-sāra*, the date of Bhāsarvajña will have to be pushed back to the eighth century, and there is nothing to militate against it.

(viii) *Śivāditya.* He is held to be the pioneer of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiseṣika *prakaraṇas*. He was also the first to enunciate

143 *Supra*, 1. 9.
144 NM. Vol. II. p. 96 ff.
145 See Gunaratna's commentary on SDSm. p. 94.
146 Nyāya-līlāvati, Nir. Sāgar edition, p. 33.
147 Apoha-siddhi, published in SBNT. p. 11.

non-existence (*abhāva*) as a regular seventh category, although *abhāva* as an external reality had already been recognised.[148] Gaṅgeśa has referred to Śivāditya by name.[149] Another work by him, named *Lakṣaṇa-mālā*, is known from its reference in *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khādya* of Śrīharṣa[150] who is earlier than Gaṅgeśa. Śivāditya, therefore, in all probability, belonged to the tenth century. His identification with Vyomaśiva, the author of a well-known commentary on *Praśastapāda*, is based on confusion in one of the manuscripts of *Sapta-padārthī* where its author is named as Vyomaśivācārya Śivāditya. But as this name occurs in none of the other manuscripts, this may be taken as an error. The two must be different, because, while Vyomaśiva accepts *śabda* as a separate *pramāṇa*, Śivāditya follows the traditional Vaiśeṣika position of accepting only two *pramāṇas*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*.[151]

(*ix*) *Vyomaśiva.* There are three great commentators on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*. They are Vyomaśiva, Śrīdhara and Udayanācārya, of whom the last two definitely belong to the close of the tenth century. But the date of Vyomaśiva, who appears to be the earliest of the three, is uncertain. His work has become available only recently. Jaina Rājaśekhara in his (unpublished) subcommentary on the *Nyāya-kandalī* mentions four commentaries on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* in the following order (i) *Vyomavatī*, (ii) *Kandalī*, (iii) *Kiraṇāvalī*, and (iv) *Līlāvatī*.[152] As the last three are definitely given in their chronological order, it may be presumed that, in the opinion of Rājaśekhara, Vyomavatī is the earliest. Discussing the definition of *kāla* (time) in Kiraṇāvalī, Udayana refers to a statement by an *Ācārya* which has been explained by Vardhamāna in *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa* as referring to Vyomaśivācārya.[153] More-

148 SBS. Vol. III. p. 117.

149 TC. Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa, p. 830; See also HIL. p. 406.

150 Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī by V. P. Dvivedi, p. 19. n. 2.

151 See Pt. V. B. Bhattacarya's article on Vyomaśiva in the G. N. Jha Research Institute Journal, Nov. 1945, p. 41.

152 The passage is quoted in the Sanskrit Introduction to the Nyāya-kandalī by V. P. Dvivedi, p. 19. Līlāvatī is not a regular commentary, but it discusses only some controversial topics.

153 Cf. G. N. Kavirāja, SBS. III. p. 108; Kir. p. 114. n. 3.

over, his closer touch with the Buddhist doctrines, as compared with the other commentaries on the *bhāṣya*, confirms the view that he was the earliest of the three. We have, however, no data to prove his date more definitely.

(x) *Śrīdhara.* His *Nyāya-kandalī* is the most popular standard work on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya.* In the colophon of the *Nyāya-kandalī*, Śrīdhara gives the date of its composition which is equivalent to 991 A.D.[154] At the same place he also mentions his native place, a village named Bhūrisṛṣṭi in southern Rāḍha in Bengal. His other works referred to in the *Nyāya-kandalī* are: (i) *Advaya-siddhi* (NK. p. 5), (ii) *Tattvaprabodha* (NK. pp. 82, 146), (iii) *Tattva-saṁvādinī* (NK. p. 82), and (iv) *Saṁgraha-ṭīkā* (NK. pp. 117, 159). Of all the commentaries on the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*, *Nyāya-kandalī* may be said to be the neatest and most lucid exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories. It occupies the same place of honour as the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspatimiśra and *Nyāya-mañjarī* of Jayanta.

(xi) *Udayanācārya.* His contribution to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is most voluminous. All the writers noted so far belong only to one of the two systems, the Nyāya or the Vaiśeṣika. For example, Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña belong to the Nyāya school, while Vyomaśiva, Śivāditya and Śrīdhara to the Vaiśeṣika school. But Udayana belongs equally to both the schools. Of his six works, two, viz., (i) *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-pariśuddhi*[155] and (ii) a short work called *Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa* belong to the Nyāya school, and two, viz., (i) *Kiraṇāvalī* and (ii) a short work named *Lakṣaṇāvalī* to the Vaiśeṣika. The remaining two works, (i) *Kusumāñjali* and (ii) *Ātmatattva-viveka* are independent treatises which belong to the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. All his works seem to have been extremely popular, because they have been extensively commented and sub-commented upon, and an extensive literature

154 Try-adhika-daśottara-navaśata-śākābde Nyāya-kandalī racitā. NK. p. 331.

155 Published with Vardhamāna's Nyāyanibandha-prakāśa in Bib. Ind. Series, only up to 768 which does not complete even the 5th sūtra of the first chapter.

grew round Udayana, which space does not permit us here to notice. But one long chain of eight commentaries may here be noticed as an interesting illustration of the Indian scholiasts' habit of heaping commentary upon commentary. It will be seen that Udayana's *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-pariśuddhi* is the fifth in the following chain of commentaries in which each succeeding one is a commentary on the preceding: (i) the *Nyāya-sūtras*, (ii) *Vātsyayana-bhāṣya*, (iii) *Nyāya-vārtika*, (iv) *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭikā*, (v) *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-pariśuddhi*, (vi) *Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa* by Vardhamāna, (vii) *Vardhamānendu* by Padmanābhamiśra and (viii) *Nyāya-tātparya-maṇḍana* by Śaṅkaramiśra. There is no knowing if the chain actually broke at this point, because there may be many manuscripts yet undiscovered.

Like Śrīdhara, Udayana has also given us the date of one of his works, namely *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, which is equivalent to 984 A.D.[156] This date is seven years earlier than the date of the *Nyāya-kandalī*. In *Kiraṇāvalī* the views of the *Nyāya-kandalī* are quoted and refuted.[157] Although the name of Śrīdhara is not mentioned, it is clear that he knew him and his *Nyāya-kandalī*. The *Nyāya-kandalī* also refers to the views expressed in *Kiraṇāvalī*.[158] The chronological order of the two works which quote each other is a matter of great puzzle. M. M. G. N. Kavirāja has made a suggestion to solve this difficulty. According to him, *Kiraṇāvalī* was written later than the *Nyāya-kandalī*. "But Udayana did not live to complete the work.... On the death of Udayana, Śrīdhara, still living, began to revise his book in the light of the criticism made, not failing, however, in his turn to cast a fling at Udayana, whenever occasion permitted."[159]

Udayanācārya stands at the juncture of the second period

156 Tarkāmbarāṅka-pramiteṣv atīteṣv śakāntataḥ,
Varṣeṣūdayanaś cakre subodhāṁ Lakṣaṇāvalīm.
Lakṣaṇāvalī, concluding stanza.
This gives 906 Śaka era which corresponds to 984 A.D.

157 Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī by V. P. Dvivedi, p. 21, n. 5; and G. N. Kavirāja, SBS. III. p. 111.

158 Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāya-kandalī by V. P. Dvivedi p. 21, n. 3.

159 G. N. Kavirāja, SBS. III. p. 111.

of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school with the third which is already anticipated in his writings. We have in his works, as already stated, a glimpse of the method of subtle argumentation without much substance, and this is the chief characteristic of Navya-nyāya which developed in the third period. Like the writers of the Navya-nyāya school, he lacks philosophical insight and originality and, as in their case words get the better of the sense. Lastly, a sense of arrogance which developed in the later period, is equally noticeable in him. An anecdote is related of him in an appendix of *Bhaviṣya-purāṇa*. When he went to the temple of Jagannātha, he found all the four doors of the temple shut against him, whereupon, he, being enraged, directed his banter against the Deity himself in the following words: "Intoxicated with thy supreme glory, thou despisest me upon whom thy very existence depended when thou wast attacked by the Buddhists."[160]

9. THE POST-BUDDHIST PERIOD

(i) *Anticipatory Significance of Udayanācārya, Bhāsarvajña and Śivāditya.* The beginning of the third period, which synchronises with the disappearance of the Buddhists from this country, is marked by a decadence in philosophical thought. The period commences somewhere in the eleventh century, although Gangeśa, the founder of the Navya-nyāya school, came a century later. There are, in this period, two distinct and different channels of intellectual activity, the foundations of which were already laid in the second period by Bhāsarvajna and Śivāditya. Bhāsarvajña, as already stated, treated Nyāya as pure epistemology and logic, divesting it of all its metaphysical appendage. This served as model for the new school of Gaṅgeśa, who like Bhāsarvajña treats of only four means of knowledge. The new school henceforward supersedes the old Nyāya and Vaiśesika schools. The principal activity of the period centres round Gaṅgeśa, whose methodology is amplified and made more and more subtle in endless commentaries and sub-commentaries. The other line of activity, for which

160 Aiśvarya-mada-matto 'si mām avajñāya vartase,
Upasthiteṣu Bauddheṣu mad-adhīnā tava sthitiḥ.

the way was already shown by Śivāditya, is the writing of *prakaraṇas* and commentaries thereon.

(ii) *Varadarāja, Vallabhācārya and Śaśadhara.* Three writers who preceded Gaṅgeśa deserve mention. Varadarāja, the author of the *Tārkika-rakṣā*, probably belongs to the eleventh century. All the manuals headed by *Sapta-padārthī* are the Vaiśeṣika *prakaraṇas* in the sense that their structure is based on the Vaiśeṣika categories in the framework of which the Nyāya topics are also incorporated. Varadarāja's work is a Nyāya *prakaraṇa* which primarily deals with the sixteen Nyāya topics, *pramāṇa*, etc. He includes the Vaiśeṣika categories as a second set of *prameyas*. His example was followed by Keśavamiśra, the author of *Tarka-bhāṣā*, who probably belongs to the thirteenth century. The *Tarka-bhāṣā* is an excellent treatise, and must have been very popular as indicated by the large number of commentaries on it. The other two writers are: Vallabhācārya, the author of *Nyāya-līlāvatī* and Śaśadhara, the author of *Nyāya-siddhānta-dīpa*. Both of them preceded Gaṅgeśa. They do not attempt a complete and systematic exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines. The former deals with all the principal controversial topics in the usual order of the Vaiśeṣika manuals, but the latter discusses only a few topics at random. As evidenced by the large number of its commentaries and subcommentaries, *Nyāya-līlāvatī* seems to have been a popular work.

(iii) *Gaṅgeśa and his Successors.* Gangeśa, the hero of the third period, probably belongs to the twelfth century. In his *Tattva-cintāmaṇi*, he laid the foundation of a new methodology on the basis of sharp and subtle distinctions in the connotations of logical terms. Exactitude and precision are sought to be achieved by a hair-splitting process of logic, which in intellectual, or, perhaps more appropriately in verbal, subtlety remains unsurpassed. Not only has Navya-nyāya made no contribution to the *prameya* part of the system (metaphysics), but none even to the *pramāṇa-vāda* (epistemology). Gaṅgeśa's school evolved a new terminology and a new language in which the long compounds of Subandhu reappear in a far more formidable form. Amongst the successors of Gangeśa, there are two

important figures: Vardhamāna, his own son, who, though not possessing the brilliance of his father, is the author of a large number of works of merit, and Pakṣadhara, the renowned teacher of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, whose real name was Jayadeva. The Bengal school of Navya-nyāya at Nadia was vested with glory and fame by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi. After Gangeśa, he is regarded as the second great figure of the Navya-nyāya school. He was an independent thinker. Besides his famous *Dīdhitī*, a commentary on the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* on which about a dozen sub-commentaries were written, he also wrote a short treatise, *Padārtha-tattva-nirūpaṇa* in which he refuted the Vaiśeṣika categories, particularly the category of *viśeṣa*. Mathurānātha and Jagadīśa are two other famous writers of the Navya-nyāya school, belonging respectively to the close of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. Jagadīśa is also the author of a manual named *Tarkāmṛta*. In Gadādhara, belonging to the middle of the seventeenth century, the subtlety of Navya-nyāya reaches its climax.

(iv) *Syncretic Manuals.* It has already been noted that side by side with the development of Navya-nyāya, manuals and commentaries, belonging to the old school, were also written. But these manuals and especially their commentaries are overloaded with the terminology of the new school.

Reference has already been made to two early Nyāya manuals, viz., *Tārkika-rakṣā* and *Tarka-bhāṣā*. Of the Vaiśeṣika manuals, the most important is the *Tarka-saṁgraha* of Annambhaṭṭa who belongs to the seventeenth century. Many manuals must have been written before the *Tarka-saṁgraha*. One such work is the *Pramāṇa-mañjarī* of Sarvadevasūri. As it is quoted in the *Nayana-prasādinī* (a commentary on Citsukhī of the fifteenth century), it must be an older work. It appears that the manuals of the intervening period were all eclipsed by the dominating popularity of the *Tarka-saṁgraha* which, with its commentary called *Dīpikā* by the author himself, is regarded as the most important introduction to Nyāya philosophy. Many commentaries on the *Tarka-saṁgraha* were written. In the *Tarka-saṁgraha*, although the basic structure of the Vaiśeṣika categories is maintained, the Vaiśesika theory of the two *pramānas* gives place to the Nyāya theory of the four *pramā-*

ṇas. The next *prakaraṇa* in chronological order as well as in popularity is *Bhāṣā-pariccheda* of Viśvanātha with its commentary called *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī* by the author himself. Viśvanātha belongs to the second quarter of the seventeenth century. In his *Gautama-sūtra-vṛtti*, he has given his date which corresponds to 1634 A.D. In the *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvai*, *pramāṇas* assume important position. Here the *pramāṇas*, instead of being treated under *guṇas* which is the usual way of Vaiśeṣika manuals, are dealt with under *ātman* and a separate chapter is devoted to each of the four *pramāṇas*. After the treatment of the four *pramāṇas*, the qualities are dealt with; and strangely enough, a part of epistemology (i.e., topics like illusion, doubt, validity of knowledge, etc.), is treated under *guṇa* (*buddhi*) according to the usual Vaiśeṣika scheme. There is a third manual named *Tarkāmṛta* by Jagadīśa. *Tarka-kaumudī* is another work by Laugākṣibhāskara whose date is not known.

(v) *Commentaries on the Sūtras.* The *sūtras* and other ancient works of the school seem to have been completely neglected in this period. But there are two exceptions which show that at least up to the seventeenth century, these works had not been completely forgotten as they decidedly were about the close of the eighteenth century or the beginning of the nineteenth century. Śaṁkaramiśra, who belongs to the period near about the second quarter of the fifteenth century,[161] and whose works on the Nyāya system and other systems number over a dozen, wrote a commentary called *Upaskāra* which is the oldest extant commentary on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. According to Śaṁkaramiśra's own statement, as already stated, he got no help in preparing this commentary from any other commentary, and had to depend on the *sūtras* alone.[162] The commentary is laden with the Navya-nyāya terminology. Another commentary of this age is the *Gautama-sūtra-vṛtti* on the *Nyāya-sūtras* by Viśvanātha, the author of *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*. Although written at a late period, this work is in a simple and easy style and is entirely free from the frightening Navya-nyāya terminology.

161 G. N. Kavirāja, SBS. III. pp. 150-51.
162 *Supra*, IV. 7 (vi)

(vi) *Decadent Tendencies of the Third Period.* No giant of the calibre of Jagadīśa or Gadādhara appeared in the Nyāya school after the close of the seventeenth century. Soon after that time decadence seems to have set in. So far as genuine philosophical thought is concerned, the decadence had commenced right from the opening of the third period in the eleventh century. Methodology of the Navya-nyāya school was, of course, cultivated, developed and perfected through these long centuries, but, as already pointed out, it was a fruitless pursuit.

(vii) *Climax of Decadence in the Eighteenth Century.* By the beginning of the eighteenth century, practically all is lost. While the school of Navya-nyāya was itself decaying, the works of the older school had completely been forgotten. As a result thereof, even the manuscripts of those books were lost. Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa has published some correspondence of the Portuguese Jesuits who were collecting manuscripts, in the beginning of the eighteenth century, for the King's library at Paris. The correspondence throws some light on the conditions obtaining at that period. Reference to one of the dispatches of these missionaries has already been made. Even the *Nyāya-sūtra* was not traceable.[163] Publishers' prefaces of some of the principal works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school which were published in the second half of the last century tell us that those works were unknown to pandits, and with what great efforts they could be procured. Colebrooke (1765-1837) says that he never came across a copy of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya.*[164]

(viii) *Recovery in the Nineteenth Century.* Thanks to the interest and enthusiasm evinced by European savants, there came about, at the close of the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a sort of Renaissance of Sanskrit literature. Although the interest of European scholars was, for a long time, restricted to Vedic and Buddhist literature, some basic works of Indian philosophy were also published chiefly under the ægis of the Bengal Asiatic Society, and through the

163 *Supra*, I. 10.

164 Essays, Vol. I. p. 262, quoted in the preface of the Nyāya-bhāṣya published in Bib. Ind. Series, 1861.

encouragement given by the Principals of the Government Sanskrit College Banaras. One of them, James Ballantyne, wrote a work in Sanskrit. It is in the style of the old philosophical writers. The work is named *Nyāya-kaumudi*.[165] It gives the principles of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy together with those of Chemistry and Physics. This work may be regarded as the sole contribution of the nineteenth century to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system. Some of the orthodox pandits also took active part in the Renaissance of Sanskrit in the nineteenth century.

Recapitulation. It would appear that in the third period which has been designated as the post-Buddhist period or the period of decadence, there are four distinct stages:

(i) The first two centuries before the advent of Gaṅgeśa (eleventh and twelfth) are a sort of intermezzo between the second and the third period.

(ii) For five hundred years, from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century, Gaṅgeśa reigns supreme over the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, and perhaps over the whole range of Indian philosophical thought. During that period the older works of the school were neglected, but not altogether forgotten.

(iii) In the eighteenth century, degeneration in the Navya-nyāya school set in, and as far as these old works were concerned, they were wholly forgotten and lost.

(iv) The nineteenth century is the age of the Renaissance of Sanskrit, in which some of the principal philosophical works, including those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, were discovered and published.

165 A copy of this book is preserved in the Saraswati Bhavana Library, Banaras. The fact that the same author also translated Becon's *Novum Organum* into Sanskrit shows what great pains were taken in those days to instil real philosophical thinking amongst orthodox pandits.

Chapter V

THE NATURE OF REALITY

1. EXISTENCE FROM NON-EXISTENCE

Is reality eternally fixed to which nothing can be added and from which nothing can be subtracted? In other words, nothing that is non-existent can come into being and all that exists can never be non-existent. Or does reality come out of the void and resolve into the void without leaving any residue? Every philosophical school must accept one position or the other on this fundamental point. Of Indian philosophical schools, the Sāṁkhya upholds the former position. The Sāṁkhya view is succinctly put in the famous words of the *Gītā*: "There can be no existence of the non-existent and no non-existence of the existent."[1] The other view, namely, that reality comes into existence out of the void and resolves into the void, is held by the Buddhist.

The Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory stands midway between these two positions. According to its theory of causation, an effect which was *altogether non-existent* comes into existence after the operation of its causes As the effect was altogether non-existent before, the question arises as to wherefrom it has

1 Nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ.
Bhagavad-Gītā, II. 16.

derived its existence. The answer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is that an effect has come into existence through the operation of its causes. According to its theory, however, an effect is not produced *out of* its cause, but it is produced *in* its cause.[2] A piece of cloth is not produced *out of the yarn* which (yarn) continues to exist separately and simultaneously with the piece of cloth. In other words, although a piece of cloth subsists *in* the yarn which is held to be its *inherent cause* (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*), the essence of cloth does not come *out of* the yarn, for the simple reason that, even after the production of cloth, the yarn continues to exist intact as it did before, not a whit of its essence being lost or subtracted from it to constitute the essence of its effect (cloth). Whence does, then, an effect derive its essence? It would appear that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the *essence of an effect comes into being out of* the void, although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would emphatically deny that position and point out that causes have actually worked to bring about an effect. The position of the school as formulated by Vācaspatimiśra is—*sataḥ asaj jāyate*,[3] i.e., from the existent (cause) comes into being an effect which was non-existent before. But the existent cause, as pointed out above, does not impart essence to its effect. Of course, according to the later view of the school, even the prior non-existence of an effect is not merely void or unreal, but it is a reality called 'antecedent negation' (*prāg-abhāva*). The *prāg-abhāva*, however, does not and cannot impart essence to an effect, its essence being only negative.[4] Moreover, the *prāg-abhāva* of an effect is accepted only as an accessory cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*), and not an inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). The essence can be imparted to an effect (e.g., cloth) only by its inherent cause (e.g., yarn), but the latter does not and cannot do it, as already pointed out.

2 CAUSE AND EFFECT DIFFERENT IN THEIR ESSENCE

The Mādhyamika Buddhist holds that an effect coming out of the void or non-existence is itself void or non-existent. Accord-

2 *Infra*, VII. 2-3

3 STK. Introduction to verse No. 9.

4 The abhāva (non-existence), though a reality, is accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as niṣedha-rūpa, i.e., of negative character.

ing to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as also according to the Dignāga school, an effect, although non-existent before its production, is existent after its production. The principal cause (e.g., yarn) is not conceived, by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, as material cause or *upādāna-kāraṇa* (as it is by the Sāṁkhya school), but as inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). Writers of the school sometimes use the term *upādāna-kāraṇa* for *samavāyi-kāraṇa*,[5] but the usage is not quite warranted, as the implication of *upādāna-kāraṇa* (material cause) is that it should impart its essence to its effect. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school an inherent cause is always in the form of 'parts' (*avayavas*), while an effect is in the form of a 'whole' (*avayavin*). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school maintains against the Buddhist that a 'whole' is not merely an aggregate of its parts, but an altogether new entity quite different from its parts. A 'whole' (*avayavin*) emerges as residing in its parts by inherent relation (*samavāya saṁbandha*). This means that an effect is different *in essence* from its cause in which it resides by inherent relation as a separate entity. Cause and effect are not conceived by the Sāṁkhya as different entities; they are identical. A piece of cloth, according to the Sāṁkhya, is only a different arrangement of threads. The thread imparts essence to the cloth, or more exactly, the essence of both is the same. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, however, the inherent cause, which exists simultaneously and side by side with its effect and as such retains its full essence to itself cannot, in any way, impart essence to its effect. An inherent cause is thus not a material cause.

In fact, so far as the essence of an effect is concerned, the inherent cause (e.g., yarn) is as extraneous to its effect as the accessory causes (*nimitta-kāraṇas*) like loom, shuttle, etc. This point deserves better appreciation than it has hitherto received at the hands of the students of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Uddyotakara clearly suggests that an inherent cause is not a

5 E.g., Yad dravyaṁ yad-dravya-dhvaṁsa-janyaṁ tat tad-upādānopādeyam. NSM. on verse, 35.

It is interesting to note that even Buddhists, who emphatically maintain that a previous moment does not impart its essence to the subsequent moment in any way, use the term 'upādāna-pratyaya' for the previous cause-moment.

material cause, but is extraneous like the accessory causes. He says: "Yarn is an entity quite different from cloth, because it is the cause of the latter like the shuttle, etc. As the shuttle, etc., which are the cause of cloth, are different from it, similarly, the yarn also (which is a cause) is different from cloth".[6] Now, if an inherent cause were regarded as material cause, Uddyotakara's argument will lose its point. It has force only when it is held that the yarn does not impart essence to the cloth like the shuttle, etc.

The question of the source of the essence of cloth is thus a problem for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The only possible answer can be that an inherent cause, without transferring its own essence and retaining it intact, imparts in some way essence to its effect *which resides in it by an inherent relation.* This is the beauty of the peculiar *inherent* relation. The essence of an effect is constituted by the fact of its residing in the cause by *inherent relation.* Or perhaps we may say that the same essence-stuff simultaneously serves the purpose of being the essence of the cause as well as of its effect which are, albeit, two quite different entities.

The problem of the separate essence of cause and of its effect has been a puzzling one to the exponents of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It came into prominence in connection with the question of the separate *weights* of a cause and its effect. In connection with the examination of the theory of 'whole' (*avayavi-parīkṣā*),[7] the question is raised, if a 'whole' were an entity different from its *parts*, there should be separate weights for the *parts* and their 'whole.' In that case, as soon as a piece of cloth emerges from the yarn, its weight should get doubled, inasmuch as a new object with its separate weight has been added. Or else, it will have to be assumed that as soon as a new effect is produced, the cause has lost its weight. An alternative assumption may be that the same weight is shared by the two entities, the cause and the effect (yarn and cloth). There can be no other alternative. The problem was so confounding

6 Arthāntaraṁ paṭāt *tantavaḥ tad-hetutvāt turyādivad iti. Turyādi* paṭa-kāraṇam arthāntaram iti dṛṣṭam, tathā ca tantavaḥ, tasmād arthāntaram iti. NV. II. i. 36. p. 513.

7 NS. II. i. 33. and NV. II. i. 33. pp. 402-06.

that Uddyotakara quotes two explanations given by some thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school, which he himself summarily rejects. According to one of them, the weight of the cause after the emergence of its effect is obstructed by the latter, and therefore, not cognised; while, according to the other, the weight of the cause is destroyed by that of its effect.[8] Obviously, there is difficulty in accepting any of these two views when full, separate, and simultaneous reality is to be maintained for both the cause and its effect.

Uddyotakara holds that a cause and its effect have *separate weights*. This view, in fact, seems to be more queer than the two views rejected by Uddyotakara. The obvious difficulty in maintaining separate weights for a cause and its effect is met by him by a strange device. He says that the weight of an effect, as different from that of its cause, is not manifested because it cannot be ascertained how much of the total weight belongs to the cause and how much to the effect. "When a substance is weighed, it should be understood that a collection of many substances beginning from atoms to the last effect is weighed".[9] The weight indicated belongs not to the last effect (cloth) only, but to atoms and all intervening substances between the atoms and the cloth, i.e., *dvy-aṇukas*, etc. Vācaspatimiśra in his *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭikā* adds that "a collection of substances means the collection of all the intervening effect-and-cause substances. i.e., the weight of a jar includes the weight of the particles of earth, the powder of earth, the pebbles of earth, the two lids of the jar (kapāla) and the jar itself".[10] Uddyotakara further says that "it is not possible for ordinary men (with imperfect knowledge) to say how much is the weight of the cause and how much that of the effect".[11] Obviously, this does not solve the

8 Apare tu kārya-gurutvena kāraṇa-gurutvaṁ pratibaddhaṁ bruvate ...etena kārya-gurutvena kāraṇa-gurutva-vināśo 'pi vyākhyātaḥ. NV. II. i. 33. p. 496.

9 Ācaramād ā ca paramāṇor dravya-samāhāra unmlyate. NV. II. i. 33. p. 494.

10 Dravya-samāhāra iti kārva-kāraṇa-dravya-samāhārah, mṛt-kaṇa-mṛccūrna-śarkarā-kapāla-kumbha-samāhāra ity arthaḥ. NVT. II. i. 33. p. 494.

11 Tatra manuṣya-dharmano na yu'ktaṁ vaktum iyat kāraṇa-gurutvam iti. NV. II. i. 33. p. 494.

difficulty. Granting that the weight indicated by an object belongs to the whole series of cause and effect constituting that object, the question remains unsolved why the weight does not increase when a new effect like cloth, with its separate weight, emerges from its cause (yarn).

Śrīdhara gives a still more queer explanation. With regard to there being no separate weights of the parts and the 'whole', he says that the weighing machine does not indicate any difference between the weights of the two, because the difference between them is very slight. For instance, when a big substance is being weighed, the weight of the small particles, sticking to it, is not indicated.[12] Is it an explanation at all?

Uddyotakara's desperate effort to solve the problem of separate weights of cause and effect shows how difficult it was to maintain cause and effect as two separate entities. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school was principally assailed, so far as this theory is concerned, by the Satkārya-vādins of the Sāṁkhya school who held that an effect existed in its cause in an unmanifested form even before its production.

3. THE EXISTENT BECOMES NON-EXISTENT

As is the case with the production of an effect, so also with its destruction. An effect comes into existence without having any source for its essence-stuff. Similarly, an effect is destroyed without leaving any residue, i.e., any of its essence-stuff. It is complete destruction. It is in a way *niranvaya vināśa*, i.e., the destruction of an object without its continuity in any form. Usually, that term is technically employed to denote the destruction of a moment as propounded by the Buddhist theory, and not in connection with the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory of the destruction of an object. But it is equally applicable to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory in connection with the destruction of an object. The fact that the yarn continues after the destruction of the cloth does not mean the continuity of cloth in any way, because the latter, which is quite different from the former, is destroyed

12 Yat punar avayavi-gurutvasya kāryātireko na gṛhyate tad avayavāvayavi-gurutva-bhedasya alpāntaratvāt. yathā mahati dravve unmīyamāne tat-patita-sūkṣma-dravyāntara-gurutva-kāryāgrahaṇam. NK. p. 264.

without leaving any bit of its essence. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika calls the destruction of an object as its past condition (*atītāvasthā*) which it also designates as 'consequent negation' (*dhvaṁsābhāva*). Of course, the consequent negation, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, is a reality. But it may be noted that the *consequent negation* of a cloth (*paṭa-dhvaṁsa*) is quite a different entity from that of the cloth, and continuity of the consequent negation (*dhvaṁsa*) of the cloth does not mean the continuity of the cloth in any way. Therefore, the destruction of the cloth is complete and without any continuity (*niranvaya*). In the same way, the production of an effect may also be regarded as *niranvaya*, i.e., without cause continuing in the form of an effect, for the simple reason that the cause does not impart its essence in any way to its effect. This, of course, would be resisted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school even more vehemently than the destruction of an effect being regarded as without any continuity (*niranvaya*).

This aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory was noted by ancient writers. Commenting on Saṁkara's remarks that the Vaiśesika is a semi-nihilist (*ardha-vaināśika*)[13] in comparison with the Buddhist who is a full nihilist (*sarva-vaināśika*), Vācaspatimiśra remarks: "The Vaiśeṣikas are semi-nihilists because while they accept as eternal the five substances, ether, time, space, soul and *manas*, and the categories—*sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya*, and also some qualities, they hold that the destruction of other objects (effects) comes about without the continuity of its cause-stuff (*niranvaya-vināśa*). Hence, they are semi-nihilists."[14]

In the case of production, however, cloth is produced as residing in its cause (yarn) by inherent relation, and there is, thus, continuity of the cause from which its effect has emerged as residing in it by inherent relation. But it would appear that this is the continuity of cause *as cause*, and not its continuity in the form of its effect. So far as the effect is concerned, it has

13 Śāriraka-bhāsya, II. ii. 18.

14 Vaiśesikāḥ khalu ardha-vaināśikāḥ, te hi paramānv-ākāśa-dik-kālātma-manasāṁ ca sāmānya-viśeṣa-samavāyānaṁ ca guṇānāṁ ca keṣāṁcin nityatvamabhyupetya śeṣāṇāṁ niranvaya-vināśam upayanti, tena te 'rdha-vaināśikāḥ. Bhāmatī, II. ii. 18.

come into existence without having any previous trace of its essence-stuff. The production of an effect (cloth) is therefore *niranvaya*, i.e., without any former essence-stuff continuing in the form of effect. The fact that an effect resides in its cause cannot be cited to refute the objection that the production of an effect is without any continuity of cause-essence (*niranvaya-otpatti*), inasmuch as the cloth and the yarn are two different entities.

The implication of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation suggested above, viz., the production and destruction of an effect are to be held as being without continuity of the cause-stuff (*niranvayotpāda-vināśa*), brings that school dangerously near the Buddhist view of causation.[15]

According to the Buddhists, there is a series of discrete, disconnected and discontinuous moments. The past moment is destroyed completely without imparting any of its essence to the present moment. The description that an effect is produced and destroyed without any continuity of its cause-stuff (*niranvayotpāda-vināśa*) is principally applicable to the Buddhist view of causation. The difference between the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that while the reality, according to the former, is momentary, according to the latter, it is stationary, i.e., it lasts for some time. Further, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an effect after being produced resides in its cause which continues to exist side by side with its effect. But according to the Buddhist, the cause disappears without any continuity of its stuff as soon as its effect is produced.

4. THE ESSENCE OF NON-ETERNAL SUBSTANCES

So far we have discussed the nature of the reality of objects which are effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*) and which are non-eternal. They are products of atoms of the first four substances (earth, water, fire and air). The four types of atoms

15 The theory of causation of the Buddhist is called pratītya-samutpāda. According to it, although a previous moment is a condition of the subsequent moment, it is not the material cause of the subsequent moment, inasmuch as, the former does not impart any essence to the latter. The theory and its implications will be further explained and discussed in chapter (VII.) on causation.

of these substances and their effect-substances constitute material and physical substances according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. The four substances are in two forms. In the form of atoms, they are eternal, and as effects of those atoms, they are non-eternal. All physical or material objects, or strictly speaking, all substances which we see, touch, taste or smell, are effect-substances produced out of the four kinds of atoms. It has been said with regard to these non-eternal effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*) that they have not derived their essence-stuff from their immediate causes, e.g., a piece of cloth has not derived its essence from the yarn, and the latter (yarn), in turn, from its cause, filaments of threads (*aṁśus*),[16] and so on. We thus reach dyads (*dvy-aṇukas*) which likewise do not derive their essence from the atoms. As already explained, a cause is conceived as different *in essence* from its effect—the former existing and retaining its essence intact, side by side with its effect. The necessary corollary of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation which is forced on the school—forced because not expressly admitted—is that all physical objects or effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*) have an essence or reality which has not been imparted to them by their causes, and which has come about, all of a sudden, through the operation of causes, as though from the void. Only the four kinds of atoms, which are eternal, have their eternal essence. As these eternally real atoms, in the last resort, are causes of all the effect-substances which ultimately—through a chain of their causes—reside in them, it may be said that the essence of an effect-substance hangs on the essence of eternal atoms. But it must not be forgotten that inasmuch as these eternal atoms continue to have their essence intact, they have not transferred or imparted their essence to their effects or to the effects of their effects. The essence of all the effect-substances, thus, has got to be admitted, as though it had sprung up from the void. This is the inevitable consequence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory, a cause continues

16 The parts of a substance, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, being conceived as its cause, the finer filaments of thread (aṁśus) are held to be the cause of threads. Similarly, the smaller parts of the filaments will be regarded as the cause of the filaments, and so on.

to exist, after the emergence of its effect, simultaneously and side by side with it. If it were not so, the atoms would not continue to exist after the dyads (*dvy-aṇukas*) had been produced, and in that case atoms would not be eternal. If they were not eternal, they would not be atoms, and thus the very foundation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism would be demolished. Besides, the effect-substances reside in their causes by *inherent relation*. The residing of an effect in its cause by inherent relation makes the effect inseparable from its cause, and appear as identical with it. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an effect can exist only in its cause. It is this fact which gives essence to an effect, and which principally differentiates the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory from that of the Buddhists. A necessary conclusion from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, (namely, that a cause continues to exist retaining its essence intact side by side with its effect) is that the essence of effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*) has got to be admitted as though sprung up from the void. What type of essence or reality do, then, these effect-substances possess? They appear and disappear having no essence before and leaving no essence as residue afterwards.

5. FOUR KINDS OF ETERNAL ATOMS

While the reality of effect-substances is without any abiding essence-stuff, the reality of four kinds of eternal atoms is based on their eternal essence. As pointed out above, it is on the bedrock of eternal atoms that effect-substances with their 'come-from-nowhere' essence somehow rest. The essence of atoms is fixed. New atoms cannot come into existence, and the existing ones can never be non-existent. These four types of atoms are physical or material substances; it is only through them that the physical or material nature belongs to effect-substances which, apart from atoms, have no essence. The reality of these four types of atoms is the reality *par excellence*, if that expression can be hazarded in relation to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. For, although in a realistic system gradation of reality cannot be permitted, one gets an irresistible impression about different levels of reality in the realistic categories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as we shall presently see.

These four substances—earth, water, fire and air—constitute

matter. There are five more substances—ether, time, space, *manas* and soul—which are eternal. Inasmuch as they are substances they possess quality and other properties, but still they are not material or physical substances.[17]

The most important characteristic of these four atomic substances which differentiates them from other substances is that they produce effect-substances (*dravyārambhakatva*).[18] But there is no universal (*sāmānya*) which may cover all these four substances. These four substances, together with the ether, have been regarded in ancient philosophical and non-philosophical literature as the five elements (*bhūtas*). It appears that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has regarded ether as an element only in deference to the old usage. Śrīdhara says, that there is nothing in common to the five substances which are given a common name *bhūta* simply because that term has been in use for them".[19] Obviously, ether, as conceived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika cannot be an element, and it is not conceived as a cause of physical objects like the four atomic elements.

6. FIVE EXCLUSIVELY ETERNAL SUBSTANCES

While the four atomic substances are found in both eternal and non-eternal forms as explained above, the remaining five substances, (1) ether, (2) time, (3) space, (4) *manas*, and (5) soul, are exclusively eternal. They do not produce any effect-substances. These five may be divided in two groups. The first three of them—ether, time and space—are non-psychic sub-

17 It has been suggested that the eight substances of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the four atomic ones and ether, time, space and *manas*, i.e., all substances except soul constitute matter (Dr. Umesh Mishra: *Conception of Matter*, p. 58 ff). If the last four eternal substances are included in matter simply because they are substances and possess qualities, or because they are inherent causes of some of the qualities, why should the soul also not be regarded material for the same reason? The eight substances, in fact, have never been grouped together in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and not one property common to all the eight substances has been given in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, or can even be conceived except the negative one, i.e., of having no knowledge. This conception of matter, is therefore, a misconception, and quite alien to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

18 Another common property of these four atomic substances is that they all possess the quality of touch.

19 NK. p. 22-23.

stances. They are all-pervading (*vibhu*), and each of them being only one, they possess no universal (*sāmānya*). Time and space are always present in our common experience, or it may be said that all our experience is presented through time and space. But the case of ether is different. In the Vedāntic systems, ether was conceived as an element, i.e., one of the five primary elements which create the physical world. But the ether of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception, although nominally regarded as an element (*bhūta*), is not an effect-producing substance. It is conceived only as the inherent cause of sound, and for that reason alone its existence is postulated. The remaining two substances, *manas* and *ātman* (soul) are psychic, i.e., related to the mental phenomenon of knowledge. Each of them being many, they possess universals (*manastva* and *ātmatva*). Soul, like ether, time and space, is all-pervading, but the *manas* has atomic measure (*aṇu-parimāṇa*), and being of atomic size, it (unlike the other four eternal substances) possesses movement also. The five exclusively eternal substances, although non-material, are held to be substances because they possess qualities.

7. CONCEPTION OF SUBSTANCE

When we perceive a substance like a jar, we perceive its qualities, colour, touch, size, form, etc. Apart from these qualities, do we also perceive a separate substratum called substance in which these qualities reside? The *Naiyāyika* says, Yes; the Buddhist says, No. The Buddhist refutes the conception of a separate substance apart from its qualities as emphatically as he does that of a 'whole' (*avayavin*) apart from its 'parts' (*avayavas*). The acceptance of substance, as an entity separate and distinct from its qualities, is a bone of contention between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist. In fact, from the Buddhist point of view, the basis of the two erroneous conceptions, viz., that of *substance* and that of 'whole', is the same. The Buddhists hold that qualities like colour, touch, etc., are atom-like point-instants (*kṣaṇas*), or unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*). They are discrete and disconnected point-instants which come, one after the other, in a constant flux. Apart from these point-instants which are mere *dharmas*[20] (qualities or

20 *Supra*, III. 19.

properties), there is no substratum in the form of a substance in which these properties may be residing, even as there is no separate entity called 'whole' (*avayavin*) apart from the aggregate of its parts. The Buddhists thus reject in the same breath the conception of *substance* and that of *avayavin*.

It may be pointed out that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a substance which we can experience with external senses is always an effect-substance (*kārya-dravya*) and it is necessarily an *avayavin* 'whole'. Although all the effect-substances are *avayavins*, the denotation of the term *dravya* (substance) is wider. While all *avayavins* are substances (*dravyas*), all the substances are not *avayavins* inasmuch as they also include eternal substances (*non-avayavins*) like ether, etc. The connotations of the two terms are different. A substance connotes an entity in which qualities and movement reside by *samavāya* relation. An *avayavin* connotes an entity which has parts in which it resides by *samavāya* relation. For instance, a cloth, as *avayavin*, resides in its parts (threads) by *samavāya* relation, but as a substance, it is the abode of its qualities—colour, etc.—which reside in it by *samavāya* relation.

Now, let us revert to the question of the conception of substance. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as already noted, follows the dictum that "our experience is the sole criterion for determining the nature of reality".[21] In our experience we distinctly see that there is a substratum (e.g., a jar) in which qualities like colour, touch, size, etc., reside. Our experience presents two separate realities, the properties and their substratum, which two are different in their essence. We have seen that differentiation between properties and their substratum (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*) is the basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. A substance is thus conceived as the substratum of its properties. Of course, a substance itself may be a property (*dharma*). A 'whole' (*avayavin*) is a property (*dharma*) of its parts (*avayavas*) in which it resides. Thus, while a substance may itself sometimes be a property, a substratum of properties is necessarily a substance. An exception may, however, be noted.

21 Saṁvid eva hi bhagavati vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam. NVT. II. i. 36. p. 506.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, properties include universals (*sāmānya*), and the universals reside in qualities and actions also. For instance, the universal 'colourness' (*rūpatva*) resides in 'colour' (*rūpa*) which is a quality. Here we find a substratum of properties other than a substance. But properties, such as substance (in the form of *avayavin*), quality and action, in which the universal (*sattā*) resides, are, for that reason, real *objective* properties.[22] These properties reside only in a substance.

The difference between properties and their substratum, i.e., the substance, is that the former are dependent for their existence on the latter. So long as the properties exist, they can exist only as residing in their substance. But a substratum (substance) does not depend for its existence on anything else. Śrīdhara says that "apprehension of substanceness is just an apprehension of having independent existence."[23] Substance is defined by Kaṇāda as 'possessing qualities and actions, and as an inherent cause."[24] The theory of a substance in the form of a 'whole' residing in its *parts* was not perhaps firmly established in his time, otherwise, Kaṇāda would have included *substance* also in the properties residing in a substance. On the question of the separate existence of substance, the Buddhist joins issue with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra have devoted a full section to this topic. Their arguments and counter-arguments will be stated in the next chapter.

In the context of differentiation between properties and their substratum (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*), it may be pointed out that the word property (*dharma*) in this context does not mean only qualities, but it is used in a wider sense and includes all the five kinds of properties, (i.e., substance, quality, movement, the universal and *viśeṣa*) which subsist in their substrata by inherent relation. These five properties may be divided into three types. The first type is substance itself which, in the form of a 'whole', resides in its *parts* by inherent relation. The second type consists of *quality* and *movement*, which properties to-

22 According to Kaṇāda, only dravya, guṇa and karman were held to be *objectively* real (artha).

23 Sva-prādhānya-pratitir eva dravyatva-pratitiḥ, NK. p. 13.

24 Kriyā-guṇavat samavāyi-kāraṇam iti dravya-lakṣaṇam, VS. I, 15.

gether with the first one (i.e., substance) possess the universal being' (*sattā*). The third type consists of the universal (*sāmānya*) and the particular (*viśeṣa*) which do not possess the universal being, and which, in the early stage of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, were regarded as mere intellectual abstractions,[25] and not full-fledged objective realities, as they were held in the later period.

8. REALITY OF THE CATEGORIES OTHER THAN SUBSTANCE

The differentiation between properties and their substrata being the basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, qualities, actions, the universals, *viśeṣas* and even the relation called *samavāya* are held to be externally existent objective realities, quite different *in essence* from the substance in which they reside. Even the seventh category, the negation (*abhāva*), which was added later on to the list of the original six ones, is accepted by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school as an objective reality. According to it, *abhāva* is not unreal or non-existent like the horn of a hare. It is, of course, negative, but even then, it is real and existent.

From the standpoint of the nature of their reality, the six categories other than substance may be divided into four groups. It has been stated that of the seven categories, the first six are of a positive nature, while the negation or non-existence (*abhāva*) is negative. The last three of the six positive categories, namely, *sāmānya, viśesa* and *samavāya* are eternal, while the second and third categories, namely, qualities and actions, are non-eternal, except that some of the qualities of eternal substances, such as, oneness (*ekatva*) of ether, time, space, etc., are eternal. These two categories, i.e., *guṇa* (quality) and *karman* (movement) together with the substance, are held to be possessing the universal 'being' (*sattā-jāti*). Kaṇāda says that the word *artha* (which literally means a *real* object) is applicable only to the first three categories, viz., substance, quality and movement.[26] The last three categories, *sāmānya,*

25 See V. 10.

26 Artha iti dravya-guna-karmasu. VS. VIII. ii. 3.

etc., according to Kaṇāda, are *padārthas*, but not *arthas*. This clearly shows that Kaṇāda conceived *padārtha* only as 'the meaning of a word' and not as an external *objective* reality. With regard to *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, he has expressly declared that they depend merely on our intellect.[27] They reside in their substrata by *samavāya* relation. But *samavāya* itself does not reside by some other relation. *Samavāya* may, therefore, be said to possess even a lesser degree of reality than *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. In fact, the subsistence (*vṛtti*) of *samavāya* in the objects related, not being by any other relation, is in the form of the related objects themselves. Thus, we find that from the standpoint of reality—out of the categories other than substances—qualities and actions form one group, the *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, the second group, and *samavāya* forms a third group. Negation (*abhāva*), being of negative character, constitutes the fourth group. It may, however, be noted that this kind of gradation, although it follows from the account of the categories as given in the authoritative manuals, is not expressly stated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works.

9. EXTREME REALISM OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOOL

Different grades of reality of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories result from the basic principle that whatever enters into the texture of our experience must have its counterpart in the external world. Critical thinkers of the school, however, did not fail to notice the limitations of this basic principle. In the first instance, all our experience, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is not necessarily valid as it is held to be by the Prabhākara school of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. The evidence of experience therefore may sometimes be erroneous. Secondly, if we were to assume an external counterpart for every factor of our experience, our world of reality would be flooded with unlimited contents. For instance, in that case, we shall have to assume a new relation for the subsistence of the inherent relation (*samavāya*) also. Another relation will have to be assumed for the subsistence of *abhāva* in the objects where it resides. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika held that the relation of *abhāva* with the object where it resides is in the form of that object itself (*svarūpa*

27 Sāmānyaṁ viśeṣa iti buddhy-apekṣam. VS. I. ii. 3.

saṁbandha). That relation, therefore, apart from the object in which it resides, is not a separate external entity; it thus appears to be only a mental entity. External reality, according to the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is to be assumed only where the assumption leads to brevity (*lāghava*). *Samavāya* as a separate category is accepted on the same principle. Instead of numerous relations in the form of numberless objects, the assumption of one ubiquitious entity (*samavāya*) leads to brevity.[28] Similarly, the universal *dravyatva* is accepted by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, not because of its being experienced as such, but because it is the determining or distinguishing characteristic (*avacchedaka*) of the inherent causation.[29] In simple language it means that only a substance can be an inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). The universal *sattā* is accepted not because it causes the common notion of existence in the case of the first three categories (*dravya, guṇa* and *karman*), which notion is present in the case of the other categories, *sāmānya*, etc., also, but because it is the determining characteristic of the causality of the consequent negation (*dhvaṁsa*).[30] It only means that whatever is destroyed (i.e., the subject of consequent negation) is one of the first three categories in which *sattā* resides. Of course, the external entities which were accepted by old masters of the school were not discarded by the neo-scholiasts. But prior to the *Navya-nyāya* school, the existence of an external reality corresponding to everyone of our ideas was always assumed. It went in some cases to the extreme length of even assuming the creation of a new reality just for a few moments, simply for the purpose that it may serve as an external counterpart of an idea. This may be illustrated by two examples:

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, our notion of remoteness or nearness (*paratva* or *aparatva*) with reference to time and space, is due to the presence of these qualities in the object which we experience as remote or near. But these qualities do not permanently exist in those objects. They are only produced for the

28 Ananta-svarūpānāṁ saṁbandhatva-kalpane gauravāl lāghavād eka-samavāya-siddhiḥ NSM. on verse 11.

29 Samavāyi-kāranatāvacchedakatavā. NSM. on verse 3.

30 Dhvaṁsa-kāraṇatāvacchedakatayā. Dinakarī on verse 9 of NSM.

time being, i.e., at the time of their perception. The process of origination of the quality of remoteness with reference to space is given by Praśastapāda thus: "When two objects are situated in the same direction, and connections of the connected points of space of one of them, taken from the point of the ground where an observer is standing, are more than those of the other, then there arises in the mind of the observer of both objects a notion of not being close (*asannikṛṣṭā buddhiḥ*) with reference to the object which has the larger number of connections of the connected points of space and which is the *would-be-substratum* of the quality of remoteness. The notion of not being close takes the form that that object is distant in relation to the other object which is close (and which has got lesser number of connections of connected points of space in relation to the observer). Then, with reference to that notion of not being close, the connection of the object with the distant point in space produces[31] the quality of remoteness in that object, and then there arises the notion of remoteness.[32] Obviously, the external quality of remoteness is produced in an object according to this view, simply to serve as the external counterpart of our perception of remoteness. And after serving that purpose, it is forthwith destroyed.

The process of the production of the quality of duality (*dvitva*) is still more striking. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the quality of oneness (*ekatva*) resides in every object permanently. When, however, we see two objects simultaneously, we have a collective perception of two *onenesses*. On account of this collective perception (*samuccaya-buddhi*), which itself is *one* and which is technically called *apekṣā-buddhi*, there is produced an *external objective quality* (called *dvitva*) jointly, i.e., *one* quality residing simultaneously in the *two* objects—

31 Connection with the distant point in space serves as the 'asamavāyi-kārana' of the quality of remoteness (paratva) produced in the distant object which is the 'samavāyi-kāraṇa' of that quality.

32 Ekasyām diśy avasthitayoḥ piṇḍayoḥ saṁyukta-saṁyoga-bahv-alpa-bhāve saty ekasya draṣṭuḥ sannikṛṣṭam avadhiṁ kṛtvā etasmād viprakṛṣṭo 'yam iti paratvādhāre 'sannikṛṣṭā buddhir utpadyate tatas tām apekṣya pareṇa dik-pradeśena saṁyogāt paratvasyotpattiḥ. PP. p. 164. The above passage is translated, not literally, but in the light of its explanation in the Nyāya-kandalī.

each of which is the abode of the quality of oneness separately. Only after the production of the objective quality of duality in the two objects, can we have a perception of the same. It is pointed out that the collective notion (*samuccaya-buddhi*) of two onenesses cannot cause the perception of duality, because we see duality externally, and therefore it must exist externally in the objects themselves. We have here a striking illustration of the principle that our mind can have no perception of which the counterpart reality does not exist in the external world. Where a reality corresponding to our perception cannot be accepted as existing permanently in the external world, it must be assumed to have come into existence even for a few moments in order to serve as a counterpart of the perception. The process of the production of duality, its cognition and its destruction, as given in Praśastapāda[33] and its commentaries, are frightfully intricate. No wonder, then, that it was declared that only he who knew the intricacy of duality, etc., was a true adherent of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy.[34]

External realities are, thus, created as if by a magic wand to be the counterparts of our cognitions. But could the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adhere to the last to the principle that every cognition must have its counterpart in the external world? No. The most striking example is that of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) where something that does not exist as an outside reality enters into our experience. In the example: "He is the same Devadatta whom I saw at Patna", the past condition of Devadatta being at Patna is not present before my eyes; there is no reality like Devadatta's being at Patna existent now. Yet it does enter into our cognition. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika takes great pains to explain the process.[35] It insists that in the case of recognition, the notion of the past condition is not a recollection (*smṛti*), but a constituent part of the direct perception of the object present before the eyes. Similarly, although the existence of a universal is assumed on account of the notion of commonness in objects of the same class, yet it is not done in all cases. While

33 PP. p. 111.

34 Dvitve ca pākajotpattau vibhāge ca vibhāgaje,
Yasya na skhalitā buddhis taṁ vai vaiśeṣikaṁ viduḥ.

35 *Infra*, VI. 23 and 31; and XII. 11-12.

brāhmaṇatva (belonging to Brāhmana caste) is a universal, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *bhāratīyatva* (belonging to India) is not a universal, although it also gives a common notion of community. A Naiyāyika may advance reasons for it, but the fact remains that every mental notion cannot be said to have a counterpart in the external world.

It has been pointed out above that the *svarūpa-saṁbandha* by which *abhāva* (non-existence) resides in an external object is not an external entity, but only a mental one. But here also, instead of plainly admitting it to be a mental entity, a Naiyāyika says that *svarūpa-saṁbandha* is in the form of the object in which non-existence resides. Its objectivity is denied in the same breath as it is asserted. When it is said that the *svarūpa-saṁbandha* is in the form of the object, it only means that it does not exist as an external reality apart from the object. Early writers of the third period of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were fully conscious of it. In the *Tarka-bhāṣā* of Keśavamiśra (of the twelfth or thirteenth century), an objection is raised by the Mīmāṁsaka that *abhāva* (e.g., non-existence of a jar on the ground) cannot be cognized by perception which comprehends only the objects that are related to the sense. The non-existence of the jar resides in the ground by *svarūpa-saṁbandha* or *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇabhāva* which is not an objective relation like *saṁyoga* or *samavāya*. Therefore, the sense which is connected with the ground cannot be connected with non-existence. Keśavamiśra meets the objection by pointing out that the principle, that senses cognize only that which is related to them, is applicable only in the case of positive objects (*bhāva-padārtha*), and not in that of negative objects (*abhāva-padārtha*). It is, therefore, clear that Keśavamiśra did not hold *svarūpa-saṁbandha* to be an objective reality.[36]

The most significant example of a cognition which has no corresponding external reality at the time of its cognition is, strangely enough, that of duality (*dvitva*) itself which was assumed as temporarily produced for the very purpose of being an external counterpart of its perception. It appears that under the influence of the theory of the succession of moments as propounded by the Buddhists, Praśastapāda adopted the view that

36 TB. pp. 51-53.

at the *exact moment* of its cognition, the quality of *dvitva* was not present.[37] *Dvitva* causes its cognition by virtue of its existence in the immediately preceding moment. It does so exactly in the manner of a *sva-lakṣaṇa* (point-instant), which, according to the Buddhist theory, produces its sensation in a subsequent moment when it exists no more. Whatever be the justification of the Buddhist for holding that view, there is none for the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. Acceptance of the fact that *dvitva* does not exist at the moment of its perception is a clear violation of the principle that every perception must have its counterpart in the external world.

It may also be noted that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, qualities like nearness or remoteness or *dvitva* are produced by our mental notions which precede the perception of those qualities. These external objects are, thus, the creation of our own mind. Faced with this difficulty, Śrīdhara declares with the typical boldness of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school: "There is nothing extraordinary in the production of an object by knowledge. It is well-known that pleasure, etc., are produced by knowledge."[38] Obviously, the case of pleasure, etc., which are mental objects is different. But if even external objects, like *dvitva*, etc., are accepted to be produced by our knowledge, do we not approach very near Idealism? An idealist maintains that the external objects do not exist outside the mind, that they are simply projections of our ideas, and that they do not exist independently of those ideas. The qualities mentioned above are produced, not by their own ideas, but by the ideas which precede their cognition; and then these qualities disappear just after producing the cognition. If this is not idealism, what else is it? Extreme realism inadvertently slips into idealism.

10. CONCEPTION OF EXISTENCE (SATTĀ) IN THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

Is there any warrant for postulating different gradations of reality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika? In order to answer this question,

37 Yady api dve dravye iti jñānotpatti-kāle dvitvaṁ nāsti tathāpi tad asya kāranam. NK. p. 118; Dvitva-pratyakṣa-jñānasya pūrva-kṣaṇa-varty evārtho viṣayo 'sti. Ibid. p. 121.

38 Jñānād arthasyotpāda iti nālaukikam idaṁ, sukhādīnāṁ tasmād utpatti-darśanāt. NK. p. 116.

let us first consider as to what constitutes the existence or reality of an object. According to the Buddhist, efficiency for purposive action, i.e., efficiency to produce an effect, constitutes the existence, the essence or the reality of an object.[39] According to Kaṇāda, it is the universal called *sattā-jāti* (existence or being) which produces the notion of existence in the case of the first three categories, viz., substance, quality and action.[40] Here the notion of existence is not analysed beyond what is given in experience. It will be seen that there is a fundamental difference in the Buddhist's and Kaṇāda's conception of reality. According to the Buddhist, reality is constituted solely by the efficiency to produce an effect, i.e., a desired object. According to him, the perception of an object is followed by a desire either to take it or to leave it (*hānopādāna-buddhi*). On the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that, besides these two desires, perception is sometimes followed by indifference (*upekṣā-buddhi*) also. This is emphatically denied by the Buddhist. In the works of both the schools there are arguments and counter-arguments on the point whether a perception is followed in some cases by the idea of indifference or not.[41] The real reason of this controversy lies in their different conceptions of reality. If reality, as held by the Buddhist, consists only in causal efficiency, the attitude of indifference towards it is not possible. On the other hand, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conceives reality as something static towards which there may be, sometimes, an attitude of indifference as well.

'Being' (*sattā-jāti*) is accepted by Kaṇāda as a universal which resides only in the first three categories. As already stated,[42] Kaṇāda regarded only the first three categories as *artha* (objective reality). The highest universal is named by Kaṇāda as *bhāva* (existence). *Bhāva*, according to him, is the pure universal (*sāmānyam eva*) inasmuch as it is the cause of inclusive notion alone (*anuvṛtter eva hetuḥ*)[43] and not of

39 Arthakriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ. NB. (Chap. on Pratyakṣa).

40 Sad iti yato dravya-guṇa-karmasu sā sattā. VS. I. ii. 7.

41 NM. Vol. I. p. 23. Also NVT. p. 88.

42 *Supra*, V. 8.

43 Bhāvo 'nuvṛtter eva hetutvāt sāmānyam eva. VS. I. ii. 4.

exclusive notion (*vyāvṛtti*). It is difficult to say whether this *bhāva* is the same as *sattā* (which resides only in the first three categories), as all commentators explain; or *bhāva* is a wider universal than *sattā*, and covers all the six categories. The last aphorism[44] of this section of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* suggests that the two may be identical. But why Kaṇāda should have used two words for the same thing in the same context is inexplicable. In this connection, it is worth noting that the Jaina Rohagutta, who introduced Vaiśeṣika theories into Jainism, stated that the *sāmānya* is of three kinds:[45] (i) *mahā-sāmānya* which resides in all the six categories, (ii) *sattā-sāmānya* which resides in the first three categories and (iii) *sāmānya-viśeṣa*, *dravyatva*, etc. It would appear that the first *mahā-sāmānya* is the same as the *astitva* of Praśastapāda which resides in all the six categories.[46] It is, therefore, probable that *bhāva* of Kaṇāda may be equivalent to *mahā-sāmānya* of Rohagutta and *astitva* of Praśastapāda.

Be that as it may, the real difficulty arose when after the recast of the Vaiśeṣika system by Praśastapāda, full objective reality was assigned to the last three categories, and when, at a still later stage, even negation (*abhāva*) was accepted as an existent reality. In face of this, how could the universal *sattā* (which means being or existence) be conceived as residing only in the first three categories? There was another problem. Praśastapāda, holding *sattā* as identical with the *bhāva* of Kanāda, declared that the universal *sattā* was the cause of the inclusive notion alone (*anuvṛtter eva hetuḥ*).[47] But, if it resides only in the first three categories, it will surely exclude the last three categories from the first three ones, and thus it will be the cause of exclusion also. Śrīdhara replies thus: "Although the universal *sattā* is excluded from subsisting in *sāmānya*, etc., it cannot exclude its substrata *dravya*, etc., from

44 Sad iti liṅgāviśeṣād viśeṣa-liṅgābhāvāc caiko bhāvaḥ. VS. I. ii. 17.

45 H. Ui, p. 35.

46 PP. p. 16.

47 Tatra paraṁ sattā mahā-viṣayatvāt, sā cānuvṛtter eva hetutvāt sāmānyam eva. PP. p. 11.

sāmānya, etc., inasmuch as these latter are also comprehended in the notion of being, which is their own nature."[48]

This would indicate that besides *sattā*, there is also *svarūpa-sattā*, 'existence by the very nature of an entity', which is possessed by the last three categories. Now, what is this 'existence by nature' (*svarūpa-sattā*) which is different from the universal 'existence' called (*sattā*)? Praśastapāda says that *svarūpa-sattva* which he calls *svātma-sattva*,[49] i.e., existence by one's very nature, is a common characteristic of the last three categories, *sāmānya*,[50] etc. Srīdhara explains that the categories *sāmānya*, etc., do not possess the universal existence (*sattā-jāti*), and 'existence' in their case consists only in 'the form of their own nature' (*svarūpa-sattva*). Here, a question arises: Do the first three categories, substance, etc., not possess the existence by their own nature' (*svarūpa-sattva*)? We shall revert to this point later on. Now the problem is: if the categories *sāmānya*, etc., do not possess the universal 'existence' (*sattā-jāti*), why do they appear as *existent*? Srīdhara gives a queer explanation: "Why there is the common notion of *being* existent in the case of *sāmānya* etc.? It is because existence (*sattā*) is imposed upon them on account of similarity between the universal existence (*sattā-jāti*) and existence in the form of their own nature (*svarūpa-sattā*). Then, is that notion false? Who says it is not? It is indeed false. A notion of commonness of existence in the case of objects which are of different nature

48 *Yady apy esā sāmānyādibhyo vyāvartate, tathāpi na tebhyaḥ svāśrayaṁ vyāvartayituṁ śaknoti, teṣām api svarūpa-sattā-saṁbuddhi-saṁvedyatvāt.* NK. p. 12.

Dr. Ganga Nath Jha has translated this very important passage thus:—

"Though it is true that 'being' differentiates itself from such entities as 'generalities' (sāmānya) and the like, yet it cannot in any case exclude or differentiate from them, the things wherein it inheres, as these—generalities, etc.—also are *often* (italics *mine*) recognised as having an *existence in themselves*" (Trans. *of Nyāya-kandalī, a reprint from Pandit*, p. 25).

This translation is not only wrong, but it does not make any sense. How can 'being' (sattā) differentiate itself from generality (sāmānya)? It is itself a generality. Insertion of the word 'often' is rather queer.

49 Svarūpa-sattā, *svarūpa-sattva*, *svātma-sattva*.

50 Sāmānyādīnāṁ trayāṇāṁ svātma-sattvam. PP. p. 12.

cannot but be false. Of course, the comprehension of their nature is not false, because their nature is real."[51]

This is a strange explanation. The categories (*sāmānya*, etc.) are existent because their nature is real; but they are not existent, because commonness in the form of the universal 'existence' is not apprehended in those objects. But why commonness in the form of the universal 'existence' is upheld in the case of the first three categories which are also of a different nature? By a mere verbal trick, the categories, *sāmānya*, etc., are held to be at the same time existent and non-existent.[52]

The real reason why the exponents of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika made such frantic efforts at a solution was that Kaṇāda had accepted the objective reality of the first three categories alone, and, therefore, he rightly assigned the universal 'existence' only to them. But the exponents of the school, from Praśastapāda onwards, ascribed objective reality to categories, *sāmānya*, etc., also. As its corollary, they should have extended the universal 'existence' also to them, but in deference to Kaṇāda, the founder or the system, they continued to hold that the universal 'existence' resided only in the first three. Hence arose their puzzle whether to accept or not to accept 'existence' in the categories, *sāmānya*, etc. Anyway, this differentiation between 'existence as a universal' (*sattā-jāti*), and 'existence by nature' (*svarūpa-sattā*) clearly indicates that the ascription of objective reality to the categories, *sāmānya*, etc., was only half-hearted. It is a proof positive that different levels or gradations of reality were conceived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, though not expressly admitted.

Now, let us return to the question whether the first three

51 Kutas tarhi sāmānyādiṣu sat-sad ity anugamaḥ? Svarūpa-sattva-sādharmyeṇa sattādhyāropāt, tarhi mithyāpratyayo 'yam; ko nāmāha neti; bhinna-svabhāveṣv ekānugamo mithyaiva, svarūpa-grahaṇaṁ tu na mṛṣā svarūpasya yathārthatvāt. NK. p. 19.

52 Udayana, who was in this matter followed by the neo-Naiyāyikas, explains the notion of existence in the categories, sāmānya, etc., by yet another device. He says that it is because these categories reside in the same objects in which the universal existence (sattā-jāti) also resides, i.e., there is their coexistence with sattā in the same object (sattaikārtha-samavāyāt). Kir. p. 24. Hence indirectly these, sāmānya, etc., also appear as if possessing the universal 'existence'.

categories, substance, etc. (possessing the universal *existence*), have also 'existence by nature' (*svarūpa-sattā*). Praśastapāda who declares that this is the characteristic of only the last three categories *sāmānya*, etc., clearly implies that 'existence by nature' does not belong to the first three categories, substance, etc. Obviously, he thought that their existence was constituted by the universal 'existence' (*sattā-jāti*). But is this possible? 'Existence' as a universal, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is *in essence* different from the individuals in which it resides. If individual objects, substance, etc., have their existence by virtue of the universal 'existence' (*sattā-jāti*) which is different from them, it will mean that they exist through the agency of something which, *in essence*, is extraneous to them. It would imply that apart from the universal 'existence', these individual objects do not exist. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika might say that apart from the universal 'existence' they actually do not exist. The Buddhist questions whether 'existence' (*sattā-jāti*) is associated with the object which is existent or with one which is non-existent. In the first alternative, the association of *sattā-jāti* would be meaningless. The second alternative is absurd on the face of it. Uddyotakara meets the objection by declaring that "*sattā* is associated neither with the existent nor with the non-existent. Whenever an object comes into existence, it is already associated with *sattā-jāti*."[53] The well-known dictum of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that the origination of an individual object and its relation with its universal takes place at the same moment.[54]

But even this dictum does not solve our problem. Granted that an individual substance is related to existence at the very moment of its origination, the question before us is whether after its birth and relation with the universal 'existence', the individual substance is identical with or different from the universal 'existence'. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a universal is different *in essence* from the individual in which it resides. But, can an individual substance be different from the universal 'existence' if its own essence is constituted by that universal?

53 Na sataḥ sattā-sambandho nāsataḥ. Yadaiva tad vastu tadaiva sattayā sambaddham iti. NV. II. ii. 64. p. 669.

54 Jātaḥ sambaddhaś cety ekaḥ kālaḥ.

It can be different *in essence* from the universal only if it has its separate individual essence or existence, i.e., it has its 'existence by its own nature' (*svarūpa-sattā*). Therefore, it will have to be admitted that the first three categories (substance, etc.) also possess 'existence by their own nature'. Vācaspatimiśra refuting the Buddhist theory of flux concludes: "The causality of an object does not constitute its reality or existence (as accepted by the Buddhist), but causality is only its property, and a property is different *in essence* from its substratum".[55] As to what constitutes the reality of an object, he says, "The own nature (*svarūpa*) of an object, like *blue*, etc., which is apprehended in sensation and, later on, in a perceptual judgment, constitutes its reality or existence."[56] Now, if existence by nature (*svarūpa-sattā*) is accepted as residing in all categories including the first three, the assumption of a universal called *existence* (which resides only in the first three categories) becomes quite superfluous,[57] unless it were intended to indicate that only the first three categories possess objective reality.

11. RECAPITULATION

Although, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, all the objects coming under the categories and their sub-divisions possess objective reality, it appears that there are different levels or gradations of reality. Conclusions arrived at in this chapter may be summarised thus:

I. In the case of substance as accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika:

55 Janakatvaṁ nāma na vastu-svabhāvaḥ, api tu tad-dharmaḥ dharmaś ca dharmiṇo vastuto bhidyate. NVT. III. ii. 14. p. 843.

56 Na ca kāraṇatāiva sattā, kintu svarūpaṁ nīlāder anubhūtāvasitam. NVT. III. ii. 14. p. 843.

57 For more or less identical reasons, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi discards the universal *existence* as residing in the first three categories. Dinakarī, the famous commentary of the Nyāya-Siddhānta-muktāvalī, quotes (on verses 8-9) the view of some neo-Naiyāyikas according to which the notion of existence is due to 'bhāvatva' (i.e., existence by nature) which is common to all the categories including sāmānya, etc. They discard the universal 'being' (sattā-jāti). This view is accepted by Dinakarī, but the author further says that the 'sattā' (as a universal residing in the first three categories) should be accepted for another reason, i.e., it is the determining factor (avacchedaka) of the causality of consequent negation (explained in section 9 of this chapter).

(i) The material or physical reality, to which nothing can be added or from which nothing can be subtracted, belongs only to the four types of eternal atoms.

(ii) All effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*) held to be produced ultimately from the four types of atoms have got their separate and simultaneous essence side by side with their causes, i.e., atoms. Although their essence has come about through the operation of causes, it has not come *out of* those causes (atoms). The conclusion, therefore, seems to be forced on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that essence of all the effect-substances, apart from the atoms, has come as if out of the void.

(iii) Of the five exclusively eternal substances which are immaterial, the soul and *manas* are psychic and related to the phenomenon of knowledge.

(iv) Time and space are non-psychic substances, but they are also connected with the phenomenon of knowledge in the sense that all objects of our experience are presented to us through time and space.

(v) Ether is another non-psychic substance. Its existence is assumed solely for the reason that it is held to be the inherent cause of sound.

II. Besides substance, only two other categories, viz., *guṇa* (quality) and *karman* (movement), were originally regarded as objective realities. The universal (called *sattā*) was held to be residing only in these three categories.

III. *Sāmānya* (universal) and *viśeṣa* were, in the beginning, regarded only as intellectual abstractions. Objective reality was ascribed to them by Praśastapāda. They both reside in their substrata by *samavāya*.

IV. *Samavāya* (inherent relation) is also regarded as an objective reality. It is related to the objects (which are related by it) not by any other relation, but in the form of the related objects themselves. Therefore it appears that its level of reality is different from that of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*.

V. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school holds negation (*abhāva*) also to be a reality. But its reality, being of a negative nature, is different from that of the first six categories which are of a positive nature.

Chapter VI

DEFENCE OF SUBSTANCE

1. SUBSTANCE AS A SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLE

The Buddhist splits reality into discrete, disconnected, and discontinuous bits called moments or point-instants (*kṣaṇas*)[1] coming in continuous succession. The so-called perceptible objects do not exist as such in the external world. They are constructed (not created)[2] by our mind on account of the continuity (*saṁtāna*) of point-instants (*kṣaṇas*). But as the continuity of point-instants is not an objective reality, there is no principle of synthesis or unity of these bits of reality in the external world. It is only our mental synthesis which causes the

Note: From this chapter onwards, many *long* Sanskrit texts will have to be quoted in the footnotes. It has been thought advisable that instead of putting them at the bottom of pages, such passages, except where they are needed for ready reference, should be given in a Text Appendix at the end. There they are indicated in serial order with reference to the chapter and page.

1 Kṣaṇas (moments) are not the smallest units of time; they are, as conceived by the Buddhist, the smallest bits of reality, the ultimate reals.

2 The idealist would say that the external objects are 'created' by the mind, but according to the Dignāga school, they are not created; they are only constructed by the mind on the basis of point-instants, the ultimate reals.

appearance of synthetic or unified objects. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the world of external objects is made up of the smallest bits called atoms, the ultimate reals. The difference between the *kṣaṇas* of the Buddhist and the atoms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika will be brought out at a later stage. But the fundamental difference between the two schools is that while the Buddhist discards any real principle of synthesis in the external world, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there are two synthetic principles which are objectively real. These two principles are 'substance' (*dravya*) and the 'universal' (*sāmānya* or *jāti*). According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, besides the smallest ultimate reals called atoms, there is also 'substance' in the form of a unifying 'whole' (*avayavin*). The *avayavi-dravya* (substance in the form of 'whole') is distinct and different *in essence* from the parts which it holds together. As already stated,[3] it is a basic doctrine of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that parts (*avayavas*) and their 'whole' (*avayavin*) are two different substances. The parts, in their turn, are also *avayavins* in respect of their own parts, and so on, till we reach the atoms which are only parts, and themselves have no parts, and, therefore, they are not *avayavins*. It may, however, be noted that although a substance in the form of *avayavin* is the unifying principle of its *avayavas*, the conceptions of *avayavin* and that of 'substance' (*dravya*) are not identical. Substance has a wider scope and includes atoms and eternal entities like ether, etc., which are not *avayavins*. Of course, so far as the material objects of ordinary experience are concerned, they are all effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*), and, as such, they are *avayavins*, i.e., the unifying principles of their parts. The term 'effect-substance' (*kārya-dravya*) is co-extensive with *avayavin*. A 'substance' in the form of *avayavin* is thus a unifying principle.

The other unifying principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which brings about the unity of the objects of a class is the 'universal' (*sāmānya*). The substance and the universal have an objective existence in the external world. Both the concepts (as external entities) were vehemently assailed by the Dignāga school, according to which, all synthesis is mental. The nature of the universal and the Buddhist polemic against it will be discussed

3 *Supra*, V. 7.

in chapter IX. The substance, as conceived in the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika, has already been briefly dealt with. In this chapter we propose to examine the principal arguments advanced by the Buddhists and others for refuting the conception of substance, and its defence by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

2. THE THEORY OF SUBSTANCE AS THE HALL-MARK OF THE ORTHODOX CAMP

The conception of substance is one of the basic tenets of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika, which is also adopted by other orthodox realist schools like the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*, etc. In fact, in one form or the other, it has a place in all the systems of the orthodox camp. 'Substance', as conceived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is not, of course, acceptable to the Vedānta or the Sāṁkhya, but they both accept the existence of a substratum (*dharmin*) of properties (*dharmas*). Properties are held to be identical with the substratum by the Sāṁkhya, and unreal by the Vedānta. Acceptance of a *dharmin* is a common doctrine of all the orthodox systems. It was stated[4] that the differentiation between the substratum and its properties (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*) is the line of demarcation between the realistic schools (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*) which accept it and the idealistic schools (the Vedānta and the Mahāyāna Buddhist) which reject it. The Vedānta denies the differentiation of *dharma* and *dharmin*, because, according to it, only the *dharmin* (*Brahman*) is real. The Buddhist also denies it, but he does so because he holds that only *dharmas* (momentary point-instants, the *kṣaṇas*) are real. It would appear that the acceptance of *dharmin*, the substratum of properties, is a common point of all the orthodox schools, realistic as well as idealistic. Emphatic denial of *dharmin*, on the other hand, is the corner-stone of Buddhist metaphysics. As already stated,[5] the 'no-soul theory' (*anātma-vāda*) of the Buddhist, which is contrasted with the 'soul-theory' (*ātma-vāda*) of the Upaniṣads, is not simply a denial of the soul in human beings or other living creatures, but it is also a denial of 'soul', i.e., the unifying principle called substance

4 *Supra*, III. 20.
5 *Supra*, III. 2.

(*dravya*) or 'whole' (*avayavin*) as existing in the external world. The Buddhist theory of 'no-soul' is, therefore, fundamentally 'a denial of the theory of substance' (*adravya-vāda*) against which all the orthodox schools, realistic or idealistic stand arrayed. Internally, the orthodox schools differ from one another. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the *avayavin* as different from its parts is as emphatically denied by the Vedānta and the Sāṁkhya as by the Buddhist, but the existence of a permanent or abiding substratum (*sthira-dharmin*) is an essential tenet of all the orthodox systems. It is diametrically opposed to the Buddhist theory of the flux of discrete point-instants (*kṣaṇabhaṅga-vāda*).

There is a fundamental difference between the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in their conception of substratum. According to the Sāṁkhya, substratum (*dharmin*) is identical with its properties (*dharmas*), while, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is different *in essence* from its properties. Vyāsa, the commentator on the *Yoga-sūtras*, has actually used the Vaiśeṣika word *dravya* for substratum. But he explains that in his system (Sāṁkhya-Yoga), *dravya* means the *aggregate* of general and special properties.[6] In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, *dravya* means substratum of those properties from which it is different *in essence*.[7] According to the Vedānta, properties are unreal. The reality of the substratum is, however, common to all the orthodox systems. When therefore the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advanced interminable arguments in refutation of the theory of flux, it was leading a crusade on behalf of the whole orthodox camp against a common enemy. All the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, such as the *Nyāya-vārtika*, *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā*, *Nyāya-mañjarī*, and *Nyāya-kandalī*, devote one full section each to the refutation of the doctrine of flux (*kṣaṇabhaṅga-nirākaraṇa*).

3. FOUR PLANKS IN DEFENCE OF SUBSTANCE

The refutation of flux and the establishment of *avayavin* are the two main planks in the defence of the theory of sub-

6 Sāmānya-viśeṣa-samudāyo 'tra dravyam. Vyāsa-bhāṣya, p. 255.

7 Vācaspatimiśra commenting in Tattva-vaiśāradī on the Vyāsa-bhāṣya, says that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it would be sāmānya-viśeṣāśrayo dravyam. *Ibid.*

stance. In fact, these are the two aspects of one and the same thing. Substance, when conceived in terms of extension in space, requires the establishment of *avayavin* (whole), but when conceived in terms of duration in time, it presupposes the refutation of the theory of flux.

There are two more theories which are also related to the defence of substance. The atomic theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as we have already seen, provides a material or physical basis for its realistic structure. That theory was attacked by other schools, especially by the Buddhist. Their arguments and counter-arguments deserve consideration in the context of the defence of substance. Secondly, in the history of Realism in India as well as in the West, the question is raised whether a substance exists apart from its qualities, colour, touch, etc., of which it is the substratum. This topic, which has raised so much controversy in the history of western philosophy, has not received the same amount of attention of Indian thinkers. The Buddhist holds that there is no separate substance apart from qualities. Of course, they conceive of point-instants (*kṣaṇas*) as something like qualities. That view has been referred to and refuted here and there by the orthodox writers. We shall deal with it in the present chapter.

There are thus four topics which we have to discuss in connection with the defence of substance:

(i) The theory that a 'whole' (*avayavin*) is different *in essence* from its parts (*avayavas*).

(ii) Refutation of the Buddhist theory of flux (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-nirākaraṇa*).

(iii) The atomic theory, especially its metaphysical aspect.

(iv) The theory of substance being separate from and independent of its qualities.

4. THE ATOMIC THEORY OF THE VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOOL

All the physical objects of the universe, i.e., all the effect-substances which are made up of parts, when split into their parts or parts of parts, culminate in atoms (*paramāṇus*) which cannot be split further, and are therefore indivisible and part-

less. Kaṇāda to whom the atomic theory is traditionally ascribed conceived only the basic idea. He declared that the existence of partless atoms must be assumed, and that inasmuch as, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, causes are always in the form of parts, atoms must be held to be causeless (*akāraṇavat*) and therefore eternal (*nitya*).[8] Further development of the atomic theory, viz., the combination of two atoms into *dvy-aṇukas* (dyads), and of three *dvy-aṇukas* into *try-aṇukas* (or *trasareṇus*) is not found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* of Kaṇāda, but is met with only in Praśastapāda. And although the atomic theory is chiefly associated with the Vaiśeṣika school, its defence against the arguments of the Buddhist is neither found in the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda nor even in Praśastapāda, but occurs in the *Nyāya-sūtras.*

The stock argument for proving the existence of the atom is: if the existence of partless atoms is not accepted and the process of splitting up into parts and parts of their parts goes on infinitely, the Meru mountain and a mustard seed, both having in that case infinite parts, would be of the same size. This argument has been repeated in almost identical words in all the principal works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, such as the *Nyāya-vārtika,*[9] *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīka,*[10] *Nyāya-mañjarī,*[11] *Nyāya-kandalī,*[12] *Kiraṇāvalī,*[13] *Vyomavatī,*[14] and later manuals. Another argument allied to the previous one is: the measure called 'large' (*mahat-parimāṇa*) has its culmination in 'all-pervading measure' (*vibhu-parimāṇa* as that of ether). Similarly, the 'minute measure' (*aṇu-parimāṇa*) should also have its culmination in the minutest measure, which can only be that of an atom. The existence of the atom, therefore, must be assumed. Udayana, however, rejects the argument on the ground that it leads to the fallacy of interdependence.[15] This is explained in *Kiraṇāvalī-prakāśa* thus: the measure called 'minute'

8 Sad akāraṇavan nityam. VS. IV. i. 1.
9-10 NV. and NVT. pp. 1057-1071.
11 NM. Part II. pp. 72-73.
12 NK. pp. 31-32.
13 Kir. pp. 50-52.
14 VV. pp. 224-25.
15 Kir. p. 52.

(*aṇu*), as different from the measure called 'large' (*mahat*), can be assumed only if the existence of the atom is first established; and its existence is sought to be established by the assumption of the measure called minute.

From a *try-aṇuka* which has the smallest perceptible measure, we arrive at the conception of an atom through an intervening entity called *dvy-aṇuka* which partakes of the nature of both, the objects of our experience and the atom. Like the former, it is made up of parts, and like the latter, it possesses minute measure (*aṇu-parimāṇa*). The existence of the intervening *dvy-aṇuka* is argued in this way: the smallest perceptible particle, viz., a *try-aṇuka*, must be made up of parts (*dvy-aṇukas*), because it is perceptible, and further its constituent parts (*dvy-aṇukas*) must also be made up of parts (atoms) because *dvy-aṇukas* are the cause of the measure called 'large' (*mahat-parimāṇa*). The argument can in the same way be further extended to prove that these parts of a *dvy-aṇuka* (atoms) should also be made up of further parts on the ground that they give rise to an effect-substance (*kārya-dravyārambhakatvāt*). But that kind of argument would lead to a process *ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*), and therefore the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika points out that it should be rejected.

5. PROBLEM OF CHANGE IN MEASURE

It has been stated that in the first instance only two atoms combine to produce an effect. Śrīdhara points out[16] that one atom cannot produce an effect, because if it could, it would always do so, for which it would not stand in need of anything else. Secondly, the effect produced from one atom would never be destroyed, because destruction takes place only by the disconnection of parts. Nor could three atoms combine in the first instance to produce an effect. It is held, for reasons to be explained in the sequel, that the number, more than two (*bahutva*), of the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* is also one of the causes of the large measure. Three atoms, as inherent cause (*samavāyi-kārana*), therefore, having a number more than two (*bahutva*), will produce an effect characterized by 'large mea-

16 NK. p. 32.

sure' (*mahat-parimāṇa*); but another condition of the large measure is that it can be produced only by such constituent parts as are themselves made up of parts, i.e., effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*). If, in the first instance, three atoms produce an effect, the constituent parts would be atoms which are not effect-substances. It is therefore held that in the first instance only two atoms (neither less nor more) combine to produce an effect, i.e., a *dvy-aṇuka*. A *dvy-aṇuka* is held to possess, like an atom, the minute measure (*aṇu-parimāṇa*). As the large measure can be brought about only by plural number, at least three *dvy-aṇukas* must combine in the second instance to produce an effect having large measure, i.e., a *try-aṇuka*. But as the large measure can be produced even by four or more *dvy-aṇukas* (which possess *bahutva*, i.e., plural number), the possibility of those combinations cannot be ruled out.[17] But usually a *try-aṇuka* has been regarded as the necessary unit of a material object by writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, especially of the later period. If alternatively three, four or more *dvy-aṇukas* are held to combine to produce the first smallest perceptible particles, the latter would be of various dimensions. It appears that probably in order to bring about uniformity of the smallest perceptible particles of matter (comparable to the molecules of modern science), the later writers laid down that, in the first instance, only three *dvy-aṇukas* combine to make a *try-aṇuka* (molecule) which was regarded as the smallest *perceptible* unit. After the formation of a *try-aṇuka*, two, three or more of them might combine to produce larger objects.

One of the problems of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school was: how from the measure called minute (*aṇu-parimāṇa*), belonging to an atom, there could arise the measure called large (*mahat-parimāṇa*) which is the measure of a different kind. The smallest *perceptible* measure (which belongs to a *try-aṇuka*) is technically called 'large' (*mahat-parimāṇa*). Now this large measure, which is different *in kind* from the minute measure (*aṇu-parimāṇa*) belonging to an atom or to a *dvy-aṇuka*, cannot arise from the measure of either. It is held that the measure of an atom does not produce the measure of a *dvy-*

17 NK. p. 32, line 8.

aṇuka, and the latter, likewise, does not produce the measure of a *try-aṇuka*, because in that case the measure would not be of a minute type, but it would become minuter still. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika principle, the measure of an effect must be of the same kind as, and of a higher degree than, that of its cause.[18] The measure of a *dvy-aṇuka* is therefore held to be produced by duality residing in two atoms. As already stated, the large measure is produced by a number more than two (*bahutva*), and therefore it is produced in a *try-aṇuka* which is made up of three *dvy-aṇukas*. The measure of a *dvy-anuka* which is made up of two atoms continues to be minute. It does not become more minute because it is not produced from the measure of atoms, but from the number *two* inherent in two atoms. Duality and plurality are, however, produced, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, by the simultaneous perception (*apekṣā-buddhi*) of two or more *onenesses* residing in atoms or *dvy-aṇukas*. There being no human perceiver at the time of primeval creation, it is assumed that God is the perceiver whose perception produces duality and plurality in a *dvy-aṇuka* and a *try-aṇuka* respectively. Now, plurality residing in three *dvy-aṇukas* produces the large measure of a *try-aṇuka*. The Buddhist objection that the minute measure of an atom can never produce the large measure is here met only by superseding the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika principle that the qualities of an inherent cause produce similar qualities in its effect, and by invoking the aid of God.

6. MEASURE OF ATOM AND DVY-ANUKA

The measure of an atom and of a *dvy-aṇuka* is minute. There is no difference in the minute measure of the two except that the minuteness of an atom is eternal, and that of a *dvy-aṇuka* is non-eternal. The minute measure of an atom is named as *pārimāṇḍalya* which means spherical or circular. *Parimaṇḍala* is the word used by Kanāda for the atom.[19] Praśastapāda says that the eternal measure of an atom and *manas* is *pārimāṇḍalya*.[20]

18 Parimāṇasya sva-samāna-jātiyotkṛṣṭa-parimāṇa-janakatvāt. NSM. on verse 111.

19 VS. VII. i. 20.

20 PP. p. 130.

Although an atom, which has a measure without any dimension, can have no shape (triangular, square, or circular), the thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school probably thought that in the case of an object which has no facets, *circular* would perhaps be the nearest description. But the circular shape also has facets or sides. Neither can an object which has no dimension can be circular. Anyway, the term *pārimāṇḍalya* has exclusively been used for the minute measure of the atom,[21] and not for that of a *dvy-aṇuka*. Can there be conceived any quantitative difference between the measures of the two? None, according to the latest Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, because the very nature of minute measure precludes the possibility of quantitative difference. Early writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, seem to have conceived of some kind of difference between the two. Śrīdhara, for example, describes *pārimāṇḍalya* as the minutest of all measures.[22] He says that "the measure of a *dvy-aṇuka* is minute (*aṇu*), but the measure of an atom is lesser than that of a *dvy-aṇuka*."[23]

The term *aṇu* is used to denote substance (atom) as well as quality, i.e., the minutest measure residing in an atom or a *dvy-aṇuka*. The term *paramāṇu* is also likewise used in both the senses, but when it is used in the sense of measure, it denotes the measure of an atom only and not that of a *dvy-aṇuka*. Apart from the question of measure, both the words *aṇu* and *paramāṇu* have been used for an atom without distinction. Some writers use the word *anu* and others *paramāṇu*.[24] The real reason of this double usage seems to be that Kanāda had not arrived at the conception of *dvy-aṇuka*, which is the intervening link between the *paramāṇu* and the *try-aṇuka*. Kanāda used the word *parimaṇḍala* for an atom, and following this usage, Praśastapāda named the measure of an atom as *pārimāṇḍalya*. He introduced the conception of a *dvy-aṇuka* as possessing the same minute measure as that of an atom. But at

21 Nityaṁ paramāṇu-manassu tat pārimāṇḍalyam. PP. p. 130.

22 Pārimāṇḍalyam iti sarvāpakṛṣṭaṁ parimāṇam. NK. p. 133. line 18.

23 Dvy-aṇuka-parimāṇaṁ tāvad aṇu...tasmāc ca paramāṇu-parimāṇam apakṛṣṭam. NK. p. 133. lines 9-10.

24 Nyāya-sūtra uses the word anu (IV. ii. 16), while Praśastapāda uses the word paramāṇu, and NSM. uses both.

the same time, in deference to Kaṇāda, he retained the use of the word *pārimāṇḍalya* exclusively for the measure of an atom. This suggested to the ancient writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika after Praśastapāda a quantitative difference between the measures of a *dvy-aṇuka* and of an atom. The writers of the Navya-Nyāya period, however, discarded that difference. It appears that in many cases Praśastapāda developed new ideas, but still he clung to the old words which sometimes caused confusion. We have already noted that although Praśastapāda accorded objective existence to the last three categories, *sāmānya*, etc., he still adhered to the idea that *sattā* (existence) resided only in the first three categories, substance, etc.[25]

7 ATOM COMPARED WITH KṢANA OF THE BUDDHIST

Before entering into the controversy between the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regarding the defence and refutation of the atomic theory, it would be proper to compare briefly the atom as conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with the *kṣaṇa* of the Buddhist.

As already stated, the Buddhist splits reality into discrete and disconnected moments or point-instants called *kṣanas*, the ultimate reals. Atom, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also, is a mere point which has no extension in space, but speaking in terms of time, it is just the opposite of the Buddhist point-instant. Not merely has it a duration but is also eternal.

There is another point of contrast between the two. The atom of the Vaiśeṣika is a substance which possesses not only qualities like smell, taste, colour, touch, etc., but many universals like *sattā* (existence), *dravyatva* (substance-*ness*), *pṛthivītva* (earth-*ness*), etc., and also the differentiating entity called *viśeṣa*. All these properties—qualities, universals, and *viśeṣa*—are objective entities having their essence separate from that of their substratum (atom). The atom of the Vaiśeṣika conception, therefore, being a substance and containing these separate entities (properties) within it, would appear to be a complex object. Of course, it is not so in a physical sense because qualities, etc., although separate entities, are not material realities.

25 *Supra*, V. 10.

Kṣaṇas of the Buddhist, on the other hand, are conceived as *dharmas* (properties). They are described in terms of qualities, colour, touch, etc., and for that reason, they are sometimes held to be qualities (*guṇas*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology. *Kṣaṇas*, however, like a material substance, possess the property of *sapratighatva*, i.e., impenetrability which is defined as "the fact that the space occupied by one of them cannot, at the same time, be occupied by another".[26] But they are not substances of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception; the very idea of *substance* is foreign to Buddhist thought.[27] In one aspect, however, the atoms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception seem to be less material than *kṣaṇas* of the Buddhist. A material object cannot occupy the same space as occupied by another. This is applicable to the Buddhist *kṣaṇa*. But atom, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, occupies the same space which is occupied by its effect, *dvy-aṇuka*, which is a separate substance. Apart from this, *kṣaṇa* is like a property (*dharma*). It is thus obvious that the conception of the Buddhist *kṣaṇa* is different from that of the atom. But owing to their obvious similarity in being the smallest fragments of reality, the Buddhist *kṣaṇa* is often spoken of as an atom (*paramāṇu*). For instance, both Śrīdhara and Vācaspatimiśra refer to 'colour', etc. (*kṣaṇas* of the Buddhist theory), as *paramāṇu*.[28] The term *kṣaṇa*, however, can never be used for the atom (*paramāṇu*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception, for the reason that the latter being held to be eternal cannot be equated with the *kṣaṇa* which is merely a momentary point-instant.

8. DEFENCE OF ATOM IN THE NYĀYA-SŪTRAS

Objections to the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣika came mainly from two sources, viz., the Vedānta, representing in this respect the Sāṁkhya also, and the Buddhist. Defence of the atomic theory is found practically in all the principal works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. As already stated, the earliest work which contains a polemic in support of the atomic theory is the

26 Samānadeśa-virodhitā. See Central Conception, p. 11.

27 *Supra*, V. 7.

28 Rūpādayaḥ paramāṇu-svabhāvāḥ. NK. p. 41; and rūpādi-paramāṇava eva.... NVT. p. 205.

Nyāya-sūtra of Gotama. The best and the most illuminating discussion on the topic is found in the *Nyāya-vārtika* and the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭikā* which cover almost all the points of other treatises. As the discussion in these two works which is reproduced and summarized below is based on the *Nyāya-sūtras*, it would be appropriate to preface it with a brief summary of the arguments given there.[29]

The *Nyāya-sūtras* take up the defence of the atom in connection with the doctrine of the 'whole' and parts (*a ayavivāda*). An opponent points out that the series of the 'whole' (*avayavin*) and its parts and parts of parts, will continue till their last parts end in annihilation (*pralaya*). The Nyāya reply is that there can be no question of annihilation because there exist partless atoms with which the process of splitting stops. The atom is defined in the *Nyāya-sūtras* as "that which is beyond splitting."[30] The opponent further argues that the ether being all-pervasive will permeate even inside the atom which, therefore, cannot be indivisible, or else the ether will not be all-pervading. The Nyāya answer is that *inside* and *outside* are spoken of in the case of an effect-substance with reference to its parts, i.e., some parts which are hidden by other parts are said to be *inside*, while those which hide them are called *outside*. There can be no *inside* and *outside* in the case of an atom which is causeless and therefore partless. The ether is held to be all-pervading because its qualities, sound (*śabda*) and connection (*saṁyoga*), are found everywhere. It may be objected why ether, being all-pervading, does not obstruct objects moving in it, and is not sundered by them, just as water obstructs a boat, and gets sundered by its movement. The Nyāya points out that not getting sundered (*avyūha*)[31], non-obstruction (*aviṣṭambha*), and all-pervasiveness (*vibhutva*) are the properties of ether. The opponent objects again that an atom, inasmuch as it

29 NS. IV. ii. 15-25.

30 Paraṁ vā truṭeḥ. NS. IV. ii. 17. The word 'truṭi' was used at a later stage as a synonym of try-aṇuka, but it seems to have been used here in its ordinary sense of splitting.

31 Vācaspatimiśra takes the word vyūha in the sense of transfiguration (vyūhāntarāpādana). This word is also used in the sense of breaking apart or sundering which meaning, being unquestionably more appropriate in the present context, has been adopted here.

is a material object (having a limited measure, i.e., *mūrta-parimāṇa*) must have a shape, and consequently it must have component parts. Moreover, as an atom has connections on all its sides with other atoms, it must have various sides, i.e., parts. The answer to all these objections is that this sort of argumentation can go on *ad infinitum*—to endless splitting which cannot be upheld.

9. *UDDYOTAKARA'S POLEMIC*

We have given above the gist of the arguments contained in the Nyāya-sūtras. To this, Uddyotakara has appended a subtle polemic[32] which is explained and summarised here. To the Buddhist argument that an atom must be made up of parts because it has a corporeal form (*mūrti*),[33] Uddyotakara replies: if it be held that *parts of the atom* are also corporeal but without further parts, the argument would be inconclusive (*anekānta* or *savyabhicārin*), because the parts of the atom also being corporeal should have further parts.. And if the parts of the atom are also held to have further parts, the smallest particle will have infinite weight, infinite parts and infinite measure, because it will have infinite parts. If, however, in order to meet this predicament, it may be said that a corporeal object can be split up to its extreme limit, then the end itself would be partless. If it is said that what is left at the end is itself in the form of a disconnection (*vibhāga*), it would not be possible to say so, because there can be no disconnection without 'something to be disconnected' (*vibhajyamāna*). To put the same in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terms, disconnection being a quality must have as its substratum a substance which is to be disconnected. There are, thus, only three possible alternatives: (i) splitting of a material object ends on reaching a partless entity, (ii) splitting ends with the disappearance of the last parts, and (iii) splitting continues *ad infinitum*.[34]

32 NV. IV. ii. 25.

33 The term mūrti in the N-V system technically means the measure of a non-all-pervading substance (*avibhu-dravya-parimāṇa*) which belongs only to corporeal objects. Hence the term is rendered here as corporeal form.

34 (i) Paramāṇv-anto vibhāgaḥ, (ii) pralayānto vā, (iii) ananto 'vā. NV. IV. ii. 25 (p. 1067).

If the first alternative which is right is accepted, and if it is still insisted that the atom will have further parts on account of being corporeal (*mūrtimat*), the argument would be inconclusive (*anekānta*, i.e., not covering all cases). As pointed out above, the parts of the atom, on account of being corporeal, should also have further parts, and we would in this way never reach a partless entity. Secondly, it would involve a contradiction. The atom is conceived as causeless, i.e., a non-effect (*akārya*), and, in the words of Vācaspatimiśra, the atom having parts (*sāvayava*) would mean that it has homogeneous parts, i.e., not only is it produced out of those homogeneous parts, but it also resides in them.[35] To say therefore that the atom has parts only means that it is an effect. And it is contradictory to say that the atom which is causeless (i.e., a non-effect) is an effect. As to the second alternative that splitting ends with the disappearance of the last parts, the answer has already been given that splitting which is a quality (*vibhāga*) cannot take place without a substratum, i.e., a substance to be split. Regarding the third alternative that the splitting goes on *ad infinitum*, the smallest particle, as already noted, will have infinite weight, parts and measure.

In order to surmount these difficulties, it may be contended that though the atom may not have parts, yet it may not be causeless, i.e., non-effect (*akārya*), for it may have been produced just from one atom. To this, the answer is that it is untenable because there is no instance of an effect being produced from a single constituent cause. And if an effect is to be produced from a single cause, it will not stand in need of anything like the sum-total of causes (*kāraṇa-sāmagrī*), and consequently, the cause will produce its effect at once, and there will be no antecedent negation (*prāg-abhāva*) of an effect. An effect which has no antecedent negation cannot even be produced.[36] Moreover, if an atom is produced from a single atom, the former being an effect, will be a 'whole' (*avayavin*), and its cause, the single atom, will be its part (*avayava*) because,

35 Sāvayava-śabdasyārthaḥ samāna-jātīyāvayavaṁ, na kevalaṁ tadārabdhaṁ, api tu tadāśritaṁ. NVT. IV. ii. 25 (p. 1067).

36 According to the N-V school, antecedent negation of an effect is also one of its causes.

according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation, an in herent cause is always in the form of a part, and an effect i the form of a 'whole'. But the single cause-atom cannot exis at the time of the effect-atom, as the former itself has becom the latter.[37] Thus the cause-atom not being co-existent wit the effect-atom, the former cannot be the part of the latter. The atom, therefore, cannot have a single atom as its constituen part.

It would appear that the argument given in the last paragraph is an argument for argument's sake. It is superfluous because it is hardly probable that any opponent of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika could advance the view that the atom might be produced from a single atom as its cause. But Uddyotakara seems to be fond of answering an imaginary opponent.

Uddyotakara next asks the Buddhist to explain the nature of the corporeal form which the atom is said to possess and to say whether that corporeal form of the atom is different from the atom, or is identical with it. If, according to the Buddhist theory, a 'corporeal form' (*mūrti*) consists only of *colour*, etc., then the atom cannot possess that kind of corporeal form. According to Buddhist tenets, there is no atom other than the minutest form of colour, etc., the atom being identical with colour, etc. It is not their possessor or substratum. According to this view, the atom, its parts, and its corporeal form, all being identical with 'colour', etc., the Buddhist argument that an atom must be made up of parts because it has a corporeal form, would tantamount to this: *'colour', etc., must possess colour, etc., because they possess* colour, etc.[38] Similarly, the illustration cited by the Buddhist, that a cloth is made up of parts as it has a corporeal form, will not hold because, according to him, neither the cloth is different from colour, etc., nor is there any corporeal form different from colour, etc. If, however, the Buddhist were to hold these three

37 The statement of Uddyotakara that the cause-atom does not exist at the time of the effect-atom (na kāryaparamāṇu-kāle kāraṇa-paramāṇur asti. NV. IV. ii. 25 p. 1037) indicates that the N-V theory of an inherent cause continuing to exist side by side with its effect (see Chap. V. Sec. 2.) had not yet been fully crystallized. It will be discussed in the chapter on causation.

38 Rūpādayo rūpādimanto rūpādimattvāt. NV. p. 1068.

—cloth, colour, and form—to be different entities, he would be going counter to his own doctrines. Similarly the argument, put forward by the Buddhist that an atom is made up of parts because its connections with other atoms must be held to be residing at different points, is also untenable. If, he says that connections are different from atoms, he would be violating his own system. If, however, connections are identical with the atoms, his original argument will not stand, inasmuch as the inferential mark (*hetu*) will not be different from the thing to be inferred (*sādhya*).

The Buddhist further argues that atoms are made up of parts, because they have a particular shape or form (*saṁsthāna*). Against this, it is pointed out that the shape or form does not mean anything different from parts. If, however, form means a corporeal form (*mūrti*), that has already been answered.

The refutation of the arguments of the Buddhist as detailed above suffers from one serious flaw. These arguments of the Buddhist are intended for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and, therefore, they naturally refer to the doctrines of the latter. For instance, when the Buddhist argues that the atom is made up of parts because it possesses a corporeal form, he does so because the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accepts that the atom possesses a corporeal form (*mūrti*). Similar is the case with the arguments based on *connections* in the atoms. Now, to tell the Buddhist that the corporeal form in his theory will consist of 'colour', etc., and to ask him whether the corporeal form consisting of 'colour', etc., is identical with the atom or not, is hardly fair. It is simply meant to confuse the issue in dispute. The realization that this manner of arguing is fallacious comes to Uddyotakara himself towards the end of the section when a Buddhist rejoins that the theories quoted by him in the course of his argument are not of the Buddhist but of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.[39] Here again, Uddyotakara, in his usual manner, gets over it by saying: If the Buddhist has accepted the theories in question as valid, he becomes a party to them, otherwise he should not refer to those theories which he himself does not hold to be valid. Uddyotakara intentionally avoids the real point that the arguments have

been cited against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which accepts the theories in question as valid.

10. VASUBANDHU ANSWERED

Towards the conclusion of Uddyotakara's polemic, an argument follows which involves considerable mathematical subtlety. The Buddhist argues that an atom which has many connections simultaneously with other atoms must have parts. The argument is contained in the following stanza quoted from Vasubandhu: "The atom on account of its simultaneous connections with six other atoms must have six component parts, i.e., six different sides or points where it is connected with the six atoms. If the connections of the six atoms with the central one have the same point as their substratum, the aggregate of seven atoms (i.e., the one surrounded by the six atoms) will remain of the size of a single atom."[40] It means this: If there are no sides in the central atom, and if all atoms combine with it at the same point, there will be no increase in the volume after combination. (Here one atom is supposed to be combined with six atoms on its six sides, i.e., four sides corresponding to four quarters, and the upper and the lower ones.)[41]

Uddyotakara's answer as elucidated by Vācaspatimiśra[42] may be summarised as follows. There are six connections (*saṁyogas*) of the central atom with six atoms on its six sides. Of these, the connection of the central atom with the eastern one resides in the central atom and the eastern one; it does not

40 The verse of Vasubandhu (now discovered in his work, Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi) is as follows:

> Ṣaṭkena yugapad yogāt paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍ-aṁśatā,
> Ṣaṇṇāṁ samāna-deśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakaḥ.
> Quoted in the NV. p. 1068.

41 Dr. Jha explains the six atoms as those of a try-aṇuka which does not make any sense and violates the whole context. In the first place, a try-aṇuka is not a direct combination of six atoms, and secondly, the six atoms are said to be combined with one atom which is impossible according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika process of the creation of dvy-aṇukas and try-aṇukas.

42 The discussion given below is partly taken from the NV. and partly from NVT.

reside in the central and the western. Similarly, the connection of the central with the western atom resides in those two atoms and not in the central atom and the eastern one. The same is the case with other pairs. Now, when we refer to the connections of different pairs of atoms, the substrata (*deśas*) of the different connections are different as explained above.[43] If we do not think of the connections of different pairs as residing in those pairs, but of the connections of the central atom with the six atoms as residing in the central atom,[44] then, indeed, the connections in question have the same substratum (*samāna-deśa*). The Buddhist had pointed out that the six atoms combining with the central one would have the same substratum, and therefore, there would be no increase in volume in their aggregate. The reply of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is: although the *connections of the six atoms* as residing in the central one may have the same substratum, the *six atoms* themselves have not the same substratum. The latter cannot have their substratum in the central atom because, in the first instance, the substratum (*ādhāra* or *deśa*) of a substance can be nothing else than its parts, i.e., its inherent cause, and atoms, being causeless and

43 Yadi dve dve dravye adhikṛtyābhidhīyate tato bhinna-deśāḥ. NV. p. 1069. 'abhinna-deśāḥ' as published in most of the printed editions is wrong.

Dr. Jha has translated and explained this rather difficult text as follows:

"If what you speak of is in reference to each pair of atoms *that are in contact with the central one* (Italics mine), then the conjunctions certainly do not appear in the same substratum (that is one conjunction, that of the first atom with the central atom appears in the first atom, while that of the second atom with the central atom appears in the second atom, so that they do not appear in the same substratum)."

Obviously, to speak of 'each pair of atoms that are in contact with the central atom' is meaningless because there are no pairs of atoms in the context which may be in contact with the central atom. The pair, in the context, consists of one of the six atoms and the central atom. Secondly, the conjunction of the first atom (which should be termed in the present context as the eastern atom) with the central one does not reside in the first atom alone, but in both, i.e., the first atom and the central one, as explained above.

44 Connection (saṁyoga) is a quality which resides in both the substances that are connected Here one connection resides in one of the six atoms and the central one.

partless, do not reside anywhere by inherent relation. Qualities like colour, etc., reside in a substance by inherent relation. Connections also, being qualities, reside by inherent relation in the central atom as stated above. But the six atoms, from their very nature, can have no substratum (*deśa*), and the question of their having the same substratum does not arise at all.

Secondly, no two material substances can subsist in the same substratum by inherent relation. For instance, only one piece of cloth can reside in its substratum, the yarn; it is impossible for any other substance (say, any other piece of cloth) to reside in the same yarn. Of course, *qualities* like colour, odour, taste, etc., inasmuch as they are not corporeal, can reside in the same substance. As connection is a quality, many connections may reside in the same substratum, and thus the six connections may reside in the central atom. But as no two substances can reside in the same substratum, the question of six atoms residing in one central atom does not arise.[45] Here, the opponent raises an objection: "An effect and its cause, sometimes reside simultaneously in the same substance. When a jar is connected with a piece of cloth, it also becomes connected with the cause of cloth (yarn), and also with the cause of the yarn, (i.e., small fibres of the yarn called *aṁśus*). Here, the effect (cloth) and its cause (yarn) and also the cause of the yarn (*aṁśus*), all reside in the same substratum, namely, the jar.[46] To this Uddyotakara replies that although *connections* of cloth, yarn, etc., with the jar occupy the same substratum, the two substances, cause and effect (cloth and yarn), do not occupy the same substratum. This cryptic reply has not only been elucidated, but also somewhat emended by Vācaspatimiśra. He cites the instance of 'fruit in a basket' (*kuṇḍe badaram*) in place of 'jar and cloth'. In the latter example, the relation between the substratum and that which subsists in it, i.e., between the container and the contained (*ādhārādheya-bhāva*), does not exist necessarily. While a basket is the substratum of fruit, a jar, although connected with a piece of cloth, may not necessarily be its substratum. The new example is, therefore, more appro-

45 For the text "Madhyasya hi.....ity arthaḥ." see Text Appendix.

46 Nanu kārya-kāraṇe saṁyogi-samānadeśe yathā ghaṭaḥ paṭena saṁbadhyate tantunā tad-aṁśunā ca tantv-āśrayeṇa. NV. p. 1069.

priate, although the old one was also not incorrect, as we shall presently see. Now, in the present example, the basket as the substratum is connected with the fruit as well as the parts of the fruit, and parts of the parts of the fruit (which are all separate substances). We find here one and the same substratum of so many substances, as in the previous example the jar was the substratum of cloth, yarn, and the cause of the yarn.

In answering this, Vācaspatimiśra makes a subtle distinction. A substratum can contain a thing by one of the two relations—'connection' (*saṁyoga*) or 'inherence' (*samavāya*). In the instance of 'fruit in the basket', the basket is the substratum of the fruit, its parts, and parts of the parts by 'connection' (*saṁyoga*). Basket and the fruit are both substances, and the relation between two substances is that of *saṁyoga*. Similarly, parts of the fruit, or parts of the parts of the fruit are also substances, and their relation with the basket is also that of *saṁyoga*. It would, therefore, appear that the fruit, the parts of the fruit, and parts of the parts of the fruit, are all separate substances which reside in their substratum, the basket, *and occupy exactly the same place or space.* It is, thus, clear that when more than one corporeal substances reside in their substratum and occupy exactly the same space, they do so by 'connection' (*saṁyoga*). Now, in this very example, take the case of the fruit. It resides in its parts which are its inherent cause by *samavāya* relation, and further, parts of the fruit reside in their parts (i.e., parts of the parts of the fruit) which are their inherent cause by the same *samavāya* relation. Obviously, these substances—the fruit, its parts, and parts of the parts—also occupy exactly the same space. But, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, space is not the substratum of a substance, but its substratum is its cause, i.e., its parts in which it resides by *samavāya* relation. It would, thus, be found that the substrata of many substances in the form of parts and parts of the parts subsisting in their causes by *samavāya* relation are not the same, e.g., fruit resides by *samavāya* relation in its parts, while the parts of the fruit reside by *samavāya* relation in parts of the parts of the fruit. It is thus clear that when many substances occupy the same place (*samāna-deśa*) as their substratum, whether it be the basket or the space, they reside in it by *saṁyoga*

relation and not by *samavāya* relation. When, however, they are viewed as residing in their substrata by *samavāya* relation, their substrata are different although they may be occupying the same space. A corporeal substance can reside by *samavāya* relation only in its parts (the inherent cause) and nowhere else. No two material substances can subsist by *samavāya* relation in the same substratum, e.g., only one piece of cloth can reside by *samavāya* relation in the same yarn, and in that yarn no other substance (say, another piece of cloth) can reside. Vācaspatimiśra thus comes to the conclusion that the occupying of the same place in the same substratum[47] (*ekatra samāna-deśatā*) by two or more corporeal substances is untenable with reference to *samavāya* relation (inherence), and not with reference to *saṁyoga* (connection).[48]

It may, however, be noted that this is so only when the substratum (*deśa*) is in the form of a cause-substance. But if substratum is taken in the sense of space, then *samāna-deśatā* would mean subsistence in the same space. In that sense, the two corporeal substances (cause and its effect) subsist in the same space, e.g., threads and cloth subsist in the same space.

Now, coming to the question of atoms, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position, as stated above, is that there can be no common substratum of two or more corporeal substances by *samavāya* relation (inherence). The central atom, therefore, cannot be the common substratum of the six atoms combining with it. The increase in volume of several combined atoms also cannot therefore be precluded, because the increase in volume is precluded only when several things reside in the same substratum by *samavāya relation*. For instance, qualities like, colour, taste, touch, etc., residing in the same atom by *samavāya* relation do

47 Samāna-deśatā in the present context has advisedly been rendered as *occupying of the same place* in the same substratum. Ordinarily, samāna-deśa means just the same substratum, and one may say that a basket is the substratum of fruit, sweets, and many other things put therein. But they do not occupy the same space in the basket. In the present context, we are concerned with such substances as fruit, its parts, and the parts of its parts which occupy the same space in the basket, i.e., the same space in the same substratum.

48 Dravyāṇām ekatra samavāyena samāna-deśatāṁ vyāsedhāmo na tu saṁyogena. NVT. p. 1069.

not increase its volume. It is possible only for the incorporeal entities like qualities to reside in the same substratum by *samavāya relation,* and not for corporeal things as shown above.[49] The central atom, therefore, as already stated, cannot be the substratum of the six atoms by *samavāya* relation, and, therefore, the Buddhist objection against the increase of volume in the aggregate of the central and the six atoms does not stand.

It was stated that the connections of an effect and of its cause reside at the same point in their substratum, e.g., those of the cloth and the yarn occupy the same point in the jar, or those of the fruit and its parts, in the basket. Strictly speaking, even these connections have no common substratum. For instance, the connection of the basket with the fruit resides in the basket and the fruit, and that of the basket and parts of the fruit, resides in the basket and the parts of the fruit, and thus, the substratum of two connections is not the same. Similarly, the connections of the central atom with the six other atoms also reside each, as already shown, in the pair of one of the six atoms and the central atom and, therefore, the substratum of the six connections is not the same. Thus, the statement of the opponent in the second half of the stanza quoted from Vasubandhu, namely, 'all the six atoms will have the same substratum', is true neither as referring to atoms nor even as referring to their connections with the central atom.[50]

11. HOW ATOM IS RELATED TO SPACE-QUARTERS

The Buddhist raises another objection: the atom, in which there are *several* points, each associated with one of the different space-quarters, cannot be a partless object. Uddyotakara replies that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit that there are several points in the atom associated with different space-quarters. Difference of points associated with different space-quarters is not real, but only imaginary. There can be no difference of points in an atom. Of course, an atom is connected with space-quarters, but this fact cannot damage our position in any way.[51]

49 For the text "Samavāyena .... iti siddham" see Text Appendix.

50 Paramārthatas tu kuṇḍa-badara-saṁyogasya kuṇḍa-badare āśrayaḥ tad-avayava-kuṇḍa-saṁyogasya kuṇḍa-badarāvayavā iti siddhaṁ saṁyoginām api bhinna-deśatvam. NVT. p. 1070.

51 NV. p. 1070.

The difference in points of space-quarters and consequent imaginary difference of points in the atom has been elucidated by Vācaspatimiśra thus: "Space (*dik*) in reality is one and all-pervading. There is no difference (as that of quarters) in space as such. Now, if there is one space, how does there arise in the atom the difference of notion and expression to the effect that one atom is eastern in relation to another which is western? The reply is: though the space is one, an atom, which is connected with the point nearer to the point of sunrise, is eastern in relation to another atom which is connected with the point more distant from the point of sunrise. Similarly, an atom, which is connected with the point nearer to the point of sunset, is western in relation to another which is connected with a point more distant from the point of sunset. And an atom which is connected with the most distant point from *both* the points of sunrise and sunset is, in relation to those eastern and western atoms, the central atom."[52]

In the same way, Vācaspatimiśra explains the position of southern and northern, and upper and lower, atoms. He says that "nearness and distance respectively depend upon lesser and larger number of connections with connected points of space."[53] Vācaspatimiśra then concludes: "*Connections* of a single (partless) atom with other atoms—which are 'non-all-pervading' (*avyāpya-vṛttayaḥ*, explained below)—are imagined as if they were *parts* of the atom. Similarly, in the case of space also, which is one, its connections are imagined to be its parts. Connections of one central atom simultaneously with six other atoms are due to the atom having corporeal form (*mūrtatva*), and not due to its having parts. It cannot, therefore, be concluded that the atom is made up of component parts."[54]

Vācaspatimiśra here qualifies such connections as *avyāpya-vṛttayaḥ* (See the text quoted under n. 54 below). A property which does not pervade the whole of its substratum, but resides only in one part of it, is called *avyāpya-vṛtti*. For

52 For the text "Svarūpeṇaikā.....madhyavartī," see Text Appendix.

53 Saṁyukta-saṁyogālpatva-bhūyastve ca sannikarṣa-viprakarṣau. NVT. p. 1070.

54 For the text "Ekasyāpi.....arhati," See Text Appendix.

position. Another argument that an atom of earth, having more qualities than that of water, etc., should be of a larger size, has no point so far as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is concerned, for no amount of addition of qualities can add to the size of an atom or of any substance, as qualities are incorporeal.

13. SUBSTANCE AS DISTINCT FROM QUALITIES

The Buddhist holds that a substance does not exist as separate from qualities which alone are presented to us by our senses. The Buddhist position has been succinctly stated by Jayanta thus: "The substratum of qualities as distinct and apart from them is never cognized. It never shows itself to be an entity separate from those qualities, and yet surprisingly enough, it wants to establish its entity as such.[56] It would appear that the Buddhist takes his stand on common experience which presents only the qualities like colour, touch, etc., and not any substance as separate from, and as the substratum of, those qualities. The evidence of common experience in favour of the Buddhist appears to be so strong that even Uddyotakara seems to be carried by it. Meeting the Buddhist objection that a substance is never perceived apart from its qualities, he says that the non-perception of an object may be due to two reasons: (i) non-existence of the object in question, as in the case of a hare's horn and (ii) absence of the means of its perception.[57] Here Uddyotakara tacitly admits that a substance apart from its qualities is not perceived. This is against the Nyāya-Vaiśesika tenet, according to which, a substance as well as its qualities are both separately and directly perceived.

Leaving aside such unwary admissions, it is, however, noteworthy that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also like the Buddhist bases its defence of substance on the evidence of common experience. Śrīdhara says, "While qualities like colour, etc., are common to all objects, there is in the notion of objects like a jar or a pillar a specific cognition of their peculiar shape (*vilakṣaṇa saṁ-*

56 Guṇino 'pi guna-vyatiriktasyānupalambhād ayam guṇī rūpādibhyo 'rthāntaratvena nātmānam upadarśayati vyatirekaṁ ca tebhyo vāñchatīti citram. ('vāñchanti', as printed in the text, is wrong.) NM. Part I. p. 272.

57 Kim idam agrahanaṁ grāhyasyābhāvād āho grahe hetvabhāvāt. NV. p. 212. line 12.

sthāna). *It can only be due to the existence of a separate substance as distinct from its qualities.*"[58] Uddyotakara himself, who tacitly admitted that a substance was not cognized as separate from its qualities, is compelled to take recourse to the evidence of common experience. When pressed to give a proof of the separate existence of a substance and its qualities, he says: "When a perceptible object is stated as related to another perceptible object as for example, 'the gourd of a Brāhmaṇa', the two are always different. Similarly, our experience that sandal has white colour, pungent taste, etc., shows that qualities, colour, etc., are different from the substance (sandal)."[59] Here we find two warring camps both swearing in the name of the same common experience, and yet coming to just the opposite conclusions. The reality in this case, as in many other cases of metaphysical dispute, is that the same common experience is interpreted in two different ways. *Prima facie*, we experience external objects which appear to us as the substrata of qualities. An analysis of our experience, however, shows that substances do not exist apart from those qualities. The Nyāya-Vaiśesika takes its stand on the *prima facie* experience, while the Buddhist relies on the analysis of that experience.

14. THE BUDDHIST VIEWPOINT

The statement that the Buddhist does not accept substance as separate from qualities should not go to suggest that he accepts *colour, touch*, etc., as qualities (*guṇas*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception. As already stated, the Buddhist regards colour, touch, etc., as ultimate particulars (*kṣaṇas* or *dharmas*) which, interpreted in the Nyāya-Vaiśesika terminology, are neither qualities nor substance.[60] When the Buddhist says that there is no separate substance apart from qualities, he only means that substance and qualities are not two different entities as maintained by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. As the Buddhist

58 *Pratyeka-vilakṣaṇa-saṁsthāna-saṁvedanāt, rūpādi-svabhāvasya sarvatrāviśeṣāt*, NK. p. 41. line 4.

59 *Yad idaṁ candanam upalabhyate tasya śvetaṁ rūpaṁ tikto rasaḥ paṭur gandhaḥ śītaḥ sparśa iti. Yaś cāyaṁ pratyakṣasya pratyakṣena vyapadeśaḥ so 'rthāntare dṛṣṭo yathā brāhmaṇasya kamaṇḍalur iti.* NV. p. 210. line 1.

60 *Supra*, VI. 7.

a cognition of peculiar and distinguished shapes should also be accepted. Concluding this discussion, he refers to the argument adduced in the *Nyāya-sūtra* that only a single object is cognized by the two functions of seeing and touching.[66]

16. ARGUMENT OF UDDYOTAKARA

A detailed argument on the topic is found in the *Nyāya-vārtika* and the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*.[67] The discussion in the *Nyāya-vārtika* opens with the argument just referred to, namely, that a single object is cognized by seeing and touching, and therefore that object must be accepted as one substance as distinguished from the qualities of which it is a common substratum. The Buddhist points out that what we actually cognize by the senses of vision and touch are the two qualities, colour and touch, and not one single substance. The Nyāya-Vaiśesika here adduces the evidence of common experience and declares that a substance is comprehended by the senses in the same way as colour and touch are. As to the suggestion of the Buddhist that qualities, colour, etc., 'arranged in those different forms' (*rūpādayas tathā sanniviṣṭāḥ*) cause the notion of a substance, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika replies that the arrangement in those forms implies that those forms must exist somewhere as real. For instance, the illusion of a man caused by a pillar is possible only if the man and the pillar both exist as real somewhere, and there is some similarity between the two. As the Buddhist does not accept the existence of real substances like a cow, horse, or jar, there cannot arise specific notions of the shape of those substances caused by qualities, colour, touch, etc. If the Buddhist were to suggest that the different notions of the cow, horse, etc., are caused by different arrangements (*saṁsthāna*) of qualities, colour, etc., the answer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would be: if these different arrangements are identical with colour, etc., they cannot account for the difference in cognitions. If, on the other hand, they are held to be different from them, it would be tantamount to the acceptance of a separate substance by another name, i.e., arrangement (*saṁsthāna*).

66 NK. p. 41.

67 NV. and NVT. pp. 204-213.

Vācaspatimiśra further elucidates the Buddhist viewpoint. With regard to the arrangement of qualities, colour, etc., in different shapes, the Buddhist says that the same atoms of colour, etc., when characterised by the function of fetching water, are called jar, but when they are characterised by the function of imparting colour they are called 'blue', etc.[68] With regard to Uddyotakara's contention that an erroneous cognition of a substance always presupposes a right one, Vācaspatimiśra suggests on behalf of the Buddhist that the objection could be raised only in the case of an error having a beginning, but in the case of an error without beginning, it could be said that it was based on a prior erroneous notion, and that erroneous notion on a still prior one, and so on.[69] The statement of Vācaspatimiśra here clearly implies that Uddyotakara's refutation of the Buddhist is not quite fair. This is one of the instances of Vācaspatimiśra's scrupulous regard for a faithful representation of the views of his opponent, and it stands in contrast with the method of Uddyotakara who believed that everything was fair in love and war.

The contention that the cognition of a substance apart from its qualities is erroneous could be upheld only if it be proved that substance and qualities were not two distinct and different entities. The Buddhist therefore proves the identity of substance and qualities, and points out that there is no cognition of a substance without the cognition of its qualities.[70] It is only when something is identical with another that there is no cognition of it when the other is not cognized,[71] as in the case of a row of trees or a meat-soup. A row of trees is not different from the trees, and therefore it is not cognized when the trees are not cognized. And similar is the case with the soup which is not different from meat and water. On the other hand, when one

68 Rūpādi-paramāṇava eva tena tenākāreṇotpannā ekayodakāharaṇa-kriyayā vyavacchinnā ghaṭādaya ity ucyante, anurañjanādikayā tu rūpādi-vyapadeśaḥ. NVT. p. 205.

69 Ādimān mithyā-pratyayaḥ samyag-jñānaṁ nimittīkaroti, ayaṁ punar anādiḥ pūrva-pūrva-mithyā-pratyaya-janmā mithyā-pratyaya-pravāhaḥ kṛtam atra samyag-jñānena. NVT. p. 206.

70 Tad-agrahe tadbuddhy-abhāvāt. NV. p. 206.

71 Yad yasmād anarthāntaraṁ bhavati tad-agrahe tasyāgraho dṛṣṭaḥ. NV. p. 206.

thing is different from another, it may be cognized, even if the latter is not cognized.[72] In order to meet the self-evident argument of the Buddhist, Uddyotakara refers to an obscure Buddhist theory that an atom consists of eight component parts, i.e., four elements, earth, etc., and four qualities, colour, etc. According to this theory, when a jar is perceived, water, etc., should also be perceived because water is one of the components of the atoms of a jar.[73]

Secondly, he refutes the Buddhist argument by a sort of verbal quibbling. The Buddhist holds that qualities, colour, etc., are 'earth' (*rūpādayaḥ pṛthivī*) on the ground that when colour, etc., are not cognized, the earth also is not cognized—*atadgrahe tadbuddhy-abhāvāt*.[74] It literally means 'when *that* one is not cognized *that* other is also not cognized'. Uddyotakara says that the pronoun *tad* (that), in both places of the Buddhist proposition, would stand for *earth* which is said to be identical with qualities. Thus, the pronoun *tad* (that) in both the places would mean *earth*, and the meaning of the Buddhist statement would be that 'there is no cognition of the *earth* when the earth is not cognized'.[75] This is another instance of Uddyotakara's typical method of argumentation.

Thirdly, the Buddhist statement that colour, etc., are identical with earth (*rūpādayaḥ pṛthivī*) is assailed on the ground that colour, etc., are many, while the earth is only one. Two objects which are expressed in different numbers cannot be identical just as 'the stars and the moon', expressed in plural and singular numbers, are not identical.[76]

Uddyotakara further points out that even the original proposition of the Buddhist that a substance is not cognized when

72 Yac ca yato 'rthāntaraṁ bhavati tad-agrahe tasya graho dṛṣṭaḥ. Ibid.

73 As the full significance of the Buddhist theory referred to here is not known, it is not possible to appreciate Uddyotakara's argument. The danger of Uddyotakara having distorted the Buddhist theory, as is his wont, is always there.

74 NV. p. 206.

75 Pṛthivy-ādy-agrahe pṛthivy-ādi-buddhy-abhāvād iti hetv-arthaḥ prāpnoti. NV. p. 207. See the reading noted under n. 2. on p. 207 of the Nyāya-vārtika.

76 NV. p. 208. line 2. ff.

its qualities are not cognized stands violated. When, for instance, a white crystal appears as blue owing to the proximity of a blue object, its own white colour is not cognized, but the crystal is still cognized.[77] It would appear that this argument is hardly convincing, because the crystal is cognized with the changed colour and not without colour. With regard to the Buddhist statement that a row of trees is not different from the trees, or a meat-soup is not different from meat and water, Uddyotakara, following the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ideology, declares: as a matter of fact, a row connotes the number called plurality (*bahutva*), which being a quality is different from the trees which are substances. Similarly, soup connotes the *connection* of some articles, and connection, being a quality, is different from those articles. Concluding his polemic, Uddyotakara once again appeals to the evidence of common experience which presents a substance as different from its qualities, as already shown.

17. BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF POINT-INSTANTS (KṢANAS)

That reality is evanescent was an original and basic doctrine of Buddhism. It, however, lost its importance during the period of the two great Mahāyanist philosophical schools, the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra. These two schools denied the very existence of external reality. The original doctrine of fleeting reality was later on revived, reshaped and laid on *terra firma* in the epistemology of the Dignāga school.

According to Dignāga, reality is in the form of unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) or point-instants (*kṣaṇas*) which are grasped by sensation. Corresponding to sensation which is momentary, the external reality is also momentary. It has neither duration nor extension. Time and space are not external objective realities as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist. They are only creations of our mind. The description of reality by the Buddhist as *kṣaṇika* (lasting only for a moment) might suggest as if time were the receptacle or container (*ādhāra*) of reality as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. But for the Buddhist

77 Rūpādy-agrahe dravya-grahāt, yasmān nīlādy-upadhāna-bhedānuvidhāyinaḥ sphaṭika-maṇe rūpānupalabdhau sphaṭika iti pratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ. *NV.* pp. 208-209.

there being no objectively real time or its smallest part called moment, reality, instead of being called momentary, should be held to be identical with the moment (*kṣaṇa*) which term is actually used for reality by the Buddhist. When we conceive these moments or point-instants as arising in succession one after another, we construct the idea of duration or time. On the other hand, when we think of these point-instants as arising in contiguity with one another, we construct the idea of space. Similarly, when we conceive of these point-instants, both in simultaneous succession and in contiguity, we have the notion of motion. As a matter of fact, external reality is timeless, not in the sense that it is eternal, but in the sense that it has no duration; it is spaceless, i.e., it has no extension; and it is without motion. It is isolated, discrete, and disconnected and is, therefore, in the form of unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) which do not share their nature with one another or with anything else. The reality is variously designated as a point-instant (*kṣaṇa*), or a unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*). A point-instant is annihilated as soon as it arises and a new one takes its place.

There is another point which deserves clarification. Buddhist philosophy is often popularly designated as a doctrine of incessant *change*. If *change* means, as it ordinarily does, the passing of one state of a thing into another state, there is absolutely no room for the concept of change in Buddhist thought, for there is no *abiding stuff* which may pass from one state to another. As a matter of fact, Sāṁkhya theory alone deserves to be designated as a 'doctrine of change' (*pariṇāma-vāda*)[78] in which matter is conceived as something which passes from one state to another. If, however, change means simply the coming of one thing in place of another, the Buddhist theory may be regarded as a doctrine of change. Stcherbatsky has pointed out the difference in the conception of *change* in the Buddhist and the Sāṁkhya schools in his characteristically illuminating way.

78 The Sāṁkhya holds that it is the nature of matter (prakṛti) to change every moment (prati-kṣaṇa-pariṇāmino hi bhāvāḥ). During the period of creation there is dissimilar change in matter (virūpa-pariṇāma), and hence the manifold universe. But even during the period of dissolution (pralaya), there is change, but it is a change from one state to a similar state (sarūpa-pariṇāma).

He says that, according to the Buddhist, the universe represents *a staccato movement*, i.e., the point-instants of reality are detached and disconnected, while; according to the Sāṁkhya, it represents a *legato movement* in which the phenomena are continuous, being "waves or fluctuations standing out upon a background of an eternal, all-pervading, undifferentiated matter with which they are identical."[79] It would, thus, appear that every point-instant (*kṣaṇa*), lasting only a moment and being replaced by another, the reality, according to the Buddhist, is not static; it is dynamic. It is not *being*; it is *becoming*. It is a constant movement, but a movement—one must not forget—which is without motion, for there is no durable substance which may be the substratum of motion as held by the realist. It is a movement only in the sense that disconnected and detached bits of reality constantly follow one another.

18. REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF EVANESCENCE

In all controversies raging between the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the doctrine of the evanescence of reality stands out the foremost. For Buddhism, even in its early period, this was a basic doctrine and it gained even greater importance when the Buddhist philosophy reached its climax in Dignāga. Jayanta makes a significant remark that "the Buddhist cannot brook the existence of a durable or permanent object even in love-sports."[80] The theory was assailed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as vehemently as it was defended by the Buddhist. It is defended in the works of the Dignāga school, especially in the *Tattva-saṁgraha*.[81] The two theses ascribed to Ratnakīrti[82] are exclusively devoted to this topic. Its refutation is similarly met with in all the principal works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika including *Nyāya-vārtika*.[83] *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-*

79 Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 83.

80 Yena nityo nāma padārthaḥ praṇaya-keliṣv api na viṣahyate. NM. Part I. p. 179.

81 TS. pp. 131-166.

82 Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-siddhi, Parts I and II, published in the Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts.

83 NV. pp. 435 ff. and 823 ff.

ṭīkā,[84] *Nyāya-mañjarī*[85] and *Nyāya-kandalī*.[86] These works, as is usual with the orthodox writers, represent the Buddhist viewpoint with the utmost faithfulness. Now we shall briefly state the Buddhist arguments in support of the theory of evanescence.

19. EVANESCENCE PROVED BY THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION

Of all arguments adduced by the Buddhist to prove the evanescence of reality, the foremost one is based on the law of contradiction. The same thing cannot be the abode of contradictory attributes at the same time, e.g., one thing cannot be hot and cold at the same moment. In Buddhist logic, everything is conceived in the form of exclusion of things other than itself, e.g., a cow means nothing but exclusion of non-cows.[87] Because every object has its essence only as standing in contrast with other things, the law of contradiction plays an important role in Buddhist philosophy. As a corollary of this law, two contradictory attributes cannot belong to the same thing; they can belong only to two things. The Buddhist dictum is that whenever we find two contradictory attributes, we may be sure that there are two separate objects to which those two attributes belong.[88] If a thing exists at one place, it cannot exist at the same time at another place. And one place, strictly speaking, can only be a point of space. If, therefore, a thing exists at one point of space, it cannot at the same time exist at another point of space. Existence at two points of space can, therefore, belong only to two different things. According to the realist, a *dvy-aṇuka* (dyad) being a 'whole' (*avayavin*) resides in its two parts, the two atoms at the same time. But this is impossible. The existence of one thing, the *dvy-aṇuka* in one atom necessarily excludes its existence at the same time in the other atom. The very doctrine of 'whole' (*avayavin*) is against the law of contradiction, and, therefore, the Buddhist holds that there is no

84 NVT pp 435 ff and 823 ff
85 NM Part II p 17 ff.
86 NK p. 73 ff
87 Atad-vyāvṛtti
88 Viruddha-dharma-saṁsargād dhy anyad vastu. NBT. p. 5 The same principle is also expressed as: Yad viruddha-dharma-saṁsṛstaṁ tan nānā, yo viruddha-d harmādhyāsavān nāsāv eka iti.

whole' (*avayavin*) other than its parts (*avayavas*). We shall revert to this topic in connection with the doctrine of 'whole' (*avayavi-vāda*).

What is true with regard to space, is equally true with regard to time also. "If a thing exists at a moment A, it cannot also exist at the moment B, for to exist really at the moment A means not to have any real existence at the moment B or at any other moment. If we thus admit that the same thing continues to exist at the moment B, this could only mean that it at once really exists and does not really exist at the moment A. If a thing could have real duration through several moments, it would represent a real unity existing at once at different times."[89] According to the Buddhist, therefore, existence at one moment implies non-existence at any other moment. All reality is therefore momentary, i.e., evanescent by its very nature. To a realist, however, there is no contradiction if a thing which exists at one moment, say, the present moment, existed at a previous moment, and continues to exist at a subsequent moment also. The real reason for the difference between the two lies in their fundamental conception of reality. To the Buddhist, reality is *the efficient moment of a thing*[90] which comes about only at one particular time; its presence at one moment implies its non-presence at any other moment. To a realist, on the other hand, reality means to be endowed with the universal called 'existence' (*sattā*).[91] There is therefore, according to him, no contradiction in holding the duration of reality to be extending to several moments. To the Buddhist, however, evanescence is implied in the very nature of reality.

20. EVANESCENCE IMPLIED IN THE NOTION OF EXISTENCE

The proof of evanescence, as based on the law of contradiction, follows from the Buddhist notion of reality conceived as an efficient moment, i.e., capable of producing an efficient action.[92] In other words, the existence of an entity is identical

89 *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. pp. 86-87.
90 Sattvam artha-kriyākāri ksanah.
91 Sat sattā-jātimat
92 Artha-kriyā-kāritvam sattvam.

with its causality. This follows from the Buddhist doctrine of evanescence, or conversely, the latter is based on its conception of existence which is identical with causality. Existence (*sattā*) is held to be the stock reason (inferential mark or *hetu*) for proving evanescence.[93] The Buddhist points out that a durable entity cannot be existent, because it cannot be the cause of anything. He further explains that an efficient action can be produced only in two ways, either in succession or simultaneously.[94] It means that different efficient actions which are to be produced may take place either at different successive moments or they may all come about simultaneously at the same moment. There can be no third alternative. Both the alternatives stated above are impossible, if the reality or existence (which produces efficient action) is assumed to have a permanent or enduring nature. Because, if a permanent object is capable of producing an efficient action, it must produce it at once. It cannot wait to produce it in successive stages (*krameṇa*), because a capable cause cannot brook delay in producing its effect. If, on the other hand, it is incapable of producing that efficient action, it will not produce it even at a future moment because its incapability which is its nature will abide. It is, therefore, clear that a cause which is enduring cannot produce its effect in successive stages.

The realist, however, points out that a cause, although permanent or enduring, does not produce its effect at once because it has to wait for accessories, and as the latter appear only in successive stages, the effect cannot be produced at once. For example, a seed does not produce a sprout at once because it has to wait for the help of such accessories as earth, water, heat, etc., and the help comes only in successive stages. To this the Buddhist rejoins: do these accessories produce some addition or 'excellence' (*atiśaya*) in the cause, or not? If not, the accessories would be useless as being of no avail. If, however, they do, is that 'excellence' different from the cause or identical with it? If it be different, then, inasmuch as the effect in question (i.e., sprout) has been produced by the 'excellence' (different

93 Sarvaṁ kṣanikaṁ sattvāt.
94 Krama-yaugapadyābhyām.

from the cause), that 'excellence' alone should be regarded as the cause, and not the seed. Obviously, the effect is produced in the presence of the 'excellence' and not produced in its absence. And so far as the original cause (seed) is concerned, the effect (sprout) did not appear in spite of its presence, and therefore the seed cannot be the cause of the sprout. If it be contended that the original cause (seed), helped by the 'excellence' (produced by the accessories), is the cause, that too is not tenable. The 'excellence' cannot help the original cause without producing some kind of 'excellence' in it, because without that the original cause will continue to be what it was before. If, however, some 'excellence' is produced in it by the previous 'excellence' which has been held to be different from the cause, then the old question whether this new excellence is different from the seed or not will arise, and the same will go on *ad infinitum*. If, on the other hand, the 'excellence' produced by accessories is regarded as identical with (and not different from) the cause, it will only mean that the cause remains what it was before, and therefore it should have produced its effect at the very first moment of its existence. If the realist were to say that the cause, devoid of 'excellence', has disappeared, and that the cause, as possessing the excellence, has come in its place, it will only mean that the previous object has disappeared, and a new object has taken its place. It is exactly the Buddhist doctrine of evanescence. It is thus proved that a permanent or enduring object cannot produce its effect in succession.

The realist may ask how do the accessories help an evanescent object. If the accessories are of no avail in the case of an enduring object, much less can they be so in the case of an evanescent one. The principal cause and the accessories, according to the Buddhist theory, come into existence at one and the same moment, and beyond that moment they do not exist. There is, thus, no time for the latter to help the former. Here, the Buddhist declares that the accessories, as a matter of fact, do not help the principal cause at all. If the theory of evanescence be accepted, mutual help is impossible. Then what is the function of the accessories like earth, water, air, etc., in relation to the seed which produces a sprout? The Buddhist answers that the accessories (*sahakārins*) are called so because

they also operate simultaneously with the principal cause (*saha kurvanti*) to produce the same effect. He holds that the principal cause and the accessories produce their common effect independently of each other. None helps or can help the other. Dharmottara declares: "Accessories are of two kinds: those which help mutually, i.e., co-operating causes (*parasparopakārin*), or those which produce their common effect together without helping each other, i.e., concurrent causes (*ekakāryakārin*). In the case of an evanescent object, there being no possibility of creating an excellence (i.e., rendering mutual help), an accessory can be conceived only in the latter sense, i.e., of producing the same common effect together."[95] Thus, according to the Buddhist theory, seed, earth, water, air, etc., produce their common effect (the sprout) together. But as none of them helps the other, each one of them produces the sprout quite independently of others.

Here a question arises: if each one of them is separately capable of producing the sprout, why so many accessories operate in producing the same effect which could be produced by *any one* of them alone? The Buddhist answers that, in accordance with an inexorable causal law, several causes called *upasarpana-pratyayas* come together to produce their common effect. *Upasarpana* literally means moving close together. The numerous preceding moments which are *samanantara-pratyayas*, corresponding to the *upādāna-kāraṇa* (material cause) of the Sāmkhya, or *samavāyi-kāraṇa* (inherent cause) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, converge to produce their common effect, i.e., the present moment. Thus, the moments of seed, earth, water, etc., converge to produce their common effect, the moment called sprout. The preceding moments (seed, earth, etc.)—or such causes as hands of labourers, etc., which bring the seed, earth, etc., together—are the *upasarpaṇa-pratyayas*. According to a fixed law of nature, many *upasarpaṇa-pratyayas*, also called *saha-kārins* or accessories, must always come together to produce their common effect.[96] The effect is called a *saṁskṛta-dharma*, i.e., the

95 Dvi-vidhaś ca sahakārī, parasparopakārī ekakārya-kārī ca, iha ca kṣanike vastuny atiśayādhānāyogād ekakārya-kāritvena sahakārī gṛhyate. NBT. p. 13. (Peterson's edition).

96 Upasarpaṇa-kāraṇasyāvaśyambhāva-niyamāt. NK. p. 74. line 10.

common effect of many causes working together. There are, of course, many accessories which produce an effect, but they do not work unitedly to produce that effect; they work separately, and each one of them is, at least theoretically, capable of producing that effect alone, i.e., independently of other accessories.[97] Actually, however, an effect is never produced by one of them alone, but it is produced by all the accessories working together, i.e., working *simultaneously, but not unitedly.*

The realist may further ask as to why an effect which has already been produced by one cause is produced by other causes also. The Buddhist replies that the other causes do not produce what has *already been produced* by one cause, but they all produce *what is being produced* by one of the causes. The question still remains: when one of the causes is capable of producing an effect, why do the other causes unnecessarily operate in producing the same effect? The Buddhist reply, as quoted by Vācaspatimiśra, is "that the causes (*bhāvas,* existent entities) which have been brought together for operation are not intelligent beings. They are not capable of realising that one of them is quite enough to produce the effect, and therefore the simultaneous operation of all of them being unnecessary, they should retire from the scene."[98]

This is how the position of the Buddhist is stated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises like *Nyāya-kandalī*[99] and *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭīkā*[100] and more or less supported by the Buddhist treatises like *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi*[101] and Kamalaśīla's commentary on *Tattva-saṁgraha.*[102] The Buddhist was compelled to accept such a view by the logic of his theory of evanescence. The sole test of reality, according to him, lies in producing an efficient action, i.e., an effect. Now, in order to constitute the claim of a thing to existence, this capability must

97 This point will be made further clear in the sequel.

98 Na ca svakāraṇa-labdha-sannidhayo bhāvāḥ prekṣāvantaḥ—śakyam adam asmāsv ekenāpi kartuṁ, kṛtaṁ naḥ sarveṣāṁ sannidhānena. NVT. p. 840.

99 NK. p. 74.

100 NVT. p. 840.

101 Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi, p. 37.

102 Tattva-saṁgraha, p. 154.

be absolute or independent of any other factor like the accessories. The seed which is the cause of the sprout is the seed of the last moment just preceding the sprout. This is called *kurvad-rūpa*, i.e., the seed just at the moment of producing its effect (the sprout). The seed of the last moment (*antya-bīja-kṣaṇa*) must be regarded as having an absolute capability of producing a sprout without requiring any accessory. Otherwise, it will not differ from the seed in the granary which the Buddhist refuses to accept as the cause of the sprout. That being so, the seed of the last moment which is the cause of the sprout must be regarded as capable of producing it without the help of any accessory. Besides, it should not be forgotten that producing its effect at the very next moment is the nature or the essence of a point-instant. How can it depend on anything else for the function which is its own nature? An efficient moment, therefore, must produce its effect independently of any accessory. The Buddhist has thus got to emphasize that every one of the causes is capable of producing the effect independently of the rest.

The obvious objection raised against this theory was that, according to it, the accessories like earth, water, air, etc., become useless in the production of a sprout from the seed. The answer of the Buddhist is that accessories are useless so far as the help to the last efficient moment of the seed called *kurvad-rūpa* or *samartha-bīja* is concerned, but the accessories have their function in bringing about the last efficient moment of the seed which is produced by the contact of accessories like earth, water, air, etc., with the previous moments of the seed. In brief, the position is this: the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the effect (sprout) is produced when a permanent or enduring object like seed comes in contact with the accessories like earth, water, etc. The Buddhist, on the other hand, holds that as a result of this contact, a new efficient seed (*samartha-bīja*) is born which has got a new 'excellence' (*atiśaya*) or capability of producing the sprout not possessed by its preceding counterpart. Thus, the position of the Buddhist is that while *a new capacity or 'excellence' (atisaya) in an enduring or permanent object cannot be produced, a new object endowed with that excellence' is produced.* Vācaspatimiśra sums up the Buddhist position thus:

"The principal cause does require the help of the accessories, but it does so in its own production (i.e., in the production of the efficient moment of the seed), but not in the production of its effect (sprout). It is regarded as independent of accessories with regard to the production of its effect, and not with regard to its own production."[103] It means that the seed of the last moment (which produces the sprout in the immediate next moment) does require the help of accessories like earth, water, etc., for coming into existence, but itself being fully charged with the capacity of producing the sprout, it does not require help of any accessory for producing it. The Buddhist position in a nut-shell is that an *effect*, which has been brought about by many causes working together, requires the help of all those causes; but in so far as the *causes* are concerned, each one of them can bring about the effect independently of the rest.

The Buddhist has so far argued at length that an enduring object cannot produce its effect by succession (*kramena*) Now, he proceeds to show that it cannot produce it simultaneously either. In the first instance, as Jayanta points out in explaining the Buddhist argument,[104] it is against common experience. We do not see in the actual world a cause producing all of its effects simultaneously. Secondly, its capability to produce all effects simultaneously should abide in the successive moments also. If it be argued that it does not produce the same effects in successive moments, because it has already produced them, then the cause will be as good as non-existent in the successive moments, for existence means producing an efficient action, and it is admittedly incapable of producing an efficient action. It is thus proved that producing an efficient action is possible neither successively nor simultaneously in the case of a permanent or enduring object. Existence means capability of producing an efficient action which can be produced only in one of the two ways, either successively or simultaneously. A permanent or enduring object which cannot produce an efficient action either successively or simultaneously, must be held as devoid

103 Nanv apekṣata eva, kintu svotpāde na punaḥ sva-kārye, tatra tasyānapekṣatvam upeyate na tu svotpāde. NVT. p. 841.

104 Nāpi yugapad, loke tathā-vyavahārādarśanāt. NM. Part II. p. 18.

of existence.[103] Existence, being thus excluded from a permanent or enduring object, can rest only in an evanescent or momentary object. In the case of an evanescent object, the difficulty of one of the two alternatives of succession and simultaneity does not arise. An object existing only for one moment produces its effect, the efficient action, at the very moment of its existence. The sprout-producing seed exists only at the moment when it actually produces the sprout.

21. EVANESCENCE PROVED FROM DESTRUCTIBILITY

Evanescence is also proved from destructibility of objects. The Buddhist argument may be summarized thus: All the material objects are effect-substances (*kārya-dravyas*); they have been produced from their causes, and as such they are all, as universally admitted, liable to destruction. Now the question arises: are they born with destructible nature or indestructible nature? There is no third alternative. If they possess indestructible nature, they will never be destroyed, because not to be destroyed is their nature; and they will thus be eternal. As this is not a fact, only the first alternative that they are born with destructible nature can be upheld. In that case, destruction will be as much their nature as their existence. Destruction, being their nature, must come as soon as they are born. Inasmuch as destruction is the nature of every object, it does not stand in need of any extraneous help for its accomplishment. The Buddhist argument has been succinctly and forcefully summarised by Jayanta thus: "If an existent object is of destructible nature, it does not require any cause for its destruction. If,

103 The same idea is put in a logical form in the NVT. p. 840:—
Akṣaṇiko sattva-vyāpakayoḥ kramākramayor anupalambhād vyāpakānupalabdhyā nivartamānaṁ sattvam akṣaṇikāt, kṣanikatvena vyāpyata iti pratibandha-siddhiḥ It may be literally translated thus: Succession and simultaneity, which invariably accompany existence, are absent in an enduring object; and therefore, on account of the absence of an invariably accompanying factor (vyāpaka), existence will be excluded from an enduring object. The existence will therefore be invariably accompanied by evanescence. Invariable concomitance of existence with evanescence is thus established.

on the other hand, it is of indestructible nature, even then it does not require any cause for its destruction."[106]

Śrīdhara has stated the Buddhist argument thus: No extra cause is needed for an intrinsic and essential (*dhruva-bhāvin*) attribute of an object. Iron-*ness* of an arrow or a sword does not require any extra cause. Similarly, destructibility also, which is an intrinsic and essential property of all effect-substances, does not require an extra cause. It may be argued inversely also. Those attributes of an object which are dependent on some extraneous cause are not its intrinsic and essential attributes, e.g., the red colour of a cloth.[107] Besides, if the existent objects are dependent for their destruction on some external causes, the same may in some cases be obstructed or may remain ineffective or may not appear at all. In that case, some effect-substances may become eternal. It is, therefore, necessary to hold that the existent objects are born as destructible. And, inasmuch as they do not need any other cause for their destruction, they would inevitably be destroyed as soon as they are born. If, on the other hand, the existent objects are of indestructible nature, their destruction will be as impossible as 'the presence of coldness in fire'. They must, therefore, be held to be destructible by nature, and so they would not require any other cause for their destruction. Destruction is thus identical with the existence of objects. It is the very nature of existence, and is brought about by the same causes by which existence is brought about. Difference in causes brings about difference in effects also, and therefore if destruction were brought about by other causes, it would not be identical with the existent objects. If, on the other hand, it is held to be something different from the existent object, an absurdity will ensue in the form that the existent object will continue to exist even after destruction. For, by the origination of something which is different from the object (as destruction is held to be), the essence of the latter cannot be affected. Moreover, if a jar and its destruction are different, the expression should not take the form 'a jar is destroyed', because here the jar

106 Vināśvara-svabhāve 'smin kṛtaṁ pralaya-hetubhiḥ,
Anāśvara-svabhāve 'pi kṛtaṁ pralaya-hetubhiḥ.
NM. Part II, p. 20.

107 For the text "Tathā hi.....rāgādayaḥ." see Text Appendix.

is expressed as identical with destruction (being its subject). The expression in that case should rather take the form "destruction has taken place", i.e., it should have no reference to the jar which is different from destruction. Moreover, if in answer to the question as to what has happened to the jar, one were to say that destruction has taken place, the answer would be irrelevant because the question was with regard to the jar and the answer is given with regard to destruction which is held to be different from the jar. To avoid these absurdities, destruction must be held to be the nature of an existent object, i.e., identical with it.[108]

Jayanta cites one more point as part of the Buddhist argument: "If an effect-substance is not destroyed in the very first moment of its origination, it will mean that it has overcome its death (destruction), and being thus indestructible, it will last for hundreds of æons."[109] If it be suggested that an existent object has the nature of being destroyed after the interval of a few moments of its existence, even then it will never be destroyed. Even after the interval of a few moments, the nature of waiting for a few moments will persist, and it will always wait for a few moments for its destruction.[110] It is, thus, maintained that either an existent object should be destroyed at the very first moment of its existence, or it will never be destroyed.

On a closer examination, it will be found that the fundamental principle underlying the proof of evanescence from destructibility or from existence (discussed in the previous section) is the same. The principle is that the nature of an object cannot change without the change of its identity. Whenever some change in the nature of an object or emergence of some new quality in it is noticed, it must be assumed that the old object has disappeared and a new one has taken its place. Strangely enough, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika itself was driven to the

108 For the text "Tathā yadi.....vināśa iti." see Text Appendix.

109 Atha mṛtyor apakrāntas tasya cet prathamaḥ kṣaṇaḥ,
Avināśi-svabhāvatvād āstāṁ yuga-śatāny api.
NM. Part II. p. 20.

110 Atha katipaya-kṣaṇa-vyavaluta-vināśa-svabhāvo bhāva isyate, tarhi prāktana-nayena kadācid api na vinaśyet, vināśa-samaye 'pi tat-svabhāvānapāyena punaḥ katipaya-kṣanāpekṣaṇa-prasaṅgāt. NM. Part II. p. 20.

position that any change in the arrangement of its parts or any change in its primary qualities involves a change in the identity of the object itself. In all such cases the previous object is destroyed, and a succeeding one comes in its place. This will be discussed at length in the chapter on causation.[111]

The destruction of an object, according to the Buddhist, means the imperceptible decay which is supposed to be going on every moment of its existence. But what about the perceptible destruction which follows upon the stroke of a hammer? If destruction comes about of its own accord, what, in that case, is the function of destroying agents like the hammer? The Buddhist replies that the function of the hammer is not to destroy the jar, but only to bring about a dissimilar series (*vijātīya-saṁtati*) in the form of pot sherds. It means, when members (objects) which appear and disappear in a series called a jar are of a similar type, the series is regarded as a homogeneous series (*sajātīya-saṁtati* or *sabhāga-saṁtati*). When, however, as a result of the stroke of a hammer, there appear dissimilar members (pot-sherds in place of the jar), the series is called a heterogeneous series (*vijātīya-saṁtati* or *visabhāga-saṁtati*). Thus, the function of the hammer is not to destroy the jar, but to bring about dissimilar members in the series, i.e., to produce a heterogeneous series.[112]

22. RECOGNITION RECONCILED WITH EVANESCENCE

The foremost argument of the realist for proving the permanence or enduring nature of an object is furnished by perception itself. The perception called recognition which takes the form, "this is the same jar that I saw before,"[113] comprehends the existence of the jar in the present moment as well as in the past. To this, the Buddhist says that the experience that 'this is the same jar' is not a unitary knowledge, but it is made up of two factors, perception and remembrance. Here one part of the experience, i.e., 'this' refers to the present object which is

111 *Infra*, VII. 14.

112 Kva tarhi mudgarādīnāṁ vyāpāraḥ? Vijātīya-saṁtati-janmaniti brūmaḥ. NM. Part II. p. 20.

113 Sah ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ. Here 'ayam' (this) is identified with 'sah' (that).

perceived by the sense, while the other part, i.e., 'that' refers to the past object which is *remembered*. The two parts of the experience have been produced by two different causes which are mutually exclusive. The sense which comprehends only the present object has no power to comprehend the past object which is expressed by 'that'; and the act of remembrance which comprehends the latter, i.e., 'that' (the object of the past) has no power to comprehend the present object expressed by 'this'. The sense alone is the cause of perception, while the impression (*saṁskāra*) caused by past perception is the cause of remembrance. The two heterogeneous factors like clay and threads cannot combine to produce a common effect.[114] Besides, this cannot be *one* unitary experience because there is a qualitative difference in the nature of its two parts. 'This' part is perceptive and immediate cognition (*pratyakṣa*), while 'that' part is mediate knowledge (*parokṣa*). Immediate knowledge and mediate knowledge are mutually inconsistent. The experience in question is therefore made up of two experiences, perception and remembrance."[115] Presenting the Buddhist case, Jayanta says, "granting that it is *one* unitary experience, the question will arise as to which kind of object it comprehends. If it comprehends the object of the past, it does not differ from remembrance; and if it comprehends the object of the present time only, it can never prove the permanence of the object. Past, present and future are mutually exclusive and inconsistent, and therefore all the three or any two of them cannot enter into *one unitary experience*.[116]

The theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that recognition comprehends an object as qualified by the previous knowledge also stands refuted by what has been said above. The previous knowledge which is non-existent at present cannot qualify the present object. Jayanta says: "Recognition comprehends an object which is not in the process of origination and destruction." This is also

114 For the text "Nany esa -- prasuvita." and "Tasmād dve..... anubhavah." see Text Appendix.

115 For the text "Ito 'pi naitad....bhinnaviṣaye." see Text Appendix

116 Paraspara-parityāga-vyavasthita-nijātmanām
ekatra na samāveśah kathañcid upapadyate.

NM. Part II. p. 21.

wrong, because it has been established that existent objects are related only to the present time. What will, now, be the time of origination and destruction of an existent object—the present time or any other time? It has been pointed out that any time other than the present time is not comprehended. If, therefore, origination or destruction refers to the present time, it will be comprehended along with the present time which is invariably associated with it. Therefore, an existent object will necessarily be associated with origination and destruction."[117] Concluding the Buddhist arguments, Jayanta puts a sarcastic remark in the mouth of the Buddhist: "The recognition—a poor wretched thing—which came to the scene to prove the permanence of objects, will now leave after establishing the evanescence of objects (i.e., just the opposite)".[118]

Recognition, thus, cannot prove the permanence of objects. The notion of identity is simply an illusion of the kind that we have in the case of a burning flame or hair which is cut and grows up again.

23. EVANESCENCE AND DIRECT PERCEPTION

Some Buddhist logicians, as pointed out by Śrīdhara as well as Jayanta, have tried to prove the evanescence of an object by direct perception. Śrīdhara puts the Buddhist argument thus: "Perception lasts only for a moment, and therefore it can comprehend only the reality which is coeval with it, i.e., which exists at that moment. It also excludes the possibility of that reality not being related to that time (present moment). It further excludes the relation of that reality with any moment other than the present, i.e., with the past and future moments, because it is concomitant with the present time. Now, if the relation of the reality, which has been grasped at the present moment, has been excluded from the past and future, it would mean that it exists only at the present moment, and therefore it is evanescent."[119] If it be urged that only a reality like *blue*,

117 For the text "Athopajanāpāya.....ayātām." see Text Appendix.

118 Seyaṁ tapasvinī sthairyaṁ prasādhayitum āgatā,
Pratyabhijñā vināśitvaṁ pratiṣṭhāpya gamiṣyati.
NM. Part II. p. 22.

119 For the text "Kṣaṇikaṁ.....gṛhṇāti." see Text Appendix.

etc., is grasped, and not its momentariness, the Buddhist replies that this cannot be urged by the realist who himself holds that objects are grasped as determined by time (*kālāvacchinna*). So far as the Buddhist is concerned, there is no real time. It is only imaginary, and therefore "time is not different from reality, *blue*, etc."[120] "It may be urged that in an expression like 'some one is cooking or studying', the present time also appears as extended to several moments, and may not be confined only to one moment."[121] To this the Buddhist, as quoted by Jayanta, replies: "It would be absurd to say that the present moment is a protracted time, and it consists of an aggregate of a few moments, as if it were a 'whole' (*avayavin*) of time."[122] He continues: "The present time consists only of one moment, and all moments prior to it belong to the past, and those posterior to it belong to the future."[123] Further: "A momentary sensation cognizes a momentary reality coeval with it, and then a subsequent momentary sensation cognizes another reality which is coeval with it. In the intervening period there is no comprehension of any reality, and non-comprehension of reality is regarded as the intervening period."[124] The realist points out that if one continues to perceive an object without any break in the act of perceiving, one cognizes an object which exists without any break, i.e., an enduring object. To this, the Buddhist rejoins: Cognition lasts only for one moment. The evanescent nature of knowledge is admitted even by the realist, and, therefore, even according to him, continuous cognition without break is not possible. The question of perceiving an object existing without break, therefore, does not arise. A continuous cognition, which is in fact a series of a number of momentary cognitions, is an illusion. Simi-

120 Nīlatvāvyatirekinī ksanikatā. NK. p. 81.

121 Nanu pacati pathatīti vartamāno 'prvitata eva kālah pratīyate. NM. Part II. p. 23.

122 Na hy asti kālāvayavī nānā-ksana-gaṇātmakah.
Vartmāna-kṣaṇo dīrgha iti bāliśa-bhāṣitam.
NM. Part II. p. 23.

123 Vartamānah kiyān kāla eka eva ksanas tatah.
Pūrvah ksaṇo 'tītatām sprśaty uttaras tv anāgatatām. *Ibid.*

124 Pūrvam hi jñānam tatkālam eva, uttaram api svakālam eva vastu grhnāti, madhye tu nāsty eva grahanam, agrahanam eva madhyam āhuh. *Ibid.*

larly, a permanent object, which is a series of a number of similar moments of reality, is also an illusion.[125] The Buddhist concludes that our perception lasting only for one moment can comprehend only a momentary reality. Evanescence is thus proved not only by inference but also by perception.

24. THE LAW OF CONTRADICTION RECONCILED WITH PERMANENCE

Now we shall proceed to discuss the refutation of the Buddhist arguments. The Buddhist stated that the present, past and future moments, being contradictory to each other, could not refer to one and the same object. Existence must be different in two different moments. The same point was raised in connection with the phenomenon of recognition, which, as referring to two moments, past and present, cannot establish the identity of an object existing at two times. The topic has been discussed by Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta and Śrīdhara. Śrīdhara in the course of his argument admits that when the present time is determined, it will exclude the non-present times (past and future), because there is incompatibility of the present with the non-present. He, however, points out that the *relation* of an object with the present time is not incompatible with its relation with the past and the future times. There is no contradiction in one thing being related to many things, as for example, in the case of 'jewels and the thread' many jewels are related to one thread.[126] Vācaspatimiśra has discussed the same point in connection with the theory of the determinate perception. He argues thus: Granted that the prior and posterior times and their relation with an object are two different entities because the non-existence of one of them is concomitant with the existence of the other owing to their never being comprehended as identical, but the object, say a ruby (*padmarāga*) does not become different by its association with the two times (past and present). The ruby is different from the two times or from its relation with them. Difference

125 For the text "Nanv avicchinna.....utthitaḥ." see Text Appendix.

126 Vartamāna-kāla-paricchede cātītakāla-vyavacchedo yukto bhāvābhāvayor virodhan na tu kālāntara-sambandha-vyavacchedo maniśūtravad ekasyānekа-sambandhatvāvirodhāt. NK. pp. 81-82.

of one thing cannot cause difference in another thing, i.e., difference of the two times cannot cause difference in the ruby.[127]

The same topic has been discussed at some length by Jayanta.[128] The Buddhist argues that the past and the present times are mutually incompatible, that they cannot stand together with reference to one and the same object, and that existence at those two times, must therefore, be held to be different.[129] The answer of Jayanta which agrees with that of Śrīdhara quoted above is that despite the difference of ornaments like armlet, crown, bracelet, or ear-ring, the wearer Devadatta is not different. Similarly, an object related to two different times, the present and the past, may not itself be different. The Buddhist objects that there is no contradiction between armlet and crown as there is between the present and past moments. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika replies that this objection does not lie in the mouth of the Buddhist who holds that all objects that exist are mutually exclusive.[130] There is, therefore, a contradiction between an armlet and a crown so far, at least, as the Buddhist is concerned. The Buddhist may say: granting that there is a contradiction between them, they can at least exist at one time, and that they may therefore be related to one identical Devadatta. But the present and past time cannot exist simultaneously, and yet it is said that an object (like a pillar) is determined simultaneously by both the times. How strange is it to say that both the times are comprehended together although they do not exist together! To this the realist replies that he does not say with reference to the past time that it exists, but only that it *existed*. The past is not comprehended as present but only as *past*, and the present is comprehended as present. The object, however, is comprehended as one and the same and related to both the times.

127 For the text "Purvāpara-deśa-kālau.....āpādayati." see Text Appendix.

128 NM. Part II, pp. 21-24 and 31-33.

129 Nanu pūrvāparau kālau paraspara-virodhinau,
Naikatra viśatas tena tad-bhedād vastu bhidyate.
NM. Part II. p. 31.

130 According to Buddhist logic, the nature of a particular object consists in exclusion of objects other than itself. An armlet (keyūra) is, therefore, only the exclusion of non-armlets (akeyūras) which includes a crown also; and hence the two, according to the Buddhist, should be regarded as contradictory.

The Buddhist objects that the past time being absent at the present moment, a cognition comprehending it, cannot be caused by the object, and hence it would be an illusion. The realist replies that the object conditioned by the past time is present, and the cognition is indeed caused by it; the cognition is therefore not an illusion.[131]

If it be asked how the past which does not exist could be a determinant (*avacchedaka*), the answer is that it is what we actually experience, i.e., it is the same object which *existed before*. In this cognition, an object is comprehended as conditioned by the past time. But the question still remains, how a cognition produced by the *sense* could comprehend an object as qualified by the past time which cannot be comprehended by the sense. The realist replies: In the process of counting, when the last jar is cognised as the hundredth, the other ninety-nine jars, which were perceived in the past, cause the cognition of the number hundred. Similarly, the relation of an object with the past time would also be its attribute and a cause of its recognition at the present time. If the Buddhist were to say that in the present instance, the jars to be counted were present, and not past, the realist can cite an instance of the past things which are to be counted and which exist no more. For example, when it is said that 'a wild man ate a hundred wild fruits', the number hundred is cognised at the time of eating the hundredth fruit, and it refers to ninety-nine fruits which are no longer existent. From this instance, the realist seeks to prove that even a thing which is not present before our sense can enter into our sense-perception. The Buddhist rejoins that this is not at all an instance of sense-perception, but that of a thought-process (*vikalpa*). To this the realist retorts that, according to the Buddhist, there is hardly anything which is not a thought-process.[132] It is in this context that Jayanta makes a spirited remark: Let the Buddhist remember that "the upholders of the genuineness of determinate perception (which he holds to be mixed with thought-process) are still alive."[133]

Even if determinate perception be regarded as genuine per-

131 NM. Part II. pp. 31-32.
132 For the text "Nanu bhūta...vikalpamātram." see Text Appendix.
133 Jivanty ami savikalpaka-prāmāṇyavādinaḥ. NM. Part II. p. 32.

ception, it is difficult to accept the realist contention that comprehension of the number hundred, when the hundredth fruit is being eaten and ninety-nine have already been finished, is an objective perception. Jayanta probably realised the weakness of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position. The same question, how a past object can enter into a sense-perception, is raised by him in connection with the phenomenon of recognition in which, according to the realist, the past time is held as determinant of a present object. Jayanta says that in the case of recognition, an object is cognised not only as conditioned by the present time, but also by the past time. Inasmuch as the knowledge of 'its being conditioned by the past time' is caused by the object which is present, that knowledge (recognition) should also be regarded as a sense-perception, for whatever is caused by a *present object* is necessarily a sense-perception.[134] The Buddhist once more raises the same question as to how the sense can operate with reference to a past object. The reply of Jayanta is that "the sense cannot operate with reference to *the past time as such*, but it can do so with reference to a present object which is perceptible by the sense and *which is conditioned by the past time*. Of course, an object conditioned by the past time cannot be perceived by the unaided sense, but it can be perceived by the sense aided by the previous impressions (*saṁskāras*). Recognition which comprehends a permanent object (pillar) as qualified by the past time is thus caused by the contact of the sense with the object."[135]

Jayanta proposes yet another alternative according to which recognition may be held to be conditioned by the previous knowledge of the object. A jasmine flower, when perceived by the sense of vision, is, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, perceived as a fragrant flower. Although fragrance is not the object of the visual sense, it is held that the knowledge of the flower as fragrant is a mental perception. Similarly, the recognition of a pillar, which is conditioned by past knowledge, may be regarded as a mental perception.[136] The phenomenon of a flower being perceived as fragrant by the visual sense was explained by the

134 For the text "Vartamāna……anuvidhānāt," see Text Appendix.
135 For the text "Atīte kāle……iti siddham." see Text Appendix.
136 For the text "Athavā……pratyabhijñā." see Text Appendix.

later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholiasts by the theory of extraordinary contact (*alaukika sannikarṣa*) called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa*. According to this theory, the perception of a flower as fragrant is held to be visual perception. As the eye cannot have any of the six usual contacts (*saṃyoga*, etc.) with fragrance, an extraordinary contact in the form of knowledge (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa*) is devised for the purpose. The previous knowledge of its fragrance serves as a contact between the visual sense and the fragrance; by this contact there is a visual perception of fragrance. It would appear that in the discussion given above, the theory of *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* appears to be in the process of formulation. Of course, it is not as yet fully established. Obviously, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika evolved this theory in the course of its conflict with the Buddhist on the nature of *pratyabhijñā*.[137]

25. THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF EXISTENCE REFUTED

The evanescence of existent objects as implied in the notion of existence has been refuted by all important orthodox writers including Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta and Śrīdhara. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist urges that the Buddhist conception of existence as capability for efficient action is untenable. Jayanta says that existence is what is comprehended as existent by cognition and is not set aside later on.[138] Vācaspatimiśra says that "existence is not identical with causality, but it consists in the essential nature (*sva-rūpa*) of an object, blue, etc., as presented in the sensation and determined by judgment."[139] He further declares: "Causality is not an essential nature of an object (*vastu-svabhāva*) but an attribute of an object. An attribute is indeed different from the object, and the difference of one thing cannot cause differentiation in something other than itself, because that would lead to an unwarranted stretch of the matter (*atiprasaṅga*).[140] It means that on account of the emergence of

137 For fuller discussion, see *infra*, XII. 12.

138 Kintv abādhita-*sadbuddhi-gamyatā sattvam iṣyate*. NM. Part II. p. 25.

139 *Na ca kāraṇatairva sattā kintu svarūpaṁ nīlāder anubhūtāvasitam*. NVT. p. 843.

140 *Janakatvaṁ nāma na vastu-svabhāvo 'pi tu tad-dharmaḥ, dharmaś ca dharmiṇo vastuto bhidyate. Na cānyasya bhedo 'nyasya bhedāyālam atiprasaṅgāt*. NVT. p. 843.

a new attribute, i.e., causality which is different in essence from the efficient cause (*kurvad-rūpa* seed), the latter cannot be held to be different from the seed of the previous moment. If a thing could cause difference in something else, it would mean a confusion (*atiprasaṅga*, literally, stretching a principle too far). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika takes its stand here on its basic doctrine of *essential* difference between an attribute and its substratum (*dharma-dharmi-bheda*). The difference in polemics on the question of evanescence between the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is based on the fundamental difference in their metaphysical standpoints. To the Buddhist, the causality of an object is its essence, but to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is an adventitious attribute.

It may be noted here that the usual definition of an existent entity, viz., which possesses the universal called 'being' (*sattā-jāti*), as found in all later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, is given neither by Śrīdhara nor by Vācaspatimiśra. It is therefore of some significance that the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers refer to an existent entity as having 'existence by nature' (*svarūpa-sattā*), and not as having the universal called 'being' (*sattā-jāti*). Besides, the existence of an *existent object* cannot be constituted by the universal called *being*, which, as a *universal*, is different from the existent object. Older masters of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, therefore, reasonably held that the existence of an object is constituted by its nature (*svarūpa-sattā*).

26. EXISTENCE DOES NOT PROVE EVANESCENCE

Some of the arguments which assail the Buddhist plea that evanescence is proved by existence relate to logical formality in pointing out some flaw in the formal syllogism of the Buddhist. Śrīdhara says that exclusion of the logical reason (*hetu* or *sādhana*) from the counter-instances (*vipakṣa*, i.e., where the major term, the thing to be proved, is positively known to be absent),[141] is a condition of a valid syllogism. In order to prove evanescence from existence, there should be a counter-instance in which absence of evanescence should be accompanied by the absence of existence. But everything being evanescent

141 Vipakṣād vyāvṛtti.

according to the Buddhist, he cannot cite any such counter-instance. The logical requisite not being fulfilled, his syllogism stands vitiated. Secondly, Śrīdhara points out that there cannot be a similar instance (*sapakṣa*) in which the major term is positively known, and positive concomitance (*anvaya-vyāpti*) of 'evanescence' (*sādhya*) and 'existence' (*sādhana*) can be shown, because every object in the universe is covered by the subject of the syllogism (*pakṣa*). The Buddhist met both these objections based on formal logic, especially the second one, by proving the concomitance of existence and evanescence, in the first instance in a jar and then making a word or sound (*śabda*) the subject of evanescence in the formal syllogism.[142] We need not, however, enter here into the intricacies of formal logic, which is not possible without a recourse to the technicalities of the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logic.

Now, with regard to the metaphysical aspect of the matter, Jayanta argues at length that the origination of an effect from its cause is impossible according to the theory of evanescence. He raises four alternatives: (i) whether one effect is produced from one cause, or (ii) from multiple causes; or (iii) multiple effects are produced from one cause, or (iv) from multiple causes.[143] Of these, the first and third alternatives are set aside because, admittedly, nothing is found originating from one cause, and because it is noticed that many accessory causes are brought together for producing an effect. And if one cause were to produce many effects, it would do so either in succession or simultaneously. In the former case, the cause will have to be accepted as permanent, and in the latter alternative, it would go against experience. Moreover, one cause with multiple capabilities of producing many effects will itself be multiple and not one, because the Buddhist has emphatically laid down the dictum that

142 In this connection Dharmottara, the commentator of Dharmakīrti's Nyāya-bindu, has been quoted and answered by Śrīdhara (NK. p. 76, line 19). Ratnakīrti in his Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi has discussed at length how the evanescent jar can serve as a similar instance (sapakṣā) for the Buddhist syllogism.

143 Api ca kṣaṇikatva-pakṣe kim ekasmād ekotpāda uta bahubhya ekotpattir, athaikasmād aneka-niṣpattir āho bahubhyo bahu-saṁbhava iti parikṣaṇīyam. NM. Part II. p. 26.

contradictory attributes can belong only to objects which are themselves different.[144] The second alternative that one effect is produced from multiple causes, is also unthinkable according to the Buddhist theory. The Buddhist does not admit anything like a 'whole' (*avayavin*) which is made up of many parts, and which may be held to be produced by a number of parts. Moreover, if one effect is produced by many causes, it will partake of the nature of all those causes, and as such, will have many contradictory attributes. It will, therefore, not be *one* object; it will itself be multiple. If it does not partake of the nature of all those causes, it will have to be admitted that the effect does not partake of the nature of its causes, and there will result a wholesale confusion. In that case anything may be supposed to have been produced by any and everything. Thus, only the fourth alternative (viz., multiple effects are produced by multiple causes) remains which, in fact, represents the Buddhist position. The Buddhist holds that the aggregate of homogeneous causes at a particular moment (*pūrva-kāraṇa-sāmagrī*) produces a similar aggregate of effects at the succeeding moment. When, however, an aggregate of heterogeneous causes operates, the aggregate of effects produced is also heterogeneous.[145]

Jayanta proceeds to argue that even this fourth alternative is not plausible according to Buddhist metaphysics. An *aggregate* of multiple causes is not different from the multiple causes themselves, because according to the Buddhist, an aggregate is not different from the objects of which it is an aggregate. It may be asked: when an aggregate produces a subsequent aggregate, will one individual member of the effect-aggregate be produced by one individual member of the cause-aggregate, or by all the multiple causes working together? If the former alternative be accepted, it will mean the production of *one* effect from *one* cause which was already rejected. In the case of the second alternative, if *all* the members of the cause-aggregate operate together in the production of each of the individual members of the effect-aggregate, the same old question will arise as to whether they operate in succession or simul-

144 Viruddha-dharma-saṁsargād hy anyad vastu. NBT. p. 5.
145 NM. Part II. pp. 26-27.

taneously. If they work successively, it will mean that the aggregate of multiple causes produces one member of the effect-aggregate first, then another member, and so on. In that case, the multiple causes will have to wait for some time, and therefore, they will no longer be evanescent. If, on the other hand, they operate simultaneously, it will mean that all the multiple causes have produced all the multiple effects at one and the same time. There being, thus, no discrimination of separate causes for each individual effect, there will be no differentiation of effects as *colour, taste,* etc. All the individual effects, in that case, should either be in the form of colour or that of taste, or they may be neither colour nor taste, but something quite different.

It may be pointed out by the Buddhist that though an aggregate of colour, taste, etc., produces the same type of aggregate, yet with reference to one effect something is held to be the material cause, while another thing is held to be the accessory cause. Thus, in the production of colour, the colour of the previous moment will operate as the material cause, while other moments will operate as accessory causes; hence there will be no intermixture of effects. But this is untenable, rejoins the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist, because whether material or accessory, they do not cease to be the causes. If colour is the material cause of the effect-colour by the same nature by which it is the accessory cause of taste, then there would be again no discrimination among the effects. If, on the other hand, it is held that colour has one nature as the material cause of colour, and another as the accessory cause of taste, then there will arise difference of nature in the same object, which means that the object in question is not one, but multiple. Nor can the Buddhist maintain that these two natures are not contradictory, because, according to him, all objects have their nature in the form of exclusion of others, and hence the two natures will necessarily be contradictory. Moreover, in the case of evanescent objects, the discrimination that this one is the material cause and that one the accessory is incomprehensible.[146]

Besides, according to the Buddhist theory, causation itself is difficult to establish. If a thing can be the cause of another

146 For the text "Athocyate kim.. duravagamah," see Text Appendix.

thing without operating in its origination, then everything can be the cause of everything else. The operation (*vyāpāra*) of a cause is, of course, unthinkable, because a cause cannot operate in the origination of another thing before its own production, and if it does so after its production, its existence at least at the next moment (i.e., the moment of operation) has got to be postulated. The Buddhist may say that causation, according to him, takes the form of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) which means, one thing having appeared, the other thing follows. Even then the existence of an object will have to be admitted at the moment of its appearance after the moment of its origination, because causation cannot be comprehended by mere immediate precedence. The operation of an evanescent object is, therefore, possible neither in the present moment nor in the past or future.[147]

Not only is *existence* inconclusive as a logical reason for proving evanescence but, on the contrary, declares Jayanta, it is a diametrically opposite reason (*viruddha*), which proves just the opposite (non-evanescence or permanence). As shown above, the causation of a thing can be determined only if it *operates* for the production of an effect and, therefore, it must be assumed as existing at least for two or three moments.[148] The Buddhist, however, may rejoin: "Even if a cause has duration, it does not produce the effect at all times; its operative condition (*kārakāvasthā*) lasts only for a *moment*. It actually produces the effect at the moment when it is charged by an operative movement[149] as held by the Mīmāṁsakas, or when it is in the proximity of accessory causes as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The cause will thus have to be admitted as operative (*kāraka*) only at *that particular moment*, neither before nor afterwards."[150] An object, therefore, at least, *as an operative cause* (*kāraka*), has been admitted as evanescent by all the schools. Here Jayanta in his characteristically witty manner, makes the Buddhist declare in this context that "while all the schools admit evanescence (in the way shown above, the fol-

147 For the text "Athavā tiṣṭhatu...na bhāvinaḥ," see Text Appendix.
148 For the text "Athavā labdhātmanaḥ...hetuḥ," see Text Appendix.
149 Vyāpārāveśa.
150 For the text "Api ca sarvadā...kārakāyogāt," see Text Appendix.

lowers of Sugata alone got the credit thereof."[151] To this Jayanta rejoins that it is not correct because the operative condition of a cause lasts not for one moment, but 'for the full period of the production of its effect'[152] which covers many moments.

With regard to the Buddhist objection that an enduring object can neither produce its effect successively nor simultaneously, the stock answer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that it produces its effect in succession, i.e., at the moment when all the accessory causes come to proximity with the principal cause which alone is incapable of producing its effect. In reply to the question raised by the Buddhist, whether these accessories produce some new excellence in the principal cause or not, Śrīdhara says that the accessories do not produce any excellence in the *nature* of the object. They are just accessories; and excellence consists only in their proximity with the principal cause which produces the effect.[153] Therefore the question of any excellence being produced in the nature of the object does not arise and, consequently, all the storm of difficulties raised by the Buddhist on that account is off the point.

27. POLEMIC OF VĀCASPATIMIŚRA

The most abstruse and slashing polemic against the Buddhist arguments for proving evanescence from existence is given by Vācaspatimiśra.[154] The Buddhist argued that neither succession nor simultaneity being possible in an enduring object (*akṣaṇika*), existence is also excluded from it. Vācaspatimiśra posits a similar argument against the Buddhist. *Existence* in the Buddhist sense, viz., capability for efficient action, must invariably be accompanied by one of the two alternatives, either by dependence on accessories (*sāpekṣatva*), or by non-dependence on them (*anapekṣatva*). He shows that

151 Sarva-vādibhir eva prāyeṇa kṣaṇikatvam idam abhyupagatam iti, yaśa eva kevalaṁ saugatāḥ pītavantaḥ. NM. Part II. p. 20. line 4.

152 Kārya-niṣpatti-paryantatvād avasthānasya. NM. Part II. p. 30. line 7.

153 Nāpi sahakāriṇo bhāvasya svarūpātiśayam ādadhāti kintu sahakāriṇa eva te. Atiśayaḥ punar etasya sahakāri-sāhityam. NK. p. 77.

154 NVT. p. 841. ff.

both these alternatives are impossible in an evanescent object, and that existence is, therefore, excluded from it. It has already been pointed out that it is not possible for an evanescent object to be dependent on accessories, and the Buddhist, therefore, insists that the principal cause and the accessories produce simultaneously one and the same effect (*eka-kārya*); they do not do so unitedly (*sambhūya*), i.e., by depending on or helping each other. With regard to the function of accessories, it is pointed out that the principal cause requires the help of accessories, but it does so for its own production (i.e., the production of the efficient moment of the seed, *samartha-bīja*), but not for the production of its effect (the sprout). "The principal cause is regarded as independent of accessories with regard to the production of its effect, but not with regard to its own production."[155] It means that the seed of the last moment (which produces the sprout in the immediate next moment) requires the aid of accessories like earth, water, etc., for itself coming into existence, but, inasmuch as it comes into existence fully charged with the capacity to produce a sprout, it does not require the aid of any accessory for producing it.

The position in a nut-shell is: *an effect*, which is brought into existence by many causes working together, requires the aid of all those causes for its origination, but so far as those *causes* are concerned, each *one of them* brings about that effect without the aid of the other causes. This is a queer position. An effect requires *many causes* of which *any one* is capable of producing the effect. If any one of the causes can produce the effect, the need of many causes for producing it does not arise at any stage. This has been explained with his usual insight by Vācaspatimiśra. He says: "For the production of an efficient seed-moment (*samartha-bīja*), the previous moments of seed-series, being causes, will also, in the same way, be independent (of accessories), and similarly, all the previous moments of the seed series will be independent of accessories, and thus, ultimately, the cultivator should have his object fulfilled by just keeping the seed in the granary, and there should be no need for him to take recourse to the tedious task

155 Nanv apekṣata eva, kintu svotpāde na punaḥ sva-kārye, tatra asyānapekṣatvam upeyate na tu svotpāde. NVT. p. 841.

of cultivation."[156] Concluding his argument, Vācaspatimiśra says that "the Buddhist, therefore, will be forced to admit, although unwillingly, that the causes, as the last moments, can produce their effects only as dependent on one another."[157]

Vācaspatimiśra, thus, demolishes the principal Buddhist argument adduced for proving evanescence from existence or, what is the same, from the causal efficiency of an object.

28. EXPLANATION BY RATNAKĪRTI AND ŚĀNTARAKṢITA

If accessories, as maintained by the Buddhist, do not render any help to each other, then they are quite useless. What would, in that case, account for the qualitative change in the series of an object? In the case of a seed-series in a granary, the change is homogeneous; every seed-moment of the series is replaced by a similar seed-moment. This is called continuity of a homogeneous series (*sajātīya-saṁtati* or *sabhāga-saṁtati*). But in the case of a sprout-series, being produced by the seed-series, there appears qualitatively a heterogeneous series. This is called continuity in the form of dissimilar series (*vijātīya-saṁtati* or *visabhāga-saṁtati*). The obvious and common-sense explanation of the qualitative change is that it is brought about by the presence and operation of accessories like the earth, water, air, etc. The Buddhist also does not deny this. It was stated that an efficient seed-moment (*samartha-bīja*) is dependent on the aid of the accessories so far as its own production is concerned (*apekṣata eva svotpāde*). It is, however, not dependent on the accessories in producing its effect (the sprout). But, as Vācaspatimiśra has pointed out, the previous moments also, as causes, will not be dependent on the accessories which will thus be useless, and the phenomenon of qualitative change, according to the Buddhist, will remain unaccounted for.

Ratnakīrti in his treatise, *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi*, raises the question: When all the seeds in the granary are of a similar type, why do only some of them have the capacity of producing an efficient seed-moment which results in a sprout? He answers: The causes of all effects are of two kinds, seen and unseen. A

156 For the text "Nanūtpattāv.....duhkhabahulena." see Text Appendix.

157 Tasmāt parasparāpekṣāṇām eva antya-kṣaṇa-prāptānāṁ kārya-janakatvam akāmenāpy upeyam. NVT. p. 511, line 22.

man with limited knowledge can never know the aggregate of all the seen and unseen accessory causes. It is, therefore, possible that only some particular seed-moments possess that special nature due to a difference in their aggregate of causes, and they alone, in course of time, give rise to the efficiency (for producing the sprout), while others do not.[158] But this also is no explanation. From the statement of Ratnakīrti, it follows that the difference in the two cases will be caused by the difference in the aggregate of causes, and it has been shown that multiple causes working together do not help each other, and that every one of them is held to be sufficient to produce the effect.

Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśila offer an explanation in *Tattva-saṁgraha* and its commentary, the *Pañjikā*. The latter says: "Accessories (*sahakārin* causes) are conceived as functioning in two ways: (i) by producing the same effect, i.e., by producing the same efficient action (*ekārtha-kriyā-kāritayā*), or (ii) by helping one another in producing the effect (*parasparopakāritayā*). Now, with reference to the immediate effect, i.e., the *immediate next* moment, the accessories can be conceived as functioning only in the former way, i.e., they produce the same common effect. As they exist at one indivisible moment, they cannot render any mutual help. But with reference to a *mediate effect*, i.e., the third or fourth subsequent moment the accessories may be conceived as helping one another."[159] The reason is this: the immediate next moment, viz., the second moment, is produced as their common effect by all the accessories, working simultaneously, but not unitedly (*sambhūya*), i.e., without helping one another.

It has been pointed out that so far as the effect is concerned, it requires all the accessories for its origination. It follows, therefore, that although the principal cause (seed) and its accessories (earth, etc.) have not worked unitedly (i.e., by helping each other), the immediate next moment (*kurvad-rūpa*) is their common effect as a result of which there has been produced a qualitative change in it. It is, therefore, different from the seed-moments in the granary. Now, with reference to the

158 For the text "Nanv ekatra.....bījakṣaṇaḥ." see Text Appendix.
159 For the text "Tathā.....sahakāritvam." see Text Appendix.

third moment which is the product of the second moment, it may be said that all the accessories have rendered mutual help in its origination through the second moment in which a qualitative change has already been produced. In brief, all the accessory causes of the first moment worked separately, i.e., without helping one another so far as the production of the *immediate* second moment is concerned. But the second moment being the common effect of all the accessory causes, they are all combined, in a way, in the entity of the second moment. It may, therefore, be said that through the second moment, all of them have combined and helped one another in the production of the subsequent moment.

It would appear that in the last analysis, it is the same formula that an *effect* requires all the accessories for its own production (*kāryaṁ svotpāde apekṣate*), but a *cause* does not require any accessory for producing its effect (*na punaḥ svakārye*). But if, in view of the criticism of Vācaspatimiśra cited above, we think of accessory causes not as effects of the previous moments, but as causes of the subsequent moments, it would appear that any one of them could produce that effect. The Buddhist position, as already stated, is that so far as the causes are concerned, any one of them can produce the effect without dependence on other accessories, but so far as the effect is concerned, it is dependent on all the accessory causes which have *actually* produced it. For example, the seed of the last moment capable of producing a sprout, is, as an effect, dependent for its production on all the accessories, seed, earth, water, air, etc., but thinking in terms of its causes, i.e., the accessories, any one of them is capable of producing the seed of the last moment. Now, the question arises: if any one of the accessories is enough, even theoretically, to produce the effect, why should the effect be regarded as dependent on all the accessory causes? Secondly, does it not violate all common sense to hold, even theoretically, that any one of the accessory causes (seed alone or, for the matter of that, even earth alone) can produce the efficient seed-moment independent of the other accessories? Of course, the Buddhist texts, as pointed out above invariably say that while the efficient seed-moment does not require the aid of accessories like earth, water, etc., in producing the sprout, it

requires their aid in its own production. But this is not tenable because, as pointed out by Vācaspatimiśra, it could also be said with regard to the seed-moment which precedes the efficient seed-moment, that as a cause, it could produce the efficient seed-moment irrespective of any accessory cause, earth, water, etc.

The position of the Buddhist in this matter requires careful examination. It is well-known that, according to the Buddhist, no effect can be produced by one single cause, and that it always requires multiple causes[160] which may all be called accessories. To say that any one of the accessories can produce the effect would surely militate against that universally accepted principle. Besides, as already stated, there is a contradiction involved in holding that an effect requires all the accessories for its origination, but so far as the accessories are concerned, any one of them could produce that effect. The explanation of the difficulty seems to be this: the statement that any one of the accessories is capable of producing the effect, is an overstatement or rather a misleading statement of the Buddhist position, although it is found not only in the orthodox treatises presenting the Buddhist position, but in the Buddhist treatises themselves. It is true that the last moments of accessories, which all produce their common effect at the next moment, cannot work in concert, that they cannot help one another for the simple reason that they are evanescent, and that there is no time for them to render mutual help. It is, therefore, correct to say that every one of the accessories works separately to produce the common effect. But, as already stated, all the accessories come together necessarily at the point of origination on account of the inexorable law of convergence (*upasarpaṇa-niyama*). The question of any one of the accessories actually producing the effect, independently of others, does not, therefore, arise at all. If an effect is held to be produced by *all* the accessories which necessarily converge by an inexorable law, it is not quite correct to say that any one of them is capable of producing the effect. Of course, at the moment of producing their common effect, all the accessories, being born as charged with the efficiency to produce it, do not stand in need

160 *Na kiñcid ekam ekasmāt* See also the section 27 of this chapter.

of mutual help when they produce their common effect working separately but simultaneously. This fact has been stretched by writers of both the camps to imply that anyone of the accessories can produce that effect even alone. It is just an overstatement of the fact that accessories produce the effect without themselves being in need of mutual help. Of course, all the accessories work separately, and not in concert.[161]

29. DESTRUCTIBILITY AND EVANESCENCE

Now, the realist proceeds to examine the next argument of the Buddhist. If the existent objects were intrinsically of a destructible nature, they would be destroyed by their very nature. If, on the other hand, they were of an indestructible nature, they would never be destroyed. Jayanta, adopting a similar line of argument, retorts: "The same may be said with regard to the origination of objects also. If a jar is of the existent nature (*bhavana-svabhāva*), it will come into existence without operation of any cause, and there is no use of causes, stick,[162] etc. If, on the other hand, it is of the non-existent nature, it will never come into existence like a 'hare's horn.' If it be urged by the Buddhist that in the case of origination, we actually see that the objects are brought into existence by the operation of causes, the same may be said with regard to their destruction as well."[163]

Śrīdhara proceeds to argue that destruction cannot be identical with existence. "Does an object after being produced last for only one moment, or also for the next moment? In the latter case, its momentary character will be violated because it would endure for more than one moment. If it lasts only for one moment, it will not exist at the next moment, i.e., at the moment of its destruction; and therefore existence and destruction as belonging to two different times will not be identical.

161 The present writer sent, sometime ago, a note on the Buddhist theory of causation to some Buddhist scholars in order to ascertain their views on this problem. But unfortunately none of them replied. The above-given explanation is author's own.

162 Stick (daṇḍa) which is used for revolving the wheel is one of the efficient (*nimitta*) causes of the jar.

163 For the text "Utpattāv api.....samādhiḥ." see Text Appendix.

The Buddhist might urge that an object is not its own destruction, i.e., it is not identical with its own destruction, but the second moment is the destruction of the previous moment. This also is not tenable, because although the previous moment of an object differs from the next moment of its series, there is no contradiction in their nature, i.e., they can co-exist. Just as a jar of one series exists side by side with the jar of another series, similarly, the previous moment of an object might also exist side by side with the next moment of the same series. The cognition, which comprehends the second moment, having its function fulfilled by apprehending its positive form, cannot comprehend the negation of the previous moment. This means that comprehension of the second moment does not cognise the destruction of the previous moment of the same series.[164] And therefore, according to the Buddhist theory, a previous moment should continue to exist along with a subsequent moment of the same series.

So far as the realist is concerned, there will be no such problem, because he holds that destruction or non-existence of an object is of the nature of its negation. The notion takes the form that 'the jar does not exist' (*ghaṭo nāsti*). Hence it is that the origination of non-existence (of an object) is the cessation of its existence, that continuance of non-existence is non-continuation of the object, and that comprehension of non-existence is non-comprehension of the object, because the object and its non-existence are contradictory.[165] The object (jar), therefore, according to the realist theory, does not continue to exist after its *destruction* which is contradiction of its existence. Nor can it be asked how by the origination of one thing the essence of another can be destroyed, because it is so in the nature of things. The expression 'a jar is destroyed' does not mean that a jar and its destruction are identical. That expression is used simply because the destruction has been caused by action in the constituent parts of the object. We speak of the destruction of the jar, and not of anything else,[166] because the action

164 For the text "Utpanno...pramānatvābhāvāt," see Text Appendix.
165 For the text "Abhāvas ....parasparavirodhāt," see Text Appendix.
166 For the text "Anyotpāde katham ..sarvasya," see Text Appendix.

has occurred in the parts of the jar. The expression 'a jar is destroyed,' therefore, means that destruction, which is contradictory to the jar, has occurred. Śrīdhara declares, "that being so, an existent object is not momentary, because its destruction, which comes after some time and which is dependent on causes other than itself, does not necessarily follow immediately after its origination. It is experienced that a jar, after being produced, is destroyed after a pretty long time by the stroke of a hammer".[167]

The argument that "the intrinsic and essential attribute of a thing does not require an extra cause is also fallacious, as there are instances like the rising and the setting of the sun which, although essential attributes, are dependent on other causes. If it were not so, there would be no difference of time indicated by sunrise and sunset."[168] It was further contended by the Buddhist that what is dependent on external causes is not an essential attribute because those causes may sometime be obstructed, and the destruction of an object may not take place at all. For instance, the colour of a cloth is dependent on external causes, and therefore it is not an essential attribute of the cloth, and it is possible that it may not appear at all. To this Śrīdhara replies: "There is a particular (*niyata*) cause of the colour of the cloth which appears at a particular time (*niyata-kālaḥ*), and mere absence of the cause at that time will mean non-appearance of colour, but in the case of destruction, *its causes are* unlimited and not confined to a particular *time* (*aniyata-kālāś ca*).[169] It is, therefore, *impossible that all of them may be* obstructed *at all times. One of the causes is sure to operate.*"[170] Jayanta meets the *same* argument in this way: "An effect, which has parts, and resides in those parts, is sure to be destroyed at

167 For the text "Evaṁ ca.....mudgarābhighātāt " see Text Appendix.

168 Yac ca dhruva-bhāvitvād abhāvasya hetv-antarānapekṣety uktaṁ tad api savitur udayāstamayābhyām *anaikāntikaṁ* tayor anapekṣatve hi kāla-bhedo na syāt. NK. pp. 79-80.

169 *It is not* 'niyata-kālāś ca' as printed in the text. It should be 'aniyata-kālāś ca' (See the text in n. below). Dr. Jha has taken the reading as 'niyata-kālāś ca' in his English translation which makes no sense.

170 Niyato hi vāsasi rāga-hetur niyata-kālaś ca tasya tatkālāsannidhimātreṇa rāgasyānutpādaḥ sidhyati, anantās tu vināśa-hetavo aniyata-kālāś ca teṣāṁ sarvadā sarveṣāṁ pratibandhasyāśakyatvāt kaścid eko nipatati eva. NK. p. 80, line 3.

one time or the other on account of disconnection or destruction of those parts. There can thus be no question of its being eternal. No one therefore finds even in the royal palaces today the jar used at the time of Rāma's installation to the throne; and therefore one of the causes of the destruction of an object is sure to operate."[171]

As for the statement that the function of the stroke of a hammer is not to destroy the jar, but only to bring about a heterogeneous series in the form of pot-sherds, Śrīdhara replies: "So long as the power of producing homogeneous (*sajātīya*) members in a series is not destroyed, there can be no production of heterogeneous (*vijātīya*) series. If the destruction of that power by the stroke of a hammer is admitted, why should there be disinclination to admit the destruction of the object itself by the same agency?"[172] In connection with this problem, Vācaspatimiśra observes: "Let the Buddhist say whether a heterogeneous series in the form of pot-sherds in the place of a homogeneous series of the jar is a certainty (*dhruva-bhāvinī*) or not. If it is not certain, the destruction of the jar also will not be a certainty because ordinary people endowed only with eyes of flesh never experience the destruction of a jar without the origination of a heterogeneous series (in the form of pot-sherds)!"[173] Certainty of the destruction of the jar will thus not be established. If, on the other hand, the emergence of a heterogeneous series is a certainty, then for the emergence of that series itself which is certain, the necessity of an extra cause like the stroke of a hammer will have to be admitted, and there-

171 For the text "Sāvayavasyāśritasya ....hetuh." see Text Appendix.

172 Saṁtāna-pratibaddhāyāh sadṛśārambhana-śakter apratighāte vilakṣaṇa-saṁtānotpatty-asambhavāt mudgarābhighātena tasyāh pratihatau ca bhāva-pratighāte kah pradveṣah. NK. p. 79. line 11.

173 Api ca dhruva-bhāvitvam asiddham anaikāntikaṁ vā. Idaṁ bhavān pṛṣto vyācaṣṭāṁ kim ghaṭa-saṁtānāt sabhāgāt kapāla-saṁtatih dhruva-bhāvinī na vā, na ced na vināśo 'pi ghaṭasya dhruva-bhāvī, na khalu viṣabhāga-kṣanotpādam antareṇa ghaṭa-vināśam ikṣāmahe māṁsa-cakṣuṣas tathā cāsiddhā dhruva-bhāvitā vināśasya. NVT. p. 836, line 23. The fling at the Buddhist is: while ordinary people only know of the destruction of a jar which is accompanied by its change in the form of pot-sherds, the continuous imperceptible change going on every moment is only experienced by the Buddhist alone who is perhaps endowed with a vision of extraordinary power.

fore the proposition that a sure event does not require an extra cause stands vitiated, and it cannot set aside the fact that even sure destruction requires some extra cause." [174]

Obviously, when the Buddhist speaks of destruction as the innate nature of every object, he does not thereby refer to the empirical destruction (such as caused by the stroke of a hammer), but to the imperceptible and continuous decay or change going on every moment in every object which, according to him, takes place at the very next moment of its origination. When, however, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika speaks of destruction, it always refers to what is brought about by the external causes, i.e., by disconnection or destruction of the parts of an object. The chief objection of the Buddhist is that in the case of some objects, the adventitious causes may not appear at all, in which case those objects will become eternal. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika answer is that there being unlimited number of causes of destruction and there being no limitation of time, one of the causes of destruction is sure to appear at one time or another. Obviously, the answer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is not convincing, for although theoretically every object may always be liable to destruction, there is also a possibility that causes of destruction which are adventitious may not occur for millions of years, and an object may continue to exist for an unlimited period. It does not lie in the mouth of Jayanta to say that the destruction is a certainty, and that the jar used for Rāma's installation to the throne does not exist today. Why should it not exist? The Buddhist may rejoin that there is, at least, a possibility of that jar existing today. A more convincing answer to the Buddhist is given by Vācaspatimiśra quoted above. The Buddhist must admit that a heterogeneous series (*visabhāga* or *vijātīya saṁtati*) in the form of the breaking of a jar into pot-sherds is a certainty (i.e., it is the nature of the object), and yet it is brought about by extraneous causes. This takes us to the basic conceptions of the two schools. According to the Buddhist conception, the universe is kinetic, i.e., the whole universe, its millions of millions of particles called point-instants (*kṣaṇas*) are all interrelated; they act and react upon one another; they are *saṁskṛta-*

174 For the text "Atha dhruva.....arhatīti." see Text Appendix.

dharmas. As a result of this, homogeneous and heterogeneous (*sabhāga* and *visabhāga*) series are constantly going on. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, the universe is static; there are stationary objects or substances isolated from each other. It may, therefore, be said against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, if destruction is to happen to an object by an extraneous cause, the latter may not occur at all for an infinite time.

30. THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA ON CONSTANT DECAY

Let us now consider the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position with regard to the imperceptible constant decay or change which, according to the Buddhist, is going on every moment in an object. Let us think of a jar which has not met with any destroying agency, say, for one thousand years or more. Has it undergone some decay or change during that period? Theoretically, it may be the same object without any change or decay, but, as a matter of fact, some particles of it are bound to have disjoined. The object, if weighed, would be found to be less at least by a few grains than its original weight. Now, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, if any new particles are added to an object in a way that they become its part by inherent relation, or if any inherent parts are subtracted from an object, it becomes a new object, i.e., the former 'whole' (*avayavin*) is destroyed and a new one comes in its place. The disjoined particles may be millions in number, and with the subtraction of every single particle the object has changed, which means that the object in question has been replaced by a different object millions of times. The durability of an object is thus shattered in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's own house.

In the case of inorganic objects like a jar, it may at least theoretically be maintained that there has been no subtraction or addition of particles for some time. But what about organic objects, the animal bodies or plants which grow every moment? As already stated, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was confronted with this problem in connection with the development of the fœtus. To quote Śrīdhara again: "The essence of the food eaten by the mother is transferred to the fœtus in small measures. And there takes place an action in the atoms constituting the fœtus

by contact with digestive fire through the agency of unseen power (*adṛṣṭa*). From that action follows disconnection by which the previous fœtus is destroyed. And then, a new (embryonic) body is created in combination with the atoms of the mother's food by the fœtal atoms in which new qualities have been produced by contact with the (digestive) fire, and in which action has been engendered by an unseen power. This process (of destruction and new creation) goes on every day." [175]

Obviously, this process goes on not only in the case of the fœtus but it goes on in all living bodies or other organic objects. And although Śrīdhara says that this process goes on every day, in reality, he means that it goes on *every moment, because the* essence of the mother's food continues to nourish the fœtus all the time. Thus, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, all organic bodies are constantly changing. The old bodies are being destroyed and new ones taking their place every moment. In the case of inorganic objects also imperceptible decay goes on every moment. Some of their parts are being subtracted continuously. It means that old objects are being destroyed and new ones created in their place almost every moment. This is the position clearly implied, though not explicitly stated, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. The Buddhist only reduces this process of constant destruction and origination, as deduced from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory itself, to a scientific and logical conclusion that it is the inborn nature of every object to be destroyed at the very next moment of its origination.

31. RECOGNITION AND EVANESCENCE

It has been shown how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position that permanence of objects is proved by the fact of recognition was assailed by the Buddhist. The Buddhist contention has already been partially met in the course of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argument showing that the law of contradiction can be reconciled with permanence. The Buddhist pointed out that the knowledge that 'this is the same jar' is not unitary, but it has two factors, perception and remembrance. Perception comprehends a present object and is immediate; and remembrance compre-

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175 For the text "Tatra mātur.....draṣṭavyā." see Text Appendix.

hends a past object and is mediate. They, thus, comprehend two different objects and not one and the same object which may be held to be permanent. To this, Śrīdhara replies: "Cognition (called recognition) comprehends one and the same thing which is determined by both the times, past and present. To say that one and the same thing is not the object of recognition is contrary to experience. As perception and remembrance cannot comprehend one and the same object, the knowledge called recognition, should be held, on the strength of experience, to be one unitary knowledge comprehending both the past and the present states of an object. In order to explain a phenomenon which is experienced, the wise assume causes which are not even perceptible. They never discard what is clearly evident merely on the ground that its cause is not known. Otherwise, all the diversity of the world will have to be repudiated simply because its cause is not perceived. Of course, the sense (*indriya*) and the impressions (*saṁskāras*), when working separately, are incapable of producing recognition which is a unitary knowledge, but when they work in concert, they produce a single effect called *recognition*. And, on account of the strength of both the causes, the sense and the impression, it can have both past and present as its object. It is held to be a perceptive knowledge because it is caused by the sense and an external object. Nor is it a fact that what cannot be done by one single cause separately cannot be done even by many of them when working in concert. Earth, water, seed, etc., although separately incapable of producing a sprout, do so when they are mutually proximate. It is well-known that if there is a difference in the aggregate of causes, the effect also is different. The nature of recognition, therefore, as mediate on account of comprehending a past object and immediate on account of comprehending a present object will not be inconsistent. And for the same reason, although the past factor in recognition is not in contact with the sense, knowledge of the past is held to be perceptive because it is produced by the sense, and that alone is the criterion of a knowledge being called perceptive." [176]

Explaining the phenomenon of recognition, the Nyāya-Vai-

176 For the text "Pratiyate tāvad.....pratyakṣatāyāḥ." see Text Appendix.

śeṣika declares that even the past state of an object, not in contact with the sense, can become the object of sense-perception along with the perception of the object which is in contact with the sense. The Buddhist, on the other hand, stresses his argument that recognition could not be regarded as a unitary perception, because perception is caused by sense alone, and it must be free from all elements of remembrance. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, however, swears by experience which actually presents to us a perceptive knowledge in which there is an element of the past as well. That being so, Śrīdhara tells us (as noted above) that the duty of the wise is to assume some cause for the phenomenon which is actually experienced and not to discard the phenomenon itself. Jayanta points to the futility of the opponent's objection in his characteristic way by putting forward two alternatives: "If the effect is comprehended, what is the use of examining the causes; and if the effect is not comprehended, what is the use of examining the causes."[177] Jayanta, then, declares that when an effect is there, the cause must also be there, and that "in the case of recognition, the sense accompanied by impression is the cause."[178]

It was held, when a flower is being perceived by the eye, its fragrance is also an object of a visual perception even when it is not being smelt by the nose. Jayanta has referred to this point.[179] This phenomenon was explained by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers by assuming an extraordinary sense-object-contact called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* (contact in the form of knowledge). As already suggested, the way was being paved for the formulation of this theory in course of the polemic with the Buddhist on the nature of recognition.[180]

This also disposes of the Buddhist refutation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that a recognition comprehends an object as devoid of origination and destruction. If, of course, the recog-

177 Kāryaṁ ced avagamyeta kiṁ kāraṇa-parīksayā,
Kāryaṁ cen nāvagamyeta kiṁ kāraṇa-parīkṣayā.
NM. Part II. p. 31.

178 Saṁskāra-sahitam indriyam asyāḥ pratiteḥ kāraṇam. NM. Part II. p. 31.

179 *Supra*, VI. 25.

180 *Ibid.*

nition can comprehend the past state of an object, that object will be cognised as permanent.

32. PERCEPTION AND EVANESCENCE

To the Buddhist plea that perception lasting only for a moment can grasp only a momentary reality, Jayanta replies: "A person with unwinking eyes grasps objects like a pillar, etc., as having unbroken existence."[181] The Buddhist points out that even according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, a cognition lasts only for one moment, and that it comprehends an object which is coeval with it. To this Śrīdhara says that at the time of comprehending an object, "cognition does not comprehend even its own self, much less its coevalness with the object. Or granting that it does, a perceptive cognition would still be incapable of comprehending that the object did not exist before or will not exist afterwards. It cannot grasp the previous and the subsequent time."[182] As to the Buddhist plea that a perception cognizing a reality existing at the present moment excluded the relation of that reality with other moments (past and future), Śrīdhara says, "indeed the comprehension of the present time does exclude other times, past and future, as there is a contradiction between what is present and what is not present (i.e., past and future). It cannot, however, exclude the *relation of the object with other times.* As there is no contradiction in one thread being connected with a number of beads, similarly, one object may also be connected with all the three times present—past and future."[183]

181 Animeṣa-dṛṣṭer atrutita-sattāka-stambhādi-padārthagrāhi pratyakṣam utpadyate. NM. Part II. p. 35. line 2.

182 Svātmānam eva na gṛhṇāti vijñānaṁ kutaḥ sva-samānakālatām arthasya gṛhnāti, gṛhnātu vā, tathā 'pi pūrvam ayaṁ nāsīt paścāc ca na bhaviṣyatity atra pratyakṣam ajāgarūkam pūrvāpara-kālatāgrahanāt. NK. p. 81, line 23. According to the Buddhist, Prabhākara and some other schools, when an object is comprehended, its cognition is also comprehended along with it. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, holds that a cognition is not comprehended at the time of perception of an object, but it is comprehended by a subsequent mental perception.

183 Vartamāna-kāla-paricchede cātatkāla-vyavacchedo yukto bhāvābhāvayor virodhān na tu kālāntara-saṁbandha-vyavacchedo mani-sūtravad ekasyāneka-saṁbaddhatvāvirodhāt. NK. p. 81. line 25.

As to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika objection that only objects like *blue*, etc., are comprehended, and not the fact that they are momentary, the Buddhist rejoins that the objection does not lie in the mouth of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika according to which the comprehension of objects is always determined by time which is objectively real. To this, Jayanta replies: "Let there be no real time, but an object is grasped by a person with unwinking eyes and, there being no break in his vision, the object has an unbroken existence for him; his perception therefore does not comprehend the object as momentary."[184]

To the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika plea that in expressions like 'someone is studying', the present time appears as extended for several moments, the Buddhist reply is that it is a wrong notion. As already stated, the present time consists only of one moment; all moments prior to it belong to the past, and those posterior to it belong to the future; thus a momentary sensation cognizes only a momentary reality coeval with it. A subsequent momentary sensation cognizes another reality which is coeval with that sensation. In between the two, there is no sensation and, therefore, no corresponding reality. Jayanta meets the Buddhist argument by once more pointing to the continuous cognition of an object of unbroken existence. He says, "Granted that there may be no comprehension of the past and future times, the question arises how far the present time extends for a person who is looking at an object with unwinking eyes. When there is no room for break in the perception even by winking, it will have to be admitted that the whole period during which the perception remains unbroken is the present time, and therefore even by the comprehension during the present time, permanence of an object is grasped and not its evanescence."[185] The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school maintains that "a cognition of present time can grasp the past and future also."[186] Besides, Jayanta declares that

184 Mā bhūt kālaḥ, padārthas tv animeṣa-dṛṣṭibhi dṛṣṭy-avicchedād avicchinna-sattāka eva dṛśyata iti na kṣanika-grāhi pratyakṣam. *NM.* Part II. p. 35, line 19.

185 For the text "Ma nāma bhūd ..... kṣanikatvam." see Text Appendix.

186 Jñānaṁ tu vartamāna-kālam apy atītānāgata-kāla-grāhi bhavati. *Ibid.* line 26.

even the present time extended to several moments, as explained above, can grasp the permanence of an object.

The real difficulty in the above line of argument adopted by Jayanta arises on account of the fact that even, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a cognition is momentary,[187] and a continuous perception can only be a series of momentary perceptions. The Buddhist asks the Nyāya-Vaiśesika realist: "You also do not hold cognition to be of an enduring nature. What is it then that comprehends an object at the second moment when cognition dies out? If the object is comprehended by another cognition, how can that object be said to be the same?[188] Under the stress of meeting this objection, strangely enough, Jayanta refers to the view of a particular branch of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school which holds that "in the case of a person perceiving with unwinking eyes, cognition is not destroyed (every moment),"[189] i.e., it is of a permanent nature. This view is a complete negation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory which holds that all cognitions and other qualities of the soul are momentary. Jayanta is, therefore, compelled to give an alternative reply which is only evasive. He says: "What is the use of discussing this question (whether cognition is lasting or evanescent)? It has been repeatedly stated that knowledge is not comprehended at the time of the comprehension of an object, and therefore we cannot know what its nature is. But an object is comprehended as having unbroken existence."[190] A more convincing way of meeting this difficulty is, however, suggested in course of a reply to the Buddhist plea that the function of the sense in cognizing an object is also momentary. Jayanta says: "There is no break in it caused even by the winking of the eye, and yet you hold that the function of the sense

187 According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, all the special qualities of the soul like knowledge, desire, etc., are momentary in the sense that they are destroyed at the third moment of their existence.

188 Nanu bhavadbhir api na sthiraṁ jñānam isyate, kṣine ca jñāne so 'rtho dvitiya-kṣane kena gṛhyate, jñānāntareṇa tu gṛhyamānaḥ sa evety atra ko niścayaḥ. NM. Part II. p. 35. line 21.

189 Animeṣa-dṛṣter jñānaṁ na kṣiyata evety eke. *Ibid.* line 22.

190 Atha vā kuṁ na etena, na hi viṣaya-pratibhāsa-kāle jñānam avabhāsata ity asakṛd uktaṁ, vakṣyate ca. Tena tat kīdṛśam iti kuto vayaṁ vidmaḥ, arthas tv avicchinna-sattāka eva gṛhyate. *Ibid.* line 23.

is not enduring—foolhardiness indeed! Operation (*vyāpāra*) of the sense in comprehending an object consists of sense-object-contact (*sannikarṣa*); and that, of course, is enduring and therefore it is established that an object is comprehended by perception as extended in time."[191] It means, when an object is being continuously perceived by unwinking eyes, there is not one continuous cognition but a series of cognitions; the contact of the sense with the object, however, is uninterrupted, and this is possible only if the object be of enduring nature.

33. NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF AVAYAVIN

The theory that the 'whole' (*avayavin*) is a separate entity and different *in essence* from its parts (*avayavas*) was stated to be one of the two main planks for the defence of substance as a synthetic principle. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, the effect which was non-existent (*asat*) before coming into existence is conceived to be emerging as an *avayavin* ('whole') from the *avayavas* (parts) which are conceived as its cause. Cause and effect in that system are in the form of 'parts' and their 'whole' respectively. The theory of *avayavin* is, thus, intimately related to that of causation, and will, therefore, be dealt with in the next chapter on the theory of causation.

Chapter VII

NYĀYA-VAIŚESIKA THEORY OF CAUSATION

1. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THEORY

The theory of causation is the crux of every school of Indian philosophy. The conception of reality of each school is based on its approach to the problem how objects are brought into existence. In a previous chapter dealing with the nature of reality, broad features of the present discussion were anticipated. Now it is proposed to examine at some length the nature of the various theories of causation held by different philosophical systems. It will give us a clue to their metaphysical structure.

The most natural theory of causation conforming to common sense is that of change. An object, under certain conditions, changes into another form. The previous condition of the object is the cause, and the latter condition is the effect. For instance, threads change into the form of a cloth. To take complex examples, milk changes into curd, or a seed changes into a sprout. In these cases, there may be other factors contributing to the essence of the effect, e.g., in the case of a sprout, earth, water, etc., besides the seed, contribute to the essence of the sprout. These are regarded as accessories. Besides, there are factors like the farmer, implements, etc., which, though not

contributing in any way to the essence of the effect, constitute the conditions under which the change takes place. They are called efficient or instrumental causes (*nimitta-kāraṇas*) as against the former which are the material causes (*upādāna-kāraṇas*). We are mainly concerned here with the material cause which provides the essence of an effect.

2. SĀMKHYA AND NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORIES OF CAUSATION

According to the Sāṁkhya school, causation means change from one condition to another. This theory appeals most to common sense. But a philosophical system cannot be content with a bare statement of the common-sense view. It has got to analyse its deeper implications, and in that analysis, many complex problems arise which sometimes run counter to common sense. For instance, in the case of the Sāmkhya theory of causation known as that of change (*pariṇāma-vāda*), the question arises whether an effect, whose essence is wholly drawn from its cause, is a new reality or only the cause-essence manifested in a different form. The Sāṁkhya takes up the latter view and declares that the effect already exists in the form of its cause; it is not a new reality. The production of an effect means merely its manifestation from the unmanifested condition in which it already existed in the form of its cause. This is technically called the 'theory of the origination of the already existent effect' (*sat-kārya-vāda*). The Sāṁkhya theory obviously diverges from the theory which holds an effect, like cloth, curd, or sprout, to be a new emergent, i.e., a new reality which did not exist before. The common-sense view of the Sāṁkhya, however, does not stand to logic. If an effect is merely the cause-stuff arranged in a different form to which not a bit of new reality has been added, how can it be regarded as something different from the cause. The Sāṁkhya holds the theory of conservation of reality, which is known as the "law of the conservation of matter and energy"[1] in modern science. According to this view, nothing that exists can become non-existent, and nothing that is non-existent can become existent; or in other words, nothing can be added to or subtracted from the existent reality.[1] That

1 *Supra*, V. 1.

being so, an effect, according to the Sāṁkhya, cannot be a new reality in any sense. Now, if the new arrangement of the cause-stuff does not constitute a *new reality* in any way, the conclusion will be forced on the Sāṁkhya that the cause continues to be what it was, and exactly as it was before. Thus the Sāṁkhya theory of 'the origination of the already existent effect' (*sat-kārya-vāda*), which means the change from one condition to another (*pariṇāma-vāda* or *vikāra-vāda*), inevitably leads, as already pointed out, to the Vedāntic theory of unreal origination (*vivarta-vāda*).[2] A theory, based *prima facie* on common sense, when examined closely, is found to suffer from inherent contradictions. Against the Sāṁkhya doctrine of the same thing changing and assuming another form, Kamalaśīla offers the following criticism: "The same thing cannot become otherwise, because becoming otherwise means the origination of a new nature (*svabhāvāntarotpatti*). The question arises whether *becoming otherwise* is different from the (original) existent object, or is identical with it. It cannot be identical with the existent object, because the (original) object had already originated from its own cause. If it be different from the existent object, it is not possible. For, the existent object being of unchanging nature will remain as it was before, and it cannot therefore become otherwise."[3]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a system pledged to realism, advances a theory opposed to the Sāṁkhya theory. A newly originated effect, like cloth, curd or sprout, brought into existence after much causal operation, cannot be held to be already existent. An effect, therefore, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is a new emergent which was non-existent before. This is the 'theory of origination of the non-existent effect' (*asatkārya-vāda* or *ārambha-vāda*).

An average student of Indian philosophy is apt to think

2 *Supra*. III. 19 (concluding portion).

3 Na hi sa eva anyathā bhavati svabhāvāntarotpatti-laksaṇatvād anyathātvasya; tathā hi yat tad anyathātvaṁ nāma tat kiṁ bhāvād arthāntaram āhosvid bhāva eva, na tāvad bhāva eva, tasya sva-hetor eva pūrvaṁ nispannatvāt. Athārthāntaraṁ (cet), tathā sati bhāvo 'cuti-dharmā tathaivāvasthita iti na tasyānyathā-bhāvaḥ. TSP. p. 141.

that according to both the Sāṁkhya and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an effect like cloth is produced out of its cause, i.e., the threads, and that the only difference between the two theories is that while, according to the Sāṁkhya, an effect is existent before its origination, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, it is non-existent. It is seldom realized that even according to the Sāṁkhya, a cloth as such does not exist before its origination; only its essence or substance-stuff exists in the form of threads. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the non-existence of an effect before origination implies that its essence or substance-stuff also did not exist before. A cloth, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is not produced *out* of the threads, but *in* the threads.

The theory in its latest developed form is the outcome of a long drawn conflict of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school with others, notably with the Sāṁkhya and the Buddhist. The implications of the theory are not fully assessed even in the standard treatises of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, for which there is an historical reason. In the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda, the theory is found only in a rudimentary form. It is Praśastapāda who formulated this theory in a clear-cut and definite form as he did many other theories of the Vaiśeṣika school. The theory was further developed in the works of Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta and others. In Śrīdhara's *Nyāya-kandalī* and other contemporary commentaries on Praśastapāda, it is crystallized and carried to its logical conclusion. The form in which the theory is found in the latest manuals of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika such as *Bhāṣā-paricchēda* and *Tarka-saṁgraha* and their commentaries indicates that development and further clarification must have continued down to the twelfth century, when Gaṅgeśa appeared on the scene and diverted the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school from ontology to epistemology. This diversion, together with the fact that the Buddhist opponents who gave a fillip to the intellectual activity of orthodox schools were driven out of this country, resulted in the stagnation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, at least, so far as its metaphysics was concerned. The latest manuals referred to above make simply a bare statement of the theory; they give no indication of insight into its implications.[4] Yet one great

4 A very important task awaiting the labours of a researcher in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy is to trace the development of the causal

advantage of Indian philosophy, as many of its critics have noted, is its exactness, definiteness and clarity. The fundamental basic principle being established, its logical implications can be drawn with the certainty of a geometrical theorem.

3. MAIN FEATURES OF NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY

When a number of substances are conjoined, there appears as a result of their connection, *in some cases*, a new entity which was altogether non-existent before. For instance, when a number of threads are connected, there appears a new entity called cloth which was non-existent before. In this context the following points are to be noted:

(i) The new entity, viz., the effect (cloth), appears in the form of a 'whole' (*avayavin*) made up of the 'parts' (*avayavas*, i.e., threads). As the emergent effect is a new entity, it follows that it was altogether non-existent before. The essence or substance-stuff which constitutes the effect did not exist before its origination.

(ii) The new emergent 'whole' is not a mere aggregate (*samudāya*) of parts, but quite different from them; it is a new entity which has emerged as a result of the connections of parts. The fact that the effect, viz., the 'whole' (cloth), is different from the cause, viz., the parts (threads), means that the essence or stuff of the cloth is different from that of the threads. The cloth and the threads are two separate entities, different in their essence, both of which exist simultaneously side by side.

(iii) Obviously, the threads and the cloth do not appear to common sense as two separate independent entities. There is only one entity which was in the form of threads before the origination of cloth, and now the same appears in the form of cloth. Even if you look upon the cloth as threads, it is only one entity, call it cloth or threads. To say that there are two separate entities is outrageous to common sense. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had to accept this position, because this was the only way to

theory from Kaṇāda to its latest form as found in later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika manuals. Some broad aspects of that development, of course, have been noted in the present chapter.

uphold realism.[5] The obvious objection to the theory was met by the device of *samavāya* (inherent) relation obtaining between the two entities which obviously appeared identical (e.g., the substance and its qualities, etc.), but which were held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to be two separate entities. The effect, the 'whole' (cloth), was thus conceived as residing in its cause, i.e., the parts (threads), by inherent relation.

(iv) It follows from what has been said above that the material cause and the effect are always, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika theory, in the form of 'parts' and the 'whole', and further, an effect (the 'whole') necessarily resides in its cause (the parts) by inherent relation. It may also be noted that all kinds of parts into which an effect may possibly be split are not conceived as causal parts (*ārambhaka avayavas*) of an effect. For instance, if a piece of cloth is torn into small pieces, they may be the parts of the cloth, but not the causal parts. Only the threads are held to be the causal parts of a piece of cloth.

(v) When a number of entities are connected, as stated above, there appears, in some cases, as a result of that connection, a new entity which was non-existent before. Here the words *in some cases* are significant. When a number of entities are connected, their connection does not *in all cases and necessarily* produce a 'whole', i.e., a new effect. In some cases, such a connection may simply mean a 'mere aggregate' (*samudāya-mātra*) of those entities; it may not produce a new emergent called the 'whole' (*avayavin*). For instance, if a bundle of bamboo sticks be tied with a rope, it would make no new 'whole' produced from the connection of those bamboo sticks. It will be a mere aggregate of bamboos. Similarly, an army is not a 'whole' produced by the soldiers as parts, or a forest is not a 'whole' of so many trees. They are mere aggregates. When, however, a number of threads are connected, an *avayavin* in the form of 'cloth' emerges. But even in the case of threads, when they are connected only by being put together in a bundle, the latter will not be an *avayavin*. Now the question is: in which case does the connection of a number of parts produce a new entity, and in which it does not? The only answer the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika can

5 *Infra*, VII. 4 (iii).

give is by a reference to experience. In some cases instrumental causes, like shuttle, loom, etc., produce a connection of parts in such a way that a new *avayavin* as an effect emerges. A cloth emerging from threads appears as an entity distinct from the threads, but a bundle of threads is not regarded as a new entity distinct from the threads.

(vi) According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, certain effect-substances are regarded as the 'ultimate wholes' (*antyāvayavins*). This means that they cannot be parts of any other *avayavin* to be produced out of or rather *in* them. For instance, a jar is produced in its parts as an *avayavin*, but a jar being an ultimate *avayavin*, a number of jars cannot serve as parts to produce a new *avayavin*. Similarly, an army is not regarded as an *avayavin* because the men who constitute it are ultimate *avayavins* themselves. Likewise a forest is not an *avayavin*, because the trees are ultimate *avayavins*.[6] But in the instance of a 'bundle of threads', even though the threads are not ultimate *avayavins*, they do not produce a new *avayavin*. The same threads, however, produce a new *avayavin* in the form of a cloth. The question may be raised: why a certain thing should or should not be regarded as an ultimate *avayavin* or why a number of jars tied together may not be held to produce a new *avayavin* in the form of a small boat of jars which serves the purpose other than that of jars, or why a bundle of threads may not be regarded as a new *avayavin* which may serve some other purpose?

There is, no definite criterion (*vinigamanā*) as to (i) where connections of parts produce a new 'whole' and where they to not and (ii) which objects should be regarded as ultimate *avayavins*, and which not. All this is said to depend on experience. For instance, when the threads are merely collected together, they form an aggregate and do not produce a new *avayavin*. But if they are arranged and intertwined, they produce a rope which is a new *avayavin*. Now, suppose the

6 Although the conception of antyāvayavin is referred to in almost all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works, the theory of antyāvayavin seems to have expressly been introduced in Sapta-padārthī where it is defined as 'dravyāntarārambhakaṁ kārya-dravyam antyāvayavi' (section 121. Gurumūrti edition). It means, that an effect-substance which does not produce another effect-substance is antyāvayavin.

threads are arranged in such a way as to present the appearance of a thread-garland, will that garland be regarded as a new substance? Why should it not be? And if it is a new substance, why should every kind of collection of threads be not regarded as a new effect? The only criterion accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that of experience. Whenever a collection of parts appears to be presenting an object which performs a new function not performed by the parts, that object is regarded as a new substance born of the parts. For example, a cloth performs the function of covering the body which cannot be done by threads. Cloth, therefore, is regarded as a newly emerged substance. It would, after all, be a matter of individual judgment where to recognize a new function and accept a new emergent as an *avayavin*, and where not to do so. Thus, *avayavin* which is a principle of external synthesis would depend on subjective factors. As a matter of fact, every collection can perform some function which cannot be performed by its parts alone. Thus, according to the logic of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, whenever and wherever there is a connection, a new effect must be supposed to have emerged. Full implications of this theory were not brought out in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises.

(vii) As stated above, the effect is produced in the form of an *avayavin* in the parts which are the material cause. The cause (threads) continues to exist even after the origination of its effect (cloth). In other words, the cloth is not produced *out of* the threads, but *in* the threads. The threads do not impart their essence to the cloth for the simple reason that the threads continue to exist *intact* side by side with the cloth.

Although the threads do not transfer their own essence to the cloth, the cloth when originated resides in the threads by *samavāya* relation. The threads are the cause of the cloth in the sense that they are the *condition precedent* to the origination of the cloth. The position is similar to the Buddhist theory of *pratītya-samutpāda* in so far as, according to both of them, a cause does not transfer its own essence to its effect. The only difference is that while, according to the Buddhist theory, the preceding cause-moment is totally annihilated before the origin-

ation of its effect, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the cause continues its existence and holds its effect in itself.

The thread and the cloth are held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to be altogether two different entities, each having its separate essence-stuff and separate weight. A question was raised with regard to the difficulties in maintaining their separate weights to which a reference has already been made.[7] The question naturally arises: from where does the essence of an effect come? It has been discussed in the chapter on the nature of reality. The conclusion is forced on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, although not expressly admitted, that the essence of an effect arises of its own accord, or in other words, it comes as it were from the void. But as soon as an effect is originated, it resides in the cause by *samavāya* relation. In fact, its origination and residence in the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* come about at one and the same moment. The term for the material cause in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is *samavāyi-kāraṇa* which means 'a cause in which its effect resides by *samavāya* relation.' As stated above, the word *upādāna-kāraṇa* (material cause) as a synonym of *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception, is not quite appropriate,[8] although sometimes it is used in that sense.[9] The word, *upādāna-kāraṇa* is appropriate only for the *cause* of the Sāṁkhya conception, because it means a cause which is conceived as transferring its essence to its effect. As a matter of fact, the *samavāyi-kārana* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is as extraneous in relation to its effect as the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) is, because the former like the latter does not impart any essence to its effect. Writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika seem to be fully conscious of it, for Uddyotakara argues: "The cloth and the threads are different entities because the cause and the effect must be different entities like the shuttle and the cloth."[10] Obviously, Uddyotakara thinks that the yarn is no more an intrinsic cause than the shuttle for the origination of the cloth.

All the features of the causal theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

7 *Supra*, V. 2.

8 *Ibid.*

9 Upādānasya cādhyaksam. NSM. verse 151. Also see *supra*, V. 2.

10 Arthāntaram paṭāt tantavaḥ tad-dhetutvāt turyādivad iti. NV. p. 513. line 8.

school which have been detailed above are implied in the laconic definition of *samavāyi-kārana* as 'a cause in which the effect resides by *inherent relation*.'[11]

4. CAUSATION-THEORIES OF OTHER SCHOOLS

(i) According to the Sāmkhya, a cause *changes* into the state of its effect, but the essence of the cause and the effect is identical. Now, what is the sense of change when the essence of the two is absolutely the same? The problem has been tackled in Vyāsa's commentary on the *Yoga-sūtras* which says: "There is change in the form or arrangement of the essence-stuff (*bhāvānyathātvam*),[12] but none in the essence-stuff (*na dravyānyathātvam*).[13] For instance, when a gold vessel is broken and changed into a different form, the change occurs only in the arrangement of gold (*bhāva*), but not in the substance (*dravya*) gold.[14] Thus, according to the Sāmkhya, the *dharmin* (*dravya*) does not change; only the *dharmas* (*bhāvas*) change. The two, however, are identical. It means that the changing phases (*dharmas*), as such, do not possess an essence different from that of the *dharmin* (the substance or the cause-stuff). A question here arises: how can there be a change in the form without there being any change in the essence? Either the change in the form would be unreal, or there should be some kind of change in the essence as well. Thus the Sāmkhya theory of change which seems *prima facie* to be in accord with common sense does not stand logical scrutiny.[15]

(ii) The Vedāntin of the Saṁkara school declares that if

11 Yat-samavetam kāryam bhavati jñeyam tu samavāyi-janakam tat. NSM. verse 17.

12 Bhāva, according to the gloss of Vācaspatimiśra, means saṁsthāna-bheda, i.e., a particular arrangement.

13 The term dravya here means 'essence-stuff', i.e., gold which is the same in its various forms of a ring, an armlet, or a necklace. Here the connotation of *dravya* is different from that of the 'dravya' of the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika school.

14 Bhāvānyathātvaṁ bhavati *na dravyānyathātvaṁ* yathā suvarnabhājanasya bhittvānyathākriyamānasyānyathātvam bhavati *na* suvarnānyathātvam iti. Vyāsa-bhāsya on the Yoga-sūtra, III. 13.

15 Also note in this connection the criticism by *Kamalaśīla quoted* above. *Supra*, VII. 2.

18

there is no change in the essence, there can be none in the form either. Therefore, the change in the form is only apparent and not real. The Sāṁkhya theory of change (*vikāra-vāda* or *pariṇāma-vāda*) is thus supplanted by the theory of unreal change (*vivarta-vāda*) of the Vedānta school. *Vikāra-vāda* maintains that there is a real change in the cause, but *vivarta-vāda* declares that the change is only seeming and not real.[16] According to the Vedānta, there is, in fact, no change and the cause continues to be exactly what it was before; a new 'word-and-form' (*nāma-rūpa*) is falsely imposed on the cause. In terms of *dharmin* and *dharma*, the Vedānta holds that only the *dharmin* the one cause (*Brahman*), exists. *Dharmas* (the manifold effects) are unreal, being falsely imposed upon the *dharmin*.

(iii) Thus, the Sāṁkhya theory of change of the form without any change in the essence-stuff of the cause, inevitably leads to the Vedāntic theory of *vivarta-vāda*. If the threads are held to be changed into the state of a cloth without undergoing the slightest change, the change must be held to be unreal. It will mean that the cloth is unreal; only the cause (the yarn) is real. In the last resort, the first cause (*Brahman*) alone would be real, and all the manifold effects (phenomenal universe) would be unreal. Realism is, thus, untenable with the *sat-kārya-vāda* theory which inevitably leads to the theory of *vivarta-vāda*. In order, therefore, to save the reality of the external world, the effect must be held to be something having a new essence, apart from that of its cause. A cloth in order to be real must have an essence different from that of the threads. This is the reason why the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adopts the theory of *asatkārya-vāda* (origination of the non-existent effect). It has been explained above that the effect, which is a substance separate from its cause, is originated as residing in the threads by a peculiar relation called *samavāya*, and it continues to exist only as residing in its cause, both the cause and the effect existing simultaneously side by side.

(iv) As surely as the Sāṁkhya theory of change leads to the Vedāntic theory of no change, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory

16 Satattvato 'nyathā-prathā vikāra ity udīritaḥ,
Atattvato 'nyathā-prathā vivarta ity udīritaḥ.

of origination of the non-existent from the existent (*asatkārya-vāda*) leads to the Buddhist theory of origination from the non-existent (*pratītya-samutpāda*). It is difficult for common sense to believe that the threads and the cloth are two separate substances, with their separate size, colour and measure, and separate weights. Even the ingenious device of the *samavāya* relation cannot make one believe that the threads and the cloth are two different substances. There is a flagrant incongruity in holding the continuity of existence of the cause after the origination of the effect. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has created a world *in which there is constant birth but no death so far as the* cause-and-effect series is concerned. New children (effects) are born but the parents (causes) never die. For example, when a jar is produced from the atoms through the process of *dvy-aṇuka, try-aṇuka, etc., there accumulates a series of substances—atoms, dvy-aṇukas, try-aṇukas,* parts and further parts of the jar, and finally the jar—where a previous cause has given birth to a new entity without itself being destroyed. This is repugnant to *common sense. Now, in order to avoid this, if we were to hold* that the cause disappears when its effect is produced, we arrive at the full-fledged Buddhist doctrine that a cause disappears *in toto* without leaving any residue or without imparting any essence to its effect, and there arises in its place an altogether new entity, *i.e., the effect. It would, thus, appear that the* Buddhist theory of causation is merely the logical culmination of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. But it should be borne in mind that logical sequence in this case does not necessarily mean chronological sequence also. The two schools could have developed, as probably they did, *independently.* But an affinity between them is unmistakable. This point is further discussed in a subsequent section of this chapter.

5. SOME SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF THE FOUR CAUSAL THEORIES

The following points of comparison and contrast between the causal theories of the various schools, which may be divided into two groups, may be noted:

(i) Both the Sāṁkhya and the Vedānta hold that an effect has no independent essence different from that of its cause. They

form one camp as against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist school, both holding in common that the effect is a new emergent reality to which no essence is imparted by its cause.

(ii) Of all the four schools, only the Buddhist holds reality to be evanescent—a logical conclusion of the causal theory of the second group. According to the three remaining orthodox schools, reality may either be of eternal, or of stationary nature; it is not evanescent.

(iii) It is only the Sāṁkhya which holds the theory of *change*. No other school accepts the phenomenon of change in its true sense. Evanescence of reality, according to the Buddhist, means that a moment of reality vanishes *in toto*, and is replaced by another moment. The reality of the previous moment does not pass into the second one, the two being wholly disconnected. It was pointed out that the Buddhist theory is erroneously regarded as one of constant change.[17] Replacement of one entity by another is not a change in the true sense of the term, although it is sometimes regarded as such in popular usage. Change, in the strict sense of the term, means succession of different phases of an enduring stuff which abides or persists throughout those phases. Reality, according to the Sāṁkhya, is changing every moment, yet it is permanent. Consciousness (*puruṣa*), according to the Sāmkhya, like the *Brahman* of the Vedāntin, is immutable and eternal (*kūtastha-nitya*), but matter is changeable-eternal (*parināmi-nitya*). The conception of change, therefore, belongs to the Sāmkhya school alone. It is applied to the Buddhist theory only in a secondary sense. Nor has the conception of change any place in the Nyāya-Vaiśesika. According to the latter, whenever a substance appears to have changed its primary qualities like colour, etc., or whenever its parts are differently arranged, or whenever a new particle is added to it as its constituent, or a particle is subtracted from it, it is not the same substance undergoing a change; but in all such cases, the original substance is regarded to have been destroyed and replaced by a new one. According to Nyāya-Vaiśesika, a substance cannot undergo a change. All cases of seeming change always imply destruction of the previous

17 *Supra*, VI. 18.

substance and its replacement by a new one.[18] The word *change* thus stands banished from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. So far as the Vedānta is concerned, it accepts only one immutable reality, viz., Brahman; all change is only apparent and unreal. It is thus clear that of all the orthodox Indian philosophical schools, the conception of change belongs exclusively to the Sāṁkhya.

(iv) According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as stated above, the so-called change is only a case of destruction of the previous substance and its replacement by a new one. But what about the atoms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception? Of all substances, eternal or non-eternal, there *is only one* exception where a substance does undergo a change. It is an atom of the earth that changes its qualities like colour, touch, or taste through contact with fire (*pākaja-saṁyoga*). When a blue jar turns red as a result of being placed in fire, it is held that so long as it remains in the form of the same jar, it cannot change its colour. When, however, it is put into the fire, it is disintegrated into its component atoms of which the blue colour is destroyed and red colour appears in its place. The atoms then combine and through the process of formation of the intermediary *dvy-aṇukas*, etc., make a new jar of red colour. All this happens so quickly that it appears as if the same old jar has changed from blue to red.[19] But in reality the change takes place in the atoms and not in the jar. Thus, the atoms of the earth are the only instance where a change of quality occurs in the same substance. In all other cases, a change of quality or a change in the arrangement of parts necessarily implies the emergence of a new substance.

(v) One more point deserves notice. Of the four schools, the *Vedānta is the logical culmination of the realist Sāṁkhya* theory, and the *Buddhist* that of the realist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. Both of them are idealistic in their conception. This

18 *Infra*, VIII.4.

19 The theory of the dissolution of a jar into its atoms for the purpose of change of its colour is called the theory of 'pilu-pāka' which belongs to the Vaiśeṣika school. The Nyāya, in this matter, holds another theory called 'piṭhara-pāka', according to which the change from blue to red colour takes place in the jar itself. But the Nyāya view, of course, does not accord with the realistic structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

demonstrates clearly how philosophical thinking, in the last resort, tends to move from realism to idealism.

6. AVAYAVIN AS A SYNTHETIC PRINCIPLE

The external world of the Buddhist consists of discrete and disconnected flashes of reality. The material reality, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is in the form of four types of atoms. The difference between the *kṣaṇa* of the Buddhist and the *atom* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system has been noticed elsewhere.[20] But they are both discrete and detached bits of reality. The external world presented to us is, however, a unified reality, and the question arises as to what the unifying agency or the principle of synthesis is. The Buddhist declares that the synthetic principle is subjective only, i.e., it exists in our thought, and nowhere in the external world. With the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, the basic principle is that whatever is experienced exists in the external world exactly as such, and therefore, the unifying or synthetic principle has an objective basis. As a result of the connection of two atoms, there arises a unifying reality in the form of a 'whole' *avayavin*, i.e., a *dvy-aṇuka* which is different from atoms. Similarly, further *avayavins* emerge from *dvy-aṇukas*. The *avayavin*, which is a separate substance, has been conceived in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as unification of parts, a synthetic principle. Thus, a *dvy-anuka* is a synthetic principle of two atoms, and a piece of cloth, of the threads. This unifying principle, as already explained, emerges as an effect-substance from the parts. There is another synthetic principle called the universal (*sāmānya*) which brings about a synthesis of a different kind, i.e., in the form of a notion of commonness in similar objects. The two synthetic principles are, of course, different in their nature and function. But they both have one common feature. In both the cases, there is *one* entity associated with *many*—the *one avayavin* associated with many parts in one case, and the *one universal* with many individuals in the other. To hold that there is an objective reality which is *one*, yet associated with many, both in point of time and of space, is fundamentally opposed to the Buddhist principle, according to which external reality exists only in the form

20 *Supra*, VI. 7.

of discrete and disconnected moments. It has been explained elsewhere[21] that the 'no-soul theory' (*anātma-vāda*) of the Buddhist implies that there is no unifying principle in the detached moments of reality. Thus the two principles, viz., the *avayavin* and the *sāmānya* are the most disputed topics on which the Buddhist joins issue with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

7. ARGUMENTS TO PROVE AVAYAVIN

The topic of *avayavin* is discussed in all the principal works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school like *Nyāya-vārtika, Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā, Nyāya-mañjarī, Nyāya-kandalī, Kiraṇāvalī*, etc. A number of arguments have been advanced to prove *avayavin* ('whole') to be different from its parts. The main argument, which has been repeated in all the principal treatises of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is this: the material world perceived by our senses is made up of atoms which on account of being minute are imperceptible, and therefore there must exist objects made up of atoms which possess gross measure and are perceptible. These gross objects must be in the form of *avayavins* of their parts (*avayavas*), i.e., the atoms from which they must be different. The Buddhist points out: although one single hair is not perceptible from a distance, a mass of hair becomes perceptible. Similarly, one single atom may be imperceptible, but a large number of them become perceptible. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika rejoins that a hair, although not visible from a long distance, is not imperceptible by nature, because it can be seen from a close range. But in the case of atoms, there is a qualitative difference, for they are by nature imperceptible and therefore even a mass of atoms cannot be perceptible. Uddyotakara argues: "He, who believes that atoms themselves are the cause of comprehension of (gross) objects like a jar, should be asked whether the difference in the comprehension of atoms (which become perceptible) is due to some speciality being produced in them or without any such speciality. If it is produced in them, we call it *avayavin*, and if not, it would be a contradiction to say that the same atoms are both perceptible and imperceptible. The opponent may say that the connection (*samyoga*) of atoms is their

21 *Supra*, III. 2.

speciality; and the atoms, when in mutual proximity, become perceptible on account of their connection. But the realist rejoins that it is not possible because atoms being imperceptible, their connection also cannot be perceived."[22]

Commenting on the above passage of Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra quotes a verse from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāna-vārtika* which argues the Buddhist point of view thus: "What contradiction is there, if *many* atoms, having acquired some excellence (*atiśaya*) which was absent in a single atom, cause comprehension of *one* gross object like the sense and others."[23] It means that the sense, *manas*, and an external object produce a knowledge when all of them work in concert, but each one of them separately does not do so. Vācaspatimiśra says that this has already been answered by Uddyotakara when he says that excellence or speciality in atoms cannot be anything other than the origination of an *avayavin*. To this, the Buddhist rejoins: even for the origination of an *avayavin*, you will have to admit the emergence of a new quality (speciality) which will be its cause. Why not hold, then, the same quality as the cause of the knowledge of *one* gross object, instead of introducing an intermediary, *avayavin*?[24] In answer to this, Vācaspatimiśra replies: "Whatever is comprehended in a cognition is regarded as the object-cause (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of that cognition."[25] And "our cognition cannot have for its object mutually exclusive and most subtle atoms (and, therefore, we have to assume the emergence of a gross object in the form of an *avayavin*). Other-

22 For the text, "Yasya paramānavo..... bhavitum arhati." see Text Appendix.

23 The verse in question is:—

Ko vā virodho bahavah samjātātiśayāh prthak,
bhaveyuh kāraṇam buddher yadi nāmendriyādivat.

The verse in the NVT. (p. 502) is quoted as that of Vārtika-kāra. The editor of the Calcutta edition, thinking that this verse could not be of Uddyotakara (who alone, he thought, could be the Vārtika-kāra), dropped the word Vārtika-kāra from its context. But the present writer has traced the verse in question in the Pramāna-vārtika of Dharmakīrti who has been referred to here as the Vārtika-kāra, i.e., the author of the Pramāna-vārtika.

24 Na ca yam āgantukam āsādya paramānavo 'vayavinam janayanti tenaiva sthūla-buddhim, krtam avayavinā. NVT. p. 502.

25 Yad-ābhāsā hi buddhis tad asyā ālambana-pratyayah. NVT. p. 502, line 19.

wise, there cannot arise the knowledge of *one* gross object, because atoms are different from a gross object."[26] The Buddhist, however, points out that grossness or extension is not the attribute of an external object, but of the comprehension of the object (*pratibhāsa-dharmah*). The realist rejoins: in that case, the knowledge which presents an external object as gross or extended will have to be regarded as an illusion. And as an illusion is always preceded by right knowledge, there must have been some cases in which there was the right perception of a *real* gross object.

It would appear that in this case, as in many others, the controversy between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist goes beside the mark, because each side not only argues its case according to its own viewpoint, but refutes the position of the other side also from its own standpoint, and not from that of its opponent. For instance, in the present case, the viewpoint of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that only such knowledge is to be considered right as comprehends an object exactly in the form in which it actually exists in the external world. But for the Buddhist of the Dignāga school, who is a critical realist,[27] not only the grossness or extension but all the determinations and attributes of the world of our experience are forms of thought (*pratibhāsa-dharmāh*).

8. EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT OF NYĀYA

The conception of *avayavin* is an essential element in the causal theory of the syncretic system of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It originated in the Vaiśeṣika school. It is rather strange that the defence of *avayavin* is met with, not in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, but in the *Nyāya-sūtras* of Gotama. The *Nyāya-sūtras*, however, do not take up the question of *avayavin* from the ontological standpoint as required in connection with the theory of causation, but from the epistemological standpoint. It may be noted in this connection that the other Vaiśeṣika topics, especially that of

26 Na ceyaṁ paraspara-vyāvrtta-parama-sūkṣma-paramānv-ālambanā, tathā sati sthūla-bhedāt tad ekam iti na syāt. NVT. p. 502. line 20.

27 Dignāga who is a transcendental idealist may also be designated as a critical realist.

universal (*sāmānya*), were also treated epistemologically in the treatises of the Nyāya school.

The discussion in the *Nyāya-sūtras* on *avayavin* is introduced in connection with the question why the perception of an object like a tree should not be regarded as an inference.[28] It is pointed out that when one perceives a tree, one does not perceive all its parts but only a few front parts, and on the basis of the comprehension of those parts, the tree as a whole is comprehended. It is similar to the case of inferring fire from smoke. In perceiving a tree also, one perceives only a few parts of the tree, and from them one infers the tree as a whole. Therefore, the so-called perception of a tree is in reality a case of inference. Answering this, Vātsyāyana raises the question whether the object to be inferred is merely the unperceived parts of the tree or the *tree as a whole,* which is something different from the parts and which is the 'whole' (*avayavin*) of the parts. If the tree in the form of an *avayavin* is not accepted as different from the parts, and is regarded only as an aggregate of the parts, the comprehension of the tree as such will be an impossibility. For, the tree is neither the front parts that are perceived, nor those parts that are not perceived but are said to be inferred. Thus the tree as such is neither perceived nor inferred. If, on the other hand, the tree is accepted as an *avayavin* different from its parts, it will have to be regarded as directly perceived, and not as inferred. It is necessary for inference that the inferential mark (*liṅga*) and the thing to be inferred (*sādhya*) must directly be perceived as associated together, as in the well-known example, fire is inferred from smoke only when smoke and fire have been perceived as associated with each other. Now, in the present instance, how can there be a direct perception of the tree in the form of an *avayavin* as associated with its parts? If this kind of perception is accepted as obtaining in any other instance, it will mean that the tree as an *avayavin* is also perceived along with the perception of the front parts of the tree. That being so, the question of the inference of the tree does not arise, because even for inference, perception of the tree as a 'whole' along with the perception of the parts has got to be admitted.

28 NS. II. i. 31 ff.

It has thus been pointed out that if a tree is regarded merely as an aggregate of parts, it can neither be perceived nor inferred, and its comprehension becomes an impossibility. But if, on the other hand, a tree is accepted as an *avayavin* different from its parts, it will have to be admitted that it is directly perceived along with its front parts. Thus, for the very possibility of the comprehension of external objects, they are to be accepted in the form of *avayavins* different from their parts.

An objection is raised: if the perception of an object as an *avayavin* takes place through the perception of its front parts, then, in the same way, there should also be non-perception of the object on account of the non-perception of its back parts. This question has been discussed in *Nyāya-vārtika, Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭikā*, and also in *Nyāya-kandalī*.[29] It has been answered more or less on similar lines in all the three works. Vācaspatimiśra points out that the perception of an object as an *avayavin* will have to be accepted by the perception of only a few parts. If the perception of the object as a 'whole' be regarded as caused by the perception of all the parts, it will never be possible because all parts can never be perceived, the back parts being always hidden by the front ones. It is, therefore, held that the perception of some parts of an object brings about the perception of that object as a 'whole'.[30] Śrīdhara points out: if a large number of parts are not perceived, and only a small number of them are perceived, the *avayavin* will not be perceived in that case. For instance, when a man is immersed in water, and only the head is visible, the man (*avayavin*) is not perceived.[31] It, of course, depends upon experience as to how many parts should be perceived to cause the perception of an object as a whole.

It is interesting to note that in Gotama's time, there existed

29 NV. and NVT. pp. 474-75. NK. p. 42.

30 Kiṁ sarvāvayava-darśana-dvāreṇāvayavinaḥ pratipattir uta katipayāvayava-darśana-dvārena? Pūrvasmin kalpe nāvayavī kadācid api dṛśyeta. Na hy asarvavit sarvāvayavopalambha-kṣamaḥ arvāg-bhāgena madhya-para-bhāgayor vyavadhānāt. NVT. p. 474, line 16.

31 Yatra tu bhūyasīm avayavānām āvaraṇam alpatarāvayava-grahaṇaṁ ca tatrāvayavino na grahaṇam. Yathā jala-nimagnasya śiro-mātra-darśanāt. NK. p. 42, line 12.

a theory that every perception should be regarded as an inference. It is difficult to say to which school the theory belonged. It has been suggested elsewhere[32] that, according to the Dignāga school, a determinate perception such as that of a tree, being of a generalized nature (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), should be regarded as an inference. Dignāga being later than Gotama and Vātsyāyana, his theory could not have been referred to here. It is quite possible that even before Dignāga, it was realized that there was in the act of perception an element of thought in addition to the external *sensum*. Perhaps that line of thinking ultimately led to its logical culmination in the doctrine of Dignāga who held that a pure perception comprehended only a unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), and not a generalized object like a tree. Dignāga thus steers clear of all the difficulties raised by Gotama and Vātsyāyana on the ground that he did not accept the theory of *avayavin*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues that without the acceptance of an *avayavin* as different from its parts, the perception of external objects is not possible, and therefore, the existence of the *avayavin* must be upheld. The Buddhist, on the other hand, points out: inasmuch as the *avayavin* is merely a mental synthetic principle and a *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, it cannot be an objective reality, and the so-called perception of external objects must be regarded as a pseudo-perception. A pure and real perception is in the form of a sensation caused by momentary flashes of reality, called *sva-lakṣaṇas*.

Whether the two synthetic principles, *avayavin* and *sāmānya*, are mere mental factors or are objective realities remained a bone of contention between the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. As a matter of fact, there is only a slender line which divides an external object from a mental one. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers themselves often fall into the error of treating *avayavin* and *sāmānya* as merely mental entities. Jayanta shows the same tendency in the course of his discussion of the theory of *avayavin*. An objection is raised: when a person closely examines a piece of cloth from one end to the other, he only perceives threads, and not a 'whole' (*avayavin*) called cloth as different from

32 *Supra*, III. 11.

those threads.[33] Jayanta's answer to this objection is significant: "When only the parts are being closely observed, the non-comprehension of the *avayavin* is quite natural, because at that time the destruction of the *avayavin* also lingers in the mind."[34] This is further explained: "Disconnection of parts is the cause of the destruction of the *avayavin*. When that (disconnection of the parts) is mentally comprehended, the destruction of the *avayavin* also would not remain uncomprehended. How can the *avayavin* be perceived in that case?"[35] This means that, according to Jayanta, disconnection of parts and consequent destruction of the *avayavin* can as well be mentally conceived.

The burden of the epistemological argument is that the *avayavin* is actually experienced as an entity different from its parts. Strangely enough, the Buddhist also demolishes the theory of *avayavin* on the same ground of experience. He says that an *avayavin* as distinct from its parts is never perceived. Vācaspatimiśra states the Buddhist argument thus: "We never experience a cognition which comprehends the form of an *avayavin* as different from the atoms, of colour, etc., which are born in a continuous flux."[36] The Buddhist maintains that it is only qualities like colour, etc. (conceived as atoms), which alone are cognized in pure perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyaksa*). In this context, Vācaspatimiśra refers to a witty remark of the Buddhist: "The *avayavin* which does not lend its form to cognition, and yet claims to be perceived, is like one who wants to purchase a thing without paying its price."[37]

33 Yadā buddhyā vivinakti esa tantur esa tantur iti tadā prācyād añcalāt prabhrti praticinam añcalam yāvad viviñcan asau tantu-samtatim eva kevalām upalabhate na tato 'tirikta-patāvayavinam. NM. Part II. p. 114, line 18.

34 Vivicyamānesv amśesu yuktas tad-anupagrahah,
tadāvayavi-nāśo hi buddhau viparivartate.
NM. Part II. p. 115, line 22.

35 Avayava-vibhāgo hy avayavino vināśa (vibhāga, *printed in text is wrong*)-hetus tasmin buddhyā samullikhyamāno 'vayavi-nāśo ('vayava-vināśo, *printed in text is wrong*) 'pi nānullikhito bhaved iti katham avayavī tadānim gamyate. NM. Part II. p. 115, line 24 ff.

36 Na ca nirantarotpanna-rūpādi-paramāṇv-atiriktam avayavyākāram bibhratim samvidam iksāmahe. NVT. p. 478, line 14.

37 So 'yam amūlya-dīna-krayī svākāram na ('ca' *is wrongly printed*

9. OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY OF AVAYAVIN

(a) *Problem of Variegated Colour.* One of the objections to the theory of *avayavin* arises in the context of the problem of variegated colour (*citra-rūpa*) of the *avayavin*. The topic is discussed in *Nyāya-vārtika*, *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* and *Nyāya-kandalī*.[38] According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, colour (or any quality) of an *avayavin* (effect) is different from that of its parts (cause). For instance, the colour of a cloth is different from that of its threads. The causes of the two are also different. The inherent cause of the qualities of a substance, i.e., colour of the cloth, is the cloth itself, while its non-inherent cause is the colour of the threads which are the cause of the cloth. The difficulty in this scheme of causation arises when a cloth is produced from threads of different colours, say, blue, yellow, red and white. Obviously, the effect (cloth) will also have all these colours. It may here be pointed out that qualities are of two kinds. Some like connection (*saṁyoga*) reside only at a particular point in their substrata,[39] while others like colour pervade the whole of the substratum.[40] In the case of a cloth of variegated colour, however, the various colours, blue, etc., reside in particular parts, and therefore they will be the colours of those parts only. Obviously the numerous colours cannot be the colours of the cloth, because each one of them does not pervade the whole of the cloth, and also because the cloth must have a colour different from that of its parts (threads). In order to solve this difficulty, the Nyāya-Vaiśesika declares with its typical boldness that the cloth has only *one* colour, called variegated colour (*citra-rūpa*) which consists of many colours, blue, yellow, etc. The Buddhist ridicules the theory of *citra-rūpa*: "What can be more queer (*citra*) than to call variegated colour (*citra-rūpa*) as one colour."[41]

in place of 'na') jñāne samarpayati, pratyakṣatāṁ ca svīkartum icchaty avayavī. NVT. p. 478. line 17.

38 NV. and NVT. pp. 476 ff. and pp. 1051-52; NK. pp. 30 and 42.

39 Avyāpya-vṛtti. Connection is such a quality as resides in two substrata which are connected by it.

40 Vyāpya-vṛtti.

41 Citraṁ tad ekaṁ iti ced idam citrataraṁ mahat. Quoted in NVT. p. 1051. There is pun on the word *citra* which means variegated colour as well as 'queer'.

The question naturally arises as to how the contradictory qualities, blue, yellow, etc., could produce one colour, called variegated colour. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika replies: There is no contradiction in it because we do not accept the Buddhist view that the colours, blue, yellow, etc., are in the form of negation of one another (*itaretarābhāvātmaka*) inasmuch as they are observed to be of a positive nature. If they were accepted to be in the form of negation of one another, it would involve the flaw of interdependence. The opponent points out that there would still be contradiction on account of the difference in the nature (*svarūpa*) of the various colours. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika rejoins: True, this contradiction is there, yet there is no impropriety in holding variegated colour as one, because, being produced by the power of manifold causes, it is established as one by common experience.[42] This is a typical instance of how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika swears by experience which may not always be justifiable.

The acceptance of the concept of variegated colour as *one* landed the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in other difficulties. For instance, what would be the position, if the border of a variegated cloth were not variegated? Inasmuch as the cloth as an *avayavin* exists in the border also, its variegated colour should also be there. Here, again, Srīdhara offers a novel explanation: The perception of the colour of various parts is also one of the causes of the perception of the variegated colour, but at the time of the perception of the border, the colour of the various parts is not cognized; therefore the border is not cognized as variegated.[43] The difficulty, however, remains unsolved, because, if the cloth as an *avayavin* is perceived in the border, its variegated colour should also be perceived, for, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the cloth cannot be perceived without its colour being perceived.

The theory of variegated colour, at a later stage, appeared so outrageous to the followers of the Navya-Nyāya that they summarily rejected it. The Navya-Nyāya held that an object, having many colours possesses them in a non-pervasive manner

42 For the text "Ko virodho.....pratyakṣeṇaivopapāditatvāt." see Text Appendix.

43 For the text, "Acitre pārśve.....'bhāvāt." see Text Appendix.

(*avyāpya-vrttitvena*) like the qualities, connection, etc., which are confined to one part of an object and do not pervade it wholly.[44] The Navya-Nyāya could do away with the theory of variegated colour only by sacrificing a basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika, namely, that qualities like colour, touch, etc., pervade their substance wholly. This was, in fact, an essential part of the doctrine of *avayavin*, because if different qualities resided in different parts of an object, it would not be *one* object but an aggregate of different parts, as held by the Buddhist. The older Nyāya-Vaiśesika school, which had constantly to defend the theory of *avayavin* against the Buddhist, had to insist that the variegated colour (*citra-rūpa*) was *one*. But during the period of the Navya-Nyāya, the Buddhists having disappeared from the scene, it was no more necessary to stick to that theory.

(b) *The same Object—both Red and not-Red.* If a particular part of a cloth be dyed red, what will be the colour of the cloth as an *avayavin*? A part of the cloth being red, the cloth should be held to be red, but other parts of the cloth not being red, the cloth should be held to be not red. Nor can the colour of the cloth be regarded as variegated, because the variegated colour can be produced only by *asamavāyi-kārana*, i.e., the numerous colours of the constituent parts (threads). Vācaspati-miśra[45] and Srīdhara[46] both offer the same explanation: the red colour does not belong to the cloth but to the dye-stuff (*mahā-rajana*) with which the cloth has become connected (*samyukta*); a part of the cloth appears as red simply because the whole surface of that part is covered by the dye-stuff. Moreover, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory, the colour of an object cannot change so long as the object lasts. Therefore, all objects dyed in some colour should be regarded as merely having connection with the dye-stuff.

(c) *Can One Avayavin subsist in many Parts?* A stock objection of the Buddhist to the theory of *avayavin* which is dis-

44 Navyās tu tatrāpi avyāpya-vrttyā eva nānā-rūpam. NSM. verse 100.

45 NVT. p. 476.

46 NK. p. 42.

cussed in all the principal Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works[47] is: does an *avayavin*, which is *one*, subsist in *many* parts 'in its entirety' (*kārtsnyena*) or 'partially' (*eka-deśena*)? In the former case, the *avayavin* will be exhausted in one part, and the remaining parts will be without it. If the latter alternative be accepted, it will have to be assumed that an *avayavin* has some other parts by which it resides in its constituent parts. In this way the process will go on *ad infinitum*. The answer of Jayanta is: "The subsistence of the *avayavin* in many parts is accepted in the manner of one entity residing separately (*vyāsajya*) in all of its parts. It is not exhausted in one part, but resides in many parts like the universal (*sāmānya*) which resides in many individuals. And although it resides in several parts, it does not do so by means of parts other than its constituent ones, because those other parts are never comprehended. The fact remains that *one avayavin* does subsist in its *several* parts.[48] As to the question whether there is any instance of *one* subsisting in many, Jayanta says, "No instance is needed to prove a thing which is directly experienced."[49]

Uddyotakara's answer to the above question is: The two aforesaid alternatives are contrary to the stand of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which holds that *one* resides in many (*ekam anekatra vartate*). The question of subsistence, therefore, in entirety or in parts, becomes untenable. Whether the *avayavin* subsists in each part in entirety or partially, in either case it will be an instance of several entities subsisting in several ones (*anekam anekatra vartate*). It will contradict the original position, viz. one subsists in many. Uddyotakara, then, points out that there are many other entities like the number duality (*dvitva*, etc.), separateness (*pṛthaktva*), connection (*saṁyoga*), disconnection (*vibhāga*) and the universal (*sāmānya*) each of which, though one, resides in many objects.[50]

47 NM. Part II. p. 114; NK. p. 42; NV. and NVT. pp. 472 ff.

48 Vṛttiś cāvayaveṣv asya vyāsajyaiveti gamyate,
Na praty-avayavaṁ tasya samāptir vyakti-jātivat.
Vyāsajya vartamāno 'pi na khalv avayavāntaraiḥ,
Vartate tad asaṁvitteḥ kintu vartata eva saḥ. NM. Part II. p. 115.

49 Pratyakṣa-dṛṣṭa evārthe dṛṣṭāntānveṣaṇena kim. NM. Part II. p. 115, line 32.

50 NV. pp. 472-74.

It may be noted that the nature of the entities like number, connection or the universal is different from that of the *avayavin*. While they are partless, non-substantial, indivisible and unitary entities, the *avayavin* is a substance which has many parts different from itself. This difference in the nature of the *avayavin* and the universal was noticed by Uddyotakara himself who overlooked the problem of the *avayavin* in rebutting similar two alternatives in the context of the universal. To the question whether a universal resides in individuals in its entirety or only partially, Uddyotakara says: "These alternatives are not possible in the case of a universal like *gotva* (cow-*ness*) which is neither an *avayavin* nor an aggregate. The word 'partial' (*eka-deśa*) can be used only in connection with a member of an aggregate, or a constituent part of an *avayavin*. When totality is to be expressed without leaving out anything, the word 'entire' (*kṛtsna*) is used for an *avayavin* with reference to its constituent parts and for an aggregate with reference to its members. Cow-*ness* is neither an *avayavin* nor an aggregate, and therefore words like 'partial' and 'entire' are not applicable to it."[51] In the present context, however, Uddyotakara says that the words 'partial' and 'entire' are not applicable even with reference to an *avayavin*.

All these arguments and counter-arguments regarding the theory of *avayavin* mainly spring from a fundamental difference between the conceptions of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika and the Buddhist. According to the latter, the subsistence of one entity in two places is barred by the law of contradiction, because, as already explained, the existence of a reality at one point implies its non-existence at any other point. So far as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is concerned, the existence of one in many entities or at many points is the *sine qua non* of its basic theory.

(d) *Different Weights of Avayavas and Avayavin.* The most awkward situation which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had to face on account of its theory of *avayavin* was when it was forced to admit that *avayavas* and the *avayavin* (e.g., threads and the cloth), being two separate substances, should have separate weights. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika made a desperate effort to meet

51 For the text, "Na gotvam.....kṛtsnaika-deśa-śabdau staḥ." see Text Appendix.

the situation, but it failed miserably. This point has already been discussed at length elsewhere.[52]

10. *THEORY OF CAUSATION IN EARLY NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA*

A serious objection against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is: How cause and effect as parts and 'whole' can exist simultaneously? The theory offends against the principle that two material substances cannot occupy the same space. The Buddhist points out that impenetrability (*sapratighatva*) is a necessary attribute of matter, which means that the space occupied by one matter cannot be occupied by another. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, too, has a dictum that two gross (material) substances (*mūrta-dravyas*) cannot occupy the same place (*deśa*).[53] But the term *deśa* in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika dictum does not mean space, but substratum. And substratum (*deśa*) of an object, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika, is in the form of its parts (cause) in which it resides. For instance, threads are the substratum of the cloth, and substratum of the threads is their cause, i.e., fine fibres (*aṁśus*) of cotton. Thus the cause and the effect have not the same substratum. It would appear that the objection has been met by the peculiar Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that an effect resides in its cause or a 'whole' resides in its parts.[54] The real problem of the same space being occupied by two gross substances is, however, not solved. The answer from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika standpoint would be that the dictum that two gross substances cannot occupy the same space is not applicable in respect of two gross substances of which one resides in the other by *samavāya* relation.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explanation is not quite convincing. It appears that in the early stages of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the theory that a cause exists simultaneously with its effect and that effect resides in its cause by *samavāya* relation was not formulated. It is not found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, the *Nyāya-sūtras*, the commentary of Vātsyāyana on the *Nyāya-sūtras* or even in

52 *Supra*, V. 2.

53 Mūrtānāṁ samāna-deśatā-virodhāt. The dictum is referred to in all the works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. NM. Part II. p. 66 (wrongly printed 42); NK. p. 148; NSM. on verse 113.

54 This topic has been discussed at length. *Supra*, VI. 10.

the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya*. It has been referred to somewhat vaguely by Uddyotakara in his defence of *avayavin*. It is further developed in the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭikā* of Vācaspatimiśra, but it has been crystallized only in the *Nyāya-kandalī* and the *Kiraṇāvalī* and in the works of a later date.

In the *Nyāya-sūtras* and in its commentary by Vātsyāyana, *avayavin*, as different from its parts, and emerging from them as a new substance, is accepted,[55] but the simultaneous existence of the cause with its effect is not postulated. On the contrary, it is clearly stated: "Because a new effect-substance is produced only when the cause-substance undergoes a different arrangement (*vyūhāntara*), it is inferred that the cause is destroyed when its effect is produced."[56] The cause, in the theory of the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is conceived in the form of 'arrangement of parts preceding the effect.' For instance, in the case of cloth, the previous *arrangement* of threads is its cause which is destroyed when the cloth is produced. The statement quoted above is given in the *Nyāya-sūtras* against the Sāṁkhya which holds that the cause is not destroyed, but continues in the form of its effect. According to the theory of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, the threads are the cause which continue to exist simultaneously with their effect (cloth), the two being separate substances.

It is necessary to have a clear idea of the theories of causation held by the earlier and the later Nyāya-Vaiśesika schools *vis-a-vis* those of the Sāṁkhya and the Buddhist. The Buddhist holds that the preceding cause-moment is annihilated totally without leaving any residue to be transferred to its effect-moment which comes into existence as an altogether new entity. The cause (threads) is annihilated and its effect (cloth) is an altogether new entity to which the threads have not passed even a whit of their essence. According to the Sāṁkhya, the essence of the threads and that of the cloth is the same. The same essence-stuff first appears in the form of threads and later in

55 In the Vātsyāyana's commentary on the Nyāya-sūtras, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the *avayavin* is referred to as dravyāntarotpatti-paksa, i.e., the theory of the origination of a new substance in the parts.

56 Vyūhāntarād dravyotpatti-darśanaṁ pūrva-dravya-nivṛtter anumānam. NS. II. ii. 16.

that of the cloth. The essence-stuff is an abiding substance; it changes from one aspect into another, e.g., from threads (the cause-aspect) into cloth (the effect-aspect). Against the Sāṁkhya view, the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school held that the destruction of the cause-substance was a necessary condition of the origination of its effect. The opposite views of the two schools are due to their different conceptions of reality. To the Sāṁkhya, there runs an abiding stuff through the changing conditions called cause and effect, and that abiding stuff alone is the reality. The changing conditions are not separate realities, but are only different aspects of that abiding stuff and are identical with it. For instance, a ring, a bracelet, or an ear-ring are only different aspects of the substance called gold. If an ear-ring is made out of a bracelet, the latter is only another form of the real substance gold which continues in the state of the effect, viz., the ear-ring. According to the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, however, the bracelet, the ear-ring, etc., are separate substances, and as such the bracelet must be destroyed before its effect, viz., the ear-ring, is originated.

The Buddhist contends: If the cause is destroyed before the effect comes into existence, it will mean that the effect is produced from the destruction of the cause, i.e., from the void. Vātsyāyana answers: "When the old arrangement of parts is disturbed and, consequently, the cause-substance which was born of that arrangement disappears, the effect is produced from the new arrangement of parts which comes into being and not from the void."[57] It will thus appear that, although the cause-substance is destroyed, its parts arranged in a different way produce the effect. It is important to note that according to this early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the effect is not merely a new arrangement of parts, but is a new substance produced by that new arrangement.[58] The cause-substance is destroyed according to this theory as well as that of the Buddhist. The difference between the two is this. According to the Buddhist, the cause is wholly destroyed without leaving any

57 Vyāhata-vyūhānām avayavānāṁ pūrva-vyūha-nivṛttau vyūhāntarād dravya-niṣpattir nābhāvāt. Nyāya-bhāṣya. IV. i. 18. p. 939.

58 Note the word 'dravya-niṣpattiḥ' in the above quotation, and also the fact that Vātsyāyana says in the same context (IV. i. 18) vyūhāntarād aṅkura utpadyate.

residue or any kind of continuity (*niranvaya-vināśa*), while, according to the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, although the cause is destroyed, it leaves its parts behind; it is not a case of destruction without any kind of continuity. Both Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra point out to the Buddhist, almost in the manner of the Sāṁkhya, that if a rice-seed is destroyed without leaving any residue (*niranvaya-vinaṣṭa*), its destruction will not be different from that of the barley seed, and if the destruction is held to be the cause of the effect, a rice-seed, by its destruction, may produce even a barley-sprout.[59]

It has been stated that the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school maintained that a cause must be destroyed before its effect is produced—a view diametrically opposed to the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, according to which the cause continues to exist simultaneously with its effect, the latter residing in the former, The earlier theory was quite similar to that of the Sāṁkhya. The previous phase which, according to the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, is the cause-substance, i.e., born of the preceding arrangement of parts, must disappear before a new phase (which is the effect-substance born of subsequent arrangement of parts) can arise. It was realised by the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school that the two substances, cause and effect, could not possibly exist simultaneously in the same space. Jayanta, who definitely subscribes to the earlier theory, explicitly says: "If, even after the origination of an effect, the destruction of its cause is not accepted, there will arise the absurdity of two gross substances occupying the same space."[60] According to the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, although an *avayavin* emerges as a new substance from the parts, the parts are not regarded as a separate substance apart from the *avayavin* and as existing simultaneously side by side with it. The two ('parts' and 'whole') together make up one substance, and the absurdity of two substances occupying the same space does not arise. As a matter of fact, in the cause-state, there existed in the parts (threads) an

59 Na hi ananvaya-vinaṣṭayoḥ śāli-yava-bījayoḥ kaścid viśeṣo 'sti yena ekasmāt śāly-aṅkuro nānyasmād iti. NV. and NVT. (IV. i. 18) p. 939.

60 Uttarottara-kāryārambhe'pi pūrva-pūrva-kāraṇānapāyān mūrtānām ekadeśatvaṁ syāt. NM. Part II. p. 73.

avayavin (bunch of threads) which was the cause-substance. Later on, when there is a change of arrangement in the parts (threads), there emerges *from the same parts* another *avayavin*, the effect-substance (cloth), and the old *avayavin* (bunch) is destroyed. In both cases, the *avayavin* and the *avayavas* make up one substance and not two.

The position of the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school differs from the Sāṁkhya in this: according to the Sāṁkhya, the essence-stuff which runs through the series of cause and effect, is abiding. The cause and the effect of the series are not separate substances, but are merely different aspects of the same abiding essence-stuff which is regarded as a substance. The early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, however, holds that the cause and effect are both separate substances. This position is similar to that of the Sāṁkhya in the sense that there is an abiding stuff in the form of *parts* through which the essence of the cause is transferred to its effect. This idea is wholly foreign to the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. It appears that the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, in order to refute the Buddhist view that the effect originated from the *void*, propounded the theory that the essence of the cause actually passes to its effect—a Sāṁkhya-like view. For, anything like the transference of the cause to its effect is possible only according to the Sāṁkhya theory of change. Sāṁkhya-ism is sometimes noticeable even in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers. No less a person than Vācaspatimiśra, in some inadvertent moments, particularly under the stress of the Buddhist attack, describes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory in terms of the Sāṁkhya. Replying to a Buddhist opponent, he says: "Seed is the material cause of the sprout, because the sprout is produced by transformation (*vikriyā*) of its essence-portions."[61] The term 'transformation' or change (*vikriyā*) belongs to the Sāṁkhya ideology which can have no place in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation.

11. EARLIER NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY COMPARED WITH THE LATER

Let us now see how the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation developed from the earlier one. According to the

61 Bījam aṅkurasyopādānaṁ tat-sāra-bhāga-vikṛiyayā aṅkurasyotpatteḥ. NVT. p. 842.

earlier theory, the effect is born of the parts of the cause-substance which itself is destroyed. The parts are not conceived as a separate substance, i.e., different from the *cause-substance* which is conceived as the *avayavin* of those parts. Subsequently, the effect-substance becomes the *avayavin* of the same parts. In the course of conflict with the Buddhist, the full implications of the theory of *avayavin* as accepted in the earlier period began to be unfolded. It became obvious that the parts should be regarded as a separate substance, i.e., different from the substance called *avayavin*, both existing side by side. That being so, the theory was formulated that the effect-substance was produced as a new *avayavin* from the substances called parts. Both of them being separate substances, the former was conceived as residing in the latter by *samavāya* relation—a unique device of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika by which two gross substances could be made to occupy the same space. Now, when the parts were regarded as separate from the 'whole' which was conceived as the effect, it was natural that the parts should be held to be the cause of the effect which was conceived to have been born in those parts in the form of an *avayavin*. The earlier theory that the *avayavin* (i.e., bunch of threads) which existed as a separate cause-substance in those parts and was destroyed when the new arrangement of the parts came about was dropped.

According to the earlier theory, when a cooking vessel of clay is made from[62] a lump of clay, the *lump of clay*, which is a substance born of a certain arrangement of parts of clay, *is the cause*. The cause-substance (lump of clay) is destroyed when the same parts assume a different arrangement from which emerges the effect-substance (cooking vessel).[63] Similarly, in the case of cloth, the *bunch of threads* is the cause which is destroyed before a new substance is produced in the form of cloth in the same threads. According to the later theory, however, the lump of clay taken as a substance is ignored, but the

62 According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika technique, we cannot say 'out of' the lump of clay, but we have got to say 'from' the lump of clay. *Supra*, VII. 10.

63 Yathā mṛd-avayavānāṁ vyūhāntarād dravyāntare sthālyām utpannāyāṁ pūrvaṁ mṛt-piṇḍa-dravyam mṛd-avayava-vibhāgebhyo nivartate. NBh. III. ii. 16. p. 847.

parts of clay in which the cooking vessel is produced as an *avayavin* are held to be the cause. Likewise, the threads themselves (and not their bunch) are the cause of the cloth. A question arises: whether the bunch of threads should be regarded as a separate *avayavi-dravya*, or is it a mere aggregate of parts? The later theory holds it to be a mere aggregate,[64] while the earlier theory conceives it to be a separate substance.

In the earlier theory, the preceding *avayavin* of parts, conceived as a separate substance, is the cause which is inevitably destroyed before the effect emerges as a new *avayavin* in the same parts. The later theory, however, conceives the parts themselves as the cause which necessarily exist simultaneously with the effect, for the effect is held to reside in them by *samavāya* relation.

There is thus a fundamental difference between the earlier and the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation. It was stated how the later Nyāya-Vaiśesika solved the difficulty of two substances occupying the same space by postulating that the substrata of the cause and the effect were their respective causes which were different. For instance, threads were the substratum of the cloth, and the fibres (*aṁśus*), of the threads. Not only do the two substances, the cause-substance and the effect-substance, occupy the same space, but, by the miracle of *samavāya*, a large number of substances, arranged in a series of causes and effects occupy the same space. For instance, two atoms make a *dvy-aṇuka;* three *dvy-aṇukas*, a *try-aṇuka;* a number of *try-aṇukas,* a small particle of cotton; a number of cotton particles, a fibre of thread; a number of fibres, a thread; and a number of threads, a piece of cloth. All these substances, from atom to the piece of cloth, occupy the same space. Every subsequent substance being an effect, or (which is the same thing) being an *avayavin,* resides in the preceding one, which is its cause, by *samavāya* relation. The series stops only with that effect-substance (*kārya-dravya*) which is regarded as the last 'whole' (*antyāvayavin*, cloth), because it does not become the part or cause of any further *avayavin.*

Again, not only do substances of the same series of causes

64 *Supra*, VII. 3 (v).

and effects occupy the same space, but according to one branch of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, even a large number of substances of the same class, which may not be related as cause and effect, can occupy the same space. According to this view to which Śrīdhara subscribes, when two threads are connected, a new substance in the form of a piece of cloth born of two threads emerges, and then, when a third thread is added, another piece of cloth of three threads, different *in essence* from the former one, emerges. Thus, pieces of cloth of four or five or more threads emerge in succession, each one of them being a different substance. In this case, not only the space, but even the substratum occupied by the piece of cloth of two threads is the same as that occupied by each piece of cloth of three, four or more threads. Śrīdhara surmounts the difficulty by saying that the substrata of the different pieces of cloth are not the same, inasmuch as a piece of cloth of two threads resides in the two threads, and that of three threads resides in the three threads, i.e., not only in the two, but in those two and one more, and so on.[65] According to this theory, when there is a piece of cloth, it is not one cloth, but a collection of many pieces of cloth. The piece of cloth residing in two threads, and the one residing in three threads, and so on, are separate entities, each one different from the other. All this looks too fantastic for common sense to swallow.

The latest thinkers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, therefore, discarded this theory. Viśvanātha, the author of *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī*, says that the theory involves the flaw of two or more gross substances occupying the same space.[66] The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers represented by Viśvanātha hold that after the production of a cloth of two threads, when a third thread is added, the connection of the first two threads is destroyed by the stroke of the shuttle, and, with the destruction of that connection which is the *asamavāyi* cause of the piece of

65 For the text, "Na ca mūrtānām .....samāna-deśatvam." see Text Appendix.

66 Na ca pūrva-tantava eva tantv-antara-sahakārāt pūrva-paṭe saty eva paṭāntaram ārabhantām iti vācyam. Mūrtayoḥ samāna-deśatā-virodhāt, tatra paṭa-dvayāsambhavād ekadā nānā-dravyasya tatropalambhasya bādhitattvāc ca. NSM. on verse 113.

cloth of two threads, the cloth is also destroyed. In this scheme, the previous cloth is destroyed with the addition of every new thread, and a new cloth takes its place. The last cloth alone resides in the threads. Thus, the absurdity of many pieces of cloth residing in the same threads is removed, but in this scheme a series of new pieces of cloth is being produced and destroyed in the process of weaving. This theory, too, is not less fantastic.

The process of change from the earlier theory to the present one can be clearly seen at work in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises. According to the latest theory, a seed as such is not the cause of the sprout because, strictly speaking, only the component parts of the sprout in which that sprout resides by *samavāya* relation are its cause. The seed is only a distant and indirect cause. When the seed is destroyed, its parts continue to exist and they combine with some other particles. By a continuous process of splitting and combining with other particles, the parts of the would-be sprout are produced, and from them the sprout emerges as an *avayavin*. Let us now see how this theory developed. Uddyotakara says: "The destruction of the seed is not the cause of the sprout. When the arrangement of the parts of the seed is disturbed, and a new arrangement takes place, the sprout is born from the latter. Hence it is said that a seed is required to produce a sprout."[67] This is in accord with the earlier theory that a seed is the cause of the sprout which it produces through a new arrangement of its parts. Commenting on this, Vācaspatimiśra poses a question: "If the new arrangement of the parts of the seed, and not the seed, is the cause of the sprout, why does a farmer take the seed to achieve his object?" To this he answers: "The seed is taken simply because it is indispensable to get at its parts which are the cause."[68] On this point, Vācaspatimiśra expressly says that the parts of the seed are the cause, and not the seed. But Uddyotakara, as already noted, subscribes to the earlier theory

67 Na bīja-nāśo 'ṅkura-kāraṇam, api tu vyāhata-vyūhānāṁ bījāvayavānāṁ pūrva-vyūha-nivṛttau vyūhāntaram utpadyata iti vyūhāntarād aṅkura āvirbhavatīti..... evaṁ ca bījopādānaṁ yuktam. NV. p. 938. line 7.

68 Nanu yadi bījāvayava-vyūhāntaram aṅkurotpāda-hetur na bījaṁ, kasmād aṅkurārthinaḥ kṛṣivalā bījam upādadate?.....bījāvayavopādāne avarjanīyatayā bījam āgacchad aśakya-pratyākhyānam. NVT. p. 938.

that the seed is the cause which is destroyed when the effect is produced.

In another context, an opponent suggests that an atom may be regarded as produced by another cause-atom which may be treated as the part in which the effect-atom is produced. To this, Uddyotakara replies: "The cause-atom cannot exist at the time of the effect-atom ."[69] Hence the former cannot be the part of the latter. According to this view, therefore, a cause does not exist simultaneously with its effect. On this, Vācaspatimiśra comments: "The implication of a thing having parts (*sāvayava*) is that it should have homogeneous parts, and should not only be originated by those parts, but should also reside in them."[70] Here it is expressly stated that an effect resides in its parts which are its cause. It means that the cause exists simultaneously with its effect. Although in this context, Uddyotakara has clearly subscribed to the view that a cause is destroyed when its effect is produced, elsewhere he takes up the question of separate weights of parts and their *avayavin* (i.e., cause and effect).[71] This indicates that in his time, the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the cause (parts) existing simultaneously with its effect was already anticipated.

Even when it was fully established that the cause exists simultaneously with its effect, it was suggested that after the origination of the effect in its cause, the cause was affected with some sort of disability. Being 'obstructed by its effect' (*kāryāvaruddha*), it could not perform all the functions it could do before. For example, after the production of the cloth in the threads, the threads would no longer be capable of performing all the functions which they could do before. In connection with the change of the colour of a jar from blue to red, Śrīdhara says that it takes place only when the jar is actually dissolved into atoms, because "it is seen that a new colour in a substance can originate only when the substance is not obstructed by its effect."[72] It means that the change can take place only in atoms.

69 Na kārya-paramānu-kāle kārana-paramānur asti. NV. p. 1067. l. 15.

70 Sāvayava-śabdasyārthah samāna-jātīyāvayavam, na kevalam tad-ārabdham api tu tad-āśritam. NVT. p. 1067. line 21.

71 *Supra*, V. 2.

72 Kāryānavaruddha eva dravye sarvatra rūpādy-utpatti-darśanam. NK. p. 108, line 2.

The difference pointed out above between the earlier and the later theories of causation has not been noticed in modern treatises of Indian philosophy or even in those especially written on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Obviously, the implications of the present Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation which was evolved by the tenth century A.D. have not been fully appreciated by modern writers. It is a pity that in most of the learned treatises, which are intended to present the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics in its latest form, the theory of causation, as found in the *Nyāya-sūtras* and its commentary by Vātsyāyana, is given without any indication that it belongs to an earlier period. In these modern works, the earlier theory of causation has been tacked on to the conception of three causes, viz., (i) inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*), (ii) non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*), and (iii) efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*), all of which are intrinsically connected with the later theory of causation. The formulators of the earlier theory had no idea of the three causes as they are understood in the present Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.[73] This makes the confusion worse confounded.

12. BUDDHIST THEORY OF PRATĪTYA-SAMUTPĀDA.

In a cause-and-effect series, such as that of a ring, bracelet, ear-ring, or that of fibres (*aṁśu*), threads, and cloth, there are, according to the Sāṁkhya, various changing phases of one abiding essence-stuff with which they are identical without having a separate essence or reality of their own. To the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, these various appearances or phases are so many different substances, each having its own separate individual essence. The Sāṁkhya theory of one substance-essence changing in various phases appeals to common sense. But, if these changing phases have no separate and different essence, it will mean that these phases or the object represented by them have no reality of their own apart from the

73 For instance, Professor Dasgupta in his History of Indian Philosophy describes the three causes as accepted in the later theory (p. 322), and in the same breath declares that the cause is destroyed before the effect is produced (p. 318). In a recent book by Dr. Bhaduri which purports to be a detailed and critical study of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, the same mistake is repeated (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics, p. 293 and p. 315).

that the seed is the cause which is destroyed when the effect is produced.

In another context, an opponent suggests that an atom may be regarded as produced by another cause-atom which may be treated as the part in which the effect-atom is produced. To this, Uddyotakara replies: "The cause-atom cannot exist at the time of the effect-atom."[69] Hence the former cannot be the part of the latter. According to this view, therefore, a cause does not exist simultaneously with its effect. On this, Vācaspatimiśra comments: "The implication of a thing having parts (*sāvayava*) is that it should have homogeneous parts, and should not only be originated by those parts, but should also reside in them."[70] Here it is expressly stated that an effect resides in its parts which are its cause. It means that the cause exists simultaneously with its effect. Although in this context, Uddyotakara has clearly subscribed to the view that a cause is destroyed when its effect is produced, elsewhere he takes up the question of separate weights of parts and their *avayavin* (i.e., cause and effect).[71] This indicates that in his time, the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the cause (parts) existing simultaneously with its effect was already anticipated.

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reality of the abiding stuff. They will be unreal. Thus, as already stated, the Sāṁkhya theory of causation leads to the Vedānta theory of unreal causation (*vivarta-vāda*). In the last resort all the manifold changing world (*prapañca*) being unreal, there remains only one eternal reality, i.e., Brahman.

Therefore, in order to safeguard the realistic conception of the external world, the individual objects (appearing as phases in a series of cause and effect) must each be assigned a separate reality. That is why the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, as the principal champion of realism, insists that a cause and its effect are two separate substances, each having its own individual reality. If a cause and its effect were two separate substances, what affinity would there be between the two? The earlier Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory solved the problem by accepting a feature of Sāṁkhya-ism. According to that theory, the cause-substance resides in a particular arrangement of parts, and when that arrangement becomes different, the effect-substance emerges from the same parts. The parts, being common to cause and effect and somewhat like the abiding stuff of the Sāṁkhya theory, are conceived as the link by which the essence of a cause-substance passes to the effect-substance. The earlier theory ignores the fact that these parts would themselves be separate substances apart from the cause-substance or the effect-substance which is supposed to emerge from both of them. If, therefore, a new substance is conceived only as an *avayavin* emerging from its parts, the inevitable conclusion will be that the parts and their *avayavin* being two separate substances would exist simultaneously, occupying the same space. This position was not accepted by the earlier school, because it involved the absurdity of two substances occupying the same space.

The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, however, boldly admits what is logically forced upon it, and declares that parts and their *avayavin* (e.g., threads and cloth) are two separate substances. The absurdity of both of them occupying the same space is sought to be removed by holding that the *avayavin* resides in the parts by *samavāya* relation. Perhaps, the theorists of earlier school felt that if the parts were held to be separate substances (i.e., separate from the cause-substance which resided in them in the preceding state and also separate from the effect-

substance which is subsequently born in them), they could not serve as the medium of the transference of essence of the cause-substance to the effect-substance. According to the later school, however, the preceding substance residing in those parts (as their *avayavin*) is not regarded as the cause of the subsequent substance produced in them as a new *avayavin*. Instead, the *parts* themselves are regarded as the cause of the effect. But a cause, existing side by side with its effect and retaining its own essence intact, cannot transfer its essence to its effect in any way. The cause thus becomes merely a precedent condition of its effect, exactly as it is in the Buddhist theory of *pratītya-samutpāda*. According to that theory also, the cause does not transfer its essence to its effect in any way. The difference between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory and the Buddhist is that, according to the former, an effect after being produced resides in its cause by *samavāya* relation. But despite the fact that an effect resides in its cause, it cannot be held to have derived its essence from the latter. It would appear that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also, the causality consists only in mere immediate precedence of the cause to its effect.

It is thus obvious that the present Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation carried to its logical conclusion, and shorn of its untenable assumption that the cause continues to exist simultaneously with its effect, leads us to the Buddhist theory of causation (*pratītya-samutpāda-vāda*). The affinity between the two theories could not escape the notice of earlier writers. It was pointed out how Vācaspatimiśra, commenting on Śaṁkara's statement that the Vaiśeṣikas are semi-nihilists (*ardha-vaināśikas*) like the Buddhists, remarks that the Vaiśeṣikas also accept the destruction of an effect without the continuity of its essence (*niranvaya-vināśa*).[74]

The relation of the cause with its effect can be conceived only in two ways: either the cause passes on its essence to the effect, or it is merely a condition precedent to the appearance of the effect. The former is the Sāṁkhya view which ultimately leads to the Vedānta idealism. The latter view, presented in

74 *Supra*, V. 3.

whatever form, will, in the last analysis, lead to the Buddhist theory of causation.

13. CHANGE INCONCEIVABLE ACCORDING TO THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation, any addition to or any subtraction from an effect-substance, so long as it exists, is an impossibility. A piece of cloth is made of a certain number of threads which are its causal parts (*ārambhaka-avayavas*). An effect-substance which is an *avayavin* of a certain number of constituent parts cannot remain the same *avayavin*, even if one little part is added to or subtracted from those constituent parts. When, therefore, a new thread is added to a piece of cloth, it can be done only in two ways. (i) A new thread may be connected (*saṁyukta*) with that piece of cloth as another substance. It will be a case of two separate substances being connected. Or, (ii) the new thread may be added in the course of weaving. In that case, the previous connection of threads, which is the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of that piece of cloth, is destroyed, and with it the cloth is also destroyed. Then all the threads (including the new one) are connected afresh, and a new *avayavin* (cloth) emerges.[75] It is thus clear that, so far as the original entity of an effect-substance is concerned, nothing can be added to it.

Similarly, nothing can be subtracted from an effect-substance. For instance, even if one thread be removed from a cloth, it means one of the parts in which the cloth resided has disappeared. Consequently, the connection of that thread with other threads being destroyed, the original piece of cloth is also destroyed. Whenever, therefore, even one thread is removed, the original cloth is forthwith destroyed, and the cloth which continues to exist after the removal of the thread is in fact another cloth which has come into existence after the destruction of the original cloth. How does this new cloth originate?

The process of origination of a new cloth after one thread is removed is similar to that of the origination of two pieces of cloth (*khaṇḍa-paṭas*) when a big cloth (*mahā-paṭa*) is torn. The

75 NSM. verse 113.

two torn pieces of cloth are held to be two *new* substances produced after the destruction of the original big cloth. Here, the *nimitta-kāraṇa* of the two pieces is the destruction of the original big cloth. As for the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* (material cause) of these two new pieces of cloth, it is the same as that of the big cloth which has been destroyed. It is held that, when a substance is produced by the destruction of another substance, the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the new substance is the same as that of the substance destroyed.[76] A question now arises: how are the connections of threads of the new pieces of cloth produced? According to Śrīdhara, the pieces of cloth already existed as separate substances in the bigger cloth, and the problem of new connections of threads does not arise at all. According to Viśvanātha, however, connections which had been the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of the piece of cloth were already destroyed when new threads were added to produce the big cloth.[77] It is difficult for Viśvanātha to account for the new connections, unless it be held that the action which tears a big cloth also produces new connections. Śaṁkaramiśra says: "When a bigger cloth is destroyed, a part-cloth is produced by connections which are already existent."[78] This, however, is not feasible because, according to Viśvanātha's theory, new connections cannot be said to be already existent. There is in fact no solution to this problem in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Be it as it may, it is clear that when even one thread of a cloth is removed, the cloth is destroyed. The cloth which remains after the removal of one thread, is either a piece of cloth which already existed in the bigger cloth as held by Śrīdhara or a cloth produced anew as held by Viśvanātha.

It follows, therefore, from the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that not a particle can be added to or subtracted from an effect-substance without destroying its identity. This aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is seldom noticed. When the theory was in the process of formulation, this aspect was not sometimes

76 Yad dravyaṁ yad-dravya-dhvaṁsa-janyaṁ tat tad-upādānopādeyam. NSM. on verse 35. (upādāna means here 'samavāyi-kāraṇa')

77 *Supra*, VII. 11.

78 Mahāpaṭa-nāśe avasthita-saṁyogebhya eva khaṇḍa-patotpattau...

realized even by the early pioneers. For instance, Uddyotakara while refuting the Buddhist theory of evanescence says that, according to that theory, everything is being born anew every moment, and that no increase or decrease is possible which is conceivable only in the case of an enduring object.[79] Following Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra says: "In the theory of evanescence, increase or decrease of the parts is not possible, because when there is origination or destruction without any continuity of essence (*niranvaya*), increase or decrease cannot be conceived."[80] It was not realised by these scholiasts that, even according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, increase or decrease in an effect-substance is not possible without a change in its identity.

Besides, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, not only is increase or decrease in a substance impossible, but even a change in it is inconceivable. A change in a substance can take place by (i) addition or subtraction of parts, or (ii) by a change in the arrangement of its parts, or (iii) by a change in its qualities. It has just been shown that the first alternative is not possible. It is also quite obvious that a change in the arrangement of parts only means destruction of the old connections and production of new ones, which is the same thing as destruction of the old substance and production of a new one in its place. As for the third alternative, the qualities are of two kinds: (i) qualities like connection and disconnection which may appear and disappear during the existence of the connected object, and (ii) qualities like colour, taste, smell, touch, etc., which last as long as a substance lasts (*yāvad-dravya-bhāvin*).[81] Any change in these qualities will mean a change in the identity of the substance itself, i.e., the destruction of the object concerned and the emergence of a new one in its place. It is thus clear that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, so long as a substance lasts, it cannot undergo any kind of change. The conception of change, as already stated, belongs only to the Sāṁkhya. The

79 Ubhayaṁ caitad avasthita-vastu-visayam. NV. p. 827. line 9.

80 Avayavopacayāpacayau na kṣaṇika-pakse yujyete niranvayotpāda-vināśayor upacayāpacaya-pratyayābhāvāt. NVT. p. 827. line 21.

81 Apākaja-rūpa-rasa-gandha.....snehānāṁ yāvad-dravya-bhāvitvam. PP. p. 103.

impression that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, atoms change into *dvy-aṇukas*, and the latter into *try-aṇukas*, is quite unwarranted. The atoms far from changing into *dvy-aṇukas* continue to exist side by side with *dvy-aṇukas*; and so do the *dvy-aṇukas*, *try-aṇukas* and other cause substances.[82]

14. NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY LEADS TO THEORY OF EVANESCENCE

If increase or decrease is inconceivable in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, how will it explain the phenomenon of the growth and decay of animal bodies and other organic objects? The question of the growth of the fœtus in the womb is discussed by Śrīdhara as already noted.[83] It was stated there that the growth of the fœtus is not a case of change, but of one substance being replaced by another every moment. It would thus appear that so far as the organic bodies are concerned, they are being destroyed and replaced by new ones every moment. They are therefore as much evanescent according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as according to the Buddhist. As to the question why an organic body, which is destroyed every moment and replaced by another, is recognized as the same, the answer of Śrīdhara is that the recognition of identity is an illusion due to similarity of the bodies at different moments. "Causes for the illusion are always present, because of the absence of interval between the destruction of the previous body and the origination of a subsequent one, and because of great similarity between them. The illusion is similar to that of a flame which, although changing every moment, is recognised as the same."[84] Stability of every organic object is thus, according to one of the greatest authorities of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika, a mere illusion.

In the case of inorganic objects which do not seem to

82 In view of what has been stated here, it is interesting to note that in a work, *Conception of Matter* by Dr. Umesh Mishra, it is stated: "The whole process of the theory of causality is nothing but a process of change." This is a glaring instance how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position is wholly misunderstood even by scholars.

83 *Supra*, VI. 30.

84 Vyaktīnām avyavādhānotpādanena antarāgrahaṇasya ātyantika-sādṛśyasya ca bhrānti-hetoḥ sarvadā saṁbhavo jvālādi-vyaktivat. NK. p. 34. line 13.

undergo constant growth or decay (e.g., a piece of cloth or a jar), it has been stated that addition or subtraction of a single minute particle means the destruction of the original substance and its replacement by another substance. Now, if a jar is weighed, say, after a hundred years, it will be less in weight by at least a few grains. Imperceptible decay thus goes on constantly even in inorganic objects. These few grains represent hundreds of thousands of atoms or particles, and they have not been subtracted at one particular moment, but the process of subtraction has been going on all the time during one hundred years. It means that the process of destruction and replacement of objects is continuous. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika may say that the process might not have been going on every moment, and that the jar might have remained intact at least for a few moments. True, but the fact that it has been destroyed and replaced by another one at some of the moments, and yet is recognized as the same jar, explodes the myth of identity or permanence of an object.

It has been stated that change of a quality like colour means the destruction of the object concerned, and its replacement by another one. Now, if an object like a jar, or to take a more appropriate example, a piece of paper, be exposed to the sun, wind and rain, for a long time, will its colour remain the same? Certainly not. And the change in colour has not come about at one particular moment. It has been going on imperceptibly all the time, which means that the object in question was being destroyed and replaced by another substance every moment. Thus, inorganic substances also become evanescent on account of constant change in their qualities like colour. To say that they might not have changed every moment, as held by the Buddhist, but only at intervals, would only be a poor consolation for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It therefore follows that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory itself, the recognition of the identity of even inorganic objects is a mere illusion. This, of course, is enough to knock the bottom out of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika structure of realism which seeks to establish the permanence of objects on the basis of recognition.

Further, it is held that 'connection' of parts is the *asamavāyi-kārana* of all the effect-substances. When two threads are

connected, a new *avayavin*, i.e., a cloth made up of the two threads is produced. But a new *avayavin* is not produced in all cases of connections. In some cases, the connections of objects constitute merely an aggregate of those objects and do not produce a new *avayavin* different from the objects which have been connected. As already stated, there is no criterion as to when the connection of parts will produce a new substance and when it will not do so, except that of experience.[85] But evidence of experience is a matter of individual opinion, and therefore doubtful. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, will be that an *avayavin* must be produced in all cases of connections.

Secondly, there arises a question about which Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works are not quite clear. Must the parts in which a new *avayavin* is produced necessarily be of homogeneous type? For instance, will the threads woven on some wooden frame produce a new *avayavin* having the threads and the wooden frame both as its parts, or will it be a case of an aggregate of some parts put together? Of course, no *avayavin* or an effect-substance can be produced out of two elements (e.g., earth and water), because that would involve a cross division (*sāṅkarya*) which precludes a generalization being regarded as a universal. It means that the two universals which do not stand in the relation of genus and species cannot both be found in one object; or, conversely, if two generalizations, not standing in the relation of genus and species, are found in one object, they cannot be universals (*sāmānya*).[86] If, therefore, an effect is produced out of particles of earth and water, it will have in it both the universals, earth-*ness* and water-*ness* (*pṛthivītva* and *jalatva*) which are not in the relation of genus and species, and which are mutually exclusive. But this is not tenable because if earth and water produce a common effect, it would preclude their having universals. It is therefore held that two different elements cannot produce a common effect. In the case of animal bodies which are usually regarded as made up of particles of earth, water, etc., the Nyāya-Vaiśesika would say that they are, in fact, made exclusively of earth-particles. Particles of water, etc.,

85 *Supra*, VII. 3 (v).
86 *Infra*, IX. 7.

not being the constituent parts, are only connected as separate substances with the animal bodies. This is, of course, fantastic for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school to hold that no effect can be produced from component parts of different elements. It will follow that, according to this theory, blood (which is liquid) is not a component part of the body, but only connected with it as a separate substance So far, however, as the heterogeneous parts of *one and the same* element are concerned, there is nothing to prevent the origination of an effect from them. It will thus mean that whenever any kind of parts of *one element* are connected, they would produce a new effect-substance.

Thirdly, there is the theory of 'ultimate wholes' (*antyāvayavin*) to which we have already referred.[87] Some effect-substances (like threads which are themselves *avayavins* of their parts) become parts of another *avayavin* (cloth). But the cloth is an ultimate *avayavin;* it does not become part of any other *avayavin*. Similarly, a jar is also regarded as an ultimate *avayavin*. But, as already stated, there is no definite criterion as to why and when a certain effect-substance should be regarded as an ultimate *avayavin*. Here again, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika refers to the testimony of experience. But experience cannot be an unfailing guide in this matter. It has been shown that new *avayavins* can be formed even from the so-called 'ultimate *avayavins*'. For instance, a small boat of jars may be made from a number of jars.

Thus, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, when a number of objects get connected as parts, they produce a new *avayavin*, but there are certain riders attached to it. Firstly, such parts when connected do not always produce a new *avayavin*, but do so only *in some cases;* in other cases, their connection produces only an aggregate of parts which is not a new *avayavin*. Secondly, it is also implied, but not clearly stated, that such parts should be homogeneous. Thirdly, it is held that substances which are ultimate *avayavins* do not produce new *avayavins*. It has been shown that all these riders are without any definite criterion or basis. If, therefore, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation is carried to its logical end, it will mean that whenever

87 *Supra*, VII. 3 (vi).

some material objects *of any kind* are connected together, there should always emerge a new *avayavin*—a new effect-substance. Thus, every connection should lead to the emergence of a new effect. As every object is having new connections practically every moment, it will be producing new effects continually. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the causes (in the form of parts) continue to exist side by side with their effects, i.e., new material substances are being produced without corresponding destruction of the older ones. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika creates a queer universe in which, as already stated, there is constant birth but no death. The Buddhist merely carries the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory to its logical culmination and declares that constant origination must be accompanied by constant destruction; whenever an effect is produced, its cause is forthwith destroyed. Thus, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation positively leads to the Buddhist theory of evanescence.

15. THREE KINDS OF CAUSES CONCEIVED IN THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika recognises three kinds of causes: (*i*) the parts, in which an effect is born as their *avayavin*, are the inherent cause (*samavāyi-kārana*), (ii) the connection of those parts which produces the effect immediately is the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*), and (*iii*) all other agents or accessories which bring about the connection (e.g., weaver, shuttle, loom, etc., in the case of cloth) are the efficient causes (*nimitta-kāraṇas*). It would be seen that the first two causes, i.e., *samavāyin* and *asamavāyin*, can have no meaning in the earlier theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. For, the term *samavāyi-kārana* can be the designation of the material cause only when an effect is conceived as born in its parts and residing therein by *samavāya* relation, and *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* is inseparably associated with the conception of the *samavāyi-kāraṇa*. It is, therefore, natural that the conception of these two separate causes, which is intrinsically associated with the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation is not met with in earlier works, like the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, the *Nyāya-sūtra* or the commentary of Vātsyāyana. Praśastapāda, of course, refers to *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*, but he does so only incidentally. The three causes as such are not

explicitly mentioned by him. They have been introduced only in the commentaries on Praśastapāda, viz., *Nyāya-kandalī*, *Kiraṇāvalī* and others. In all the subsequent works of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, they are invariably given and defined. It is, therefore, regrettable that modern writers of most of the treatises on the Nyāya-Vaiśesika system have not realized that the conception of causes as *samavāyin* and *asamavāyin* has no place in the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory.

Chapter VIII

QUALITIES AND MOVEMENTS AS OBJECTIVE REALITIES

1. QUALITIES DIFFERENT FROM SUBSTANCE

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the whiteness of a cloth is different *in essence* from its substratum, the cloth. The former resides in the latter by a special relation called *samavāya* (inherence). By virtue of that peculiar relation, the whiteness appears to be identical with the cloth. The two, the cloth and its whiteness, are, however, two different entities. *Essential* differentiation between *dharma* and *dharmin* (property and its substratum) is, as already stated, the corner-stone of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. Like the qualities (*guṇas*), movement (*karman*) is also different from the substance in which it resides by the same *samavāya* relation. The conception of qualities and movements, as having their essence different from the substance, is a unique doctrine upheld by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which is foreign to all other philosophical schools, Indian or Western. In the chapter on 'Defence of Substance', the arguments of Jayanta and Śrīdhara to prove that a substance is different from its qualities have been noticed.[1] Now the same point is to be established from another aspect. Śrīdhara argues about

1 *Supra*, VI. 13.

the essential difference between qualities and the substance thus: "The people, who accept the identity of colour and its substance, and therefore declare that the cause of a substance is also the cause of its colour, should be asked to explain the following: Does the colour of an atom produce another colour or not? If it produces another colour, does it do so in itself or in its substratum, the atom? Now, if the colour does not produce another colour, or if it produces that colour in itself or in its substratum (the atom), then, in any of these cases, colour will not be produced in the *dvy-aṇuka* (the immediate product of the atom). Consequently the world, produced through the latter, would be colourless. If, however, colour of the atom produces colour in the *dvy-aṇuka*, it will have to be admitted that colour could be produced in the *dvy-aṇuka* only after its origination, because no effect can be produced without a substratum. That being so, how could there be identity between the two entities (the substance and its colour) which are prior and posterior in their origination?[2]

The above argument is based on another Nyāya-Vaiśesika assumption that a 'whole' (*avayavin*) in the form of an effect is different from the parts (*avayavas*) which are its cause, i.e., *dvy-aṇukas* are different in their essence from the atoms. As this is not acceptable to the opponent who holds the cause and its effect to be identical, the argument falls flat upon him. Be it as it may, external objective reality was assigned to qualities and movements (*guṇa* and *karman*) from the earliest times in the Vaiśesika system. It was held that substance, qualities and movements were covered under the term *artha*, which means an objective reality.[3] It was declared that the universal *sattā* (existence) resided only in these three categories.[4] The early Vaiśeṣika, true to the Hegelian dictum that a thing can exist only if it possesses some properties,[5] held that *guṇa* and the

2 For the text, "Ye tu rūpa-dravyayos.....pūrvāpara-kāla-bhāvāt." see Text Appendix.

3 Artha iti dravya-guṇa-karmasu. VS. VIII. ii. 3.

4 Sad iti yato dravya-guna-karmasu sā sattā. VS. I. ii. 7.

5 In this connection the following remark of Dr. Radhakrishnan is significant:

"That something is, that something exists, is the first proposition of the Vaiseṣika philosophy. But nothing can simply be. If we stop with bare

karman possessed properties in the form of universals (*guṇatva* and *karmatva*). The remaining three categories, viz., *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* which do not possess any property were held by the early Vaiśeṣika school, as already stated, to be merely mental entities. Objective reality was assigned to them only at a later stage, perhaps by Praśastapāda for the first time.

It would appear, as noted above, that in ordinary experience only qualities like colour, taste, smell, or touch are apprehended by our senses, and not the substance, the abode of those qualities. The Buddhist, therefore, relying on the testimony of experience, holds that only qualities like colour, taste, etc., are the objects of our senses, and not the substances which are supposed to be their substrata.[6] The *kṣaṇas*, the ultimate reals, according to Buddhist theory, are more akin to the qualities than to the substance of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception.[7] The Buddhist emphatically denies the objective existence of the substance apart from their qualities, whereas it is the key-stone of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics.

2. PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL ASPECTS OF QUALITIES

Qualities are seventeen according to Kaṇāda, and twenty-four according to Praśastapāda. A close examination shows that some qualities are of physical nature, while others are metaphysical, although no such distinction is made in the Nyāya-Vaiśesika works. It is well-known that in the first attempts at philosophical thinking in India as well as in Greece and elsewhere, problems related to physical sciences were mixed up with those of metaphysics. But, we have to sift and separate the metaphysical portion from the physico-chemical theories of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, which have now only an historical value. For instance, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that water has sweet taste, natural liquidity, and viscidity (*sneha*). To the

existence, and refuse to go further, then as Hegel has taught us, we are left with a mere blank, and even the first principle *that something exists, has to be given up.* So we must push forward and assert that a thing is, because it possesses certain properties besides mere existence." *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II. p. 185.

6 *Supra*, VI. 13.

7 *Supra*, VI. 14.

question that ordinary water has no taste, sweet or otherwise, the answer is given that when water is taken after eating a fruit named *harītakī*, sweet taste is experienced, which was latent in water and which *harītakī* has made manifest.[8] If liquidity is a natural quality, it may be asked why hail or ice is found solid. The answer is given in all seriousness that the solidity of hail is merely an illusion.[9] Viscidity (*sneha*), according to Praśastapāda, is not only the cause of the agglutination of small particles, but it also causes glossiness (*mṛjā*), and according to Śrīdhara, it causes softness (*mṛdutva*) also. Keśavamiśra says that *sneha* means greasiness (*cikkaṇatā*).[10] When it is pointed out that greasiness belongs to fatty substances like butter, oil, etc., the answer is given that greasiness of the oily substances is also due to water which is latent in them. But, strangely enough, this greasiness of oily substances, although caused by water, is declared to be of a higher degree than that of water itself, because an oily substance promotes burning, while water which possesses lesser greasiness (*sneha*) extinguishes fire.[11] This sort of description of physical properties of the four atomic elements is only of an historical value.

There are, on the other hand, some qualities which have a metaphysical aspect. In our examination of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika realism, we are concerned mainly with these qualities. Of the twenty-four qualities,[12] (i-iv) odour, taste, colour and touch belong respectively to the four atomic elements, earth, water, fire and air; (v) sound belongs to ether; (vi) weight resides in earth and water; (vii) fluidity (*dravatva*) belongs to water by its nature, and so does (viii) viscidity (*sneha*). These eight qualities, and two kinds of *saṁskāras*, viz., velocity (*vega*)

8 NSM. on verse 39.

9 Karakādināṁ kāthinya-pratyayasya bhrāntatvāt. NSM. on verse 40. It means that solidity of hail is a mere illusion. Praśastapāda offers a less absurd explanation and says that the fluidity of hail is counteracted by the cohesive conjunction (saṁghāta) of water atoms caused by conjunction with divine (ethereal) fire. PP. pp. 264-5.

10 TB. p. 71.

11 NSM. on verses 39 and 157.

12 These include Saṁskāra as one, but it is of three kinds (vega, sthitisthāpakatva and bhāvanā) which would raise the number of qualities to 26. The number of qualities other than saṁskāra is, however, only 23.

and elasticity (*sthiti-sthāpakatva*) are purely of physical nature and, therefore, of no concern here. Of the remaining fifteen qualities, eight: (i) knowledge (*buddhi*), (ii) pleasure (*sukha*), (iii) pain (*duḥkha*), (iv) desire (*icchā*), (v) aversion (*dveṣa*), (vi) effort or volition (*prayatna*), (vii) merit (*dharma*), and (viii) demerit (*adharma*), and *bhāvanā* (impression, the third kind of *saṁskāra*) belong to the soul, and therefore they pertain to epistemology. The remaining seven qualities, (i) number (*saṁkhyā*), (ii) measure (*parimāṇa*), (iii) separateness (*pṛthaktva*), (iv) disconnection (*vibhāga*), (v) connection (*saṁyoga*), (vi) remoteness (*paratva*), and (vii) nearness (*aparatva*) are of special significance in the study of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics.

3. QUALITIES: SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE

In view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that all qualities have objective external reality, it would be inconsistent to refer to them as subjective or objective. In fact, no such distinction is warranted or made in that system. There are, however, some qualities which, although possessing objective reality, have a subjective origin. We have discussed at length that qualities like 'nearness' and 'remoteness' (*paratva* and *aparatva*) and the number duality (*dvitva*) and others originate in thought.[13] They do not reside in an object permanently, but are produced only for the time being, i.e., at the time of their perception by the ideas which precede the perception, and disappear in the next moment.[14] It has been stated how the extreme realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika slips into idealism.[15] Be it as it may, qualities mentioned above may be said to be subjective, at least, so far as their origin is concerned. Notwithstanding the argumentation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, it puts a strain on the imagination to assign objective reality to them. Now, for the purpose of dividing all qualities in two groups, subjective and objective, we may leave aside the eight qualities and the impression (*bhāvanā*) which belong to the soul. Of the remaining sixteen qualities, eight qualities odour, etc., and two kinds

13 *Supra*, V. 9.
14 *Ibid.*
15 *Ibid.*

of *saṁskāra*, which have been regarded as physico-chemical qualities, are objective.

As regards the seven qualities which have a metaphysical aspect, it has been pointed out above that remoteness and nearness (*paratva* and *aparatva*), and number from duality onwards are of subjective nature. The quality called 'separateness' (*pṛthaktva*) is, like number, of two kinds: (i) residing in one substance (*eka-pṛthaktva*), and (ii) residing in more than one (*aneka-pṛthaktva*). Of these two, *aneka-pṛthaktva* which is created only at the time of its cognition is of subjective nature.

The remaining three qualities, (i) connection (*saṁyoga*), (ii) disconnection (*vibhāga*) and (iii) measure (*parimāṇa*), are of objective nature. Of these three, the first two, viz., connection and disconnection, are qualities whose emergence does not affect, in any way, the substances in which they reside. In that sense, they are not strictly objective. They may, therefore, be said to be of subjective-objective nature. Thus, of the seven qualities of metaphysical aspect, measure (*parimāṇa*) alone is a full-fledged objective quality.

It may be said that the division of qualities in two groups subjective and objective, is not found in any of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika treatises, and is therefore unwarranted. It has, however, been introduced because it helps in understanding the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theories in their bearing on the problem of realism. And although it may be an innovation, it is in accord with the conceptions of these qualities as found in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises.

4. QUALITIES CO-EXISTENT WITH THEIR SUBSTANCE

There are some qualities which are co existent with the substance in which they reside (*yāvad-dravya-bhāvinaḥ*). For instance, so long as a piece of cloth lasts, its colour, measure, weight, etc., also last. Such qualities are destroyed only when their substratum, the substance, is destroyed. A change in a quality of this kind always means a change in the substance itself. Whenever there is an apparent case of a change of qualities, it is in fact not a change of qualities, but it only means that the former substance together with its qualities has

been destroyed, and a new one with its new qualities has come in its place. Some significant implications of this phenomenon have already been brought out in connection with the comparison of the Buddhist theory of instantaneous change with that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism.[16]

According to Praśastapāda, the following qualities are co-existent with their substance: (i) colour, not produced by contact with fire (*apākaja-rūpa*), (ii) taste, (iii) odour, (iv) touch, (v) measure, (vi) oneness (*ekatva*), (vii) separateness residing in one object (*eka-pṛthaktva*), (viii) natural fluidity (*sāṁsiddhika-dravatva*), (ix) weight and (x) viscidity. It would appear that out of these ten qualities, seven, i.e., the first four, colour, etc., together with weight, fluidity, and viscidity, are the qualities which were described above as having physico-chemical and objective nature. The remaining three are of metaphysical aspect. One of them, viz., measure is strictly of objective nature. The remaining two qualities 'oneness' (*ekatva*) and 'separate-ness residing in one' (*eka-pṛthaktva*) reside permanently in every object.

It will thus be clear that the qualities which have been called objective are co-existent with their substance, and that any change in them means a change in the substance itself. These qualities are primary. On the other hand, qualities like *duality, remoteness* or *nearness*, are, in fact, subjective, but they also have been regarded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as external realities. The real difference between the two sets of qualities is: while the objective qualities are co-existent with their substance, the subjective ones are not so.

5. CAUSATION OF QUALITIES

In a system where qualities were regarded as different *in essence* from their abode-substance, it was natural that they should have a set of causes different from those of their substance. In the case of cloth, threads are its *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, and the connections of threads, its *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*. As for the causes of the qualities of cloth, colour, etc., their *samavāyi-kāraṇa* is the cloth itself in which they reside by *samavāya* relation. As an effect resides in its *samavāyi-kāraṇa* by the *samavāya*

16 *Supra*, VII. 14.

relation, and colour resides by the same relation in its substance (cloth), therefore, cloth is held to be its *samavāyi-kāraṇa*. But there arises a difficulty in this assumption. The cloth and its colour come into existence simultaneously, and therefore one of them (cloth) cannot be the cause of the other (colour), since the cause must precede its effect. The objection was met by declaring that cloth or, for the matter of that, any substance precedes, in time, its colour or any other quality by just one moment. It means that cloth or any other substance in the first moment of its existence is devoid of all qualities. Can we perceive or even conceive of a substance which is devoid of all qualities? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika points out that no practical difficulty arises by that assumption because a substance is held to be without its qualities only for the first moment of its existence when even otherwise its apprehension is not possible.

As for the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of qualities, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that the quality of a cause-substance is the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of the same quality of the effect-substance. For instance, the colour of the threads is the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of the colour of the cloth. There is a dictum of Kanāda, that the cause-substance produces the effect-substance, and the qualities of the cause-substance produce the qualities of the effect-substance.[17] But *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* was not conceived by Kaṇāda as a separate kind of cause, and its conception and definition were not evolved even by the time of Praśastapāda.[18] In a later period, *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* was defined as "that which resides in the *samavāyi-kārana* side by side with its effect."[19] For instance, 'connections of threads' are held to be the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of cloth. Here the effect (cloth) and its *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* (connections of threads) both reside side by side in the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the cloth (i.e., the threads). But this definition does not work in the case of the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of qualities. The colour of the threads is the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of the colour of the cloth. But the colour of the threads does

17 Dravyāṇi dravyāntaram ārabhante guṇāś ca guṇāntaram. VS. I. i. 10.

18 *Supra*, VII. 15.

19 Samavāyi-kāraṇa-pratyāsannam....asamavāyi-kāraṇam. TB. p. 31.

not reside in the cloth which is the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the colour of the cloth. Here the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* does not reside side by side with its effect. The effect, viz., the colour of the cloth resides in the cloth, while its *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*, viz., the colour of the threads, resides in the threads.

To meet this difficulty, the definition of *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* was modified in various ways. Keśavamiśra suggests that the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of a quality resides not in the *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, but in the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of its *samavāyi-kāraṇa*.[20] In the present instance, cloth is the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of its colour, and threads are the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the cloth in which resides their colour which is the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of the colour of the cloth. But even this explanation does not solve the problem, because, according to the definition of the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*, the effect and its *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* should reside *side by side* in the *samavāyi-kāraṇa*.[21] The colour of threads does not reside in the threads *side by side* with its effect, viz., the colour of cloth, because while the former resides in the threads, the latter resides in the cloth. To meet this difficulty, later writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school evolved two kinds of *pratyāsatti* (subsistences side by side). One of them is called *kāryaikārtha-pratyāsatti*[22] which means that the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* resides side by side with its effect (*kārya*) in one object (*ekārtha*) as in the case of the *asamavāyi-kārana* of cloth where the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* (connections of threads) and the effect (cloth) both reside side by side in one object, namely the threads. The other *pratyāsatti* is called *kāraṇaikārtha-pratyāsatti*[23] which means that the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* resides side by side, not with its effect, but with the *cause of the effect* (*kāraṇa*) in one and the same object (*ekārtha*). Here the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of the colour of cloth (viz., colour of the threads) does not reside in one object (threads) side by side with its effect (colour of cloth), but it resides side by side

20 Samavāyi-kāranasya samavāyi-kārana-pratyāsannasyāpi paramparayā samavāyi-kārana-pratyāsatmatvāt. TB. p. 31.

21 It is not mere vrtti (residence) but it is pratyāsatti, which means residence side by side.

22 Kāryeṇa saha ekasminn arthe pratyāsattiḥ.

23 Kāraṇena saha ekasminn arthe pratyāsattiḥ.

with the cause of the effect (cloth) which is the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the effect in question (i.e., colour of the cloth).

6. QUALITIES EXISTING WITHOUT SUBSTANCE

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, as noticed above, the cloth, being the cause of its qualities, precedes them by one moment, i.e., the cloth is devoid of all qualities in the first moment of its existence. This position was forced upon the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika by the logic of its theory of causation.[24] Although outrageous to common sense, the position is not untenable so far as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is concerned. The relation between a substance and its qualities is that of *samavāya* (inherence) which has been defined as that obtaining between two entities of which one is such that it exists only as subsisting in the other. For instance, in the case of substance and qualities, the latter are held to be subsisting only in a substance and never without it. On the other hand, a substance can exist without its qualities.

But in the case of qualities also, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was forced to hold that they could exist at the time of their destruction, just for one moment, even without their abode-substance. The destruction of a substance is held to be the cause of the destruction of its qualities. This means that the destruction of qualities being the effect must take place, at least, one moment after the destruction of the substance, and therefore, the qualities will exist without their substance, just for a moment, at the time of their destruction. As one moment is incomprehensible, no practical difficulty would arise on that account. In order to overcome the technical difficulty which arises from the very definition of *samavāya*, that definition was modified as "a relation between two entities of which one exists only as subsisting in the other, *so long as one of them does not come to the point of its destruction.*" It implies that, at the time of destruction, the qualities exist, just for one moment, even without their substance.[25] Thus, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school

24 *Supra*, VIII. 5.

25 In the definition: "yayor madhye ekam avinaśyad aparāśritam evāvatiṣṭhate," the word 'avinaśyat' added after 'ekam' means that at the time of being destroyed, the qualities exist even without subsisting in a substance. (vinaśyad-avasthās tu kṣaṇam anāśritā eva avatiṣṭhante. TB. p. 29).

was forced to accept the fantastic position that not only is a substance, at the first moment of its origination, devoid of all qualities, but the qualities also, in their last moment, exist without their substance; they hang, as it were, in the vacuum. Thus the theory of co-existence of the qualities with their substances is not only vitiated at the first, but also at the last moment.

7. SUBJECTIVE QUALITIES OBJECTIVIZED

As already noted, three of the seven qualities which have a metaphysical aspect, viz., duality, remoteness and nearness, have a subjective origin in the sense that they originate from the ideas preceding them. The objection was raised that the creation of external objects from ideas looked like idealism.[26] But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school adhered to the principle that every cognition must have a counterpart in the external world. We have already noticed how qualities like duality[27] or remoteness are produced as external objects at the time of their perception.

Writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school take pains to establish that the numbers, oneness as well as duality, etc., must have an external objective existence. Śrīdhara says that according to some, *oneness* is only an aspect of an object's own form, and not a separate objective quality. Śrīdhara points out that in that case, the use of the two words together, viz., *one* and *jar* will be superfluous because they will be connoting the same object.[28] Uddyotakara, in defence of the objective reality of number, says: "A person who says that number has no reality will have to accept some *predicated or negatived*[29] cause of the cognition of *one* and *many*. The cognitions of *one* and *many* cannot be set aside, and as they are respecific cognitions, they cannot take place if their cause be repudiated. It is so because the cognition of *one* or *many* is different from the cognition of a jar, and therefore its cause

26 *Supra*, V. 9.

27 *Ibid.*

28 Kecid vastuno nijaṁ svarūpaṁ ovaikatvaṁ na tu saṁkhyā-viśesa ity āhuḥ. Teṣām eko ghata iti saha-prayogānupapattiḥ paryāyatvāt. NK. p. 62. line 7.

29 Vidhīyamānam, pratiṣidhyamānam—these terms are fully explained in the course of argument in the text.

must be other than the jar like that of the cognition of *blue*, etc. Therefore, that which causes specific cognitions such as *one* and *many* is the quality called number."[30] Explaining the words 'predicated or negatived cause' in the above quotation, Vācaspatimiśra says: "They should be taken respectively",[31] (i.e., the number *one* is predicated, and the number *many* is negatived). And further, "As the negation (which is implied in the number 'many') can be conceived only against a positive assertion, viz., the *oneness* which is negatived (in the notion of many), the latter (oneness), therefore, must be accepted as an external objective quality called number."[32] Whenever there is the notion of many, there is implied in it the negation of *oneness*. Vācaspatimiśra, therefore, asserts that the notion of *one* is positive, and as such, a permanent objective reality, but the notion of *many* is based on the negation of *one*, and is, therefore, only a temporary reality produced by the *negation of one*. Now, can we not say that both *one* and *many* are relative to each other? As *many* is dependent on the negation of one, the notion of *one* is also dependent on the negation of *many* (two, three, etc.). Thus, even the number *one* is not purely a *positive* reality. It would appear that not only numbers from duality onwards, but even *oneness* has a subjective aspect. Exponents of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were thus hard put to it to establish the objective reality of the quality called number.

The objectivity of qualities called 'remoteness' and 'nearness' (*paratva* and *aparatva*) was still more difficult to establish. In the process of the external creation of qualities of *remoteness* and *nearness*, there arises, in the first instance, the notion of one of the objects being distant (*viprakṛṣṭa*) in relation to another which is close; and then with reference to that notion there is produced an objective quality called remoteness' (*paratva*) in the object which was cognized as being distant.[33] Now, it is difficult to see the difference between the

30 For the text, "Saṁkhyā nāstīti.....sā saṁkhyeti." see Text Appendix.

31 Vidhīyamānaṁ pratiṣidhyamānam iti yathā-saṁkhyam. NVT. p. 210. line 24.

32 Niṣedhasya vidhyadhīna-nirūpaṇatayā niṣedhyam ekatvam aṅgīkāryaṁ tac ca saṁkhyety arthaḥ. *Ibid.*

33 *Supra*, V. 9.

cognition of being distant (*viprakṛṣṭa*) and the cognition of being remote (*para*) for which an objective quality called 'remoteness' (*paratva*) is held to have been produced in the object at the time of cognition.

8. THE NATURE OF MEASURE

Of the remaining three qualities having a metaphysical aspect, 'measure' (*parimāṇa*) has been held to be co-existent with its substance (*yāvad-dravya-bhāvin*). Of the four kinds of measure, viz., (i) minuteness (*aṇutva*), (ii) largeness (*mahattva*), (iii) shortness (*hrasvatva*), and (iv) length (*dīrghatva*), the first and the third (minuteness and shortness), and the second and the fourth (largeness and length) are co-existent; they all reside in the same substratum. As a matter of fact, there seems to be no difference between *anutva* and *hrasvatva*, or between *mahattva* and *dirghatva*. Differentiating the last two, which reside in perceptible objects, Praśastapāda points to the differentiation between two kinds of usages: sometimes one may say, 'bring the long one from amongst the large ones', at another time he may say, 'bring the large one from amongst the long ones'.[34] From such expressions, the difference between 'largeness' and 'length' becomes clear.[35] It is obvious that this kind of differentiation is superficial.[36] For all practical purposes, therefore, there are only two kinds of measures, viz., (i) minuteness (*aṇutva*) and (ii) largeness (*mahattva*). Of these, minuteness, which resides in atoms, *dvy-aṇukas* and *manas*,[37] is without any dimension, and therefore imperceptible. The other kind of measure, viz., 'largeness', resides in eternal objects like ether, space, time and soul which are all-pervasive; and it also resides in non-eternal objects beginning with *tryaṇukas* up to the largest perceptible objects like heavenly

34 Mahatsu dirgham anityatām, dirghesu ca mahad anityatām. PP. pp. 131-32.

35 *Ibid.*

36 In most of the expositions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, ancient or modern, four kinds of measures are mechanically reproduced as they are given in the old treatises without any attempt at understanding their differentiation.

37 Minuteness as residing in eternal objects is found in atoms and *manas*, and that which resides in the non-eternal ones, is found in dvy-aṇukas. *Supra*, VI. 6.

bodies.[38] Largeness in eternal objects is called unlimited or the highest largeness (*parama-mahat-parimāṇa*) which is all-pervading, and resides in eternal substances, ether, etc., and is, therefore, eternal. This measure, being of unlimited dimensions, is imperceptible like the minute measure. Largeness, residing in objects, *tryaṇuka*, etc., is called simply largeness (*mahat-parimāṇa*) which is non-eternal (*anitya*).

There are, thus, three kinds of measures: (i) minuteness which is without any dimension, (*aṇu-parimāṇa* or *aṇutva*), (ii) largeness which is non-eternal (*anitya mahat-parimāṇa*) and which alone has perceptible dimension and (iii) eternal largeness or unlimited largeness (*nitya mahat-parimāṇa* or *parama-mahat-parimāṇa*) which has unlimited and imperceptible dimension. The last two measures, as stated above, are covered under the term *mahat-parimāṇa;* they are regarded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to be of the same kind, i.e., having no qualitative difference. Sometimes, the first two, i.e., the minute measure (*aṇu-parimāṇa*) and non-eternal largeness (*anitya mahat-parimāṇa*), which have a qualitative difference, are also covered under a common name *mūrta-parimāṇa*. The division of the three kinds of measures may be shown by the following table:



It will, however, appear that *aṇu-parimāna* which has a measure without dimension or *parama-mahat-parimāṇa* which

38 Śridhara says: "That measure which, aided by colour, makes its substratum (substance) perceptible is called 'largeness' *(mahattva)*, and that which does not do so, is the 'minute measure' (anu-parimāṇa). NK. p. 135. line 21.

has a measure of unlimited dimension are both not only imperceptible but are also inconceivable as measures. A measure which has no dimension or has unlimited dimension is no measure at all. For all practical purposes, the non-eternal *mahat-parimāṇa* which covers all measures, from the smallest perceptible size of a *try-aṇuka* to the largest perceptible size of a mountain or a heavenly body, is the only measure in a real sense.

A universal (*sāmānya*) or inherent relation (*samavāya*) is held to be omnipresent (*sarva-vyāpaka*). Wherever, in any part of the universe, a cow is born, the universal *cowness* becomes associated with it by inherent relation (*samavāya*). As they both, the universal (cowness) and the inherent relation, are only *one* in number, they must be regarded as omnipresent. But if omnipresence is a measure, i.e., a quality, then it cannot reside in the *sāmānya* and in the *samavāya*, because, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, all categories except substance are held to be devoid of qualities. Uddyotakara, in the course of his statement that *samavāya* does not require another *samavāya* relation for it, says that *samavāya* is omnipresent.[39] But as *omnipresent* can only mean 'all-pervading', Vācaspatimiśra defines the term omnipresence (*vyāpakatā*) as "the state of being comprehended everywhere, if other causes of comprehension be present."[40] But even this does not explain how *vyāpakatā* (omnipresence) differs from *parama-mahat-parimāṇa* (all-pervasiveness). This remains a knotty problem for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to solve.

9. SAMYOGA, A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN THE THEORY OF CAUSATION

The last two qualities which have a metaphysical aspect, i.e., *saṁyoga* (connection) and *vibhāga* (disconnection), occupy a central position in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. As soon as there come about connections of threads, there emerges a new entity, called cloth. It is the miracle of *saṁyoga* which brings about a new entity as an accretion to the old material. But the

39 NV. p. 159.

40 Saty upalabdhi-kāraṇāntara-sadbhāve sarvatropalabhyatā vyāpakatvam. NVT. p. 159. line 15.

substances which are connected do not undergo any change by virtue of that connection, e.g., when a stick is connected with a person, it does not mean any objective difference to the stick or to the person. The opponent contends that *saṁyoga*, therefore, should not be held to be an objective entity different from the person and the stick. Uddyotakara devotes a full discourse to proving that *saṁyoga* is an objective reality different from the substances connected. The stock argument of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to prove the objective reality of *saṁyoga* is this: the farm, water, seed, etc., although already existent, do not produce a sprout because something (i.e., *saṁyoga*) is lacking there, but as soon as that 'something' appears, the sprout is forthwith produced. That 'something,' is called *saṁyoga*.[41]

Uddyotakara quotes an opponent saying: "When substances come closer and closer, and at one point their coming closer any further is obstructed, that obstruction (*pratighāta*) is called *connection* which is not a separate objective reality."[42] To this Uddyotakara puts a question: "What is the meaning of 'coming closer' (*pratyāsatti*) and 'obstruction' (*pratighāta*)?" He answers: 'Coming closer only means lesser number of connected points, and 'obstruction' is nothing but connection with a tangible substance, and, therefore, 'connection' as a separate reality is implied even in the statement of the opponent.[43]

As to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the emergence of an effect through 'connection', Uddyotakara quotes the following refutation by an opponent, presumably a Buddhist: "An effect can be produced even without connection as in the case of sound, a magnet and a movement. A sound produces another sound without any connection between the two. A magnet attracts a piece of iron without any connection with it. Movement produces connection and disconnection without depending on

41 Yadi cārthāntaraṁ saṁyogo na syāt kṣetrodaka-bijāgnindhanādini sarvatrāvasthitāni sarvatrāṅkura-pākādi-kāryaṁ kuryuḥ; tāny eva tānīti. Tasmād yas tair apekṣyate so 'rtho 'nyaḥ, tasmin saṁyoga iti saṁjñeti. NV. p. 481. line 7.

42 Tāvad dravyāṇi pratyāsīdanti yāvat pratihatāni bhavanti, tasmin pratighāte saṁyoga-vyavahāro nārthāntara iti. NV. p. 481, line 4.

43 Tatra saṁyukta-saṁyogālpīyastvaṁ pratyāsattiḥ, mūrta-sparśavad-dravya-saṁyogaḥ pratighātaḥ. NV. p 481. line 6.

another connection."[44] Similarly, an effect can also be produced without connection. Answering this, Uddyotakara says: "We do not prove the existence of 'connection' because of the emergence of an effect; we only say that the farm, water and seed are dependent on something (i.e., connection) for producing a sprout. If these causes be not dependent on something else for producing their effect, they should always be doing so. Even in the examples quoted by the opponent, sound depends on the proximity of a point of the sky conditioned by the presence of its cause; a magnet depends for its function on the proximity of iron to its place, otherwise it should attract to it all the iron pieces of the universe; and even movement produces connection depending on the proximity of and direction towards its place."[45] Of course, Kaṇāda does declare that an action produces connection and disconnection without depending on anything else.[46] But that only means that movement, being the final effective cause, does not require the after-operation of any other cause. Uddyotakara refutes many other arguments intended to repudiate the objective reality of 'connection'.

The most crucial difficulty arises with regard to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of 'parts' and the 'whole' (*avayavāvayavi-vāda*). When a monkey is connected with a tree, obviously, the point of connection is the top of the tree. In that case, is the connection of the monkey with the top (i.e., a part) or with the tree (i.e., the 'whole')? Śrīdhara argues: "If the connection is held to be only with a particular part (the top) and not with the 'whole' (the tree), then, inasmuch as the top is also a 'whole' in relation to its parts, the connection, in that case, will have to be accepted with an atom which is partless. And the atom being imperceptible, connection with it will also be imperceptible with the result that there will be no perception of connection anywhere in the world."[47] The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,

44 Kāryotpattir vinā tena śabdāyaskānta-karmavat. NV. p. 481, line 14. This stanza, obviously from some Buddhist treatise, is not traceable.

45 For the text, "Na brūmaḥ, asti.....nirapekṣaṁ karma." see Text Appendix.

46 Eka-dravyam aguṇaṁ saṁyoga-vibhāgeṣv anapekṣa-kāraṇam iti karma-lakṣaṇam. VS. I. i. 17.

47 For the text, "Na ca mūlāgrayor.....paryavasyati." see Text Appendix.

therefore, emphasizes that connection between two substances, although existing at two particular points, belongs to the two substances as 'wholes' (*avayavins*), and not to the parts where it actually exists. It means that connection is a quality which belongs to a substance as an *avayavin*, although it resides only at one point and not in the whole of the substance, as colour, etc., do. Speaking technically, a connection is *avyāpya-vṛtti* or *pradeśa-vṛtti* which means that it does not pervade the whole of the object but resides only at a particular point. The special qualities of all-pervading substances (e.g., sound, knowledge, desire, etc.) are of this kind. The term *avyāpya-vṛtti* has been defined by Śrīdhara as that which subsists and at the same time does not subsist in its substratum.[48] The contradiction of simultaneous subsistence and non-subsistence is resolved by introducing determinating factors (*avacchedakas*) of subsistence and non-subsistence. For instance, the connection of the monkey subsists in the tree as determined or conditioned by its top, and not by its root. Indirectly, it is admitted that connection subsists only in a part, but it is still maintained that it belongs to the substance as an *avayavin*.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that there is a kind of connection which is produced by another connection. According to some thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, when a bird perches on a tree, *the connection caused by the action* of the bird is, in the first instance, between the 'parts' of the two objects, i.e., the feet of the bird and the top of the tree; and then there arises a connection between the two 'wholes', the bird and the tree. The latter connection is held by these thinkers to have been produced by the connection of the parts, and is therefore called 'the connection produced by another connection' (*saṁyogaja-saṁyoga*).[49] This view is emphatically rejected by Śrīdhara. He says that in the first instance an *avayavin* having a movement is connected with another *avayavin*. Now, if the movement is held to be residing in a part, i.e., the foot of the bird and not in the bird as *avayavin* then, by the same argument, the foot is also an *avayavin* in relation to its parts, and therefore, the

48 Svāśraye vartante na vartante ca. NK. p. 102, line 19.
49 NK. p. 146, line 21.

movement should be regarded as subsisting in its parts, and in that way the movement will have to be held as belonging ultimately to the atoms which are partless, and there will thus be no movement in any of the *avayavins*. That will, of course, be an absurd position.[50] The correct example of a 'connection produced by another connection', however, is: when a connection of two threads with the shuttle produces a connection of the cloth (made up of these two threads) with the shuttle. In this case, the two threads are at first connected with the shuttle, but when a cloth (made up of those two threads) is produced, the latter also becomes connected with the shuttle. This connection is not brought about obviously by any movement; but it is born of another connection (*saṁyogaja-saṁyoga*). It is called *kāryākārya-saṁyoga*, i.e., the connection of an effect (cloth) with a non-effect (shuttle) and is produced by *kāraṇākāraṇa-saṁyoga*, i.e., by the connection of a cause (threads) with a non-cause (shuttle). Here, the connection of the cloth (*kārya*) with the shuttle (*akārya*) is produced by the connection of two threads (*kāraṇa*) with the shuttle (*akāraṇa*).[51]

10. INTRICATE NATURE OF DISCONNECTION

Disconnection (*vibhāga*), as already stated, is not a negation of connection. It is a positive quality which is produced in the two objects which were formerly connected. It is held that disconnection of the constituent parts of a substance (*dravyāraṁbhaka avayavas*) destroys the connection of those parts, and brings about the destruction of the substance concerned. The process, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, is that there is (i) in the first moment a motion in the constituent parts; (ii) in the second moment, that motion produces the disconnection of the constituent parts; (iii) that disconnection produces, in the third moment, the destruction of the connection of those parts; (iv) as a result of this, there is, in the fourth moment, the destruction of the effect. Here, again, it is difficult for ordinary common sense to conceive that even after a movement in the constituent parts, there is no disconnection

50 NK. p. 146. line 23.
51 *Ibid.* p. 147. line 6.

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48 Svāśraye vartante na vartante ca. NK. p. 102, line 19.
49 NK. p. 146, line 21.

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50 NK. p. 146. line 23.
51 *Ibid.* p. 147. line 6.

in them for one moment, and even after the disconnection of constituent parts, their connection continues for one moment, and so on. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was driven to this absurd position because of its own conception of causation.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of 'disconnection born of disconnection' (*vibhāgaja-vibhāga*) is even more intricate. As a result of motion in the constituent parts of an effect-substance (*kārya-dravya*), there comes about the disconnection of those parts which in turn destroys connection of the constituent parts and consequently destroys the effect-substance. This disconnection of constituent parts is inconsistent with the connections which produce an effect-substance (*dravyārambhaka-saṃyoga-virodhi-vibhāga*). Obviously, at the time of the disconnection of the parts, there should be disconnection of those parts from the space-points with which those parts, or for the matter of that, the effect-substance (constituted by those parts) was connected. But, it is held that the same motion which brings about disconnection of the constituent parts cannot bring about the disconnection of those parts from the space-points with which they were connected.[52] Here again the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory goes counter to common sense. If a motion has brought about disconnection of the constituent parts, it can only mean that the latter have shifted from their previous position. That being so, it is difficult to conceive how these constituent parts will not be disconnected from the space-points with which they were so far connected. How can the former disconnection even be conceived without the latter kind of disconnection or *vice versa*? Still, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had to maintain this view because of its theory of *avayavi-vāda*. It is held that disconnection of the constituent parts produces in the next moment destruction of the connections of those parts, and the latter produces, in the succeeding next moment, destruction of the effect-substance. Now, so long as the effect-substance is not destroyed, the constituent parts, although disconnected, cannot leave their previous space-points with which they were connected through

52 Avayava-karma avayavīmtrād eva vibhāgam ārabhate yata ākāśa-vibhāga-kāranam karma avayavāntarād vibhāgaṁ na karotīti niyamaḥ. Ato 'vayavāntara-vibhāgārambhakaṁ karma avayavāntarād eva vibhāgam karoti nākāśādi-deśāt. NK. p. 155, line 25.

their *avayavin*, i.e., the effect-substance which is connected with those space-points. The constituent parts leave those space-points only when the effect-substance is destroyed, and destruction of the effect-substance takes place in the fourth succeeding moment, i.e., after the destruction of the connection of the constituent parts. There comes about, therefore, disconnection of the constituent parts from the previous space-points only after the destruction of the effect-substance. It is, then, held that disconnection of the constituent parts from the space-points is caused by the disconnection of the constituent parts from each other. Disconnection of the constituent parts from the space-points, is, therefore, called the 'disconnection born of disconnection' (*vibhāgaja-vibhāga*).[53] There are further details of the process which are too intricate to be elaborated here.

11. OBJECTIVE REALITY OF MOVEMENT (KARMAN)

It is not proposed to give all the details relating to the origin and nature of 'movement' (*karman*). The present work being concerned only with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism, we shall examine here how the objective reality of movement and its cognizability by perception were maintained. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school joined issue on this question not only with its principal opponent, the Buddhist, but with some orthodox thinkers also who denied the separate reality of movement and also its perceptibility.

Buddhist philosophy discards the notion of stability of any kind, repudiates the static conception of reality and replaces it by the kinetic one. Notwithstanding the fact that the Buddhist holds reality as a constant movement, he emphatically denies, contradictory though it may *prima facie* appear, the existence of motion. It has been explained elsewhere that, according to the Buddhist, the denial of stability only means that there is no enduring or abiding reality, and that change signifies the replacement of one moment of reality (which is completely

53 Yāvat kārya-dravyāṁ na vinaśyati tāvad avayavasya svātantryaṁ pṛthag-deśa-gamane yogyatā nāstity avayava-deśād vibhāgo na ghaṭate, tad-artham uktaṁ kārya-vināśa-viśiṣṭaṁ kālaṁ svatantraṁ vāvayavam apekṣate. NK. p. 156. line 22.

annihilated) by another.[54] The theory that reality is a constant movement implies that disconnected and detached bits of reality constantly follow one another. For the Buddhist, it is a constant movement, but a movement without motion, for there is no abiding or enduring substance which can move from one position to another, or which can be the substratum of the motion as conceived by the realist. According to the Buddhist, reality is annihilated as soon as it is born and it has no time to move. Stcherbatsky puts the Buddhist position in his characteristically lucid manner thus: "There is, therefore, no motion in the things, but the things themselves are motion."[55]

Now, the question arises how the Buddhist explains the idea of motion. Uddyotakara quotes the Buddhist as saying: "The term 'motion' is used with reference to that series of *kṣaṇas* which is produced at different points of space separated by intervals. But when the series is produced without interval, the term *saṁyoga* (connection) is used. It means, when two things (their series) are produced without interval between them, the term *samyoga* is used with reference to the production which is without interval."[56] Uddyotakara refutes this view and says that the Buddhist cannot explain the reason of the space separated and not separated by intervals. The full implication of the Buddhist statement (still untraced) is not clear. Obviously, the main stress in the statement is on the contrast between the idea of motion and that of connection. The idea of *motion* in Buddhist thought has been explained elsewhere. When we conceive these moments or point-instants as arising in succession to one another, we construct the idea of duration or time. On the other hand, when we think of these point-instants arising in contiguity with one another, we have the idea of space. The notion of motion arises when we conceive these point-instants *simultaneously* both in succession and in contiguity.[57] It would thus appear that there can be no meeting-point between the

54 *Supra*, VI. 17.

55 *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 100.

56 The actual words attributed to the Buddhist by Uddyotakara are:—yah saṁtāno viralo deśāntareṣūtpadyate tatra gati-vyavahārah, nirantarotpāde saṁyoga-vyavahārah, ye vastunī nirantaram utpadyete tayor yo nirantarotpādah sa samyogah." NV. p. 483, line 11.

57 *Supra*, VI. 17.

Buddhist theory, according to which motion is nothing but a mental construction, and the realist theory which holds that motion is a separate objective reality different *in essence* from the substance in which it resides.

The point on which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika joins issue with the Buddhist, with Prabhākara and some other orthodox thinkers is whether motion is perceptible or only inferable. The topic has been discussed both by Jayanta and Śrīdhara.[58] The opponent who holds that motion is not perceptible says: when a substance is said to be in motion, we do not perceive anything other than the connections and disconnections of that substance with space-points, from which alone we infer the phenomenon of motion.[59] Jayanta puts the case of the opponent even more forcefully when he says: "The same object called 'Devadatta' is perceived when he is cognized as stationary, or when he is cognized as moving. No other entity like motion which is different from the form of Devadatta is ever perceived."[60] This has been answered both by Śrīdhara and Jayanta. According to the opponent, the motion, say of a monkey moving from the top to the bottom of a tree is inferred from the connections and disconnections of the monkey with different parts of the tree. Now, inasmuch as the connections and disconnections are qualities which reside simultaneously in two objects, viz., the monkey and the tree, the motion, which is supposed to be inferred from those qualities, should reside in the tree as well. It should, therefore, be admitted that the motion residing in the monkey is directly perceived.[61] Jayanta further says: if in the cognition of motion, we see only connection and disconnection, the cognition should be in the form that the object in question is connected and disconnected, and not that it moves.[62]

58 NM. Part I. pp. 121-122; NK. p. 194.
59 NK p. 194.
60 NM. Part I. p. 121.
61 NK. p. 194.
62 NM. Part I. p. 121.

Chapter IX

SĀMĀNYA AND ĀPOHA

1. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THEORY OF THE UNIVERSAL

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there are two chief synthetic or unifying principles—the principle of the 'whole' (*avayavin*) and that of the universal (*sāmānya*). The *avayavin* and the universal both are objectively real. The Buddhist is opposed to this view for, according to him, the external objective world consists of discrete and detached bits of reality called moments (*kṣaṇas*); their synthesis exists only in our thought, and hence it has no objective reality. The principle of *avayavin* has already been dealt with. *Avayavin*, as a synthetic principle, is mainly ontological. The other synthetic principle, the universal, is, in a way, even more important, because around it revolve all the conflicts, ontological as well as epistemological; and it is here that the exponents of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika and the Buddhist school fought the thickest of their battles. The realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika stands or falls with the vindication or refutation of the theory of the universal. The Buddhist writers exhaust all the missiles of their armoury in attacking the theory of the universal. Nowhere is the basic conflict between the two schools so pronounced as in this polemic. A spirited vindication of the theory of the universal and refuta-

tion of the theory of *apoha* (the Buddhist counterpart of the universal) have been attempted by all important Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers including Uddyotakara,[1] Jayanta[2], Vācaspati-miśra[3] and Śrīdhara.[4]

2. NATURE OF CONFLICT

The term 'realism' was used in early Greek and mediaeval philosophy, as already stated, to designate a theory which holds that the universals residing in the particulars have their independent reality—a view similar to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.[5] This meaning of the word 'realism' is totally different from the one in which it is usually understood, i.e., a theory which holds that external objects have their reality independent of their cognition. In the former sense, the theory of realism is contrasted with that of conceptualism or nominalism which holds that universals have no independent reality, and that they exist only in the mind. Realism in the other sense, however, is contrasted with the theory of idealism, i.e., the view that the external objects do not exist independently of their cognition. It was pointed out that so far as Western thought is concerned, realism in the one sense is quite different from that in the other sense.[6] But in the case of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, strangely enough, realism in the usual sense, i.e., the theory that external objects exist independently of their cognition, is based on realism in the other sense, i.e., the theory that the universals have their separate external reality apart from the particulars in which they reside. This requires some elucidation which will also explain the nature of the conflict between the two schools.

With regard to the nature of determinate perception, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the Buddhist school and Western epistemology, all agree that it is in the form of a perceptual judgment. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika terminology, the perception of a jar takes the form—'this is a jar' (*ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ*). Here

1 NV. pp. 669-689.
2 NM. Part I pp. 271-289.
3 NVT. pp 669-689.
4 NK. pp. 11-13 and 312-321.
5 *Supra*, II. 3.
6 *Ibid.*

'this' is the subject which refers to a particular object and has as its predicate the attribute called 'jar-ness' (*ghaṭatva*). Every perceptual judgment expresses the relation of the subject with its predicate, i.e., the subject qualified by its predicate.[7] In the instance given above, the predicate is in the form of a universal, 'jar-ness' (*ghaṭatva*), but it may also be in the form of (i) a substance, (ii) a quality, or (iii) movement respectively in such instances as (i) 'a man with a stick', (ii) 'the cow is white', or (iii) 'the cow is moving'. But in all these instances, the predicates, viz., the stick, the white colour, or the movement are apprehended only as qualified by a universal residing in each of them, i.e., stick-ness (*daṇḍatva*), whiteness (*śuklatva*), or the general notion of movement (*gamanatva*). Every object in a determinate perception must thus appear as qualified by its universal. But a qualified comprehension (*viśiṣṭa-pratīti*) is not possible without a previous knowledge of the qualification; and it is for this reason that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that a determinate (*savikalpaka*) perception is preceded by an indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) perception (i.e., sensation) in which there is the comprehension of an object and its universal as unrelated to each other. It means that in a sensation both the jar and jar-ness are comprehended, but their relation, i.e., the fact of the jar being qualified by jar-ness, is not comprehended.[8]

The Buddhist holds that in the determinate perception every object is comprehended in its generalized form. According to him, only the particulars, the *kṣaṇas*, are real, and the generalized form is only a thought-creation, and not an external reality. The determinate perception, therefore, in which there is an unreal factor, i.e., the generalized form, is not a true perception. The indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) perception, however, in which, according to the Buddhist, only particulars (*sva-lakṣanas* or *kṣaṇas*) are apprehended, is a true perception. Of course, we are never conscious of the *nirvikalpaka* perception in terms of thought, but it is a necessary precedent of the determinate perception. Inasmuch as a determinate perception follows in the wake of an indeterminate perception which com-

7 Vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi jñānam.

8 Tathā ca prathamato ghata-ghatatvayor vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhy eva jñānaṁ jāyate. NSM. on verse 58.

prehends *real* particulars, the determinate perception also has, in a way, a basis of reality. But, because a determinate perception comprehends a particular in a generalized form (which is a mental construction), the world of appearance, presented to us in our actual experience, although having a core of reality as its basis, is not real as such. It does not exist externally in the form in which it is experienced by us. Hence Dignāga's theory is designated as the theory of *transcendental idealism.*

It has been stated[9] that, according to him, there are only two kinds of comprehensible objects (*prameyas*): (i) the particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) which are ultimate reals (*paramārtha-sat*), and (ii) the universals (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*) which do not exist as external reals, but only as thought-forms. There being two types of comprehensible objects (*prameyas*), the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) are also of two kinds—(i) perception (*pratyakṣa* by which the Buddhist always means *nirvikalpaka* perception) which grasps the external reals, the particulars, and (ii) inference (*anumāna*) which comprehends the universals. Sharp and clear-cut differentiation between the two kinds of comprehensible objects (*prameyas*) on the one hand, and the two kinds of means of their knowledge on the other, is a cardinal point of the theory of the Dignāga school. Furthermore, each one of the two kinds of *pramāṇas* comprehends only one kind of reality,[10] never operating in the sphere of the other.[11]

The theory of Dignāga, as adumbrated above, stands in sharp conflict with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. According to Dignāga, determinate perception is in a way a pseudo-perception, while the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika emphatically maintains that it is a valid perception, and that the world presented by it is not a mental construction, but a real objective world. To establish the validity of determinate perception is thus a basic point of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. It is only against the background of this controversy with the Buddhist that one can appreciate the spirited remark of Jayanta, viz., "The very life of the followers of the Nyāya consists in the theory of determinate percep-

tion."[12] As the validity of determinate perception depends on the objective reality of the universal, Śrīdhara declares to a Buddhist opponent who has pointed to the admixture of a word-element in determinate perception: "Now, if we succeed in establishing the universal (as an objective reality), then the knowledge which has the universal as its object will have to be regarded as true perception despite the admixture of word-element in it. In that case, the knowledge will have to be accepted as produced by the contact of the sense with a real object (i.e., the universal)."[13] How can a student, ignorant of the Nyāya-Buddhist conflict, appreciate the import and force of these remarks of Jayanta and Śrīdhara? This brings home to us how the theory of the universal is intrinsically associated with the theory of determinate perception, and how the conflict between the two schools with regard to the universal has an ontological as well as an epistemological aspect.

3. HISTORICAL RETROSPECT

The theories of all philosophical schools, especially those of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, have changed in the course of their development. There is little doubt that Kaṇāda never conceived the categories, *samānya*, etc., as external objective realities. Bodas goes to the extent of suggesting that the *sūtra* of the *Vaiśeṣika*[14] which enumerates six categories (the last three, *sāmānya*, etc., at par with the first three, substance, etc.) is an interpolation.[15] But, even if that suggestion were incorrect, there would be ample evidence to show that Kanāda did not assign objective reality to the last three categories, *sāmānya*, etc. In the first instance, only three categories, substance, quality and movement, are included in the term *artha* which obviously means an objective reality. Secondly, the highest universal (*sattā*) which means 'existence' is held to be residing only in the first

12 Naiyāyikānāṁ ca savikalpa-pratyakṣamayāḥ prāṇāḥ. NM. Part I. p. 81.

13 Tatra yadi śakṣyāmaḥ pramāṇena sāmānyam upapādayituṁ tadā saty api śabda-saṁsṛṣṭa-grāhakatve tad-viṣayaṁ vikalpa-jñānam indriyārthajatvāt pratyakṣam eva syāt. NK. p. 103. line 4.

14 VS. I. i. 4.

15 Bodas, p. xxxvii.

three categories.[16] Moreover, although *sāmānya*, etc., are included in the list of *padārthas* (categories), Kaṇāda seems to differentiate between *artha* and *padārtha*. While *artha* seems to mean an objective existence, *padārtha* seems to have been used in its literal sense, viz., the 'meaning of a word'. *Padārtha*, therefore, can include even an intellectual entity because it can be expressed by a word. Further, it has already been pointed out that in the *sūtra* in which '*sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are explicitly declared to be dependent on the intellect'[17] (i.e., they are mere relative terms), there is direct evidence to show that Kaṇāda never conceived *sāmānya*, etc., as objective realities.

It will be found that throughout the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, the terms, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, are used in the sense of genus and species which are always relative. The same property may be *sāmānya* in relation to one class and *viśeṣa* in relation to another. For instance, in the case of a jar, the universal *dravyatva* residing in it is *genus* (*sāmānya*) in relation to *pṛthivītva*, but it is at the same time species (*viśeṣa*) in relation to the universal *sattā*. These two terms indicate that there are two aspects (general and particular) of every object. Uddyotakara expressly says: "Every object has got two aspects, the general and the particular."[18] Śrīdhara says: "When we have the notion of commonness (*anugatākārā buddhi*), we cognise the universals *dravyatva*, etc., but when we have the notion of differentia (*vyāvṛtti-buddhi*), we cognise the individual substances (earth, etc.)".[19] Here, instead of maintaining that comprehension of the higher universal *dravyatva* or the lower universal *pṛthivītva* is due to the objective reality of those universals, it has been held that it is because of the notions of commonness and differentia. These statements of Uddyotakara and Śrīdhara indicate that *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* are not conceived as objective realities which reside by inherent relation in their individual objects, but as two aspects of the object itself. Although Uddyotakara

16 Sad iti yato dravya-guṇa-karmasu sā sattā. VS. I. ii. 3.

17 Sāmānyaṁ viśesa iti buddhy-apekṣam. VS. I. ii. 3.

18 Sarvasya ca vastuno dvāv ākārau, sāmānyākāro viśeṣākāraś ca. NV. p. 131. line 11.

19 Anugatākāra-buddhi-vedyāni dravyatvādini vyāvṛtti-buddhi-vedyāś ca dravyādi-vyaktayaḥ. NK. p. 315. line 2.

and Śrīdhara belonged to a period when objective reality was definitely ascribed to *sāmānya*, etc., the old view that they were only intellectual and relative entities sometimes appears in their writings. It only shows that even when *sāmānya*, etc., were accepted as objective realities, the acceptance was only half-hearted. Praśastapāda (who first assigned objective reality to categories, *sāmānya*, etc.) himself says that one of their common properties is that they are indicated by intellect (*buddhi-lakṣaṇatva*).[20] Explaining this, Śrīdhara says: "If somebody doubts the existence of *sāmānya*, etc., there is no other proof of their existence except through the intellect. In the case of the first three categories, substance, etc., the proof of their existence may be provided by their effects also, but this is not possible in the case of the last three categories."[21]

It would appear that the terms *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* had not acquired a definite signification for a long time. They are vaguely used in different senses as indicated below:

(i) In the first instance, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* were conceived as two aspects of an object. An object was considered to possess *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* (general and particular aspects) as its properties. For instance, Uddyotakara speaks of three kinds of objects of knowledge: (i) *sāmānya*, (ii) *viśeṣa*, and (iii) objects having both these aspects.[22]

(ii) Secondly, the word *sāmānya* was used in the sense of the universal (*dravyatva*, etc.), and *viśeṣa* in the sense of an individual object in which the universal resides. We find Jayanta using the term in that sense.[23] Śrīdhara, while quoting the opinion of a Buddhist, uses the term *viśeṣa* in the sense of an individual in which the universal resides.[24] This term in

20 Sāmānyādīnāṁ trayāṇām .... buddhi-lakṣaṇatvam PP. p. 19.

21 Vipratipanna-sāmānyādi-sadbhāve buddhir eva lakṣaṇaṁ nānyat, dravyādi-sadbhāve tv anyad api tat—kāryaṁ pramāṇaṁ syād ity arthaḥ. ('vipratipanne sadbhāve' should be the correct reading) NK. p. 19. line. 16.

22 Viṣayaḥ sāmānya-viśeṣa-tadvad-bhedāt tredhā. NV. p 14. line 2.

23 Pratipattiś ca viśeṣeṣv iva sāmānyeṣu ca nirapavādā darśitaiva. NM Part I. p. 286. line 21

24 Sāmānya-viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇe dve vastunī. NK. p. 315. line 0. Here sāmānya means the universal, and viśeṣa, an individual in which the universal resides.

that sense is freely used in many other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises also.

(iii) Sometimes the term *sāmānya-viśeṣa* and sometimes simply the term *viśeṣa* were used for universals other than *sattā*, viz., *dravyatva*, etc. The former usage is met with in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*[25] itself. As for the latter usage, Praśastapāda says: "The universals, *dravyatva*, etc., are called primarily *sāmānyas* inasmuch as they have many individuals within their compass, but they are also called *viśeṣas* in a secondary sense, because they differentiate their substrata from others."[26]

(iv) Sometimes the term *viśeṣa* is also used in the sense of attributes in the form of qualities or in the form of parts of an object or other appendages attached to it which differentiate it from others. For instance, Vācaspatimiśra, explaining the term *viśeṣa* used by Uddyotakara[27] says: "*Viśeṣa* signifies 'crooked, hollow, etc.' (by which a tree is differentiated from a human figure), and the term also means the ultimate *viśeṣa*".[28]

(v) It has been pointed out that differentiation was the function of that aspect of an object which was called *viśesa*. But, later on, it was supposed that the function of differentiation belonged to *sāmānyas* also, and *dravyatva*, etc., performed that function as *sāmānyas;* they were called *viśeṣa only in a secondary sense* as noted above under (iii). A *sāmānya* was held to be performing both the functions, viz., that of causing the notion of commonness (*anuvṛtti*) and also that of differentiation (*vyāvṛtti*).[29] The function of differentiation having thus been assigned to *sāmānya*, the term *viśeṣa* was restricted to the ultimate particulars (*antya-viśeṣas*). *Viśeṣa*, thus, became a separate category.

25 Sad anityaṁ dravyavat kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ sāmānya-viśeṣavad iti dravya-guṇa-karmaṇām aviśeṣaḥ. VS. I. i. 8.

26 Etāni tu dravyatvādini prabhūta-viṣayatvāt prādhānyena sāmānyāni svāśraya-viśeṣahatvād bhaktyā viśeṣākhyāniti. PP. p. 312. line 15.

27 See (i), above

28 Viśeṣo vyavacchedakaḥ, sa ca vakra-kotarādir antyaś ca. NVT. p. 14. line 14.

29 Tac ca vyāvṛtter api hetutvāt sāmānyaṁ sad viśeṣākhyām api labhate. PP. p. 11. line 15.

In the light of what has been said above, we can have some idea as to how the category *sāmānya* (universal) became a full fledged objective reality, and was held to be eternal. The first step in the development was that general attributes like *dravyatva* were conceived as only *sāmānyas* which perform both the functions of causing the idea of commonness as well as that of differentiation. It was supposed that they were *sāmānyas* primarily, but they were also called *viśeṣas* in a secondary sense. As the same attribute of a positive nature was held to be performing both the functions, the way was paved for its being assigned an objective reality. Being regarded as objectively real, the universal (*sāmānya*) was also conceived as eternal. So far as the Vaiśeṣika literature goes, Praśastapāda was the first to hold *sāmānya* to be objectively real and eternal, but it is probable that the idea might have existed some time earlier, because, as Randle has pointed out, the *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gotama already speaks of *sāmānya* as eternal and perceptible by a sense-organ.[30] This clearly implies acceptance of the theory of the objective reality of *sāmānya*. As time went on, the universals were regarded more and more as objectively real, until we come to Udayana who introduced the theory that the absence of cross-division (*saṁkara*) was a necessary condition of holding an attribute to be *sāmānya*. That theory was, as we shall see, developed only when full-fledged objective reality was assigned to the universal.[31]

4. VIŚEṢA AS CONCEIVED BY LATER NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA SCHOOL

It was pointed out that *viśeṣa* was, at first, only an aspect of every object which caused the notion of its exclusion or differentiation from other objects. When that function was assigned to *sāmānya*, the term *viśeṣa* was restricted to the sense of ultimate particulars residing in eternal atoms and other eternal substances. The process of development appears to have been somewhat like this: In the first instance, an attribute of an object like *dravyatva* was supposed to denote both the aspects of inclusion (*anuvṛtti*) as well as that of exclusion

30 Randle, p. 7; and NS. V. i. 15.
31 *Infra*, IX. 7.

(*vyāvṛtti*); and for that reason, it was regarded both as *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. But the highest of these attributes, viz., *sattā* (existence), which includes everything within it and excludes nothing,[32] could be conceived only as *sāmānya*, and not as *viśeṣa*. Kaṇāda says that *bhāva*[33] (which is the cause of the notion of inclusion alone) is *sāmānya*[34] only, while Praśastapāda holds *sattā* (the term used by him for the highest *sāmānya*)[35] to be *sāmānya* only. Now, if at the highest end stands an attribute (*bhāva* or *sattā*) which was only inclusive and therefore *sāmānya* only, can there not be at the lowest end an attribute which may be only exclusive? And that lowest attribute, not having commonness even in two of its object-substrata (individuals), would subsist only in one object. According to the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception, a universal like *ghaṭatva* may be regarded as the lowest universal, as *sattā* is the highest. There is no lower universal than *ghaṭatva*. But as *ghaṭatva* resides in many individuals, it cannot be regarded as merely exclusive.

Thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, however, hit upon *one attribute* which was *exclusive* only. Everything, they said, was differentiated from another on account of different attributes, different qualities and different universals. But in the case of two objects (e.g., two jars) which have not only the same universal but, being quite similar, have the same qualities, the question arises how one of them can be differentiated from the other. The obvious answer is that they are differentiated on account of the difference of their parts.[36] But what about

32 *Supra*, V. 10.

33 Kanāda uses the term 'bhāva' for the highest universal, while the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises use the term 'sattā' for it.

34 Bhāvo nuvṛtter eva hetutvāt sāmānyam eva. VS. I. ii. 4.

35 Tatra param sattā mahāviṣayatvāt; sā cānuvṛtter eva hetutvāt sāmānyam eva. PP. p. 11. line 13.

36 This is very often misunderstood by commentators. For instance, Siddhānta-candrodaya, a commentary on Tarka-saṅgraha, and following that commentary, a learned modern writer like Bodas, explains this as implying that parts of an object like a jar differentiate it from other objects like cloth, etc. Obviously, a jar and a piece of cloth are differentiated *prima facie* on account of their different universals (ghaṭatva and paṭatva), and the argument can have its force only if it refers to the differentiation of two similar jars.

the two atoms of the same class, say of earth, which have the same universal and the same qualities, and which have no parts? How can one atom be differentiated from another of the same class? If they are not differentiated, they will coalesce and form one mass, and the atomic theory will come to an end. It was suggested that in the case of eternal atoms, there was a special attribute which caused the exclusion of one atom from another of the same class. Obviously, this attribute, not being common even to two atoms, could only be exclusive. Supposed to be residing in atoms and being *exclusive only*, it was called *viśeṣa;* and in contrast to *bhāva* or *sattā* which was held to be *sāmānya* only (*sāmānyam eva*), it was called *antya-viśeṣa* or *viśeṣa* only (*viśeṣa eva*).[37] While *sattā* stood at one extremity, *antya-viśeṣa* stood at the other. The latter was ultimately designated simply as *viśeṣa*. It was then suggested that *dravyatva*, etc., were primarily *sāmānyas*, but were called *viśeṣas* in a secondary sense. Because they were not regarded as *viśeṣas*, the word *viśeṣa* was reserved for the *antya-viśeṣa* residing in atoms. Finally, *viśeṣa* was held to be a separate category, altogether different from *sāmānya*. Both of them, in course of time, acquired objective reality. In later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, especially in the manuals like *Tarka-bhāṣā*, *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī* and *Tarka-saṁgraha*, the term *viśeṣa* is exclusively used in the sense of *antya-viśeṣa* residing in the atoms and other eternal substances. This theory was formally introduced by Praśastapāda in the Vaiśeṣika system, but the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers, long after him, continued to use the term *viśeṣa* in other senses mentioned in the preceding section.

The term *antya-viśeṣa* occurs in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*[38] also, but it is not explained there. The theory of *viśeṣa* as differentiator of atoms, which is the corner-stone of the atomic theory, is not found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. The atomic theory is usually supposed to be associated with the Vaiśeṣika school. The name of the founder of the school, Kanāda, meaning an *atom-eater*, also seems suggestive of the same. The category *viśeṣa* being intrinsically associated with the atomic theory, it has also been

37 Nitya-dravya-vrttayo 'ntyā viseṣāh, te khalu atyanta-vyāvrtti-hetutvād viśeṣā eva. PP. p. 13.

38 Anyatrāntyebhyo viśeṣebhyaḥ. VS. I. ii. 6.

suggested that the name of the system, *Vaiśeṣika*, might have been derived from it. But this is not probable, because the theory of *viśeṣa* in that sense, as pointed out above, is not found in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the doctrine of *viśeṣa*, in the sense of particularity or exclusiveness, which along with *sāmānya* (the universal) has been accepted as an aspect of every object in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, was an important principle of that school. It is probable that the name of the school might have been due to the term *viśeṣa* used in that sense.

There was so much emphasis on the doctrine of particularity in the old Vaiśeṣika system that Stcherbatsky has gone to the extent of suggesting that "the theory of Dignāga may perhaps have been partly influenced, in its logical aspect, by some views entertained in the school of the Vaiśeṣikás."[39] After pointing out that, according to the Vaiśeṣika view, generality and particularity reside in every object, Stcherbatsky goes on to remark: "If we reduce both these residents to the single one of difference and brush aside its realistic character, we shall just have the essence of Dignāga's theory, i.e., purely negative and purely mental universals."[40] The significance of this remark will be clear in a subsequent section of this chapter where Dignāga's theory of *apoha* is explained. What Stcherbatsky has suggested here seems to have a deeper meaning. It appears that the earlier writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school did somehow realise that the particular or differential aspect of every object was beyond conception and beyond description. Uddyotakara says: "Not even a highly learned person can describe the real nature of objects."[41] Explaining his statement, Uddyotakara says that every object has two aspects, general and particular, and that every object can be described only in its general aspect and never in its particular aspect.[42] Is all this not akin

39 *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 479.

40 *Ibid*

41 Na hi kaścit suśiksito 'pi padārthānāṁ sva-rūpaṁ nirdeṣṭuṁ śaknoti. NV. p. 131 line 10.

42 Sarvasya ca vastuno dvāv ākārau sāmānyākāro viśeṣākāraś ca Tatra vastu sāmānyenaivākāreṇābhidhīyate, na viśeṣākāreṇa. *Ibid.*

to the theory of transcendental ultimate particulars (*svalakṣaṇas*) held by the Dignāga school?

5. VIŚEṢA AS RESIDING IN ALL ETERNAL SUBSTANCES

Now, let us revert to the theory that *viśeṣas* reside in the atoms and other eternal substances, ether, time, space, soul and *manas*, for the purpose of differentiating one of them from the other. As suggested above, there is the need for a differentiating agency in the case of atoms which have similar qualities and the same universal. But why should there be any need for differentiation between ether and space, or between space and time, or between time and soul, when they can be differentiated by their different properties and different functions. There seems to be hardly any justification for holding that *viśeṣas* subsist in *all* eternal substances for the purpose of differentiating one from the other. Praśastapāda, of course, lays down that the *viśeṣa* resides in all eternal substances, ether, space, time, soul and *manas*.[43] But his own argument and the examples given in the context indicate that there is no necessity for accepting *viśeṣa* as subsisting in eternal substances other than the atoms. Praśastapāda says: "Eternal atoms, liberated souls, and *manas* have similar forms, similar qualities and similar function, and therefore, there can be no other means of differentiation between them than *viśeṣa*."[44] The argument given here is not applicable to the case of differentiation, say between ether and space, or between space and time, and so on. Moreover, it is significant that Praśastapāda mentions here only the liberated souls, and not all souls in general. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the liberated souls are devoid of all specific qualities such as knowledge, desire, etc. Praśastapāda, therefore, seems to think that souls in the embodied state may be differentiated by their individual qualities which differ with each individual soul, but this is not possible in the case of liberated souls which can only be differentiated by the *viśeṣa* subsisting in them. The same is the case with *manas*. Thus, according to the argument of Praśastapāda himself, *viśeṣa* should be supposed to be subsist-

43 PP p 321. line 13

44 Nityeṣu tulyākṛti-guna-krivesu paramāṇuṣu muktātma-manassu ca anya-nimittāsambhavāt. PP. p. 321. line 19.

ing in the atoms, in the liberated souls, and in *manas*, and not in ether, space, time and non-liberated souls.

But is there sufficient justification for holding the theory of *viśeṣa* for the purpose of differentiation even in the case of atoms, liberated souls and *manas*? Opponents of the theory point out that instead of assuming a new agency (*viśeṣa*), the property of differentiation itself might be assumed to be residing in the atoms. It may also be asked how one particular *viśesa* is differentiated from another *viśeṣa*. To this Praśastapāda replies: "Cognition caused through the agency of a thing relates to things other than itself. For instance, a lamp causes the cognition of a jar, etc., but the cognition of a lamp is never brought about by another lamp. Just as the flesh of a cow and that of a horse are unclean by themselves and their contact defiles other things also, similarly, in the case of *viśeṣas*, differentiation being their nature, they are differentiated by themselves, and by their contact atoms are also differentiated."[45] But, it seems that this explanation did not satisfy the other realist schools. We find that Kumārila and Prabhākara, both of whom took their cue in the ontological sphere from the Vaiśeṣika school and accepted all the Vaiśeṣika categories only with slight alterations, refused to adm't the category of *viśeṣa* as residing in atoms and other eternal substances.

6. THE UNIVERSAL AS OBJECTIVE AND ETERNAL REALITY

Whatever caused the idea of commonness was conceived as a universal in the early period of the Vaiśeṣika school. As a matter of fact, the category of the universal was formulated in order to explain the notion of commonness in the objects of a class. It was argued that individual jars were different entities, but as they all produced a similar cognition, they were designated by a common name *jar*. There must, therefore, be something common in all the individual jars, and that common element was *ghaṭatva* the universal. But, later on, when objective reality was ascribed to the universal, it was realized that everything that produced the notion of commonness could

45 For the text, "Ihātadātmakeṣv..... .paramāṇv-ādiṣu " see Text Append.x.

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45 For the text, "Ihātadātmakeṣv..... -paramāṇv-ādiṣu" see Text Append x.

not be held to be a universal. For instance, when there are a number of men, each carrying an umbrella, there is a notion of commonness caused by the umbrella. The umbrella, being a substance, cannot be regarded as a universal. Secondly, when the universal was held to be an objective reality, it was also conceived to be eternal. An attribute like *ghatatva*, which subsists as *one common factor* in all the jars of the universe, was conceived to be all-pervading, and because it could not be conceived as being produced or destroyed every time, it was held to be eternal. Now, if the universal were eternal, any attribute which caused the notion of commonness, but which was of a transitory nature, could not be held to be a universal. For instance, the citizenship of Ayodhyā (*Ayodhyā-vāsitva*), which caused a notion of commonness amongst all the citizens of Ayodhyā, could not be called a universal, for one might leave Ayodhyā and become a citizen of some other town. Or, when a number of people are sitting in a room, the fact of sitting in the room is common to all, but that attribute, being of a temporary nature, cannot be a universal in the sense of being an objective and eternal reality. It was therefore held at a later stage that not all the attributes which caused the notion of commonness, but only such of them as could be regarded to be eternal and residing in their individuals by inherent relation (*samavāya*) were held to be universals. The universal (*sāmānya*) was, therefore, defined as "that which resides in its individuals by inherent relation and which at the same time is eternal."[46] Only those attributes to which this definition could be applied were held to be *sāmānyas*, while others were regarded as *sāmānyas* only in a secondary sense. The latter were called *upādhis* to distinguish them from the real *sāmānyas*. The distinction between these two kinds of universals is expressly made in some of the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika manuals. For instance, Śivāditya says that *sāmānya* is of two kinds: (i) *jāti*, e.g., *sattā*, *dravyatva*, etc., and (ii) *upādhi*, e.g., the 'state of being a cook' (*pācakatva*).[47] The universal which is conceived to be an objective and eternal reality, is here called *jāti*—a term which

46 Nityatve sati aneka-samaveta'vam. NSM. on verse 8.
47 Sapta-padārthī, p. 37, section 41.

is in vogue (in place of *sāmānya*) in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature. Later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika manuals, however, do not refer to two kinds of *sāmānyas;* to them *jāti*, the eternal objective reality, alone is *sāmānya;* the other one, viz., *upādhi*, is not regarded as a kind of *sāmānya*.

But owing to the old habit of regarding every attribute which causes the notion of commonness as a universal, *upādhi* is also sometimes spoken of as *sāmānya* even in the later period. For instance, a manual like *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī* says in the course of exposition of *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (extra-ordinary sense-object-contact): "*Sāmānya* means the state of being common to many. A *sāmānya* may be eternal as *dhūmatva* (smokeness), and it may as well be non-eternal, e.g., a jar may also be a *sāmānya*."[48] In the case where 'the ground has been comprehended as being connected with a jar', and thereafter, by an extra-ordinary sense-object-contact, called *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, all the grounds having connection with the jar are comprehended, the contact is in the form of the *jar* which serves the purpose of commonness and which is, therefore, a *sāmānya*. But it is not the usual *sāmānya* which is held to be eternal and a separate objective category. In the present instance, the term *sāmānya* is used in its literal sense (i.e., commonness), and not in the technical sense. If the term *sāmānya* be used in its literal sense, i.e., that which causes the notion of commonness, even a 'whole' (*avayavin*) which is common to all its parts, may be regarded as a *sāmānya*. A jar, as a 'whole', is common to all its parts. Similarly, a *tryaṇuka*, may be regarded as common to all its constituent parts, the three *dvyaṇukas;* and a *dvyaṇuka* is common to both of its constituent parts, the two atoms. But an atom having no constituent parts is not common to any two entities.

The question now arises: On what basis does the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school accept an attribute of an object as *sāmānya*? In the earlier theory, as we have seen, *sāmānya* as a category was assumed only to account for the notion of commonness. Even after Praśastapāda had ascribed objective reality to *sāmānya*, it continued to have the same old basis. But

48 NSM. on verse 63.

as time went on, it became clear to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers that the notion of commonness, which could be caused by a substance, a quality, or a movement, could not be held to be the basis for assuming a separate category. As conservatism has been the misfortune of orthodox Indian philosophy, the new thinkers could not, however, do away with the traditional and time-honoured category (*sāmānya*). They, therefore, discovered a new basis for assuming a separate category of the universal. The new basis is brevity or shortness (*lāghava*) of the determinant of causality.[49] It has been pointed out that the existence of an external object was assumed in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika only if it led to brevity.[50] Viśvanātha says that the universal *dravyatva* is assumed because it becomes the determinant of inherent causality (*samavāyi-kāraṇatā*) of every effect or that of connection or disconnection.[51] In simple language it means that only a substance can be the *samavāyi-kārana* in general or *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of connection or disconnection. If the *sāmānya* called *dravyatva* is not accepted, there will be no single determinant of the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of effects, or that of connection or disconnection; and this lack of a single determinant will necessitate the enumeration of many causes. Similarly, in *Dinakarī*, a commentary on *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvalī*, it is stated that the highest universal, *sattā* (existence) is proved not by the common notion of existence, but because it provides a determinant for the causality of consequent negation (*dhvaṁsābhāva*).[52] It is interesting to note how great changes came to be introduced in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines steadily but imperceptibly. Despite this basic change in the conception of the universal, the old idea of its causing a notion of commonness continued to be associated with it.

It has just been pointed out that any attribute, which besides causing the notion of commonness is a determinant of the causality of some effect, and thereby effecting 'brevity of assumption' (*kalpanā-lāghava*) is accepted as a universal. But

49 Kāraṇatāvacchedake lāghavam.

50 *Supra*, V. 9.

51 Kārya-samavāyi-kāraṇatāvacchedakatayā, saṁyogasya vibhāgasya vā samavāyi-kāraṇatāvacchedakatayā tat-siddheḥ. NSM on verse 3.

52 Dhvaṁsa-kāraṇatāvacchedakatayā sattā-jāti-siddheḥ. Dinakarī on NSM. verse 8.

the determination of causality is only a logician's business. The question, however, is: what will be the criterion for a layman for the assumption of the universal. In the case of species like men, cows, horses, etc., the sphere of their denotation is well-marked. But in the case of a universal like *ghaṭatva* or *paṭatva*, denotation is not so clearly marked. For instance, if a pot is made of a particular kind of material, say China clay, or stony clay or stone, will it be called a jar? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika answer may be in the affirmative. And what, if it be made of gold? Here the answer cannot but be in the negative. For, gold is held to be fire, and *ghaṭatva* (the universal of jar) is a sub-division of the universal *pṛthivītva*. If, therefore, a pot made of gold be regarded as a 'jar', the latter will have the universal *tejastva* giving rise to the flaw of cross-division (*saṁkara*, explained in the next section), because *ghaṭatva*, possessing the universal *tejastva* also, in some cases, will no more be a sub-division of *pṛthivītva* which is the basic point of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Besides the question of the material, there is also the problem of shape. Up to what limit can the change in shape be suffered to retain the universal *ghatatva*? And the same may be asked with regard to the universal *patatva*. Will it still be a cloth possessing the universal clothness (*paṭatva*) if it is made of silk, hemp, jute or some invented material like nylon? And the same question may be asked with regard to the texture. All this will land us into a maze of insurmountable difficulties. Theories regarding the universal were being formulated according to the notions of the scholiasts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. For instance, the rational sub-divisions of the universal of man (*manuṣyatva*) based on racial or regional distinctions were never conceived, but those based on caste (*brāhmaṇatva*, etc.) were accepted without question.

7. CROSS-DIVISION NULLIFIES UNIVERSAL

With the objective reality and the eternal nature of the universal established, some conditions, which caused annulment of the universal (*jāti-bādhakas*), i.e., conditions on account of which an attribute, although causing the notion of commonness, could not be held to be a true universal, were formulated. Udayanācārya has enumerated in his *Kiraṇāvalī* six conditions of

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annulment.[53] Only one of them, namely, cross-division (*saṁkara*), is significant for our purpose, because it shows how the theory of the external reality of the universal was growing more and more rigid. Annulment of universals on account of cross-division means that if there are two generalizing attributes the sphere of one of which crosses that of the other, such attributes will not constitute a universal. For instance, *bhūtatva* (state of being an element) and *mūrtatva* (non-all-pervading measure) are two such generalizing attributes. *Bhūtatva* resides in the five elements, earth, water, fire, wind and ether; and *mūrtatva* resides in the first four elements and the *manas*. Both *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva* are common to the first four elements. But inasmuch as they intersect the sphere of each other, the two attributes, i.e., *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva*, together cannot be held to be universals subsisting in the four elements. The crossing of the sphere of one of the attributes by another would mean that one of them shall be co existent with the non-existence of the other, i.e., one of them would exist where the other does not. For example, *bhūtatva* exists in ether where *mūrtatva* does not exist, and on the other hand, *mūrtatva* exists in *manas* where *bhūtatva* does not exist. When two such attributes are found in common in some objects, as *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva* do in the first four elements, they will not constitute a universal.[54] For illustration, see diagram A opposite.

The implication of the annulment of a universal due to cross-division is: universals are either quite different and their spheres of residence are mutually exclusive, or they stand in the relation of being larger and smaller, which means that the smaller is included in the larger. In such cases, the smaller must be wholly included in the larger, and not partially. In other words there can be no two universals which are common in some spheres but exclusive of each other in the rest. For illustration, see diagram B opposite.

53 Vyakter-abhedas tulyatvaṁ saṁkaro 'thānavasthitiḥ
Rūpahānir asaṁbandho jātibādhaka-saṁgrahaḥ. Kir. p. 33.

54 Saṁkaraś ca parasparātyntābhāva-samānādhikaranayor (dharmayor) ekatra samāveśaḥ Dinakari on NSM verse 8. This literally means: saṁkara is the subsistence, at one place, of two attributes each one of which *(parasparo)* is co existent (samānādhikaraṇa) with the non-existence of the other.

Diagram A[55]



Diagram B[56]



55 Taken from the author's Hindi commentary of the *NSM*, p. 30.
56 *Ibid.* p. 38.

The implication of the theory of annulment of the universal by cross-division is significant in relation to the theory of realism. All the material world, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, is constituted of four atomic elements, earth, water, fire, and air. It has seldom been realized that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, no material object can have two or more elements as its constituent parts. It must be composed of *only one* of the four atomic elements. Another element may be associated with the object only by connection (*saṁyoga*) which means that it is only appended to the object concerned. Ordinarily, organic bodies of animals are supposed to be composed of five elements, including ether (which is not accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school as an element). According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, however, an organic body, say the human body, is composed of only one element, namely, the earth. Water is only an addition to it by the relation called *saṁyoga*, and it is therefore extraneous to it, and not its component part. There is a reason for holding such a view. If an organic body or, for that matter, any object be composed of two or more elements it will have two or more universals, such as, *pṛthivītva* and *jalatva* residing in it. It will, in that case involve *saṁkara*, the annuling condition of the universal, because *pṛthivītva* and *jalatva* would be co-existent with the non-existence of the other. For, *pṛthivītva* resides in a jar where *jalatva* does not, i.e., *pṛthivītva* in a jar is co-existent with the non-existence of *jalatva*. Similarly, *jalatva* residing in ordinary water is co-existent with the non-existence of *pṛthivītva* which does not reside in water. Now *pṛthivītva* and *jalatva* would be residing in one substratum, i.e., the object composed of two elements. Consequently, *pṛthivītva* and *jalatva* will not be universals. To avoid this predicament, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika held that no material object could have two or more elements as its constituent parts, although this went counter to common experience.

Now, the question arises: If the theory of *saṁkara* led to this predicament, why was it postulated at all? As a result of conflict with the Buddhist, more and more emphasis was laid by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the objectivity of the universal. It was realized that the ranges of two *objective* realities could not be crossing or cutting each other. But, of course, one of them

may be included in the other. The theory of *saṁkara* marks the extreme limit to which the theory of objective reality of the universals could go. When, however, at a later period, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers forgot the nature of their conflict with the Buddhist, the Navya-nyāya school actually discarded the theory of *saṁkara*.

8. NOTION OF COMMONNESS AND THE UNIVERSAL

With its objective reality established, the universal was not only held to be inferable, but also directly perceptible when residing in perceptible individuals. The Buddhist naturally objected to this view. It was stated above that every attribute which caused the notion of commonness could not be considered as an *objectively real* universal. Uddyotakara, who came a little later than Praśastapāda, expressly declared that it was not necessary that "the notion of commonness in all cases should be caused by the universal alone."[57] Now, if the notion of commonness could arise from other causes also, it could not be an argument for inferring the existence of the universal. But we find that scholiasts of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school continued that argument even down to a late period. Śrīdhara, for instance, says that "the nature of each object being different from others, how could there be (without accepting the universal) comprehension of a common form in those (different individuals), and how could they be designated by a common word (class name)? In that case the relation of a word with the unlimited individual objects of a class could never be established. And if there is any common cause for the common notion and common expression, our purpose (of proving the universal) stands fulfilled."[58] The same argument is adduced by Uddyotakara[59] and other writers.

The Buddhist writer, Paṇḍita Aśoka, the author of a

57 Na punaḥ sarvo 'nuvṛtti-pratyayaḥ sāmānyād eva bhavati. XV. p. 668. line 17.

58 Pratyekam padārtha-svarūpāṇi bhinnāni katham teṣv ekākāra-pratītiḥ, eka-śabda-pravṛttiś cānanteṣu saṁbandha-grahanābhāvāt. Atha teṣv ekaṁ nimittam asti siddhaṁ naḥ samihitam. NK. p. 12. line 12.

59 Viśeṣa-pratyayānām anākasmikatvāc ca. NV. p. 667. line 22.

dissertation on the refutation of the universal,[60] begins his argument by attacking the above reasoning of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. He says: "Our opponents put forward the following inference to prove the universal: a common notion must be based on some common object as its source. For instance, the notion of a garland which arises with reference to many flowers is based on a common factor, the thread. There is a common notion with reference to the individual objects (of a class) which have no mutual contact. The argument (the Buddhist points out) is incapable of proving the existence of the universal, because it is vitiated by the fallacy of undistributed middle term (*anaikāntikatā*). With reference to many individual cooks, there is a common notion of everyone of them being a cook. There is nothing which may be common to all of them. If it be so, the common notion should arise even before the individuals concerned do the job of cooking. If you say that the fallacy in question does not arise because the particular individuals here manifest their universal as dependent on a quality accruing to them from the act of cooking, it is also not admissible. The reason is that the particular individuals being permanent objects cannot have any excellence (quality) added to them, and there can be no dependence on any accessory attribute which does not confer any benefit on them (in the form of an additional excellence). If they can have a new excellence added to them, they must be evanescent.[61] And if they be evanescent, how can they have any action belonging to them? This objection cannot be set aside (by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika opponent)."[62]

"Moreover, it is meaningless to say that the common notion with reference to many cooks arises on account of their action (of cooking), and therefore, there is no fallacy of undistributed middle term, because the action, which differs with every individual, cannot be the cause of that (common notion). Even if

60 Sāmānya-dūṣana-dik-pravāritā By Paṇḍita Aśoka published in Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts.

61 See *Supra*, VI. 20. The addition of an excellence brings about a change in the nature of an object which means the destruction of the previous object and its replacement by another object, i.e., its evanescence.

62 For the text, "Yad idam sāmānya .....duṣpārihārah." see Text Appendix.

different entities can cause a common notion, the individual objects themselves, as causing the common notion, cannot be warded off by a royal ordinance. In that case, the very object, the *universal* will be lost. Very well indeed has the fool (the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opponent) acted who, by demolishing his own basic idea, has resorted to a position quite agreeable to us. In the same way stands refuted the opponent who holds the *relation* of action with its agents (*kriyā-kāraka-saṁbandha*) as the cause of a common notion. Nor should one entertain the idea that a universal residing in all acts of cooking (*pāka-kriyātva*) will cause the notion of commonness and thus there will be no fallacy of undistributed middle, because the universal residing in some objects (i.e., acts of cooking) cannot cause a common notion in other objects (i.e., cooks). For that would involve the fault of stretching too far (*atiprasaṅga*). It may be suggested by the opponent that the universal residing in acts of cooking will reside in the cooks by the relation called 'inherence in the inherent' (*samaveta-samavāya*), i.e., the universal *pāka-kriyātva* resides by inherence in the acts of cooking and this act of cooking is inherent (*samaveta*) in all cooks, and thus, it will cause the notion of commonness with reference to cooks. This, too, is of no avail, because the act of cooking, which is destroyed as soon as it is produced, is not of a lasting nature, and when the act itself is destroyed the universal cannot subsist in it. Thus, owing to its non-subsistence in the act of cooking, it cannot subsist in the cook, and even the relation called 'inherence in the inherent' (*samaveta-samavāya*) is not possible, and therefore, it cannot be the cause of a common notion. It is now established, that the inference (put forward by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) suffers from the fallacy of undistributed middle, and is, therefore, incapable of proving the admissibility of the universal."[63]

Śāntarakṣita also more or less repeats the same arguments, and refers to the same example of common notion with reference to many cooks. That seems to be the stock-example of the Buddhists for refutation of the universal. Śāntarakṣita adds one more point: "If a common notion with reference to all cooks is due to their common act, that notion should not be there when one

63 For the text "Kriyā-nibandhanatvāt..... paryāptam iti.", see Text Appendix.

is not engaged in the act of cooking, because the action is not accepted by the opponent (Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika), like the universal, to be always present in the object."[64] Uddyotakara meets the Buddhist argument detailed above,[65] and it is in this context that he says, as quoted already, that all notions of commonness are not caused exclusively by universals. He says that a common notion with reference to cooks is caused because "the principal agent of the act of cooking is denoted by the term cook, and the attribute of being the principal agent (*prādhānya*) exists in all cooks, and therefore there is no flaw in the case of a common notion with reference to all cooks."[66] Śāntarakṣita refers to this answer of Uddyotakara, and after quoting *verbatim* the argument of the latter, he says that even the attribute of being the principal agent (*prādhānya*) which belongs to every individual cook is different (and not the same) with every individual, i.e., the same attribute which resides in one does not reside in the other. Hence that cannot be the cause of a common notion.[67]

It is interesting to note that Uddyotakara himself argues elsewhere on the same lines. When meeting an opponent who refutes the universal on the ground that the common notion may be due to the similarity of form among different individuals, he says, "The form like the body is also not common to all the objects. As the body of one individual object does not reside in the bodies of other individual objects, similarly the form also, resides only in one individual, and not in others. And if you say that the same form resides in all individual objects, our dispute is reduced to its naming"[68] (i.e., you call it

64 Kiñ ca yadi karma-nibandhanaḥ pācakādisu pratyayaḥ syāt tadoparata-kriye pākam akurvati pācaka iti pratyayo na syāt. Na hi jātivad bhavadbhiḥ sadā,sannihitaṁ karmābhiṣṭam. TS. p. 247. line 11.

65 Aśoka and Śāntarakṣita are, of course, posterior to Uddyotakara, but their argument must have been prevalent in the Buddhist circles much earlier.

66 Pācana-kriyāyāṁ yat pradhānaṁ sādhanaṁ tat pācaka-śabdenocyate, tac ca prādhānyaṁ pācakāntare 'py astīti na doṣaḥ. NV. p. 668. line 17.

67 Tasyāḥ pratyādhāra-niyatāyāḥ vyakty-antarāsamanvayāt. TS. p. 249. line 15.

68 Yathaiva piṇḍāḥ piṇḍāntara-vṛttayo na bhavanti tathā ākṛtir api eka-piṇḍa-vartitvāt piṇḍāntara-vartini na bhavati Atha ākṛteḥ piṇḍāntara-vartitvam abhyupagamyate, nāmni vivādo nārtha iti. NV. p. 667. line 26.

form, and we call it the universal). Here Uddyotakara emphasizes that whatever causes a common notion, must be a common thing residing in all the objects concerned. By extending his own argument to the case of cooks, are we not then justified in saying that if that attribute resides in each cook separately, it cannot cause the notion of commonness? And if the attribute belonging to all the cooks is one and the same, then that attribute would be nothing but a universal. We are thus driven to the conclusion that wherever there is a common notion, it can only be due to a universal which, therefore, must be held to be present in all the cases of common notion. For a conceptualist or nominalist, there is no difficulty in holding that position; but when an objective reality was ascribed to the universal, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school felt shy of accepting a universal (as objectively real) in every instance of a common notion. We find that under the pressure of the Buddhist criticism, later scholiasts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school discarded the theory that the notion of commonness was the basis of the universal. They evolved another theory, as already noted, according to which the universal was assumed on the basis of the brevity of the determinant of causality (*lāghava* in the *kāraṇatāvacchedaka*).

9 PERCEPTION OF THE UNIVERSAL

As already stated, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the universal is directly perceptible when residing in perceptible objects. The Buddhist emphatically opposed the theory of the direct perception of the universal. Śrīdhara quotes the Buddhist argument: "Some people propound the following view: the common notion with reference to different objects (of the same class) establishes the theory of the universal. But that notion does not cognize two independent entities, viz., *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*[69] (general and particular) as it does in the case of a 'man with a stick.' Neither does it cognize the relation of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* as that of a qualifier and the qualified, because the cognition does not take

69 'Viśeṣa' is used here in the sense of a particular, i e, individual in which a general or universal (sāmānya) resides.

the form: 'this cow is qualified by cow-*ness*.' As a matter of fact, the cognition in question comprehends only one identical object, because in the expression, 'this is a cow', only *one* entity is referred to. The two (the individual and the universal) have no two separate forms."[70] Obviously, we do not perceive a universal apart from the individual in which it is supposed to reside. Pandita Aśoka makes a similar remark as was made with reference to the *avayavin*: "The universal is like a person who wants to purchase without paying the price inasmuch as the universal does not reveal its form (which is the price) and yet wants to be held to be a separate object of perception."[71] Paṇḍita Aśoka concludes his discourse with the remark: "In our cognitive perception, only five fingers are distinctly revealed. A person who sees a sixth one as common (to all fingers and holds it to be a universal), perceives, indeed, a horn on his head."[72]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika answers all such objections by taking recourse to the relation called inherence (*samavāya*). Śrīdhara says: "As to the cognition of a cow without any distinction[73] of cow and cow-*ness*, it is so because of the power of inherence (*samavāya*). In the case of *saṁyoga*, the relation of the two objects is cognized, but in the case of *samavāya*, such is its power that the two related entities appear as if fused together like fire and iron (in a red hot piece of iron). The universal, of course, is not identical with the individual, but the two are different. Yet the form of the individual is not cognized as distinct from the universal as that of a plum from the bowl (in which it is kept). But there is, of course, the comprehen-

70 For the text "Atraike vadanti..... svarūpāntarābhāvāc ca." see Text Appendix.

71 Idaṁ punar amūlya-dāna-krayi sāmānyaṁ svarūpaṁ .ca nādarśayati pratyakṣatāṁ ca svīkartuṁ icchati." SBNT. p. 99. line 15. *Supra*, VII. 8 and 10.

72 Etāsu pañcasv avabhāsinīṣu,
Pratyakṣa-bodhe sphuṭam aṅgulīṣu,
Sādhāraṇaṁ sastham ihekṣate yaḥ,
Śṛṅgaṁ śirasy ātmana ikṣate-saḥ. SBNT. p. 101.

73 Avibhāgena, 'without any distinction (of cow and cow-*ness*).' Dr. Jha has rendered 'avibhāgena' as 'universally accepted' which is clearly wrong, and gives no meaning in the context.

sion of one apart from the other. For instance, although we have no cognition of the universal *gotva* (cow-*ness*) from a distance, we still cognize the individual cow (as an entity), and although an individual cow which we saw before (and with which we associated *gotva*) may not be there, yet we cognize the universal *gotva* in another cow. Therefore, according to the technique of the logicians (*tārkika*, i.e., the Nyāya-Vaiśesika), the universal is 'absolutely different (*atyantaṁ bhinnam*) from the individual."[74] We find here. as in the case of many other philosophical problems, that the two conflicting schools argue their cases from two different standpoints. For the Buddhist, there is no such entity as *sāmānya*, and therefore he insists that *cow* and cow-*ness* are identical, but for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, they are two distinct entities both of which are comprehended by direct perception, and yet they appear fused together by the magic of *samavāya* relation.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains that the universal is directly perceived. Doubts, however, arose with regard to the direct perception of some of the universals. For instance, the caste of an individual is not perceptible, unless it is stated. This difficulty is met by Jayanta who says that caste is a universal which is cognized by the perception aided by somebody's declaration.[75] Śrīdhara says that the caste is also directly perceived by tradition that one's parents and ancestors were of the same caste.[76] He further adds that this is similar to the case of gems whose species and quality are perceived only by a lapidary.[77] Jayanta points out: "It cannot be said that there is no perception of the universal *'brāhmaṇatva'* simply because it requires announcement (by some one). Even in the case of the cognition of *gotva*, instruction is necessary at the time when relation of cow with the universal cow-*ness* (*gotva*) is grasped for the

74 For the text "Yat punar gaur..... prakriyā," see Text Appendix. Upadeśa-sahāya-pratyakṣa-gamyatvāt. NM. Part I. p. 204. line 16.

75 Yadā tu mātā-pitros tat-pūrvesāṁ ca vrddha-paramparayā viśuddhaṁ brāhmaṇatvam avasitaṁ tadā brāhmano 'yam iti pratyakṣeṇaiva pratiyate. NK. p. 13 line 7.

76 Tathā hi suvidita-ratna-parikṣā-śāstro ratna-jāti-bhedaṁ pratyakṣataḥ pratyeti nāparaḥ. NK. p. 13. line 9.

first time."[79] Jayanta here overlooks the fact that the case of the caste-universals, *brāhmaṇatva*, etc., is not analogous to that of *gotva*, because in the latter case instruction is necessary only once, while in the former, instruction is necessary with reference to every individual. Śrīdhara quotes an opponent who declares that the determination of caste is not possible even by instruction, because nobody can guarantee the purity of birth when women are so fickle by nature. Answering this, Śrīdhara says that there are after all ways of protecting the virtue of women.[79] Jayanta, in his zeal to defend the caste-universals, goes to the limit of declaring that "the caste of a *brāhmaṇa* is recognized by his gentle appearance as different from that of a *kṣatriya* and others even without being announced."[80] Śrīdhara taking a more rational attitude says that the reason why the *brāhmaṇa* caste is not recognized as different from the *kṣatriya* and others at the very first contact with the senses is that owing to the close similarity between human forms, the caste is not apparent.[81]

10. IS THE UNIVERSAL OMNIPRESENT?

In terms of time, the universal is held to be eternal. Is it also omnipresent in terms of space?[82] It is held that whenever and wherever a particular object comes into being, it gets asso-

78 Na copadeśāpekṣanād apratyakṣatvaṁ tasya bhavitum arhati gotvādi-pratyayasyāpi saṁbandha-grahaṇa-kāle tad-apekṣatva-darśanāt. NM. Part I. p. 204. line 16.

79 Yac coktaṁ strīṇāṁ svabhāva-capalānāṁ viśuddhir duravabodheti tad asat, abhiyuktaiḥ surakṣitānāṁ sukaras tad-avabodhaḥ. NK. p. 13. line 11.

80 Api copadeśa-nirapekṣam api cakṣuḥ kṣatriyādi-vilakṣaṇāṁ saumyākṛtiṁ brāhmaṇa-jātiṁ avagacchati. NM. Part I. p. 204. line 20.

81 Brāhmaṇatvam indriyāpāta-mātreṇa kṣatriyādi-vilakṣaṇatayā na gṛhyate atyantaṁ vyakti-sausādṛśyena anudbhūtatvāt. NK. p. 13. line 6.

82 Omnipresence which means all-pervasiveness can only be, in terms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika the unlimited measure (vibhu-parimāṇa) which being a quality, can reside only in a substance. The question of the omnipresence of universals does not, therefore, arise at all, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system But the universals, samavāya, etc., are sometimes referred to as omnipresent. For instance, Uddyotakara speaks of samavāya as vyāpaka (NV. p. 159. line 1) which can only mean *all-pervading*. See *Supra*, VIII. 8 for further discussion on this topic.

ciated with its universal, and therefore the latter should be held to be omnipresent. But if all the universals were omnipresent, they should be present in all particulars, e.g., the universal of cow (*gotva*), should be present in horses and lions as well. Such questions were raised in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, and the following three theories in this connection seem to have been propounded:

(i) Although the universals are omnipresent and, therefore, all of them would reside in all the classes of particulars, yet each one of them *manifests* itself only in the particulars of its own class. The universal *gotva* being omnipresent, resides not only in all cows, but also in all horses and others; it is, however, manifested only in cows by the nature of things. The theory is known as *sarva-sarva-gatā jātiḥ*,[83] i.e., all universals are present in all particulars.[84]

(ii) Universals are omnipresent, but all of them do not reside in *all* particulars. Every universal resides only in its own particulars. It is present at the *place* of other particulars also, but it is related by inherence only to the individuals of its own class, and not to those of other classes.

(iii) According to the third theory the universals are not omnipresent, but they are present only in the place where their particulars exist.

The second theory and the third may be covered under the title *piṇḍa-sarvagatā*[85] which means that a universal resides only in the particulars of its own class.

It will be seen that such intricate problems with regard to the universal have not been touched at all in modern expositions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. Stcherbatsky makes a casual reference to these theories. Like the ancient Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers who usually mention only the first and third theories,[86] he also refers only to these two theories.[87] But a close exami-

83 Sarva-sarva-gatā vā syāt. NM. Part I. p. 273. line 20

84 Vyomavatī, p. 678.

85 Pinda-sarvagatā 'pi vā, NM. Part I. p. 273. line 20.

86 NM. p. 273, quoted under n. 83 and 85.

87 *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 450.

nation shows that there was a theory, midway between the two, which is given above as the second one, and which was accepted by most of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholiasts, including Vācaspatimiśra, as we shall presently see.

Stcherbatsky thinks that Praśastapāda subscribed to the third theory, namely that the universals are present only in the places where their particulars are present.[88] This is obviously wrong. Stcherbatsky was led to this error by Śrīdhara who not only himself subscribed to that view, but erroneously interpreted Praśastapāda also as subscribing to it. As a matter of fact, Praśastapāda subscribes to the second theory according to which although universals are omnipresent, yet every universal resides only in its own particulars. He says with regard to the universal that "it is present in all of its individuals",[89] and secondly, that "although universals are not restricted to any particular place (i.e., they are omnipresent), yet on account of being restricted by manifesting features (*upalakṣanas*) and also by the sum total of causes, they are manifested only in their own individuals. In the intermediate space (i.e., in the space between their particulars) the universals are not manifested (*avyapadeśya*) inasmuch as they do not subsist there by any of the relations, 'connection' (*saṁyoga*) or 'inherence' (*samavāya*).[90] Śrīdhara while explaining the term *avyapadeśya* says that "in the intermediate space universals are not manifested (*na vyapadiśyante*), i.e., *they do not exist* (*na santi ity arthaḥ*)".[91] This is obviously far-fetched because the reason given in the context, i.e., not subsisting by any of the two relations, is applicable only to the non-manifestation and not to the non-existence of the universals. Of the other two principal commentaries on Praśastapāda, that of Udāyanācārya does not go up to this point, and that of Vyomaśiva does not agree with

88 *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 450.

89 Sva-viṣaya-sarva-gatam PP. p. 311. line 14.

90 Yady api aparicchinna-deśāni sāmānyāni bhavanti tathāpy upalakṣana-niyamāt kāraṇa-sāmagrī-niyamāc ca sva-visaya-sarva-gatāni antarāle ca saṁyoga-samavāya-vṛtty-abhāvād avyapadeśyāni. PP. p. 314. line 19.

91 Ato 'ntarāle na sāmānyāni vyapadiśyante na santityarthaḥ. NK. p. 317. line 18.

the interpretation of Śrīdhara.[92] Uddyotakara does not expressly say that a universal is omnipresent, but, repudiating the view that every universal resides in all particulars of all classes, he says: "Who says that a universal resides in all particulars of all classes? As a matter of fact, it resides only in all particulars of its own class, and hence it is regarded as residing in all particulars (*sarvagatā*)."[93] Vācaspatimiśra, however, expressly maintains the second view and says: "There are some objects which although present together are not mutually related. Similarly, a universal also, although not related to all objects, is present with all of them, but it is related only to the particulars of its own class."[94] This disposes of the Buddhist objection, viz., if a universal, say *gotva*, is omnipresent, every place should appear as a cow. It does not appear as a cow because although *gotva* is present in every place, it is not present in every place by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) by which it is present only in its own individuals.

Of the two extreme views given above as the first and the third, the former, namely, that universals are omnipresent, and all universals reside in all particulars is subscribed to only by Jayanta of all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers.[95] He also refers to the third view, viz., universals are present only in places where their particulars exist. He says that the theory is held by some thinkers of his own school (*sva-yūthya*), and he defends that view also.[96] This view, as already noted, is especially advocated by Śrīdhara, and perhaps by him alone of all the well-known Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers. Śrīdhara is confronted with the question: how a universal, which is neither present in the intermediate space nor can be conceived as coming from some other

92 Vyomavatī, p. 690.

93 Kena sarva-gatatvaṁ jāter abhyupagamyate, api tu sva-viṣaye sarvatra vartata iti sarva-gatety ucyate. NV. p. 667. line 13.

94 Santi hi kecid bhāvā ye sahāvasthāne 'pi parasparam asaṁbaddhāḥ,.....tathā sāmānyam api sarvāsaṁbaddham api sarvaiḥ sahāvatiṣṭhate, yas tv asya vyaktayas tābhiḥ paraṁ saṁbadhyate (wrongly printed as sambadhyante). NVT. p. 512. line 19.

95 Sarva-sarva-gatā jātir iti tāvad upeyate. NM. Part I. p. 285. line 22.

96 Vyakti-sarva-gatatve 'pi sva-yūthyaiḥ kaiścid āśrito. NM. Part I. p. 286. line 4.

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92 Vyomavati, p. 690.

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96 Vyakti-sarva-gatatve 'pi sva-yūthyaiḥ kaiścid āśrito. NM. Part I. p. 286. line 4.

place, can get associated with its particular coming into being at some place? He replies: "It is only in the case of the relation called 'connection' (*saṁyoga*) that it gets related either to the object that comes from some other place or to the one which may already be present at a place. But so far as the *samavāya* relation is concerned, it is different from *saṁyoga*, and wherever causes operate to bring about an effect, there appears, through the power of causes, the inherent relation of that object with its universal which neither comes from some other place nor was already present there. It is so, and the inborn nature of things cannot be questioned."[97] As already noticed, the magic of *samavāya* comes to the rescue of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in this predicament as in all others. But it is too much for common sense to swallow that a universal which is associated with one of its newly-produced particulars was neither present at that place nor did it come from some other place. That view was, therefore, discarded by later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers, and we find Śaṁkaramiśra subscribing to the second view,[98] i.e., the universals are omnipresent, but they are related only to their particular individuals. This is the view most widely accepted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

11. SUBSISTENCE OF THE UNIVERSAL IN ITS PARTICULARS

A universal being absolutely different *in essence* (*atyantaṁ bhinnam*)[99] from its particulars, the question regarding the nature of the subsistence of a universal in its individuals is of great significance. The Buddhist objections in connection with the subsistence of a universal are couched in the well-known verse which says: (i) a universal does not move from somewhere else to the place where its particular is born in order to subsist therein, because the universals are *motionless*. (ii) *nor* was it already present there, because, in that case, if the universal in question be *gotva*, that place would also appear as a cow on account of the subsistence of the universal cow-*ness* in that

97 For the text "Saṁyogo hi.....aparyanuyojyatvāt." see Text Appendix.

98 Sāmānyaṁ nityaṁ vyāpakaṁ ca, vyāpakatvam api svarūpataḥ sarva-deśa-saṁbaddhatvam. Upaskāra, p. 35. line 12.

99 NK. p. 316. line 19.

place, (iii) nor can the universal be regarded *as* born at that place at the time a particular is born, because a universal is regarded as eternal, (iv) nor can the universal subsist in its particulars by its parts becaue it is partless, (v) nor can it subsist in its parts in entirety, because in that case it will have to subsist in a particular individual by leaving its former substratum which would become devoid of the universal. Whatever position, the advocates of the universal may adopt, there will be an unending series of difficulties.[100] In the previous section we have discussed the first three objections and have shown that, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, a universal is eternal and omnipresent, and yet it is related only to its particulars, and not to all the places where it exists. Now we shall deal with the fourth and the fifth objections given above.

Jayanta summarises the Buddhist objection in connection with the subsistence of the universal in its particulars thus: "Does the universal subsist in its particulars in its entirety or by parts? Both the positions are impossible. If the universal subsists in one of its particulars in its entirety, it will be exhausted there and will not be found in other particulars. If it subsists only by parts, the universal *gotva* 'in its entirety' will not be found anywhere, and there will be no idea of a *cow* with reference to individual cows. Moreover, the universal being partless has no parts by which it can subsist in every individual. Nor can it subsist in an individual in entirety, because then it cannot subsist in entirety in other individuals. For, that which is exhausted cannot have another entirety without being born again."[101] Jayanta meets the objection thus: "A universal subsists in every individual in its entirety. As for the objection that it should not be found in that case in other individuals, what are we to do and with whom should we find fault? It is, indeed, found in other individuals. When it is present there, how can we conceal it? (It is so in the nature of things). Parts

100 Na yāti na ca tatrāsīn na cotpannaṁ na cāmśavat.
Jahāti pūrvaṁ nādhāram aho vyasana-samtatiḥ.
Quoted in Upaskāra, p. 35. line 8.

101 For the text "Kiṁ pratipiṇḍam..... samāpty-antarānupapatteḥ." see Text Appendix.

of a universal, of course, do not exist by which its subsistence could be averred. As to the question whether such a phenomenon is found elsewhere, we indeed appreciate your cleverness in asking for a similar instance even when there is a direct experience. A similar instance should be asked only in the case of an inference."[102]

In order to meet this objection, Uddyotakara makes a subtle analysis of the problem. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position with regard to the nature of the universal is that it is *one*, but it subsists in *many*. Now, a question is raised on behalf of the Buddhist opponent: "If the universal subsists in common in many, does it subsist in every individual in its entirety or by parts? If it subsists in every individual in its entirety, it will be, like an individual, a different entity in each case and not *one* common entity residing in *many* individuals. In that case, it will not be a common universal. If it subsists in individuals by parts, even then it will not be a case of one subsisting in many, but that of many subsisting in many. The universal, therefore, in that case, will not be of the nature of *one subsisting in many*."[103] Uddyotakara meets the objection thus: "We repudiate your objection because we do not accept the alternatives raised by you. There can be no such alternatives whether *gotva* subsists in every individual in its entirety or by parts. As we do not accept the very alternatives raised by you, your objection does not stand."[104] Uddyotakara, then points out, as already quoted,[105] that the words *in entirety* or *by parts* are not applicable in the case of the universal.

Uddyotakara then refers to a more subtle question of the opponent: "There can be no universal like *gotva* because it can subsist neither in a cow nor in a non-cow. If it subsists in a cow, the cow, in that case, is already a cow even without

102 For the text "Pratipiṇḍaṁ.....pratyakse 'numānavat." see Text Appendix.

103 For the text "Yady anekānuvṛtti..... sāmānyam iti." see Text Appendix.

104 Na, vikalpānabhyupagamāt—nāyaṁ vikalpo 'sti gotvaṁ pratyekaṁ piṇḍeṣu parisamāpya vartate atha pradeśena vartata iti, tasmād vikalpānabhyupagamād apraśno 'yam. NV. p. 668, line 26.

105 *Supra*, VII.9, n. 14.

the subsistence of *gotva* in it, and therefore the universal is not needed. If you say, it subsists in a non-cow, we repudiate it, because in that case, a horse (and others) will also become a cow. There is no other alternative, and therefore *gotva* cannot be the cause of a common notion."[106] Uddyotakara answers: "It is not so, because we do not accept your alternatives. *Gotva* subsists neither in a cow nor in a non-cow, because prior to (the subsistence of) *gotva*, an individual is neither a cow nor a non-cow. The reason is this: both of these are qualified notions which are not possible without the association of the qualifier (*gotva*); and the individual itself does not exist prior to its association with *gotva*, and a non-existent object cannot be designated as a cow or a non-cow. No sooner is an individual cow born than it is associated with *gotva*.[107] The alternative questions raised above are therefore out of place.[108] It may also be pointed out here that in the case of the relation called 'connection' (*saṁyoga*), it is necessary that the things which are related by *saṁyoga* must exist at least for one moment prior to the emergence of the connection (*saṁyoga*), because the connected objects are held to be its inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). But this is not necessary in the case of the *samavāya* relation which is eternal. The Buddhist opponent also asked a similar question with reference to the universal 'existence' (*sattā*): whether it was associated with the existent or with the non-existent. It was also answered in the same way.[109]

Kumārila did not recognise a radical difference between the universal and its particulars. According to him, the two are different as well as non-different. Nor does he accept the relation of inherence between a universal and its particulars. According to him, the relation is that of identity of the two which are different and non-different (*bhedābheda-rūpaṁ tādātmyam*). With regard to the contradiction involved in this

106 For the text "Na gotvaṁ.....anuvṛtti-pratyaya iti." see Text Appendix.

107 Cf. the well known Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maxim: Jātaḥ saṁbaddhaś cety ekaḥ kālaḥ.

108 For the text "Na vikalpānabhyupagamāt.....vikalpaḥ." see Text Appendix.

109 *Supra*, V. 10.

position, it was said that the nature of things could not be questioned. The merit of Kumārila's theory, however, is that it steers clear of all the difficulties raised in connection with the subsistence of the universal in its particulars. Jayanta actually lays that charge at the door of the Kumārila school, and says that "the venerable one (Kumārila) formulated this theory, as if out of fear of the difficulties involved in the various alternatives regarding the subsistence of the universal."[110]

The view of the Prabhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā is similar to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Prabhākara maintains that the universal is different from its particulars in which it subsists by *samavāya* relation. He also holds that the universals are directly perceived.[111] But the *samavāya* relation, according to him, is neither *one* nor eternal. It is born anew in the case of every entity related by *samavāya*. In this connection, it may be noted that (i) according to the Kumārila school, the relation between the universal and its particulars is that of identity (*tādātmya*), (ii) according to Prabhākara, it is *samavāya*, but it is non-eternal, (iii) according to the Vaiśesika, it is *samavāya* which is *one* and eternal, but not perceptible, and (iv) according to the Nyāya, it is *samavāya* which is one and eternal, and also perceptible.

12. EPISTEMOLOGY OF DIGNĀGA SCHOOL

The exposition of the Buddhist counterpart of the theory of the universal, viz., the theory of *apoha*, requires a brief statement of the basic structure of the epistemology of Dignāga. *Apoha* can be understood and appreciated only against the background of Dignāga's system. As already stated, the fundamental principle of his system is the sharp differentiation between two kinds of knowable objects (*prameyas*), and consequent differentiation of the two kinds of means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) which comprehend these two kinds of objects. Objects, according to him, are of two kinds: (i) the unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) which are external reals, and (ii) the

110 Etat tu vṛtti-vikalpādibhyo bibhyatevabhyupagatam tatrabhavatā. NM, Part I, p. 284 line 16.

111 Jāti āśrayato bhinnā pratyakṣa-jñāna-gocarā. Quoted in the 'Prabhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā' by Dr. Jha, G. N. p. 95.

universals, the generalized objects (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*) which are merely mental entities. Likewise, the means of knowledge are also of two kinds: (i) perception (*pratyakṣa*) which means pure sensation and grasps only the particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), and never the generalized form; and (ii) inference (*anumāna*) which grasps only the generalized form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), and never the particular. It has already been pointed out that the sphere of the two kinds of *pramāṇas* is sharply demarcated, i.e., each of the two kinds of *pramāṇas* operates only in its own sphere. *Pratyakṣa* comprehends only the particular, and *anumāna* only the generalised form, and not *vice versa*. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, the same object may be comprehended by *pratyakṣa, anumāna* or any other *pramāṇa*.

The 'particular' of Dignāga is the *unique particular*,[112] and not the so-called particular object of our experience like a particular jar or a particular piece of cloth. The unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) of his system is a transcendental reality which is not only shorn of all qualities, but is also shorn of duration in terms of time and of extension in terms of space. It is differentiated and distinguished from everything else in the world (*sarvato-vyāvṛtta*). Having no duration, it is vertically cut off from all other reality in terms of time, and having no extension, it is horizontally cut off from all other reality in terms of space. It is, therefore, discrete, disconnected, and absolutely isolated. The Sanskrit word for the unique particular, *sva-lakṣaṇa*, means 'of its own kind' or 'unique' which has no 'similar' of it in the whole universe. It exists only for one moment, because no sooner is it born than it is destroyed and replaced by another unique particular which, although similar to it, is quite different from it. Lasting only for a 'moment,' it is called momentary (*kṣaṇika*). But as a matter of fact, there being no separate reality called time, which is the temporal receptacle of objects as understood in the realistic systems, the unique particular itself is called the moment (*kṣaṇa*). It is not only shorn of duration, but also of extension; and therefore,

112 *Supra*, VI. 17. Some of the points already stated there had to be repeated here in the context of the exposition of the epistemological theory of the Dignāga school.

the best English term for the Buddhist particular would be 'point-instant', a term used by Stcherbatsky. *Sva-lakṣaṇa, kṣaṇa,* or 'point-instant' alone is real, because it alone is efficient, i.e., capable of producing purposive action (*arthakriyā-kṣama*). Only that fire which exists externally can burn, and not the 'image of fire' in our thought.

Unique particulars, i.e., the external reals are grasped by *sensation*, the pure passive sense-reflex, in which there is not the slightest admixture of thought or intellection. A unique particular is never grasped by *thought* which comprehends only a generalized form. We can never be conscious of a pure sensation, because consciousness means activity of thought which grasps only a generalized form. Thus, although we have a sensation of a particular, say 'blue', we are not conscious of that sensation in terms of our thought. There is only a sort of awareness of *something*. It is, therefore, held that pure sensation is beyond the purview of thought or consciousness. Inasmuch as it is without any image (*kalpanā*) or without any mode or determination (*vikalpa*), it is called *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (indeterminate perception). Up to this point, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika agrees more or less with the Buddhist. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also holds that, in the first instance, we have only a pure sensation of a particular object in which there is no mode, i.e., no relation of subject and predicate (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāvānavagāhi*), and hence we are not conscious of a pure sensation. According to the Buddhist, a pure sensation is immediately and necessarily followed by a thought-process[113] which gives an image, a mode, a predication or determination to the sensation, and is therefore called a determinate perception. Here the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist part company. According to the former, the same object, which was, in the first instance, apprehended by sensation, is comprehended by determinate perception also in a generalized form, i.e., qualified by the universal and other attributes. As the universal and qualities are external reals, and the image or the form comprehended by the determinate perception belongs to the external object itself, and not to our thought, the determinate perception

113 Pratyakṣasya sākṣātkāritva-vyāpāro vikalpenānugamyate. NBT. p. 4. line 5.

is also a valid perception. The Buddhist, on the other hand, holds that the generalized form and other attributes ascribed to the object belong to thought, and not to the external particular. They are only ideal, and have no correspondence in the external world of reality. Hence a determinate perception is not a pure perception.

There is, according to the Buddhist, a sharp line of demarcation between sensation and determinate perception as there is between the objects comprehended by them. Those objects are: (i) the unique particular or the point-instant which is external objective reality, and (ii) the image, the generalized form and other attributes which are only modes of thought and have no external existence. We cognize in the determinate perception ideal images as if they were present in the external world. Determinate perception, which falsely comprehends unreal images as real external objects, is therefore no real perception; it is only a pseudo-perception. According to the Buddhist as well as the Mīmāṁsaka, *pramāṇa* (a means of knowledge) is defined as 'comprehending an object not already comprehended.'[114] Determinate perception, therefore, which is supposed by the realist systems to comprehend what has already been comprehended by sensation, cannot be held to be a genuine *pramāṇa*. The Buddhist asks: "When the nature of an object which is only one, and not manifold, has already been perceived (by sensation), what else remains unperceived that is supposed to be comprehended by other means of knowledge (i.e., by determinate perception)?"[115]

Now, a question may arise: if a cow comprehended in a determinate perception is only a thought-image and no objective reality, how is it to be differentiated from a cow of memory which is also a thought-image? The two are obviously different; the former is efficient as it yields milk, but the latter does not, and is therefore unreal. The Buddhist answer is this: the thought-image, in the case of a determinate perception, follows

114 Ajñātārtha-jñāpakaṁ pramaṇam iti pramāṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇam. PS. Ṭīkā, p. 11.

115 Ekasyārtha-svabhāvasya pratyakṣasya sataḥ svayaṁ,
Ko 'nyo na dṛṣṭo bhāgaḥ syād yaḥ pramāṇaiḥ parīkṣyate.
It is a Buddhist verse quoted in NM. Part I. p. 277. line 2.

immediately in the wake of a sensation; in fact, determinate perception is aroused by sensation, and as a consequence thereof, the two, the external real particular and the thought-image, are falsely identified in the conceptual or perceptual judgment (*adhyavasāya*)[116]—'this is a cow.' Here, the word *this* refers to the transcendental particular, the external real, and the word *cow* to the thought-image. The two are absolutely different, and there is not the slightest similarity or affinity between them, the one being an efficient real particular and the other only an ideal entity. Yet the two extremely dissimilar things are identified,[117] because of the non-comprehension of difference (*bhedāgraha*) between them. The thought-image is projected externally by being falsely identified with the external particular. There is, thus, in the perceptual judgment of the determinate perception (*adhyavasāya*), an element of reality.

Of the two elements of the judgment 'this is a cow', the *cow* represents a mere mental image, and *this* refers to the unique particular, the external real. It has, however, been maintained that the determinate perception or perceptual judgment does not really grasp the external particular, and that the unique particular cannot be expressed by any word.[118] The term 'this' therefore in the perceptual judgment cannot refer to the *real external particular* which, by its very nature, cannot be reflected in a judgment, but can refer only to the shadow of the real particular (*sva-laksaṇa*). Thus, the *sva-lakṣaṇa* referred to in the perceptual judgment is unreal.[119] The question, therefore, arises: how can then the worldly course and behaviour of human beings, which is based on determinate perception, be possible, and how does the same lead to the real unique particular which alone is capable of purposive action? How do human beings reach, on the basis of the thought-image of water or of a cow, the real water which can quench thirst or a real cow which can

116 Determinate perception, according to Dignāga, may be described as a perceptual judgment or what is the same, as a conceptual judgment.

117 Atyanta-vilakṣaṇānāṁ sālaksaṇyam, NVT. p. 683. line 15.

118 Nābhilāpa-samsarga-yogyam. NBT. p. 11. line 7.

119 The very minute and subtle difference between the real sva-laksaṇa and its unreal shadow has not usually been noticed. It is only Vācaspatimiśra who refers to it. NVT. p. 684. line 19.

yield milk? The Buddhist answer is that the 'this' element in the perceptual judgment indirectly leads to the real object which was reflected in the immediately preceding sensation. "Perceptual judgments of the people," says Vācaspatimiśra while explaining the Buddhist position, "actuate the seekers of particular objects, and indirectly leading to those requisite or efficient (*samartha*) objects, do not deceive them".[120] The Buddhist, as quoted by Jayanta, explains it by an apt illustration. "A man, who has first cognized in sensation the original object (the real unique particular, and then gets a perceptual judgment of its generalised image). moves towards it and actually grasps it. For instance, a man, who sees the lustre of a diamond, kept in a closed chamber, issuing out of a key-hole, and proceeds towards the lustre thinking it to be a diamond, reaches the real diamond. (Similarly, a person, who grasps in a determinate perception only an unreal image of a real object, say, of water, ultimately grasps the real object, water). But where the object does not exist even originally (*i.e.*, in the prior sensation), a person proceeding towards it (as in the case of an illusion) is deceived like a person who proceeds towards the lustre of a candle, thinking it to be a diamond. Thus, (where the original object has been grasped in sensation), there arises, with reference to perceptual judgment (*vikalpa*) which is devoid of any contact with external reality; an erroneous idea (*abhimāna*) of a common man, "I cognized the real object, proceeded to it, and actually grasped it."[121] It has been said: "A man proceeds by identifying what is given by the sense (*dṛśya*, real) with the thought-image (*vikalpa*), and he actually grasps the real object."[122]

Now, it is clear how the thought-image of determinate

120 *Tat-tad-arthino vyavahartṛn pravartayanti loka-vikalpāḥ, pāramparyeṇa saṁbandhāt samarthaṁ vastu prāpayanto na visaṁvādayanti lokam.*" NVT. p. 685. line 3. The Vizianagram edition reads '*pravartante*'. The Calcutta edition, which we have followed, suggests '*pravartayanti*'. According to Stcherbatsky, it should read '*pravartayantaḥ*'. *Buddhist Logic*, Vol II. p. 426. n. 3.

121 For the text "Atha hi mūla-vartinam·····laukikānām." see Text Appendix.

122 *Evaṁ dṛśya-vikalapāv arthāv ekīkṛtya pravartate, prāpnoti cārtham.* NM. Part I. p. 282, line 6.

perception and that of memory are different from each other, although both of them belong to the domain of thought. The former, coming immediately in the wake of sensation, is indirectly in touch with external reality and gets, on that account, vividness (*sphuṭābhatva*) which the memory-image lacks. Vividness is held to be a characteristic of sensation, which is the direct sense-reflex of an external reality. It may, however, be asked as to how a sensation of which we are not even conscious can be held to be vivid. It is no doubt true that in terms of our thought, we are never conscious of a pure sensation. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Śāntarakṣita. "When the attention of a person is engaged elsewhere, there is awareness of the bare presence of something, undifferentiated by any of its adjuncts."[123] Dignāga has quoted a passage from the *Abhidharma-sūtra*: "A man who is absorbed in the contemplation of a patch of blue, perceives the blue, but he does not know that it is blue; of the object he then knows only that it is an object, but he does not know what kind of object it is."[124] As soon as sensation of an object takes place, memory-associations are aroused, and forthwith a thought-image is produced. But a pure sensation precedes our thought-process, and we have an awareness of it. The existence of pure sensation (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) as well as the fact that it is beyond the purview of our consciousness is admitted even by the realist Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika[125] and some other orthodox schools. A pure sensation is the direct sense-reflex of reality, and it has the nature of being vivid (*sphuṭābha*). The sensation imparts vividness and a sense of reality to the determinate perception which follows in its wake.

According to both the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, a pure sensation is followed by a determinate perception. Both of them also agree that the determinate perception is in the

123 Anyatra-gata-chittasya vastu-mātropalambhanam,
Sarvopādhi-vivekena tata eva pravartate. TSP. p. 241.

124 Quoted by Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 153.

125 In a paper on *Distinction between Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Perception* (read before the Lucknow session of the Oriental Conference), I have shown that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika borrowed the idea of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa from Dignāga.

form of a synthetic judgment as already stated.[126] Further, they both agree that a synthetic or perceptual judgment takes the form, 'this is a cow'. Here the term 'this', which is the subject, denotes the particular, and the term 'cow', which is the predicate, denotes the generalized form. But the two schools fundamentally differ in explaining the nature of the particular and the generalized form in the synthetic judgment. For the Buddhist, the particular is the unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) shorn of all adjuncts and relations, and having no duration or extension. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, the particular is a composite entity endowed with attributes. With regard to the nature of the other element of the judgment, viz., the generalized form, the difference between the two schools is equally fundamental. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the generalized form is an external and eternal reality called the universal, while for the Buddhist, it is only an unreal thought-image which has no counterpart in the external world.

The Buddhist holds that while the external reality is exclusively and necessarily in the form of unique particulars, the thought-contents are exclusively and necessarily in the form of generalized images which are ideal, i.e., objectively unreal. In the synthesis of the perceptual judgment, we are concerned with the generalized forms, and therefore the perceptual judgment is said to be a conceptual judgment as well. The difference between the two is that the latter term being wider covers the cases of judgments born of pure imagination also. The terms *adhyavasāya* and *vikalpa* are used for determinate perception, and the same terms can also be used for inferential knowledge. Elsewhere it has been said that the term *anumāna*, used in a wider sense, covers determinate perception also.[127] The two kinds of knowledge accepted in the school of Dignāga are termed *grahaṇa* and *vikalpa*, the former standing for the knowledge of the unique particular, and the latter for that of the generalized form.

The fact that the sensation of a unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) is followed by thought-image, is likely to suggest that

126 *Supra*, IX. 2.
127 *Supra*, III. 11.

the unique particular, which is the cause of the thought-image, may be similar to it. But the Buddhist insists that the two are wholly dissimilar (*atyanta-vilakṣaṇa*). The two are also quite heterogeneous, one being objectively real, and the other, ideal and objectively unreal. There can, therefore, be no question of any similarity between them. When, however, the Buddhist speaks of *sārūpya* (similarity) between the two, that similarity is only a sort of co-ordination between them. The unique particular being the cause of the thought-image, the causal relation between them is expressed by the term *sārūpya*, but, as already pointed out, this is a similarity between two things which are absolutely dissimilar.[128] According to the Buddhist theory of causation (*pratītya-samutpāda*), there need not be any similarity between the cause and the effect.[129] The unique particular and the thought-image being essentially dissimilar, similarity between them is illusory and is perceived by overlooking the difference between the two. The explanation of error as given by the Dignāga school is similar to that of the Prabhākara school, according to which an illusion is caused by non-comprehension of the difference between what is directly perceived and what is recollected.[130] The same principle is applied by the Dignāga school to explain the relation between the unique particular and the thought-image.

The Buddhist insists that the relation between the external reality and the thought-image is a case of the 'non-comprehension of difference' (*bhedāgraha*), and not that of the imposition of identity between the two (*abheda-graha*). Vācaspatimiśra explains the Buddhist position thus: "Externality of the thought-image consists in the non-comprehension of the difference of the external (from the internal), and not in the comprehension of the identity of the external (with the internal), because identity of the thought-image (which appears as internal) is not possible

128 *Supra*, IX. 12. n. 117.

129 It may be noted that even, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, an object and its cognition which are respectively cause and effect are not similar, the latter being formless. For further explanation see *infra*, XII. 13.

130 For detailed explanation, see *infra*, XII. 14.

with the unique particular."[131] If identity between the two be accepted, it will mean comprehension of the unique particular in a perceptual judgment which is impossible; hence the Buddhist insists on holding it to be a case of non-comprehension of difference between the two (*bhedāgraha*), and not a case of the comprehension of identity between the two (*abheda-graha*) Some of the later writers have failed to note this subtle difference. For instance, Śrīdhara, while expounding the Buddhist theory, has examined both the alternatives as if both of them could be acceptable to the Buddhist.[132] But Jayanta, who is earlier than Śrīdhara, has noticed the subtle difference between the two views. He says: when a knower has a thought-image, "he is deceived on account of the thought-image immediately following a sensation, and erroneously thinks that in his thought-image he has grasped the object of sensation; this they call identification of the two.[133] Identification is caused, because the difference between the object grasped by the sense and that by the thought is not comprehended; it is not caused by (positive) comprehension of identity of the two which are different."[134]

The question was raised with regard to the link between the unique particular grasped by the sense and the thought-image. And it was probably with a view to establish a link between the two that the Buddhist formulated the theory of mental sensation (*mānasa-pratyakṣa*).[135] It is, however, outside our present scope to go into the intricacy of that matter.

13. THE BUDDHIST THEORY OF APOHA

Let us now examine the nature of the thought-image. It has been described as a generalized form, and it naturally

131 Bāhya-bhedāgrahaś cāsya bāhyatvaṁ na punar bāhyābhedagrahaḥ vikalpa-gocare bāhye tad-abhedagrahasyāśakyatvāt. *NVT.* p. 682. line 28.

132 *NK.* p. 319, lines 20-21.

133 Ekīkaraṇa, sārūpya, and sālakṣaṇya are all synonyms.

134 Darśanānantarya-vipralabdhas tu dṛśyam eva gṛhītaṁ manyate tad-abhimānena ca pravartate idaṁ tad-ekīkaraṇam āhuḥ dṛśya-vikalpayor bhedo yan na gṛhyate, na punar bhinnayor abhedādhyavasāya ekīkaraṇam iṣyate. *NM.* Part I. p. 281. line 23.

135 The mānasa-pratyakṣa of the Buddhist should not be confused with the mānasa-pratyakṣa of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The former is the

suggests that it should be a common attribute of individuals or particular objects, i.e., unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*). According to the Buddhist, there can be nothing that resides in common in a number of unique particulars which are shorn of all adjuncts, and there can be no question of any common entity residing in them. Then how do we have a notion of commonness with reference to many particulars of a class? For instance, many particular objects are cognized in common and designated as *cows*. The Buddhist answer is that it is the nature of things to produce a common notion on account of 'performing a common function or having a common (similar) cause.'[136] Illustrating and explaining this, Kamalaśīla says: "Herb-fruits, *āmalakī*, etc., although of quite different nature, are severally and collectively endowed with the power of removing diseases of various kinds. They have obviously no common universal residing in them. Nor can it be averred that there must be a universal residing in them by which the common function is accomplished, for there cannot reside in them a universal capable of performing a function of that kind. If there be one, how can one account for the fact that some particular herbs like *dhātrī* are found, sometimes and somewhere, capable of removing disease either quickly or with some delay. For, the universal being invariable cannot cause this difference. Nor can it be said that the universal itself acquires an additional quality on account of the influence of a particular soil and other factors, and performs these varied functions (of curing quickly or with some delay). The universal being eternal must be of invariable nature, and no change can be brought about in it by difference in the soil or in other factors. On the other hand, in the case of *āmalakī*, etc., which are non-eternal, the additional qualities can differ with the difference in soil, etc., and therefore, *āmalakī*, etc. (and not their universal), are endowed with the power of removing disease. Similarly, other objects like a jar, being produced as they are from various causes, give rise to the notion of commonness by their very

sense-reflex by the mind which is also regarded as one of the senses. The latter, however, is an apperception by the self which comes after a determinate perception, and takes the form, 'I know the jar'.

136 Ekārtha-kriyākāritvād, eka-hetutvāc ca. NK. p. 318. line 5.

nature."[137] That notion is not due to anything like a universal residing in them.

The Buddhist does not stop simply by declaring that the various particular objects of a class, which have nothing common in them give rise to a notion of commonness by their very nature, but he goes to a deeper analysis of the notion of commonness. He points out that this notion is caused not by a positive commonness residing in all the individual objects of a class, but by a negative commonness which belongs to all the individual objects of a particular class. For instance, all the cows of the world are different from one another, and have nothing common in them except the performance of a particular function and the fact of their birth from similar causes. Yet all of them have a negative commonness in that they are all different from the non-cows, viz., horses, etc. The universal, cowness, according to the Buddhist, is not an external reality, but only a negation in the form of the exclusion of non-cows. It is called *atad-vyāvṛtti* which means the exclusion of what a thing is not. The technical term used for it is *apoha* which is the Buddhist counterpart of the universal of the realist school.

It may be noted that the theory of *apoha* requires a second kind of synthesis also. The first synthesis, as already stated, is in the form of a perceptual judgment 'this is a cow', where unreal similarity or false identity is established between two absolutely dissimilar entities, viz., the thought-image and the external reality. By the second synthesis, the absolutely different *svalakṣaṇas* of a class are considered—of course falsely—as similar, and brought together under one concept as if they belonged to one class, and had a common universal. But the two syntheses are not two different acts, but only one act having two aspects. It may be noted that the thought-image (i.e., the generalized form) in the perceptual judgment becomes possible only through the second synthesis. The actual process is somewhat like this: as soon as we have a sense-reflex (sensation) of an object, memory is aroused and calls forth a *name*, i.e., a *class-name* which, in turn, brings forth a generalized image. Or it may be the reverse process also, especially when familiarity with the

137 For the text "Yathā hy.....bhaviṣyanti." see Text Appendix.

class name is not mature. In that case, the sensation calls forth a generalized image which is then associated with a class-name. Ordinarily, in the case of a person who is familiar with the class name, the two—the generalized image and the class-name—are inextricably associated, and one of them brings forth the other. There is an oft-quoted Buddhist saying attributed to Dignāga: "The words, i.e., the class-names, have their origin in the thought-images, and the latter have in the words. They are related to each other as cause and effect. The words never touch (comprehend) the reality."[138]

It may, however, be asked here: a synthetic judgment, in both of its aspects, has been declared as referring to something illusory. Does it then mean that all the worldly course and human behaviour, which are based on synthetic judgment (i.e., on empirical knowledge), are unreal and illusory? If so, how are such illusions to be differentiated from the ordinary illusion of everyday life? The Buddhist answer is the same as that of many other Indian systems, like the Vedānta, which base the phenomenal world on some kind of error. According to these systems, there are two kinds of error: one is the primordial, i.e., the beginningless nescience (*anādi avidyā* or *anādi vāsanā*) which is regarded as the cause of the phenomenal life. It is actually destroyed only by the final enlightenment, but a philosopher can discern its erroneous nature by philosophical analysis even during his own phenomenal life. The other is the illusion of everyday life, as that of 'a snake in a rope' which is removed when real knowledge regarding the object is gained. Thus, according to the Buddhist, impressions of beginningless past lives (*anādi vāsanā*) are the cause of the generalized image (*vikalpa* or *adhyavasāya*). This is the fundamental error ingrained in our very nature. That theory has got to be established by philosophical analysis, and by proving the futility of the explanations offered by the realist. This is what the Buddhist logic aims at.

We have spoken of the thought-image (*vikalpa* or *adhyacasāya*) as a generalized form which is falsely identified with

138 Vikalpa-yonayah śabdāḥ vikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ.
Kārya-kāraṇatā teṣāṁ nārthaṁ śabdāḥ spṛśanty api.
Quoted in NVT. p. 681. See n. (ka).

the external reality on account of the difference between the two not being grasped (*bhedāgraha*). It was also pointed out that the external reality could never be grasped by thought. As thought itself is internal, Vācaspatimiśra points out: "Thought-image (*vikalpa-jñāna*) cannot actuate people desirous of worldly objects to move externally towards them. Therefore, an unreal, illusory external thing (*alīka-bāhya*) is regarded as the object of our determinate perceptions (*vikalpas*)."[139] And he further says that "this illusory external image is the object of determinate perception as well as that of words."[140] The same idea is expressed by Śrīdhara: "A determinate perception of a cow projects or imposes its image externally."[141] Jayanta also in his exposition of the theory of *apoha* says that "the externally reflected image in the determinate perception (*vikalpa*) which is designated as *apoha* is the meaning of a word (class-name)."[142] Describing the nature of *apoha*, Śāntarakṣita says that "it is the (externally) reflected image (*artha-pratibimbaka*) which appears in our determinate perception."[143] It would thus appear that all these authors hold that an illusory external form or externally projected image of the thought or its external reflex or externally reflected image (all these terms signifying the same thing,[144] i.e., *apoha*) is the object of our determinate perception, and that it is the significance of a class-name.

14. NEGATIVE CHARACTER OF APOHA

Moreover, the illusory external object is similar in the case of all determinate perceptions of an object of the same class, say, cow. Śrīdhara expounds the Buddhist theory thus: "One determinate perception of a cow projects externally an image

139 Vikalpa-jñānād bāhyābhimukhī pravrttis tad-arthinām na syāt, tasmād alīka-bāhyam eṣām viṣayaḥ. NVT. p. 682. line 27.

140 Alīkaṁ bāhyaṁ viṣayo vikalpānāṁ śabdānāṁ ca. NVT. p. 683. line 6.

141 Go-vikalpo bāhyātmatayā sva-pratibhāsam āropayati. NK. p. 318. line 25.

142 Tasmād vikalpa-pratibimbanasya,
Śabdārthatām āhur apoha-nāmnaḥ. NM. Part I. p. 282. line 9.

143 Yaj-jñāne bhāty artha-pratibimbakam. TS. verse, 1006.

144 Alīkaṁ bāhyam; bāhyātmatayā sva-pratibhāsāropaḥ; vikalpa-pratibimbanam; artha-pratibimbakam—are all synonyms.

unique particular, the real, and this enables us to perform purposeful action; or conversely, (ii) the unique particular may be regarded as the cause, the sensation of which leads to the general thought-image which, in its turn, may be regarded as the effect; or (iii) it is the common illusion of human beings to identify the unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) with the generalized thought-image. It is then pointed out that the name *apoha* is applied in a secondary sense to *sva-lakṣaṇa* also, because the latter, being of the nature of the unique particular, is also distinguished from everything else. The real *apoha* is only the first one, the thought-image (*buddhy-ātman*), to which the second kind of negation, viz., *prasajya-pratiṣedha* (the negation of a positive form) is also applicable. It means that a cow is simply a negation of non-cows, i.e., it is distinguished from all other things not belonging to its class (*atad-vyāvṛtta* or *ago-vyāvṛtta*).[151]

Śāntarakṣita proceeds to point out that the first meaning of the special negation (*paryudāsa*), viz., thought-form (*buddhy-ātman*) or the externally reflected image of our thought (*artha-pratibimbaka*), is the principal meaning of a word (the class-name). When a word is spoken, it is the thought-image of an object which is directly evoked in our mind, and therefore, that is the principal meaning of a word. But, the second kind of negation, viz., *prasajya-pratiṣedha*, is also implied in it. The essence of a thought-image, i.e., of a cow, consists in this that "its essence is not the essence of another image, say, a horse."[152] It is significant to note that according to the analysis of Śāntarakṣita, the principal meaning of a class-name, e.g., cow is the thought-image of the cow. The exclusion of non-cows (*ago-vyāvṛtti*) is only a subordinate meaning.[153] Kamalaśīla refers to an objection raised by an opponent that in the knowledge caused by a word, it is not merely a negation

151 Only a brief substance of the discourse in the Tattva-saṁgraha and the Pañjikā has been given here. Stcherbatsky has translated into English portions of this discourse (TS. 1004-1015) in his *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. pp. 471 ff.

152 Na tad-ātmā parātmeti. TS. verse 1014.

153 Of course, the subordinate meaning is also implied in the principal meaning.

that is comprehended. This objection is out of place, because, according to the theory expounded above, the thought-image is the direct meaning of a word, and negation in the form of exclusion of non-cows is only an implied and secondary meaning.[154] But one should not forget that, according to the Buddhist, even the thought-image is not positive, but is only a kind of special negation (*paryudāsa*).

It has been stated that an illusory external thing designated as *apoha* is the object of determinate perception as well as the direct meaning of a word, the class-name. Analysis of the unreal external image (*alīka-bāhyākāra* or *apoha*) which is not different from the object of determinate perception, shows, as already noted, that the external image is not positive, although it has a positive-like appearance. Essentially it is negative, being in the form of exclusion of others (*anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpa*). Buddhist writers have advanced strong arguments to establish the negative nature of *apoha*, i.e., of the so-called external object like a cow which is for them an illusory object. Vācaspatimiśra has summed up the Buddhist argument in a lucid manner. He says: "The *apoha* (the external illusory object) is in the nature of exclusion of others (*anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpa*) for three reasons: (i) it is commonly applied to both existence and non-existence, (ii) it brings about similarity between the extremely dissimilar, and (iii) it is experienced as such (i.e., having the nature of exclusion of others)."[155] Vācaspatimiśra explains each of these three reasons: "Whatever is common to both, existence and non-existence, can only be in the nature of the exclusion of others, for example, incorporeality (*amūrtatva*) which is found in knowledge (which is existent), and also in the hare's horn (which is non-existent). The objects of determinate perception, like a jar or cloth, are similar (common to both existence and non-existence). This is the logical reason called (*svabhāva-hetu*).[156] With re-

154 Niṣedha-mātraṁ naiveha śabde jñāne 'vabhāsate. TSP. verse, 1012.

155 *Tac cedam anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpaṁ bhāvābhāva-sādhāraṇyāc ca, atyanta-vilakṣaṇānāṁ sālakṣaṇyāpādanāc ca tādrūpyānubhavāc ca.* NVT. p. 683. line 6.

156 This is one of the two kinds of logical reason accepted by the Buddhist; (i) one is called tādātmya or svabhāva-hetu based on an analysis of the nature of things, and the other is *tad-utpatti*, that is, based on causal relationship.

gard to the objects of determinate perception, we make assertions like 'a cow exists' and 'a cow does not exist', which refer to both its existence as well as non-existence. If the object 'cow,' were of positive nature like the unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) which is always of an affirmative nature, i.e., existent only, it could not be related to non-existence, because of contradiction. An object which is existent cannot be non-existent. Nor can a cow be related to *existence* because it will be a mere repetition (the word *cow* being affirmative means a cow which is existent, and therefore to say that 'a cow exists' is a mere repetition)."[157]

Vācaspatimiśra then explains the second reason: "Besides, similarity between absolutely dissimilar objects can only be due to the exclusion of others. There may be said to be similarity even between a cow, horse, a buffalo, and an elephant on account of their common differentiation from a lion. (All these animals are absolutely different from one another, yet they may be said to be similar in that they are all different from a lion). Likewise, there is similarity of an external unique particular, which is of an affirmative nature and is an ultimate reality, with the unreal (object of determinate perception, like a cow) which is extremely dissimilar to it. This is the logical reason called *svabhāva-hetu*.[158] The external reality (*sva-lakṣaṇa*), although of affirmative nature is differentiated from non-cows; similarly, if the object of determinate perception (i.e., the empirical object cow) is also differentiated from non-cows, then, on the basis of the differentiation alone, similarity can be established (between different objects of determinate perception, i.e., cows) and not otherwise.[159]

He then explains the third reason: "Moreover, the object of determinate perception (the empirical cow) is actually experienced in the form of differentiation or exclusion (from others). If exclusion from other objects be not experienced (at the time of the determinate perception of a cow), a person who has been

157 For the text "Yad bhāvābhāva-sādhāraṇaṁ.....paunaruktyāt." see Text Appendix.

158 *Supra*, see note 156 above of this section.

159 For the text "Api cātyanta-vilakṣaṇānāṁ..... nānyathā." see Text Appendix.

asked to fasten a cow to a post may fasten a horse instead, because the cow is not comprehended as distinguished from a horse. And, if it has been comprehended as distinguished from a horse, why not the fact of its being in the nature of exclusion from non-cows be accepted? Therefore, a class-name and a determinate perception (associated with it) are of the nature of exclusion of other things." [160]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other realist schools could never appreciate the Buddhist theory that all thought, and in fact all knowledge, was negative. They persistently pointed out that positive knowledge, not negation, was conveyed by a word. Their objection was met by the Buddhist, as it has already been noted above in a quotation from Kamalaśīla. He has pointed out that the external illusory image (called an object) which is the meaning of a word is *prima facie* affirmative. But this is an affirmation which in its further analysis is a negation, i.e., affirmation through the exclusion of other things. When, for instance, we say that an object has an origin, the *origin* only means the negation of *eternity*, and eternity in turn means the negation of origin; the negation in this instance is mutual. Similarly, whiteness as a universal covers all instances of white objects, but it is impossible to comprehend all those objects when the word *white* is uttered. Speaking negatively, the word *white*, being an exclusion of non-whites, indicates a line of demarcation between whites and non-whites. It is this demarcation which is negative and which is grasped when the word *white* is uttered. Similar is the case with all words. A tree connotes a line of demarcation with non-trees, and a cow a line of demarcation with non-cows.

Jinendrabuddhi in his commentary on the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* of Dignāga gives an illuminating discourse on the negative meaning of *apoha*.[161] The realist raises a question: if a tree were nothing over and above the negation of non-trees, we could not explain the first cognition of the tree, because

160 For the text "Api cānubhūyata.....śabda-vikalpāv iti." see Tex Appendix.

161 The discourse has been translated into English by Stcherbatsky *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 461.

at that time we did not know what a non-tree was. If we were to say that a non-tree meant 'other than a tree', and then if a question were raised as to what a tree was, and we were to answer that it was other than a non-tree, it would mean arguing in a circle. This the Buddhist answers by asking a counter-question: even if you fix the name *tree* based upon a positive universal tree, do you, then, exclude non-trees from it or not? You cannot do it without previously knowing what a tree is. But in the case of your first cognition of a tree, you cannot exclude non-trees from it, and, hence, without knowing non-trees you will not know a tree. And if a person cognises a tree without excluding non-trees, his cognition of the tree will be of no avail, because if he wants to avoid non-trees, he will not be able to do so, not knowing what a non-tree is. In fact, it is the same idea, explained here at some length, which is included in Vācaspatimiśra's exposition of the Buddhist argument, viz., if exclusion of other objects is not expressed by a word, a person asked to fasten a cow to a post may fasten a horse instead. The Buddhist points out that the difficulty for himself as well as for the realist will be the same at the time of the first cognition of a universal. The Buddhist, thus, turns the world of phenomenal experience into a series of negations, and the negation being mutual, the empirical world becomes merely relative (or dialectical according to Mādhyamika system).

It has been stated that Dignāga introduced, for the first time, in Indian philosophy and, for that matter, in philosophy in general, sharp distinction between two types of objects of our knowledge, *the particular* which is external reality, and *the general* which is only ideal and objectively unreal. The former, as already stated, is grasped by sense-reflex (*grahaṇa*), and the latter by intellect (*adhyavasāya* or *vikalpa*). By his theory of *apoha* (negation), Dignāga drew yet another sharp distinction between two sources of knowledge, namely, sense and intellect. The former is *affirmative*, and the latter *negative*. Sense, being of an affirmative nature, grasps the particular which is the ultimate real, and intellect, being of a negative nature, comprehends only the unreal, the generalized image. Thought being of a negative nature can never touch the external reality.

15. REFUTATION OF APOHA BY THE REALIST

All the principal advocates of realism like Kumārila, Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta and Śrīdhara give long discourses to refute the Buddhist theory of *apoha*. The refutation given by Kumārila is the longest and, perhaps the most intricate. His principal argument, which has been widely quoted amongst others by Jayanta, Śrīdhara, and also by Śāntarakṣita is: *Apoha*, e.g., 'cow' (according to the Buddhist) excludes 'non-cow'; but 'non-cow' can be excluded only if 'cow' itself be established, because 'non-cow' is the negation of 'cow'. The Buddhist, therefore, must explain the nature of 'cow' which has been negatived by the particle *naÑ* (non). And if 'cow' is of the nature of negation (exclusion) of 'non-cow', it will involve mutual dependence (i.e., arguing in a circle). If, however, the cow is self-established, postulation of the theory of *apoha* is useless. The conclusion, therefore, is that without 'cow' being established, 'non-cow' cannot be postulated, and without the latter, how can 'cow' be conceived?[162] We have seen how the Buddhist met this argument. He pointed out that the postulation of even a positive universal like cow involved the negation of *non-cow* which must be conceived before *cow* could be conceived, and there would thus arise the same difficulty for the realist also.

Vācaspatimiśra gives a convincing refutation of the Buddhist theory. The main argument from his long discourse, marked with great subtlety, may be summed up thus: "Particulars, with universals subsisting in them, are the objects of words (class-names) as well as of thought-images. The nature of particulars, with universals subsisting in them, is in the form of being distinguished from objects of other classes (i.e., a positive universal performs the function of negating or excluding others), and hence a person directed to fasten a cow to a post does not fasten a horse or any other animal."[163] Then Vācaspatimiśra examines the Buddhist argument, viz., if a universal like *cow* were an affirmative reality, it could not be related to

162 For the text "Siddhaś ced..... gauḥ kutaḥ?" see Text Appendix.

163 Tasmāj jātimatyo vyaktayo vikalpānāṁ śabdānāṁ ca gocaraḥ. Tāsāṁ tad-vṛttināṁ rūpam ataj-jātīya-vyāvṛttam ity arthaḥ. Atas tad avagater na gāṁ badhāneti codito 'śvādīn badhnāti. NVT. p. 684. line 4.

both existence and non-existence. He says: "The universal, although eternal in its nature, subsists in numberless particulars scattered in space and time, and becomes common to existence and non-existence, and can be spoken of as existent and non-existent. The existence of a universal means its being related to an object existent at the present time and its non-existence is its being related to an object of the past or the future."[164] It is not clear how far Vācaspatimiśra has met the Buddhist argument that to relate existence to an affirmative reality would be a repetition, and to relate it to non-existence would be a contradiction.

Vācaspatimiśra then makes a subtle examination of the Buddhist position that a similarity is super-imposed on two things absolutely dissimilar (the external unique particular and the thought-image) on account of both performing a common function of negating others. The Buddhist holds that not only the *apoha* 'cow' excludes all non-cows by its very nature, but the unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) of the cow also negates all things other than itself inasmuch as it is distinguished from everything else in the world (*trailokya-vilakṣaṇa*). Vācaspatimiśra objects that negation of others "cannot be the nature of a unique particular because it is contrary to its affirmative nature."[165] The unique particular cannot be both affirmative and negative at the same time. The Buddhist meets this objection thus: "The unique particular, as grasped by determinate perception, is not the real external particular, but merely imaginary. Therefore its nature both as affirmative and as negative is not contradictory."[166] The realist rejoins that no purpose can be served by assuming similarity between an *unreal* thought-image and an *unreal* unique particular. The Buddhist replies that he does not say that the unreal object of determinate perception is

164 Sā hi svarūpato nityāpi deśa-kāla-vikīrnānanta-vyakty-āśrayatayā bhāvābhāva-sādhāranī bhavati asti-nāsti-sambandha-yogyā. Vartamāna-vyakti-sambandhitā hi jāter astitā, atītānāgata-vyakti-sambandhitā ca nāstitā. NVT. p. 684 line 7.

165 Na tat-svabhāvo vidhi-rūpena virodhāt. NVT. p. 684. line 12.

166 Adhyavasiyamānam api sva-lakṣanam na paramārtha-sad, api tu tad api kalpitam. Tasmāt tasya vidhi-nisedha-rūpatā na virudhyete. NVT. p. 684. line 19.

a real unique particular, but only holds that "the power of burning and cooking (which belongs to the real unique particular, fire) is attributed to the unreal."[167]

The same question arises again: "Is the imposition of the function of a real thing upon the unreal due to its similarity with the real unique particular whose efficiency of performing purposive function has been experienced, or due to our beginningless impressions (*anādi vāsanā*)? The former is not possible, because there is no similarity of the unreal through image, which has absolutely no efficiency and is related to other things (*anvayin*) with *sva-lakṣaṇa* which is efficient (*samartha*) and is excluded from or unrelated (ananvayin) to anything else (*sarvato vyāvṛtta*). If similarity between the two is in respect of the exclusion of others, there should also be similarity in respect of the affirmative nature (of the unique particular), because the affirmative nature of the unique particular is not different from its nature of exclusion from others. And if imposition of the function of a thing on the unreal is due to our beginningless impressions, then a person who has come from the island of Nālikera[168] should be able to know, even in the first instance, that fire possesses the power of burning and cooking. If the Buddhist were to say that imposition of the nature of the real upon the unreal is due to the non-comprehension of the difference of the unreal from the unique particular, say fire, which possesses the power of burning and cooking, etc., the question will arise whether that imposition occurs when the unique particular is being grasped or when it is not being grasped. It is not possible at the time of its being grasped, because as already stated, the real cannot be the object of determinate perception. The sensation of that moment (i.e., simultaneous with the determinate perception), although grasping the real, cannot transfer its object to determinate perception, because it is different from the determinate perception and is quite unaware of it. (Although the sensation of the previous moment, in the wake of which determinate perception follows, may be related to it, yet

167 Kintu alīkasyaiva dāha-pākādika-sāmarthyāropaṃ. NVT. p. 684. line 26.

168 Literally an 'island of coconut trees,' the inhabitants of which are believed to be ignorant of the use of fire.

the sensation which is simultaneous with determinate perception is in no way related to it). Similarly, the determinate perception, though it may be indirectly related to the sensation immediately preceding it, cannot grasp the unique particular because it comprehends only the thought-image which is capable of being expressed and related."[169] Continuing, Vācaspatimiśra says: "And if the nature of the unique particular, say fire, is imposed upon the unreal on account of non-comprehension of difference at the time when the unique particular is not being grasped, then there should be imposition of the nature of all the objects of the three worlds because there is nothing to prevent it."[170] "The statement that the externality of the unreal is grasped by determinate perception, is therefore void."[171]

Concluding the discourse, Vācaspatimiśra repeats the argument of Kumārila and says: "Is the exclusion of 'non-cow' the nature of the external unreal, or an attribute of it? If the exclusion of 'non-cow' is its nature, the 'non-cow' cannot be grasped without the cow being established, because the 'non-cow', being in the nature of negation of the cow, requires the establishment of the 'cow'. In this way, one cannot escape the fallacy of mutual dependence (arguing in a circle). If the exclusion of the 'non-cow' be held to be an attribute of the external unreal, why not accept a real universal cow-*ness* as an attribute of a positive nature, and do away with the negative universal."[172]

Śrīdhara has devoted a section to the refutation of the theory of *apoha*. Most of his points have already been covered. One of his arguments, however, deserves notice. He says: "Just as the difference between the numerous images of the determinate knowledge is not comprehended (and therefore, accord-

169 For the text "Athāsya atad-artha.....pratibhāsa-visayatvāt." see Text Appendix.

170 Agṛhyamāṇe tu vahni-svalakṣaṇe tato bhedāgrahena tad-rūpāropе traiłokya-rūpāropa-prasaṅgo niyama-hetor abhāvāt. NVT. p. 685. line 19.

171 Tasmād alīkasya bāhyatvaṁ vikalpa-gocara iti riktaṁ vacaḥ. NVT. p. 685. line 21.

172 For the text "Api cedam.....kṛtam alīkenāvidhi-rūpeṇa." see Text Appendix.

ing to the Buddhist, those images are regarded as identical), so their identity, too, is not comprehended. Now, as there is the imposition of identity on account of the non-comprehension of difference, there should be an imposition of difference also on account of the non-comprehension of identity. Hence, it would not be possible to take the objects of a class as belonging to the same class."[173]

Jayanta also gives a long discussion on the refutation of *apoha*. Some of the points of his argument are obscure, and some already covered. His main argument is this: "There can be no difference between various classes of *apoha* if they are all merely negative. According to the Buddhist theory, all class-names which are similar will become synonyms because they all connote negation. If it be said that there will be no flaw on account of difference in the various *apohas* (class-names), the statement is not admissible because, according to the Buddhist, there is no difference between the *apohas*. If they are of different kinds like the unique particulars, they will have to be accepted as positive and real. The Buddhist may rejoin that, even according to the realist theory, all the universals are similar because they all have the nature of generalization, and therefore the same flaw of their being synonymous will arise. The answer of the realist is: the universals, being positive, are mutually distinguishable owing to their different nature; but in the case of *apohas*, one cannot be differentiated from the other, because their individual nature is nothing but negation."[174] He further argues: "nor can there be any difference among *apohas* on account of the difference among the objects that are negatived (*apohyas*), because if an *apoha* cannot be differentiated even by its substratum which has some kind of relation with it, much less can it be differentiated by the objects (to be negatived) which are wholly extraneous and have no relation with it. If, for the sake of argument, we admit the difference between negative *apohas* on account of the objects

173 Yathā vikalpākārāṇāṁ bhedo na gṛhyate tad-vad abhedo 'pi na gṛhyate, tatra bhedāgrahaṇād abhedāropavad abhedāgrahaṇād bhedāropasyāpi prasaktāv abhedocita-vyavahāra-pravṛtty-ayogāt. NK. p. 319 line 22.

174 For the text "Te sarva eva.....parasparaṁ bhidyate." see Text Appendix.

negatived by them, then there should also be the identity of *apohas* by reason of many objects to be negatived being common in the case of *apohas* like cow and horse. That is to say, when cow and horse are fixed in their connotation by mutual negation, there are many objects which are non-cows and non-horses, like elephants, etc., negatived in common by both of them (cow and horse). As a matter of fact, the objects so negatived by both cow and horse are larger in number than the single object to be negatived by each one of them, i.e., negation of cow in the case of horse and that of horse in the case of cow. Now, a question arises whether, on account of the difference of a single object to be negatived by each one of them, they should be regarded as different, or on account of the identity of the larger number of objects negatived in common by both, they should be held to be identical. The identity of cow and horse would, in fact, be more justifiable according to the principle that where there are many conflicting attributes, those that are in larger number should prevail."[175]

16. THEORIES OF THE REALIST AND THE BUDDHIST COMPARED

It will be seen that the difference between the theories of the Buddhist and of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school lies mainly in their emphasis on one aspect or the other. Whether the universal is considered to be positive and real according to the realist, or negative and unreal according to the Buddhist, its function is admitted to be two-fold by both of them, viz., (i) inclusion of the common objects of a class (*anuvṛtti-pratīti*), and (ii) exclusion of the objects belonging to all other classes (*vyāvṛtti*). A universal will be meaningless unless it performs both the functions of inclusion and exclusion. Without the idea of exclusion, inclusion itself is inconceivable. This fact was noticed not only by the Buddhist, but by the realist as well. Vācaspatimiśra, as already noted, points out that the nature of the particulars, with universals subsisting in them, consists in being distinguished from the objects of other classes. A cow cannot be conceived even *positively* without the exclusion of horses and others.

175 For the text "Na cāpohya-bhedād..... nyāyyo bhavet." see Text Appendix.

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175 For the text "Na cāpohya-bhedād..... nyāyyo bhavet," see Text Appendix.

Thus, the realist while emphasizing the positive aspect, has got to admit that the universal has the negative function of exclusion as well. Similarly, the Buddhist, although holding *apoha* (counterpart of the universal) to be of a negative nature, cannot deny its positive aspect. It has already been pointed out that, according to Śāntarakṣita, the generalized thought-image 'cow' is the *principal* meaning of *apoha* which is called special negation (*paryudāsa*), and that the negation of the 'non-cow (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) is only its *secondary* meaning. The primary meaning, although negative, is in the last analysis, positive. Kamalaśīla therefore declares, as already noted, that it is wrong to say that, according to the Buddhist, merely negation is grasped in the cognition caused by a word. Ratnakīrti, a Buddhist writer, makes the point still clearer when he says that, according to the Buddhist, the term *apoha* expresses "a positive aspect qualified by the negation of others."[176]

It would thus appear that, according to both the schools, a class-name expresses both aspects of the meaning, positive as well as negative; but the realist lays emphasis on the positive aspect, and declares the universal to be positive, i.e., an objectively real entity, while the Buddhist insists on its negative aspect, and declares the universal to be negative, i.e., merely a mental construction and objectively unreal.

17. BEARING OF THE TWO THEORIES ON EPISTEMOLOGY

As already noted, the theory of the universal is the cornerstone of the epistemology of both the schools. According to both, it is the universal, whether positive or negative, which gives form to the objects of our experience. Consequently, if the universal is positive and objectively real, the empirical world will be real. Hence, the theory of the universal as an objective reality is a basic tenet of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism. If, on the other hand, the universal is negative and unreal, as held by the Buddhist, the empirical world in the form it appears to us will be unreal. According to the Buddhist, of course, it has also a core of reality as its basis, but that reality, being in the

176 Kintv anyāpoha-viśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ. SBNT. p. 3. line 7.

nature of unique particulars and devoid of all relations, and having no extension and duration, is formless. It is grasped only in pure sensation of which we are never conscious in terms of thought. Being beyond our conscious experience, it is transcendental. Hence the theory of Dignāga may be called *Transcendental Idealism*.[177] Dignāga's theory is idealism because the world of experience does not exist as such externally, i.e., the generalized forms of the objects of experience are only ideal or mental. As these generalized forms are transcendentally mental, the theory of Dignāga may be designated, following the Kantian terminology, as Transcendental Idealism. The theory is also realistic in the sense that unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*), the primary source of knowledge, are externally real. But the question arises: why should the external reality be not held to be similar to our experience which is produced by it? The Buddhist theory of causation is called interdependent causation (*pratītya-samutpāda*), according to which, there being one thing, the other follows, but the cause does not transfer its essence or form to its effect. The question of similarity, therefore, between the cause and its effect does not arise so far as the Buddhist is concerned.

Let us now examine the epistemological theories of other schools in respect of the relation of knowledge to its cause. Resemblance between a cause and its effect is the watch-word of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.[178] Does then a cognition resemble its cause? According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the objects of the external world are directly and immediately presented to us in our determinate perception; there is no mediacy of any mental image of the object between us and the object. There being no mental image of the object, it is held that its cognition, and for that matter, all knowledge is formless (*nirākāra*). This is a necessary corollary of the theory of immediate and direct perception of an object. If the form grasped in our determinate perception is the external object itself, its cognition, apart from the object, will have to be regarded as formless. If, on the other hand, there is a mental image (and not the object itself)

177 *Supra*, II. 1. (vi).

178 Dravya-guṇayoḥ sajātīyārambhaktvaṁ sādharmyam. VS. I. i. 9.

present in our determinate perception, as the Buddhist holds, the external reality will necessarily be formless—a bare reality of the Buddhist conception. Thus, the cause, i.e., the external reality and its effect, i.e., the thought-image, are dissimilar. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, cognition (i.e., determinate perception) is formless, but its cause, the object, has a form, and thus, according to that school also, the cause and its effect are dissimilar. Dissimilarity between a cause and its effect may have some justification in the Buddhist theory of causation, but none in that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

So far we have spoken of the determinate perception which is in some way related to external reality. But what about the pure imaginative knowledge or the memory-images of past things where there is no contact with the external object? Obviously, the image of an object is present in these cases, though less vivid. If all knowledge were formless, what would be the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explanation of the form of a memory-image? The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that even in these cases knowledge as such is formless. But the question is: where does the form of the memory-image come from? There is no object present, and memory can have no relation with an object which is not present. Here the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika with its typical boldness declares that the relation of the memory with the object is known as *viṣayatā* which means 'to be its object'. It is nothing but tautology, because *viṣayatā* can be no relation at all. Every relation requires that the two things which are related should be present, but the object with which the relation of *viṣayatā* is sought to be established is not present; it might have even become extinct. As a matter of fact, the theory that knowledge is formless has been accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school also somewhat hesitatingly. It has been referred to only incidentally here and there. It has not been discussed in all its bearings in any of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises. The fact that a memory-image of an object is actually present in our thought even without the object being there, suggests that the form belongs to the thought and not to the external reality. The latter only adds vividness to the thought-image on account of which a determinate perception is differentiated from a mere memory-image.[26]

26 This is in accord with the theory of the Dignāga school.

Chapter X

SAMAVĀYA—A UNIQUE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA CONCEPT

1. RELATION BETWEEN INSEPARABLES

As already noted, there are some peculiar Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories which are not shared by any other system. Some of these theories are: that qualities and movements have their essence separate from that of the substances in which they reside; that the universal which constitutes the very nature of a particular is an entity quite different and separate from its particulars; that the threads and a piece of cloth (the cause and the effect) are two different substances. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, true to its basic principle, insists that whatever comes into the range of our experience must have its counterpart in the external world. It avers that in a cognition like 'cloth is white', whiteness appears as an entity separate from the cloth in which it is experienced as residing. An object of our experience which is one integral whole is thus resolved into two components. That being so, there must be some device to unite them once again. That device was conceived in the form of inherent relation called *samavāya*. Paradoxical though it may seem, the function of *samavāya* is to relate two entities which are inseparable. This

relation, again, according to the principle that every small bit of our experience must have its counterpart in the external world, is held to be an external objective reality. Thus, not only are there two separate objective entities, cloth and whiteness; there is, besides them, a third entity, the relation between them which is yet another objective reality. If the first five categories, substance, quality, etc., are the bricks of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika structure, the mortar to unite them is provided by the sixth category, *samavāya*. It is the *sine qua non* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysical structure which makes it possible for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school to hold qualities and movement to be entities separate from their substance, and to hold the jar and jar-*ness* (*ghaṭa* and *ghaṭatva*) to be two realities, different in their *essence*. Above all, it is the magic of *samavāya* which enables the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to regard threads and cloth as two different substances, and to reconcile somehow the violation of the fundamental principle that two material substances cannot occupy the same space. It is again the miracle of *samavāya* which makes an inherent cause, say yarn, to retain its essence to itself in entirety and yet to produce, in some mysterious way, a new essence of its effect (cloth).[1] In short, *samavāya* is a unique device to meet all the predicaments and contradictions involved in the metaphysical structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika. *Samavāya* has been defined as "the relation between two inseparables (*ayuta-siddhas*)." As to what constitutes inseparableness is an intricate and disputed point which is dealt with later in this chapter.

2. BASIC CONFLICT WITH THE BUDDHIST

In connection with the conception of relations, another basic conflict of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school with the Buddhist comes to the forefront. According to the Buddhist, all reality consists of detached, disconnected and discrete bits called moments (*kṣaṇas*), and all relations of those bits of reality are only mental and unreal. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, holds all relations to be objective realities. When one substance is connected with another, as in the case of 'a man

1 *Supra*, V. 2.

with a stick', the connection subsisting between the two substances, the man and the stick, is an objective reality existing in the external world apart from the two objects connected by it. A separate entity called 'connection' (*saṁyoga*) is conceived as a quality, which, although by itself *one*, resides simultaneously in the two substances connected by it. The relation called 'connection' (*saṁyoga*) subsists between two substances occupying two different spaces. *Samavāya*, on the other hand, is a relation which subsists between two entities occupying the same space. For instance, the *samavāya* relation subsists between a substance and its qualities, movement, etc., or between two substances standing in the relation of cause and effect or what is the same, in the relation of parts and their 'whole' (*avayavas* and *avayavin*). But *samavāya* is not a quality like *saṁyoga* (connection); it is an entity of its own kind, a separate category. Inasmuch as *saṁyoga* is a quality, it resides by *samavāya* relation in the two substances which it connects. It would thus appear that *saṁyoga*, which connects two substances, is itself related to them by *samavāya*. This shows how the Nyāya-Vaiśesika went on boldly heaping one reality upon another as a counterpart of every phase of our experience. This is realism with a vengeance which stands in radical conflict with the idealism of the Buddhist. But could the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika go the whole length? A question naturally arises: if a relation called *saṁyoga* requires another relation, called *samavāya*, to subsist in the substances which it relates, *samavāya* should also, by the same logic, require some other relation to subsist in the entities which are related by it. That would mean a series of relations *ad infinitum*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, therefore, declares that *samavāya is a sort of* absolute relation which does not require any other relation for its own subsistence in the objects. On this question, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was vehemently attacked by the Buddhist and others.

3. SAMAVĀYA AND THE THEORY OF CAUSATION

It has been stated that the realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is based, amongst other things, on its theory of causation, called the theory of 'non-existent effect' (*asat-kārya-vāda*). According to that theory, the cause and the effect, e.g., threads and

cloth are two separate substances, of which the latter resides in the former by inherent relation (*samavāya*). That relation makes it possible for the two different and separate substances "to occupy the same space."[2] Śrīdhara says: "They appear as blended together like an iron ball and fire."[3] It is for this reason that the material cause is designated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system as the *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, i.e., the cause which contains its effect within it by *samavāya* relation. The *samavāya* relation is thus the basis of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation.

The conception of *samavāya* seems to have originated in connection with the theory of causation. It explains the subsistence of an effect in its cause, or in other words, the subsistence of one substance in another substance in such a way that both of them occupy the same space. In all probability, the conception of *samavāya* at first originated in connection with the relation of cause and effect. Kanāda does not speak of qualities, movements or universals to be residing in their substances by *samavāya* relation. He defines *samavāya* as "that which produces in respect of cause and effect the notion of this being contained in that."[4] The *samavāya* thus makes the relation of cause and effect as that of the container and the contained (*ādhāra* and *ādheya*). It appears that once the relation of *samavāya* was established in connection with the theory of causation, its scope was extended to the subsistence of qualities, movement, or universals in their substances; and at a later stage, when a separate category *viśeṣa* was formulated, it was also held to be residing in atoms or other eternal substances by the same relation. In the case of non-eternal qualities and movements, the substance, in which non-eternal qualities and movements reside by inherent relation, was regarded as their *samavāyi-kāraṇa* on the analogy of the 'whole' and its parts, the whole' subsisting in its parts by inherent relation (*samavāya*).

It is clear that full significance of the intricate structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics was not realised by the later

2 .....*deśa-bhedaś ca tayor nāsti*. NM. Part I. p. 285. line 10.

3 *Atra saṁbandhināv ayaḥ-pinda-vahnivat piṇḍībhūtāv eva pratīyete*. NK. p. 316 line 15.

4 Ihedam iti yataḥ kārya-kāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ. VS. VII. ii. 26.

Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers. Viśvanātha declares that *samavāya* is assumed as a separate category for the sake of brevity (*lāghava*).[5] He points out if an effect were held to be subsisting in its cause, or qualities, etc., subsisting in their substances by the very nature of their substrata (instead of by *samavāya* relation), then the substrata being endless, relations would also be endless. It would, thus, lead to needless multiplication of assumptions (*kalpanā-gaurava*), and therefore, for the sake of brevity, it was better to assume *one* separate relation called *samavāya*.[6] Little did these later writers realize that the theory of *samavāya* was not conceived for the sake of brevity, but that it was the very basis of the entire Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysical structure.

4. EXPOSITION OF SAMAVĀYA BY ŚRĪDHARA

Now we shall proceed to show briefly how the theory of *samavāya* has been explained by the three principal exponents of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Śrīdhara, Jayanta and Vācaspatimiśra. We shall take up Śrīdhara first, because he incorporates the views of the other two also. Concluding the discourse on *samavāya*, he summarises the theory in a mnemonic verse (*kārikā*) thus: "That relation should be understood as *samavāya* which causes different and separate entities to blend together. It precludes the independent existence of one of them."[7] Effect, quality, movement, universal and *viśeṣa* are never found existing independently of their substrata.

The last point that the effect, quality, etc., never exist independently of their substrata will be further amplified, when the nature of inseparableness (*ayuta-siddhi*) will be discussed. As

5 Ananta-svarūpānāṁ saṁbandhatva-kalpane gauravāl lāghavād eka-samavāya-siddhih. NSM. on verse 11.

6 It is, however, doubtful if the assumption of samavāya actually leads to brevity. As a matter of fact, acceptance of a new category involves more assumptions *(gaurava)* than the acceptance of the relation in the form of the substrata which, although endless, do not involve the assumption of a new category.

7 Parasparopasaṁśleso bhinnānāṁ yat-kṛto bhavet,
Samavāyaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ svātantrya-pratirodhakah.
NK p 330. For fuller explanation of the last point of the verse, see section 5 below.

for the first part of the statement that in the case of inherent relation (*samavāya*), the two related entities appear as if blended together, Śrīdhara establishes the point by contrasting the nature of 'inherent relation' (*samavāya*) with that of 'connection' (*saṁyoga*). It would, therefore, be desirable to note some of the points of distinction between *samavāya* and *saṁyoga*.

5. SAMAVĀYA DISTINGUISHED FROM SAMYOGA

Firstly, connection (*saṁyoga*) obtains exclusively between two substances, as between a stick and a person while inherent relation (*samavāya*) does so (i) between two substances, as in the case of an effect residing in its cause, (ii) between a substance and a non-substance as in the case of a qualities, movement, universal, or *viśeṣa* residing in a substance, and (iii) between two non-substances, as in the case of a universal residing in qualities and movement. Secondly, connection (*saṁyoga*) exists between two substances which can be separated, whereas the inherent relation (*samavāya*) exists between two entities which cannot be separated. A man and a stick which are related by *saṁyoga* can be separated but, of the cause and the effect which are related by *samavāya*, the effect cannot be separated from its cause, i.e., a cloth cannot exist independently of threads. Thirdly, there is another difference between these two kinds of relation. In the case of *samavāya*, the two entities necessarily stand in the relation of the container and the contained (*ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva*). That which cannot exist without the other is always the contained (*ādheya*), and the other which can exist independently is always the container, the substratum, e.g., effect, qualities, etc., are always the contained and the substance in which they reside is the container or the substratum. In the case of the universal residing in qualities and movement, the universal is the contained, and the qualities and movement are the container or the substrata. But in the case of *saṁyoga*, the two substances connected by it are not *necessarily* in the relation of the container and the contained. In the instance of 'the fruits in the basket', there does exist the relation of the container and the contained, but in the instance of the 'two connected sticks' that relation does not exist; one of them is not the substratum of the other. *Praśastapāda* describes and

defines *samavāya* as "that relation which obtains between such inseparables as are in the relation of the container and the contained, and cause the notion of the latter existing in the former."[8]

Śrīdhara answers an opponent who raises a question as to why a universal like cow-*ness* be held to be different from an individual cow, when the two are not cognized as two separate objects but as only one. He says: "As to the undivided cognition in the form 'this is a cow' (in which there is no distinction between the individual cow and its universal cow-*ness*), the cognition is due to the efficacy of *samavāya*. In *saṁyoga*, on the other hand, there is the cognition of the *relation* between the two (and hence also a cognition of two) *separate objects*, but it is the magic power of *samavāya* that the two objects which are related by it appear as if they were blended together like an iron ball and fire."[9] What Śrīdhara brings out here is that in the case of *saṁyoga*, the two related objects distinctly appear to be two, but in the *samavāya* relation, although in reality they are two, they appear as one, and further, it is also the peculiar nature of *samavāya* that one of the two objects related by it never exists independently of the other. The question is why and how *samavāya* makes the two objects appear as one, and why, at the same time, they are also cognized as two. In the case of qualities, movement, universals and *viśeṣa* residing in a substance, the explanation may be put forward that being non-substances, they have their abode in a substance, and looked at from the point of view of their substratum, the two appear as one. The difficulty, however, arises in the case of parts and the 'whole' (the cause and the effect) which are held to be two substances, and which, as such, should not appear as one. The explanation of the contradiction is that the two substances when they occupy the same space appear as one for the simple reason that our intellect is habituated to think that two substances must occupy two different spaces. Of all

8 Ayuta-siddhānām ādhāryādhāra-bhūtānāṁ yaḥ saṁbandha iha pratyaya-hetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ. PP. p. 14.

9 Yat punar gaur ity ayam avibhāgena saṁvedanaṁ tat samavāya-sāmarthyāt; saṁyoge hi dvyayoḥ samsargāvabhāsaḥ, samavāvasya punar esa mahimā yad atra sambandhināv ayaḥ-piṇḍa-vahnivat piṇḍībhūtāv eva pratiyete. NK. p. 316. line 13.

the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers, it is only Jayanta who has explicitly laid down that the two substances related by *samavāya* occupy the same space.[10] Occupation of the same space by two objects is conceivable when one of the objects related by *samavāya* is a substance and the other is a non-substance, e.g., quality, etc. But how can it be possible in the case of two material substances (parts and the 'whole') to occupy the same space? The only answer that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school can give is that this miracle is wrought by *samavāya* owing to its magic power.

6. EXPOSITION OF SAMAVĀYA BY JAYANTA

In connection with the discussion on the relation between a universal and its individuals, Jayanta introduces an opponent who declares that the very idea of a relation between two inseparables is self-contradictory. "How can inseparableness (*ayuta-siddhatā*) and relationship be reconciled? Only those objects which exist separately like a basket and a plum, or a man and a woman, can be related to one another. Inseparable things, however, being one and identical, which of them can be related to what?"[11] Another absurdity is to hold a substance and its qualities as two different entities, and to imagine a relation existing between them. This point has already been dealt with in the chapters on substance and qualities. Jayanta answers the opponent in a mnemonic verse (*kārikā*) thus:

"There is certainly a difference (between parts and the 'whole', or a substance and its qualities, etc.) which is proved on account of its being cognized by us, but the difference of the space (occupied by two such things, as parts and the 'whole,' or a substance and its qualities, etc.) cannot be accepted, and, therefore, the relation of subsistence called *samavāya* must be assumed in such cases."[12]

10 *See* n. 2 of this chapter.

11 Ayuta-siddhatā ca saṁbandhaś ceti kathaṁ saṁgacchate, pṛthak-siddhe hi vastuni kuṇḍa-badaravad anyonyam saṁbadhyete stri-pumsavad vā. *Ayuta-siddhe tu tad ekatvāt kim kena saṁbadhyate.* NM. Part I. p. 272 line 21.

12 *Pratīti-bhedād bhedo 'sti deśa-bhedas tu neṣyate,*
Tenātra kalpyate vṛttiḥ samavāyaḥ sa ucyate
NM. Part I. p. 285. line 7.

The argument of Jayanta is a nutshell is: we directly apprehend such pairs as parts and their 'whole' or a substance and its qualities. They occupy one and the same space which means that one of them must be subsisting in the other. It becomes, therefore necessary to assume an extraordinary relation (*samavāya*) to explain the subsistence of one of the pair in the other. Obviously, Jayanta has struck here a basic point of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position.

7. PROOF OF SAMAVĀYA GIVEN BY VĀCASPATIMIŚRA

Vācaspatimiśra adduced the following argument to establish the *samavāya*: "Parts and their 'whole', qualities and their substrata, movements and their substrata, universals and their individuals, are experienced as mutually related, otherwise cognitions and expressions like 'cloth in the threads,' 'white cloth', 'cloth is moving' or 'cloth is a substance,' would not be possible. If it be objected that in the instances like 'white cloth' and others, there is the cognition of a common substratum (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), and not of any relation, it may be questioned as to what is meant by a common substratum. If common substratum means identity, then in that case the cognition and assertion of a second thing will be a mere repetition. Intelligent people do not consider it to be a repetition, because having cognized one of the two members of a pair (parts and their 'whole,' etc.), they want to know the other. And an object which is one cannot consist of two objects, because duality, being the substratum of difference and being invariably associated with it, cannot subsist in one object. It will involve contradiction. It is, therefore, clear that in such cases as 'white cloth,' etc., there are two different objects which are mutually *related;* but they are experienced as having a common substratum (i.e., identical). Without a relation between them, that experience (of identity) will be as impossible as in the case of two different objects like a cow and a horse."[13]

Vācaspatimiśra then proceeds to explain the difference between the two kinds of subsistence. One of them is in the form of

13 For the text "Avayavāvayavinau.....tad anupapatteḥ.", see Text Appendix.

having a common substratum (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), as in the above instances where the subsistence is called *samavāya* relation. The other kind of subsistence is seen in the instances like 'curd in a vessel', where the two objects are experienced as separate entities (*vaiyadhikaraṇyena*), which is a case of *saṁyoga* relation. Vācaspatimiśra has put forward, more or less, the argument of Jayanta in a somewhat different way. According to Vācaspatimiśra, parts and the 'whole,' or a substance and its qualities appear as two *related* objects, and despite the fact that they appear as identical, they must be regarded as separate entities on account of there being two separate cognitions and two separate expressions. And further, the two related things which appear as identical have an extra-ordinary relation called *samavāya* which is to be differentiated from connection (*saṁyoga*). Obviously, common substratum (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) here means nothing but the occupation of the same space.[14]

SAMAVĀYA DOES NOT SUBSIST BY ANY OTHER RELATION

When it is said that a 'whole' in its parts, or qualities in their substance, reside by *samavāya* relation, it implies that *samavāya* which relates the two must also reside in both of them. But, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, only the container (i.e., the parts or the substance) is spoken of as *samavāyin* (i.e., containing something in it by *samavāya* relation), while the contained entity (i.e., the 'whole' or the qualities) is spoken of as *samaveta* (contained in something by *samavāya relation*). In the case of the relation called connection (*saṁyoga*), there is no such distinction. In the instance of 'a man with a stick,' both the 'man' and the 'stick' may be spoken of as *saṁyogin* (having the relation of *saṁyoga*) or as *saṁyukta*

14 'Adhikarana,' 'āśraya,' or 'deśa' in the case of samavāya relation usually means the substratum in which something resides and not the space. For instance, parts are the adhikaraṇa (substratum) of the 'whole' or the substance is the substratum of its qualities. In this sense parts and their 'whole,' or a substance and its qualities do not have a common substratum (samānādhikarana), because while the 'whole' like cloth resides in its parts, the threads, the latter reside in their own parts called 'aṁśus' (fibres of cotton) or, while the white colour of a cloth resides in the cloth, the latter resides in its parts, i.e., the threads, and thus the adhikaraṇas are different in both the cases.

(connected by *saṁyoga*). The reason of this difference between *samavāya* and *saṁyoga* has already been explained.[15] Praśastapāda says, rather inadvertently; "The property of being *samavāyin* belongs to all the first five categories"[16] (substance, quality, movement, universal and *viśeṣa*). Śrīdhara corrects this statement by explaining that here the property of being *samavāyin* only means subsistence by *samavāya* relation[17] (i.e., the property of being *samaveta* which belongs to all the five categories.[18]

Be it as it may, inherent relation (*samavāya*) must be held to be subsisting in the container, i.e., there must be *samavāya* of the 'whole' in its parts, or the *samavāya* of colour in a substance on account of which the parts or the substance is said to be *samavāyin* (i.e., containing something by *samavāya* relation). But here arises a difficulty, reference to which has already been made. By what relation will *samavāya* itself subsist in an object?[19] If it be by another *samavāya* or some other relation, that will lead to a process *ad infinitum*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, therefore, holds that *samavāya* does not require any other relation for its subsistence. It subsists by itself. Commenting on Praśastapāda's characterisation of *samavāya* as independent (*svatantra*), Śrīdhara says that *samavāya* "being independent does not subsist by any other relation as connection (*saṁyoga*) does."[20] It means that connection (*saṁyoga*), which itself resides in the objects (which it connects) by inherent relation (*samavāya*), is dependent on those objects inasmuch as it is their quality. But *samavāya* is not a quality or property of any other object on which it may be said to be dependent; it is a separate category. The question as to the relation by which *samavāya* subsists in the container (*ādhāra*) is not, however, answered.

15 See sect. 5 of this chapter.

16 Dravyādinām pañcānāṁ samavāyitvam. PP. p. 16. line 19.

17 Samavāyitvaṁ samavāya-laksanā vṛttiḥ. NK. p. 16.

18 A substance when in the form of an effect or 'whole' is 'samaveta' (residing by samavāya relation) in its cause (parts).

19 *Supra*, X. 2.

20 Svatantraḥ, saṁyogavat saṁbandhāntareṇa na vartate. NK. p. 328. line 5.

Moreover, if inherent relation (*samavāya*) subsists in the container which on that account is called a *samavāyin*, it should be held to be the property of the container, and there must be some relation by which that property would subsist therein. A bold answer, if it may be called an answer at all, comes from Uddyotakara. To the question "Why is *samavāya* regarded as independent (*sva-tantra*)?", he replies: "It is because it has no other *samavāya* relation for its subsistence. Whatever subsists elsewhere must subsist by some relation, and therefore, *samavāya* (which has no relation for its subsistence) does not subsist anywhere."[21] Uddyotakara proceeds to establish that "*samavāya* is not 'subsistent' (*āśrita*) anywhere."[22] The argument that Uddyotakara has advanced in this context is characteristic of his method of debate. He argues that *samavāya* does not subsist anywhere because it can be designated by the term *pañca-padārtha-vṛtti*. Whatever can be designated by that term does not subsist anywhere, as for instance, an atom.[23] That term is, however, used here in two different senses. An atom is designated by the term when it is interpreted to mean: "in which there is the subsistence of five categories."[24] All the five categories reside in an atom (including substance which resides in the form of a *dvy-anuka*). *Samavāya* is also designated by the same term, but in that case, it is interpreted to mean something different, i.e., the 'relation of five categories."[25] Even Vācaspati-miśra, notwithstanding his reverence for Uddyotakara, was constrained to have a fling at his argument: "In that way it can be argued that because a cow and speech are both designated by the word go, speech should also possess horns like the cow."[26]

Uddyotakara goes a step further. When confronted with

21 Katham punah svatantrah? Samavāyāntarābhāvāt, yad dhi yatra vartate tad vṛttyā vartate, na ca samavāyasya vṛttir asti. NV. p. 168. line 9.

22 Anāśritah samavāyah. NV. p. 169. line 2.

23 Pañca-padārtha-vṛtti-śabda-viṣayatvāt paramāṇuvat. NV. p. 168. line 12.

24 Here it is expounded as Bahuvrihi: pañcānām padārthānām vṛttir yasmin.

25 Here it is expounded as Tat-puruṣa: pancānāh padārthānāh vṛttih, i e , the relation of five categories

26 Mā bhūd go-śabda-sāmyena vāg-ādīnām api viṣāṇitvam. NVT. p 169. line 12.

the question, if *samavāya* does not subsist anywhere, why is there a notion of the inherence (*samavāya*) of cloth in the threads. He answers again in his typical manner: "That notion (of subsistence of *samavāya*) is an illusion."[27] Uddyotakara, of course, is the solitary instance of a Nyāya-Vaiśesika writer who holds that *samavāya* does not subsist anywhere. Other writers merely maintain that *samavāya* does not subsist in its substratum by another relation. They never say that it does not subsist at all. Praśastapāda, however, includes *samavāya* also in the list of the entities which are subsistent (*āśrita*) in some object.[28] Commenting on this inclusion, Śrīdhara says that subsistence (*āśritatva*) here means 'being cognized as dependent'.[29] Obviously, this contradicts Śrīdhara's own statement that *samavāya* is 'independent' (*sva-tantra*). The position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has been stated by Praśastapāda: "*Samavāya* has got no other relation of subsistence; it is itself in the nature of the relation of subsistence (*vṛtti*)".[30] Śrīdhara remarks: "It is not true that *samavāya* which has no relation of subsistence does not subsist in an object. Being itself in the nature of a relation, it subsists in an object by itself (without the need of any other relation)."[31]

9. PERCEPTION OF SAMAVĀYA

Now we are in a position to appreciate the full significance of an internal controversy of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school. The followers of the Nyāya school hold that *samavāya* is perceptible while, those of the Vaiśesika deny it.[32] The reason for this difference of opinion between the two allied schools is not usually appreciated. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, an object can be perceived only if it comes in contact with the

27 Mithyā-pratyaya evaiṣa iti. NV. p. 484, line 21.

28 Āśritatvaṁ cānyatra nitya-dravyebhyaḥ. PP. p. 16. line 9.

29 Āśritatvaṁ ca para-tantratayopalabdhiḥ. NK p 16 line 10.

30 Samavāyasya nānyā vṛttir asti tasmāt svātma-vṛttiḥ. PP. p. 329. line 1.

31 Vṛtty-abhāvān na vartata ity etan na, tādātmyād vṛtty-ātmakatvāt svata evāyam vṛttir iti NK. p. 329, line 23.

32 Samavāyasya pratyakṣa-varnanam nyāya-matena, vaiśeṣikamate tu samavāyo 'tīndriyaḥ. TK. p. 8. line 20.

sense. Senses being substances can have contact in the form of connection (*saṁyoga*) only with other substances. In the case of the perception of non-substances, i.e., qualities or universals residing in qualities, indirect contacts are postulated. For instance, in the perception of the universal, 'colour-*ness* (*rūpatva*), residing in the colour of a jar, the form of the contact is 'inherence in a thing which is inherent in a connected substance' (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*, i.e., connected-inherent-inherence). There is inherence (*samavāya*) of colour-*ness* in the colour which is inherent (*samaveta*) in the jar (the substance) which is connected with the eye. Six kinds of such contacts are accepted in the system. The sixth of these contacts is called 'the relation of being an attribute' (*viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*) which is accepted in the case of the perception of non-existence (*abhāva*). It is held that if any object, substance or non-substance, comes in contact with the sense by any of the first five forms of contact, and if there resides in that object any non-existence as its attribute, the non-existence is perceived by the sixth form of contact, i.e., *viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*.

The followers of the Nyāya school point out that *samavāya* is also an attribute of the object in which something resides by that relation, and that *samavāya* also, like non-existence, is perceived by the sixth kind of contact. It appears that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conceived the sixth kind of contact mainly to uphold the perception of non-existence against the Mīmāṁsaka who emphatically denied it. According to the Mīmāṁsaka, non-existence is comprehended by a separate means of knowledge called the non-apprehension or the non-existence of apprehension (*anupalabdhi* or *abhāva-pramāṇa*). In the *Tarka-bhāṣā* of Keśavamiśra, a Mīmāṁsaka opponent points out that 'to be an attribute' (*viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*) is no relation at all, because a real objective relation must be different from the objects related by it, and 'to be an attribute' is not different from the attribute itself. Keśavamiśra does not rebut that assertion of the Mīmāṁsaka, but meets the objection by pointing out that the principle—that only the objects in contact with the sense can be perceived—is applicable only in the case of positive objects. Non-existence being a negative entity may be perceived even without sense-

object contact, merely by being an attribute.[33] Now, if only negative objects are perceived through this sixth contact, *samavāya* not being negative, cannot be perceived through this form of contact. Strangely enough, Kśavamiśra himself overlooked the implication of his own statement, and true to his allegiance to the Nyāya school, maintained, while describing the sixth kind of contact, that *samavāya* was also perceived through that (*viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*) contact.[34]

The reason of the difference of opinion on this point between the two schools, in all probability, was this: The Vaiśeṣika school, which was responsible for developing the metaphysical structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, realised the difficulties in explaining the subsistence of *samavāya* in an object as discussed in the previous section. The Vaiśeṣika school was conscious of the difficulty in establishing a sense-contact with the *samavāya*, and was, therefore, content to hold *samavāya* to be merely inferable. The statement of *Praśastapāda* to the effect that *samavāya* is itself in the nature of subsistence and has no other relation of subsistence has been quoted in the previous section. In the same context he says: "*Samavāya* is imperceptible, because it has no relation of subsistence, as is found in the universal existence (*sattā*) which resides by *samavāya* relation in the objects that are perceptible."[35] The Nyāya school, on the other hand, was not fully conscious of these difficulties, and therefore, on the analogy of the perception of non-existence, it held that *samavāya* could also be perceived through the sixth form of contact.

10. SAMAVĀYA AS ONE AND ETERNAL

The category of *samavāya* having been established, the question arose whether it should be regarded as eternal or non-

33 Bhāvāvacchinnatvād vyāpter, bhāvaṁ prakāśayad indriyaṁ prāptam eva prakāśayati na tu abhāvam. Abhāvaṁ prakāśayad indriyaṁ viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva-mukhenaiveti. TB. p. 53. line 1.

34 Evaṁ samavāyo 'pi, cakṣuḥ-saṁbaddhasya tantor viśeṣaṇa-bhūtaḥ (viśeṣya-bhūtaḥ as printed in the text is wrong) pata-samavāyo gṛhyate—iha tantuṣu paṭa-samavāya iti. TB. p. 36. line 1.

35 Ata evātīndriyaḥ sattādīnām iva pratyakṣeṣu vṛtty-abhāvāt. PP. p. 329. line 2.

eternal. In the latter case, it would necessarily be multiple, and, as it would be an effect, the question of its causation would also have to be confronted. And, as the category in question is of a positive nature, all the three causes will have to be assigned to it,[36] and there would arise insurmountable difficulties in the assumption of the three causes. *Samavāya is*, therefore, held to be eternal. A category which is beset with many contradictions could only be assumed as eternal, which assumption offered an easy escape from all the problems. Now, if *samavāya is* eternal, it can only be *one*, for endless eternal *samavāyas*, each concerned with endless non-eternal effect-objects, would present many difficulties.

The *samavāya is* thus held to be eternal and one. But here also some objections are raised. Praśastapāda, who usually avoids controversial matter, refers to an objection: "If *samavāya* is one, the *samavāya* of *dravyatva* (the universal of substance) and that of *guṇatva* (the universal of quality) being the same, the universal *dravyata* will reside in the qualities also, and *guṇatva* in the substances also. This will give rise to confusion of objects."[37] To this Praśastapāda replies: "Although *dravyatva* and *guṇatva* have the same *samavāya*, there is the difference of potentiality of manifestation (*vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-śakti*), on account of which there will be a restriction in the relation of the container and the contained (*ādhāra* and *ādheya*)."[38] Śrīdhara adds that "the potentiality of manifesting *dravyatva* resides only in substances, and therefore, the universal *dravyatva* will reside by *samavāya* relation only in substances and nowhere else."[39] It would mean that besides the universal *dravyatva* which resides in a substance, there is another attribute called 'the potentiality of manifesting *dravyatva*' which

36 In the case of non-existence which is of negative nature, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that all the three causes are not necessary. The operation of 'nimitta-kāraṇa' alone produces it.

37 Nanu yady-ekaḥ samavāyo dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṁ dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvādi-viśeṣaṇaiḥ saha saṁbandhaikatvāt padārtha-saṁkara-prasaṅga iti. PP. p. 327. line 9.

38 Dravyatvādīnām api samavāyaikatve 'pi vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-śakti-bhedād ādhārādheya-niyama iti. PP. p. 327. line 19.

39 Dravyatvābhivyañjikā śaktir dravyāṇām eva tena dravyeṣv eva dravyatvaṁ samavaiti nānyatra. NK. p. 328. line 17.

also resides in substances side by side with *dravyatva*. This is another instance which shows how exponents of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were apt to make any number of bold assumptions to meet a difficult situation. Obviously, the answer of Praśastapāda to the objection in question is not convincing at all. Viśvanātha in his *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī* meets the objection that *samavāya* being one, the *samavāya* of colour should be present in the air also, by pointing out: "Although the *samavāya* of *colour* is present in the air, yet there is no *colour* in the air,"[40] and, therefore, there is no cognition of colour. But all this is mere verbal jugglery. How can *samavāya* of colour be conceived without the presence of colour?

The *samavāya* being eternal and one, the question arises whether it is omnipresent also. The same question arose in connection with the universal as well.[41] The answer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in that context is not clearly defined.[42] This important question has not been tackled in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises in respect of *samavāya*. The universals are endless in number, and therefore the question of omnipresence arises with reference to everyone of the individual universals. If the omnipresence of everyone of the endless individual universals can be contemplated, there is greater reason to accept the omnipresence of inherent relation (*samavāya*) which is only *one* and which operates not only in the case of all universals, but also in the case of *viśeṣas*, movements, qualities and substances, which are endless in number. If the *samavāya*, besides being eternal and one, is accepted as omnipresent also, objection against the theory of *samavāya, namely, that a relation between two inseparables* is inconceivable, becomes even more forcible. For, it is not only a relation between two inseparables, but also a relation which is eternal and omnipresent.

11. DEFINITION OF INSEPARABLENESS (AYUTA-SIDDHI)

The problem of the nature or definition of 'inseparableness' which lies at the root of the theory of *samavāya* requires some

40 Tatra rūpa-samavāya-sattve 'pi rūpābhāvāt. NSM. on verse, 11.
41 *Supra*, IX. 10. n. 81.
42 *Supra*, IX. n. 82.

elucidation. Obviously, any two entities which cannot be separated and are always found as if blended together are said to be inseparable (*ayuta-siddha*). But there are difficulties about it. Every object, for instance, is inseparable from all-pervading things like ether, space, or time, but the relation between them is not that of *samavāya*, and therefore they cannot be regarded as 'inseparables' (*ayuta-siddhas*). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was thus confronted with the problem of finding a definition of inseparableness (*ayuta-siddhi*). It was defined negatively, i.e., by defining separableness (*yuta-siddhi*). The definition of *yuta-siddhi* is not given by Praśastapāda in the course of his preliminary treatment of *samavāya*, nor in the course of the examination of *samavāya* at the end of his treatise, but it occurs under the topic of disconnection (*vibhāga*).

It is held that the disconnection of cause and non-cause brings about the disconnection of effect and non-effect.[43] For instance, when, on account of motion, one's hand is disconnected from a point of ether, this disconnection produces the disconnection of the body also from that point of ether. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, disconnection of the hand from a particular point of ether is not the same thing as disconnection of the body from that point. They are two separate entities, the former being the cause of the latter. Here, the hand being a part of the body is the cause, and the body being the *whole* is its effect. The disconnection between the hand (cause) and ether (non-cause) brings about the disconnection between the body (effect) and ether (non-effect). This means that when the hand moves and produces its disconnection from ether, the body does not move with it. An objection is raised that inasmuch as the body is inherent (*samaveta*, i.e., subsisting by *samavāya* relation) in its part, the hand, the two are inseparable (*ayuta-siddha*) and, therefore, they should move together, otherwise it would lead to the separableness of the two. Praśastapāda says that the objection in question has been raised because the real nature of inseparableness has not

43 Kāraṇākāraṇa-vibhāgāt (kāryākārya-vibhāgaḥ). PP. p. 151. line 9.

been understood.[44] He then proceeds to define 'inseparableness' (*ayuta-siddhi*) negatively by defining separableness (*yuta-siddhi*). As inherent relation (*samavāya*) obtains in both eternal and non-eternal objects, inseparableness will also be present in both kinds of objects. Praśastapāda could not find a common definition of separableness which may be applicable to both the eternal and non-eternal objects. He gives two different definitions of separableness, one for the eternal and the other for non-eternal objects.

Separableness of the two eternal things has been defined by Praśastapāda as "the potentiality of both or any one of them to have separate movement".[45] 'Separate movement' has been explained by Śrīdhara as "the movement which is the cause of connection or disconnection of two objects."[46] For example, in the case of two eternal entities like ether and atom, the latter possesses the movement which is the cause of its connection with or disconnection from ether, and therefore, ether and atom are separable (*yuta-siddhas*). Similarly, in the case of two eternal entities like two atoms, both possess the movement which is the cause of their connection and disconnection, and therefore, the two atoms are separable (*yuta-siddhas*). The mutual relation therefore of ether and atom, or that of two atoms cannot be called to be of inherence. But in the case of an atom and its qualities, the atom does not possess the movement which can be the cause of their connection or disconnection, and hence they are not separable, i.e., they are inseparable (*ayuta-siddhas*); and the relation between them is, therefore, that of *samavāya*.

In the case of non-eternal entities, the separableness has been defined as 'inherence in separate substrata.'[47] For example, a piece of cloth and a jar have their inherence in separate substrata, viz., their parts, the threads and the pot-sherds, and, therefore, the cloth and the jar are separable, and their relation is not that of inherence.

44 Yadi kārana-vibhāgānantaraṁ kārya-vibhāgotpattiḥ kāraṇa-saṁyogānantaraṁ kārya-saṁyogotpattiḥ, nanv evam avayavāvayavinor yuta-siddhi-doṣa-prasaṅgaḥ, iti na, yuta-siddhy-aparijñānāt. PP. p 152. line 7.

45 Dvayor anyatarasya vā pṛthag gatimattvam. PP p. 152. line 10.

46 Paraspara-saṁyoga-vibhāga-hetubhūta-karma-.. NK. p. 160. line 7.

47 Yuteṣu āśrayeṣu samavāyaḥ. PP. p. 152. line 11.

Here the question arises why should there be two different definitions, one for the separableness of eternal objects and the other for that of the non-eternal ones. The former definition, i.e., "one or both of the related objects having the potentiality of separate movements" is applicable in the case of non-eternal objects also. For example, a piece of a cloth and a jar can have separate movements. But Praśastapāda points out a case of non-eternal objects to which that definition does not apply. For instance, the sense organ of touch (skin) and the body are held to be two separate objects whose relation is not that of inherence (*samavāya*)[48] but that of connection (*saṁyoga*), yet they cannot have separate movements. Hence, there arises the necessity of a separate definition which may cover all the cases of non-eternal objects. The new definition, viz., 'inherence in separate substrata' is applicable to both the sense organ of touch and the body which have inherence in separate substrata, viz., their respective constituent parts.[49] As for the definition of separability of non-eternals, it is obviously not applicable to eternal objects, for, the latter do not inhere in any substrata at all.

It may be pointed out that the definition of separability (*yuta-siddhi*) as 'inherence in separate substrata' is logically defective, because the word 'separate' (*yuta*) in the definition of separability (*yuta-siddhi*) should not have been used. Secondly, the words 'separate substrata' are important words in the definition. They cannot mean 'different substrata' because in that case separability will exist in the case of threads and cloth also. Their substrata, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeśika theory, are different; the cloth resides in threads and the threads in their constituent parts, viz., the fibres of cotton (*aṁśus*). Śrīdhara, therefore, amends the definition, and says that 'separability in the case of non-eternals is the *inherence* of one (of the related objects) in a different substratum of such a kind as excludes (even indirectly) the subsistence of the other therefrom.[50] In the example of threads and cloth, although they subsist in their different substrata, as stated above, one of them

48 Senses are not held to be parts of the body.

49 PP. p. 152 line 12.

50 Paraspara-parihārenānyatra āśrye samavāyo yuta-siddhiḥ. NK. p. 160, line 11.

(threads) subsist in its parts, viz., the fibres of cotton, from which (indirect) subsistence of cloth cannot be excluded. Here, the cloth subsists in threads which subsist in the fibres of cotton.

It appears that so far as material substances are concerned, their separability, as amended by Śrīdhara, is reduced to this; such material objects as occupy two different points of space are separable. For instance, the cloth and the jar occupy two different points of space, and therefore, they are separable, but the threads and the cloth (though, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, they are two different corporeal substances) occupy the same space, and therefore, they are not separable. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika speaks of a material object having its substratum or abode (*ādhāra* or *deśa*), not in space, but only in its inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). The Buddhist, in conformity with modern science, holds that a characteristic of matter (*rūpa*) is its impenetrability (*sapratighatva*) which means that space occupied by one material object cannot, at the same time, be occupied by another.[51] The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, says with regard to four kinds of material substances (*kārya-dravyas*, earth, water, etc.) that their occupying of the same place (*samāna-deśatā*) is precluded in the sense that only *one* material object can subsist by inherent relation (*samavāya*) in the same cause-substratum. For example, cloth subsists in its cause, the threads, by *samavāya* relation, and therefore, no other material object can subsist in the *same threads* by the same relation.[52] But so far as the occupation of space is concerned, not only do the threads and the cloth occupy the same space, but the inherent cause of the threads (fibres of cotton called *aṁśus*) and the inherent cause of the latter and so on up to *dvy-aṇukas*—a whole series of material objects in the form of cause and effect—occupy the same space. It will, thus, appear that matter, as it is understood by the Buddhist, is altogether excluded from the domain of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics.

51 Stcherbatsky: *Central Conception*, p. 11.

52 Dravyāṇām ekatra samavāyena samāna-deśatāṁ vyāsedhāmaḥ. NVT. p 1069. line 23. See *supra*, VI. 10 for a detailed discussion of this topic.

Chapter XI

NON-EXISTENCE AS REALITY

I. NEGATIVE REALITY CONCEIVED

The principle that every experience has its counterpart in the external world was carried, as already stated, to its extreme limit by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. When we see a piece of ground without a jar, we experience the absence of the jar in that place. Similarly, when a jar is destroyed, there is the experience of its destruction, i.e., its non-existence. Now, this experience must have its counterpart in the external world, i.e., the non-existence of the jar should have an objective reality. Howsoever contradictory it may seem, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika actually holds that non-existence exists (*abhāvaḥ asti*).

The theory of the reality of non-existence is implied in the very conception of the causal theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika known as *asat-kārya-vāda* which is opposed to the *sat-kārya-vāda* of the Sāṁkhya.[1] According to the latter, a jar is not non-existent before its production or after its destruction. It exists in its unmanifested state even before its production and after its destruction. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, holds that

1 I am indebted for this idea to Pt. Gopināth Kavirāja See his article on the History and Bibliography of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Literature (*Sarasvati Bhavana Studies*, vol. III. p. 117).

a jar is non-existent before its production as well as after its destruction. But the non-existence is a reality of a negative kind. A statement, like 'there is no jar' (*ghaṭo nāsti*) with reference to a jar before its production and after its destruction, refers to two *negative realities*, called *prāg-abhāva* and *dhvaṁsābhāva*. The non-existence here is thus not unreal like a hare's horn or a sky-flower. It is a negative reality. Thus, the reality of an object before its production and after its destruction, though *prima facie* repudiated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is introduced through the backdoor. Be it as it may, the existence or reality, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is of two kinds: positive (*bhāva-rūpa*) and negative (*abhāva-rūpa*).[2] The six categories, from 'substance' to *samavāya*, which alone were accepted by the old orthodox Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, were held to be of a positive kind to which a seventh category 'non-existence' or 'negation' (*abhāva*) was added at a later period. The non-existence of an effect before its production and after its destruction were held to be two negative realities, (i) *prāg-abhāva* and (ii) *dhvaṁsābhāva*. Further, when an object was removed from a place, its disappearance was held to be a separate reality called (iii) *atyantābhāva*. Even non-identity of two different things, e.g., of a jar and a piece of cloth, was supposed to be a separate reality apart from those two things; it was called (iv) *anyonyābhāva*. In this way, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika postulated four kinds of negative realities.

The word *padārtha* which literally means 'the meaning of a word', or the mode of expression or thought, was originally restricted to that sense like its western synonym 'category'. But at a later period, it came to mean a reality, an objective existence (*vastu*). The Sanskrit term for unreality usually found in philosophical treatises is *tuccha* (also *avastu* or *apadārtha*). A hare's horn or a sky-flower is unreal (*tuccha*)—a mere verbal

2 Some writers render abhāva not as 'non-existence' but as 'negation'. The former seems to be more literal rendering, but inasmuch as 'abhāva' is held to be of a negative nature nisedhātman), the rendering 'negation' is also not inappropriate. If we render the term 'padārtha' as 'reality', the terms 'bhāva' and 'abhāva' may be rendered as 'existence' and 'non-existence', but if padārtha be rendered as 'existence' the terms 'bhāva' and 'abhāva' may be rendered as 'positive' and 'negative'.

expression, a figment of imagination, but the non-existence of an object is not unreal; its reality is not positive but only negative. All the same, it is an *objective* reality.

There were some thinkers within the realist fold, like Prabhākara, who refused to accept non-existence as a reality. Śrīdhara asks them: "What is the basis or support (*ālambana*) of the cognition of non-existence? If you say that it is nothing, then you yourself have lent a helping hand to Mahāyānists[3] who hold that ideas have no external basis."[4] Similarly, Jayanta expresses his sense of shame at the Prabhākara school which, although a Mīmāṁsaka (i.e., a realist), refuses to accept non-existence as a reality.[5]

2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF NON-EXISTENCE

All the later manuals of the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school including (i) *Tarka-saṁgraha*, (ii) *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvali*, (iii) *Tarka-kaumudī* of Laugākṣibhāskara, (iv) *Tarkāmṛta* of Jagadīśa Bhaṭṭācārya and (v) *Pramāṇa-mañjarī* of Sarvadevasūri hold non-existence to be a category (*padārtha*). The first three of these manuals, following the lead of Śivāditya, speak of the categories as seven, non-existence being the last of them. But the last two scholiasts, following Udayanācārya, first divide the categories into two classes, existence and non-existence (*bhāva* and *abhāva*), and then put the original six categories in the former class and the seventh in the latter. All the above-named manuals follow the Vaiśeṣika's treatment of the categories. *Tarka-bhāsā* of Keśavamiśra, a Nyāya manual, enumerates only the six positive categories (*padārthas*) under the term *artha* which is one of the *prameyas* of the Nyāya. Later on, he mentions that there is a seventh category of the negative type also. Similar is the case with Varadarāja's *Tārkika-rakṣā*, which is another Nyāya manual.

3 Vijñāna-vādins of the Yogācāra school belonged to the Mahāyāna fold of Buddhism.

4 Nāstīti-saṁvidaḥ kim ālambanam? Yadi na kiñcid, dattaḥ svahasto nirālambanaṁ vijñānam icchatāṁ mahāyānikānām. NK. p. 229. line 1.

5 Yais tu mīmāṁsakaiḥ sadbhir abhāvo nābhyupeyate,
Pramādenāmunā teṣāṁ vayam apy adya lajjitāḥ. NM. Part I. p 57.

As to the question who first introduced the non-existence (*abhāva*) as a separate category, the lead was given by Śivāditya and Udayanācārya who both belong to the tenth century. The very title of Śivāditya's work *Sapta-padārthī* indicates that he wrote it with the object of establishing seven categories in place of the original six. He may, therefore, be regarded as the pioneer who formally introduced the seventh category in the syncretic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

A more pertinent question is as to where, for the first time, does the idea of non-existence as an 'objective reality' occur. So far as I am aware, the first clear indication of this idea is met with in the *Nyāya-vārtika* of Uddyotakara in connection with the discussion on the sense-object-contact (*sannikarsa*). It is stated there that *samavāya* and *abhāva* are perceived through the sixth contact called *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva* (the relation of attribute and substantive).[6] The statement that non-existence is perceived by our senses is possible only if the non-existence is accepted as an external objective reality. Commenting on the statement of Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra adduces arguments to establish the reality of non-existence as separate from its substratum.[7] Jayanta gives a full discourse on the same topic.[8] Thus, Uddyotakara seems to be the first scholiast who assigned an objective reality to non-existence, which seems to have been first argued by Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta.

There is no indication of that theory in the *sūtras* of *Kaṇāda* or of Gotama, or even in the commentary of Vātsyāyana on the *Nyāya-sūtras* and the treatise of Praśastapāda on the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*. Some scholars think that Vātsyāyana also held that non-existence was an aspect of reality. Stcherbatsky remarks: "According to Vātsyāyana, (NBh. p. 2) existence and non-existence are two sides of reality. Everything can possess existence as well as non-existence. For this reason the amalgamated Nyāya-Vaiśesika school has added a seventh category, non-existence, to the six categories of the old Vaiśeṣika school. But this opinion did not prevail in the realistic camp without strong opposition.

6 Samavāye cābhāve ca viśeṣaṇa-viśesya-bhāvā.. NV p 97 line 8
7 NVT. p 96 line 21.
8 NM. Part I. pp. 54-58.

Praśastapāda among the Vaiśeṣikas and Prabhākara among the Mīmāṁsakas rally in this point to the Buddhists (cf. Praśastapāda, p. 225)."[9] This view seems to be erroneous. What Vātsyāyana says is simply this: "When an existent object is comprehended as existent, it is a real knowledge because it is in accordance with the reality, and not contradictory to it. Similarly, when a non-existent object is comprehended as non-existent, it is also real knowledge for the same reason."[10] Vātsyāyana further says: "That being so, what is existent is comprehended by one of the means of knowledge (*pramāna*), and therefore, what is not comprehended by *pramāṇa* in the same way, is non-existent. If it had been existent, it would have been comprehended like the former. As it is not comprehended, it does not exist. Thus a *pramāṇa* which comprehends the existent also comprehends the non-existent."[11] This does not suggest, in any way, that according to Vātsyāyana non-existence is also a reality. He merely says that the knowledge of a non-existent as non-existent is real knowledge.

It is also not quite correct to suggest that Praśastapāda opposed the idea of non-existence being a reality. As a matter of fact, that theory had not been formulated up to his time. In the context referred to by Stcherbatsky (PP. p. 225), Praśastapāda simply says that non-existence (*abhāva*) which is accepted by some as 'a separate means of knowledge' is an inference.[12] It is obvious that only at the time when the objective reality of non-existence was established, it was held to be directly cognised by the senses. Before that time, when non-existence meant merely the absence of something, it was naturally held to be comprehended by inference. It is thus clear that Praśastapāda had no idea of the theory of the objective reality of non-existence, and therefore he could not have opposed that theory. Śrīdhara,

9 Buddhist Logic, vol. I. p. 92. n. 5.

10 Sat sad iti gṛhyamāṇaṁ yathā-bhūtam aviparītaṁ tattvaṁ bhavati, asac cāsad iti gṛhyamāṇaṁ yathā-bhūtam aviparītaṁ tattvaṁ bhavati. N Bh. p. 24.

11 Evaṁ pramāṇena sati gṛhyamāṇe tad-iva yan na gṛhyate tan nāsti, yady abhaviṣyad idam iva vyajñāsyata, vijñānābhāvān nāstīti. Tad evaṁ sataḥ prakāśakaṁ pramāṇam asad api prakāśayati NBh. pp. 26-27.

12 Abhāvo 'py anumānam eva. PP. p. 225. line 14.

in fact, says that 'Praśastapāda did not hold *abhāva* to be a separate category because it was dependent on *bhāva*, and not because *abhāva* did not exist.'[13] If Praśastapāda had actually opposed the reality of *abhāva*, Śrīdhara could not have made a statement like that.[14]

It seems that even when the theory of the reality of non-existence was established, its general acceptance by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika was somewhat hesitant. For instance, not only Jayanta, but even Śrīdhara, both of whom took great pains to uphold that theory, declared in the same breath that 'non-existence was not a *vastu* (reality)'.[15] Although he has, obviously, used that term in the sense of 'positive reality', the term *vastu* in Indian Philosophy always means reality in general and that which is not a *vastu* must be absolutely unreal.

3. THE THEORY OF NON-EXISTENCE IN DIFFERENT SCHOOLS

So far as the idealist schools, the Vedānta and the Buddhist, are concerned the question of the reality of non-existence does not arise. The realist Sāṁkhya and the Prabhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā also deny the objective reality of non-existence. Besides the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, there is only one other school, that of the Kumārila Mīmāṁsakas, which accepts the reality of non-existence. The latter is also a radical realist like the former. The common object of both the schools was to demolish the Buddhist idealism. Of the two schools, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is

13 Abhāvasya pṛthag anupadeśaḥ bhāva-pāratantryān na tv abhāvāt. NK p. 7 line 11.

14 Pandit Gopināth Kavirāj points out that although only "six categories are explicitly enumerated, it does not mean that abhāva is not accepted as real" (SBS. III. p. 117). He then cites the statement of Śridhara quoted above and also another statement of Vallabhācārya, the author of Nyāya-Līlāvatī, *(Ibid.* p. 121) to show that abhāva was accepted as a reality by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika from the beginning. It is, no doubt, a fact that the conception of abhāva as a reality is implied in the very metaphysical structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as shown in the beginning of this chapter. But it appears that the full implication of the concept of abhāva was not made explicit up to the time of Praśastapāda. A definite expression of the view that non-existence is an objective reality is met with for the first time, as shown above, in Uddyotakara.

15 NM. Part I. p. 49. line 3. and NK. p. 70 line 13.

more radical. It declares that not only does non-existence possess an objective reality, but it is also directly perceptible by the senses like all other external objects. Kumārila, on the other hand, holds that non-existence cannot be perceived by the senses, but it is comprehended by a separate *pramāṇa*, called non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) or absence of apprehension (*upalabdhy-abhāva*). This difference has remained one of the bones of contention between the two schools, to which we shall revert later on.

Prabhākara discards altogether the theory of the reality of non-existence. He declares: when the non-existence of a jar on the ground (*bhūtale ghaṭābhāvaḥ*) is experienced, it is nothing but the experience of the vacant condition (*kaivalya*) of the ground, and not that of a positive reality like the non-existence of a jar. In all such cases, according to Prabhākara, what happens is that "the jar is not comprehended, and not that its non-existence is comprehended."[16] Usually, the reality of non-existence is argued by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises against the Prabhākara school.

Jayanta refers to the refutation of the reality of non-existence by writers of the Dignāga school also. According to them, non-existence is a mere mental construction (*vikalpa*), and not an external reality. Jayanta points out that it cannot be held to be pure imagination because "like the mental construction of a positive reality (*vidhi-vikalpa*), it also follows in the wake of a pure sensation."[17] If, therefore, external reality is held to be the source of positive mental constructions, likewise, a corresponding reality should be accepted in the case of negative mental constructions as well.

4. DIFFERENT KINDS OF NON-EXISTENCE

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school did not stop at merely establishing the reality of non-existence. They postulated four kinds of non-existence. One of them is 'absence of identity' (*anyonyābhāva*) as in the statement, 'jar is not a cloth', i.e., the identity

16 Ghato hi na pratiyate, na tu tad-abhāvaḥ pratiyate. NM. part I. p. 58. line 1. This is the statement of Prabhākara's view by Jayanta.

17 Darśanānantara-pravṛttatvena vidhi-vikalpa-tulyatvāt. NM. Part I. p. 65. line 7.

of the two is different. The three other kinds are known by a common designation as 'non-existence by relation' (*saṁsargā-bhāva*). They are: (i) antecedent non-existence (*prāg-abhāva*), e.g., the non-existence of the cloth in the threads before its production, (ii) consequent non-existence (*dhvaṁsābhāva*), e.g., the non-existence of cloth after its destruction, (iii) absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*), e.g., the non-existence of a jar on the ground. This classification is found almost in identical form in all the later manuals of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

In earlier works such as those of Jayanta, Śrīdhara, and others, however, we find a good deal of divergence of opinion with regard to the four-fold classification of non-existence. According to some ancient writers, 'non-existence of a jar on the ground', which can be effected by removing the jar and destroyed by bringing it back, is not an instance of absolute non-existence. They hold it to be another kind of non-existence which has a beginning and an end. The absolute non-existence (which is eternal) is found in such instances as 'the non-existence of colour in the air.' There are other points of divergence in the account and classification of non-existence, some of which may be noted here.

Jayanta, for instance, thinks that the two principal kinds of non-existence are: (i) antecedent non-existence (*prāg-abhāva*) and (ii) consequent non-existence (*dhvaṁsābhāva*). Besides these two, he refers to two more kinds of non-existence, but he says that the principal *abhāvas* are only the first two, all other kinds depend on particular conditions.[18] In fact, Jayanta thinks that all other *abhāvas*, i.e., 'absence of identity' (*anyonyābhāva*) and 'absolute non-existence' (*atyantābhāva*) are included in the *prāg-abhāva*.[19] All this would look strange to a modern student of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika who is acquainted only with the theories of the later manuals.

Śrīdhara, who is much later than Jayanta, accepts four kinds of *abhāvas* as they are found in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika

18 Utpannasya vināśo vā tad-anutpāda eva vā,
Abhāvas tattvato 'nye tu bhedās tv aupādhikāḥ matāḥ
NM. Part I. p. 59 line 13.

19 Na prāg-abhāvād anye tu bhidyante paramārthataḥ
NM. Part I. p. 59. line 7.

manuals, but his conception of some of them is quite different from that of the later manuals. For instance, with regard to absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*), he says that "there is in the *atyantābhāva*, the negation of a thing which is altogether non-existent and which is only created by imagination; that negation is not limited by space and time, for instance, there are no knowable objects (*prameyas*, reality) other than the six categories."[20] It means that, according to him, absolute non-existence is not a reality.

With regard to the consequent non-existence (*dhvaṁsābhāva*) and the absence of mutual identity (*anyonyābhāva*), what Śrīdhara says[21] here is not different from the latest accepted theory, but his reference to them elsewhere indicates that his notions regarding those *abhāvas* were not quite crystallized. For instance, in the course of his discussion on 'number' (*saṁkhyā*), he refers to the view of some thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that "past things have no connection with the present time, but it is not true to say that they do not exist even by their nature."[22] It is then suggested that those past objects can be brought back to recollection, and can become the inherent cause (*samavāyi-kārana*) of the quality of number. Śrīdhara also does not seem to differ from this view. But if it were correct, consequent non-existence (*dhvaṁsa*) would then simply mean the cessation of the connection of an object with the present time. How far can that sort of phenomenon be an objective reality? Similarly, in connection with the nature of absence of mutual identity (*anyonyābhāva*), Śrīdhara says that "*bheda*, i.e., the absence of mutual identity (*anyonyābhāva*) is nothing but the individual nature of an object."[23] If it were so, how can *anyonyābhāva* be an objective reality apart from the object in which it resides? Śrīdhara also speaks of *prāg-abhāva of*

20 Atyantābhāve tu sarvathā asad-bhūtasyaiva buddhāv āropitasya deśa-kālānavacchinnaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ, yathā ṣaṭ-padārthebhyo nānyat prameyam asti. NK. p. 230. line 21.

21 NK. p. 230. line 3.

22 Atītānāṁ tu vartamāna-kāla-saṁbandho nāsti na tu svarūpaṁ nāsti. NK. p. 119. line 10.

23 Yad etad vastunaḥ prātyātmikaṁ svarūpaṁ sa eva bhedaḥ. NK. p. 36. line 18.

dhvaṁsa, and *vice versa*, of *dhvaṁsa* of *prāg-abhāva*.[24] This is not accepted by the modern Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school; this is another instance of Śrīdhara's difference from the position of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. We have pointed to these differences only to show that the theory of the reality of non-existence was the result of a gradual development.

5. PERCEPTION OF NON-EXISTENCE (ABHĀVA)

The Nyāya-Vaiśesika school not only upheld the objective reality of non-existence, but it also insisted that it was directly perceived by the senses. In fact, perception of non-existence was the chief argument for proving its reality against Prabhākara and the Buddhist. The theory of perception of *abhāva*, however, had to be specially established against Kumārila who accepted the objective reality of *abhāva*, but held that it was comprehended not by direct perception, but by a separate means of knowledge called 'non-comprehension' (*anupalabdhi*).

Kumārila pointed out that *abhāva*, being of a negative nature, should also be comprehended by a negative means of knowledge, viz., 'non-comprehension' which means the negation of comprehension by any means of knowledge.[25] Jayanta ridicules the idea that an object and the means of its knowledge should be held to be similar, and says, "there is no propriety in holding that non-existence should be comprehended by a negative means of knowledge; it is not necessary that the offering to a deity should be of the same nature as that of the deity."[26]

The main argument of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school for holding that *abhāva* is directly perceived by the senses is given by Śrīdhara. He says, "when vacant ground is comprehended through sense-contact, there also occurs the cognition of non-existence in the form 'the ground is without a jar'. That being the case, why should the cognition of non-existence be not held

24 NK. p. 230. line 10 ff.

25 Pratyakṣāder anutpattiḥ pramāṇābhāva iṣyate. SV. Abhāva section 11.

26 Tasmād yuktam abhāvasya nābhāvenaiva vedanam,
Na nāma yādṛśo yakṣo balir apy asya tādṛśah.
NM. Part I. p. 51. line 13.

to be a sense-perception like that of the ground itself."[27] Jayanta repeats the same argument: "When we open our eyes, we perceive the ground as well as the non-existence of the jar, but when we close them, we do not see either. Both the cognitions being, thus, equally consequent on the same phenomenon (opening of the eye), there is no reason to make the distinction that cognition of the ground should be held to be a sense-perception and that of the non-existence to be non-sense-perception."[28] Śrīdhara says: "Non-existence is also grasped by the sense as much as an existent (positive) object is. The function of the senses having been thus observed some form of sense-contact should also be assumed."[29] And the sense-contact is assumed, as already noted, in the form of *viśeṣaṇa-bhāva sannikarṣa* (*the contact in the form of an attribute*). *Non-existence* is held to be the attribute of the ground which is connected with the sense, and therefore, the contact is called *saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva-sannikarṣa*, i.e., the contact in the form of an attribute of the object which is connected with the sense.

The position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is assailed by the Mīmāṁsakas of the Kumārila school. They point out that, although the non-existence of a jar and the ground seem to be simultaneously cognized by the senses, the former cannot be a sense-object, because "firstly, it is devoid of colour (*rūpa*) which is a necessary condition of visual perception, and secondly, it can have no contact with the sense."[30] As for contact in the form of *viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*, it is not at all a form of contact, because "contact is possible only through one of the two kinds of relations, viz., (i) connection (*saṁyoga*) and (ii) inherence (*sama-*

27 Api cendriya-sannikarṣād upalabhyamāne bhūtale abhāva-jñānam api bhavati aghaṭaṁ bhūtalam iti, tatra bhūtalasyevābhāvasyāpi pratyakṣatā kiṁ nesyate. NK. p. 226. line 4.

28 Nanu bhū-pradeśaṁ ca ghaṭābhāvaṁ ca visphārite cakṣuṣi nirikṣāmahe, nimīlite tasmins tayor anyataram api na paśyāmaḥ. Tatra samāne ca tad-bhāva-bhāvitve bhū-pradeśa-jñānaṁ cākṣuṣam abhāva-jñānaṁ tu na cākṣuṣam iti kuto viśeṣam avagacchāmaḥ. NM. Part I. p. 46. line 22.

29 Bhāvavad abhāvo 'pi indriya-grahaṇa-yogya eva, kārya-darśanād eva cāsyendriya-saṁbandho 'pi kaścit kalpayiṣyate. NK. p. 226. line 8.

30 Nanu nīrūpasya asaṁbaddhasya ca cākṣuṣatvam abhāvasya katham abhidhīyate. NM. Part I. p. 48. line 28.

not experienced when the temple was seen by that person. Jayanta meets this objection and says that when we see a lonely place, "the non-existence of all the things that are not present there is collectively experienced as in the case of the eye of a peacock's tail (where all its varied colours are collectively cognized),"[41] and therefore the remembrance of the non-existence (of one of the objects) is possible. The answer is hardly convincing, because the non-existence of an object can be experienced only when that object (which is *pratiyogin*, i.e., the counter-reality of non-existence) is also recollected, and admittedly here the person concerned cannot recollect all the objects including Devadatta that were not present in the temple.

Śrīdhara, therefore, discards Jayanta's theory of remembrance, and answers by retorting that even the Mīmāṁsaka's theory of the knowledge of non-existence by non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) is incapable of explaining the case in question. He introduces a subtle argument to rebut the Mīmāṁsaka. When a person, having left the temple in question, vouches for the non-existence of Devadatta there, he can do so only with regard to the past when he saw the temple. The non-existence could be grasped, according to the Mīmāṁsaka, by the non-apprehension of Devadatta in the past. But that non-apprehension could not last up to the time when the person vouches for it. Nor can there be a recollection of non-apprehension, because it is the negation of apprehension, and one cannot be conscious of it, and therefore cannot recollect it. To this, the Mīmāṁsaka rejoins that non-apprehension of Devadatta will persist, because it can be destroyed only by the apprehension of Devadatta in the temple. In order to refute this, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika cites the case of a person who has seen a temple void of Devadatta, but without being conscious of Devadatta's absence there. The next day he sees Devadatta in that temple, and then declares that he did not see Devadatta there on the previous day. In this case, the non-apprehension of Devadatta in the temple has been actually destroyed by the apprehension of his presence there. Hence, the Mīmāṁsaka cannot explain the knowledge

41 Tatrāsannihita-sakala-padārthābhāva-grahaṇasya mecaka-buddhyā siddhatvāt. NM Part I. p. 50. line 4.

of the non-existence of Devadatta on the previous day on the basis of non-apprehension. The Mīmāṁsaka points out that the apprehension of Devadatta's existence today can destroy only the non-apprehension of Devadatta's existence of today, and not that of yesterday. To this, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika rejoins that this is not tenable, because non-apprehension is an 'antecedent negation' (*prāg-abhāva*) of apprehension which is *one*, and can last only up to the point of actual apprehension. It cannot be distinguished as the non-apprehension of today or that of yesterday. Having thus demolished the Mīmāṁsaka's position, Śrīdhara points out that the knowledge of the non-existence of Devadatta in the temple on the previous day is a case of inference.[42] It appears that Jayanta was not aware of this argument; otherwise he would have found it more effective to refute the Mīmāṁsaka than his own theory of remembrance.

6. MENTAL FACTOR IN PERCEPTION OF NON-EXISTENCE

Although the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika maintains against Kumārila that the non-existence is directly perceived by the sense, the mental factor involved in the comprehension of non-existence could not be discarded by the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers. Kumārila says: "When an object (the substratum of non-existence, e.g., the ground) is perceived, and the counter-reality of non-existence (e.g., the jar) is recollected, there arises the comprehension of non-existence which is a mental process independent of the senses."[43] The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not deny that remembrance of the jar is an essential factor in the comprehension of its non-existence. Vācaspatimiśra cites an objection that "sense-object-contact, being obstructed by the remembrance of the counter-reality, is incapable of producing the perception of non-existence."[44] He replies that there will be no such obstruction, as there is none in the case of the determinate perception

42 NK. p. 227. lines 5-27.

43 Gṛhītvā vastu-sadbhāvaṁ smṛtvā ca pratiyoginam,
Mānasaṁ nāstitā-jñānaṁ jāyate 'kṣānapekṣayā.
SV. Abhāva section verse, 27.

44 Pratiyogi-smaraṇa-vyavahita-indriyārtha-sannikarṣo nālam abhāva-dhiyam upajanayitum. NVT. p. 97. line 12.

of a jar because of the remembrance of name, etc. He points out: "In the course of proving that determinate knowledge is a (*real*) perception, it has been shown that remembrance of the name of an object and reference to its previous knowledge and such other factors do not obstruct the operation of the senses. It may be contended that (in the case of determinate perception) the remembrance of name, etc., stands in the relation of accord (*anuyogitā*) because they are constituent parts of a determinate perception, and it is a rule that a constituent part cannot be an obstruction. But the jar in the present case stands in the relation of opposition (*pratiyogitā*). To this contention, the question may be put as to what it is to which the jar stands in the relation of opposition. If it stands to its non-existence, it is all right. But so far as the cognition of the non-existence of the jar is concerned, the remembrance of the jar being its cause, stands to it not in the relation of *pratiyogin* but in that of accord (*anuyogin*)."[45]

But so far as the perception of non-existence is concerned, there is yet another mental factor involved besides that of the remembrance of counter-reality. It was held that reasoning called *tarka* (which means arriving at a conclusion by reducing the other alternatives to absurdity, i.e., *aniṣṭa-prasaṁga*) was not itself a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), but it helped the function of other means of knowledge. In the case of the perception of non-existence, as Vācaspatimiśra has pointed out, there precedes the reasoning (*tarka*) in the form: if a jar had been present on the ground it would also have been perceived like the ground, because both are perceptible by the sense, and as the jar is not perceived, it is not present. Thus, there occurs the sense-perception of non-existence of the jar with the aid of reasoning (*tarka*).[46] It is difficult to appreciate how it can be regarded as a sense-perception, if it arises after that kind of inference-like reasoning which already gives the mental know-

45 For the text "Savikalpakasya.....kintu anuyogy eva." see Text Appendix.

46 Yady atrābhavisyad ghaṭo bhūtalam ivādraksyata, tena saha tulyadarśana-yogyatvāt, na ca dṛsyate tasmān nāstīti, tena tarkenānujñāyamānam (prātyakṣam) ghaṭābhāva-viśiṣṭa-bhūtale pravartate kevalam ,evedaṁ bhūtalaṁ neha ghaṭa iti. NVT. p. 54. line 22.

ledge of non-existence. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, however, maintains that, despite the mental factor, the non-existence is, in the last analysis, directly perceived by the sense.

7. JAYANTA ON REALITY OF NON-EXISTENCE

As already noted, the reality of non-existence is argued by the writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika usually against the Prabhākara school. For obvious reasons, the repudiation of non-existence by Prabhākara who is a realist was more annoying than by the idealist Buddhist who, in some way, repudiated even the positive reality. Vācaspatimiśra briefly refutes the arguments of the Prabhākara school against the reality of non-existence. Śrīdhara follows suit. Almost all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers argue this topic against the Prabhākara school. Jayanta alone cites the Buddhist arguments against the reality of non-existence.[47] These latter also include the well-known argument of the Prabhākara school that 'non-existence of a jar on the ground' is nothing but a vacant condition of the ground. It appears that Prabhākara in his repudiation of non-existence, as in many other matters, borrowed arguments from the Buddhist. We shall notice here briefly the discourse given by Jayanta.

The Buddhist points out that non-existence is not cognized as an independent entity like positive objects, but it is something conditioned by space, time, and its counter-reality. For instance, our experience takes the form of 'non-existence of a jar on the ground at a particular time.' The non-existence can have no relation with the ground because of the two relations, *saṃyoga* and *samavāya*, neither is possible here, as already shown.[48] For the same reason, non-existence can have no relation with time. "As for the relation of non-existence with its counter-reality, i.e., the jar, it is even more inconceivable because the two, the jar and its non-existence, belong to two different times, and the question of their relation does not arise at all. If it be contended that the relation between the two may be that of opposition, the question arises as to what does 'opposition' signify. If non-existence, which may be supposed to be

47 NM. Vol. I. pp. 51-57.
48 *Supra*, XI. 5.

already existing, should come and assail the jar, then alone it should be regarded as the opponent of the jar like a club (which destroys the jar). But that is not possible as their times are different."[49] The destroyer and the destroyed should always exist simultaneously. Secondly, it may be asked, "Whether non-existence has the nature of coming into existence (*bhavana-dharman*) or the nature of not coming into existence (*abhavana-dharman*). In the former case, it would be a positive object (*bhāva*), like the jar, etc. But, if it be of the nature of not coming into existence, it would be an eternal entity. In that case, would non-existence be related to one object or to all objects? There being nothing to restrict it to one object, it would be related to all objects (i.e., all the objects would constitute its counter-realities), and being itself eternal, there would be left no positive object eternal or non-eternal as existent."[50]

The Buddhist criticises the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika contention regarding *anyonyābhāva* also. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika points out that if the negation of mutual identity (*anyonyābhāva*) is not accepted, there will be no differentiation of one object from another, and all objects, which are mutually differentiated by the negation of identity, will get coalesced. The Buddhist asks: "If positive objects are differentiated from other positive objects by non-existence called the negation of mutual identity, how are the positive objects to be differentiated from the *anyonyābhāva* and other kinds of non-existence? If different kinds of non-existence become differentiated by *themselves* from one another and from positive objects, what is the fault of the positive objects that they are not held to be differentiated by *themselves*, and require non-existence called 'the negation of mutual identity' to differentiate one from the other?"[51] "On the contrary, it may be said that all kinds of non-existence, being of identical nature,

49 For the text "Pratiyoginā saha.....asamāna-kālatvāt." see Text Appendix.

50 For the text "Api cāyam .....na samasti" see Text Appendix.

51 Bhāvo bhāvād ivānyasmād abhāvāmśād api dhruvam.
Asaṁkirṇo 'bhyupetavyah sa katham vā bhavisyati.
Anyonyam apy abhāvānāṁ yady asaṁkīrnatā svatah
Bhāvaiḥ kim aparāddhaṁ vā parataś cet kuto nu sā.
NM. Part I. p. 52. line 26.

are themselves differentiated by positive things, i.e., by their counter-realities (*pratiyogin*) which are differentiated by themselves. Therefore the differentiation of different kinds of non-existence should be said to be dependent on positive objects and not *vice versa*."[52] Here the Buddhist is asked: "If he does not accept the reality of non-existence, what would be the object denoted by the negative prefix *nañ*"?[53] The Buddhist answers: "We do not assume realities in accordance with mere word-expressions." And further: "We, the Buddhists, are known all over the world as deft in assuming that meanings of words are mere mental constructions."[54] The Buddhist also endorses the view of the Prabhākara school, viz., the apprehension of the non-existence of a jar (as accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) is merely the fact that the jar is not apprehended when the ground is apprehended as devoid of the jar.[55]

Jayanta, in the course of his answer to the Buddhist, first establishes the reality of non-existence. There are two kinds of cognitions experienced by everybody, viz., 'there is a jar here' and 'there is no jar here'. Now, whether (according to the Dignāga school) you say that it is a mere mental construction, or (according to Yogācāra) you call it a modification of the self (consciousness), the cognition is similar in both the cases (of the existence or non-existence of the jar). Either both these cognitions are valid or none of them is valid. It is a mere vagary to say that the cognition of existence is valid and that of non-existence is invalid.[56] Jayanta, then, answers the contention that the non-existence of a jar is nothing except that the jar is not apprehended at the time when the ground is apprehended to be devoid of the jar. He poses a question: "What is this vacant condition of the ground which you call devoid of

52 For the text "Abhāva-svabhāvatāyāś.....viparyayo yuktaḥ." see *Text Appendix*.

53 Nanv abhāva-pratikṣepe nañaḥ kiṁ vācyam ucyatām?
Naiva śabdānusārena vācya-sthitir upeyate.
NM. Part I. p. 53. line 5.

54 *Bauddhāḥ khalu vayaṁ loke sarvatra khyāta-kīrtayaḥ,*
Vikalpa-mātra-śabdārtha-parikalpana paṇḍitāḥ. *Ibid* line 7.

55 Ghaṭa-viviktа-bhūtalopalambha-bhāvo ghaṭānupalambhaḥ. MN. Part I. p. 54. line 27.

56 For the text "Idaṁ tāvat.....icchā-mātram." see *Text Appendix*.

the case of colour and taste. Moreover, non-existence is of the nature of coming into existence, because it follows (like a positive object) the presence and absence (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) of its causes (i.e., it comes into existence in the presence of its causes and does not do so in their absence). As a jar follows its causes, clay, stick, etc., for coming into existence, similarly, it follows its causes (the blow of a club, etc.) for its destruction."[62]

8. ŚRĪDHARA ASSAILS PRABHĀKARA

According to Prabhākara, the non-existence of a jar is nothing but the vacant condition of the ground. Śrīdhara, like Jayanta, rebuts it and says that if the vacant condition were the nature of the ground, non-existence of the jar should be comprehended even when it is brought there, because the nature of the ground will persist even then. And if, on the other hand, the vacant condition is different from the ground, then the reality of non-existence stands accepted in another form. The Prabhākara Mīmāṁsaka might say, "A positive object may be in one of the two states, i.e., it may be alone, or it may be associated with a second object. Of these two states, that of being alone is the nature of the object which is said to be solitary. The comprehension of that state, at a time when a perceptible thing like a jar is also desired to be grasped, causes the expression of non-existence of the jar."[63] To this the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika replies: "When you take the ground apart from the non-existence of the jar, what meaning do you assign to the word 'vacant' which may be the object-support of the cognition of an object not being there? Admittedly, without difference in the state of the object, there can be no difference in the cognition or in its expression. If the Mīmāṁsaka were to argue that the natural state of 'being one' (*ekatva*) possessed by a positive object is its solitary condition (*ekākitva*), it may be asked, what is this oneness? Is it the state of being devoid of a counter-reality or having the number called oneness? The latter, the number 'oneness', exists as long as its substratum

62 For the text "Yat tu.....anuvartate hetūn," see Text Appendix.

63 For the text "Atha manyase ....pravartayatīti." see Text Appendix.

exists, and as such it will be there even when another object (a jar, etc.) is present. If you, however, say that natural oneness means being devoid of a counter-reality, then the other reality (i.e., non-existence) stands established."[64]

The Prabhākara Mīmāṁsaka then raises a subtle point: "Even those who accept the reality of non-existence will have to admit that comprehension of the ground is the cause of comprehension of non-existence, because without the comprehension of the ground the comprehension of non-existence is not possible. But one cannot comprehend that there are no thorns on the ground, if the ground has been comprehended with thorns on it. The comprehension of the ground as qualified by the non-existence (of thorns) is, thus, the cause of the comprehension of the non-existence (of thorns). But the comprehension of the ground as qualified by a particular non-existence can be possible only when that particular non-existence has been comprehended, and the non-existence will be comprehended only when the ground as qualified by that particular non-existence has been comprehended. It comes to this that the self-same thing is to be held to be its own cause. That being so, even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika will have to accept that there is a certain vacant state of the ground, which is other than non-existence and which has no relation with the counter-reality. The comprehension of that vacant state causes the comprehension of non-existence. Now, according to us, the same vacant condition is the cause of the notion of non-existence."[65] To this, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika replies: "This, too, is not correct, because the comprehension of the nature of the ground itself causes the comprehension of non-existence. And this cognition of non-existence cannot occur when the ground is comprehended with something else (counter-reality), because like the comprehension of the ground, the contact of the sense with non-existence is also included in the sum-total of the causes of comprehension of non-existence. When the thorns, etc., are

64 For the text "Ghaṭāder abhāvād.....siddhaṁ prameyāntaram." see Text Appendix.

65 For the text "Nanv abhāva-vādino.....pravartayatīti." see Text Appendix.

there, non-existence of the same is not there, and therefore, although the ground is comprehended, there is no comprehension of non-existence."[66]

Vācaspatimiśra examines the view of Prabhākara and refutes it, following the usual line of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argument, viz., if the non-existence of the jar is the nature of the ground, it should be cognized even when the jar is present there.

Chapter XII

EPISTEMOLOGY ADAPTED TO REALISM

1. EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

In the western thought, the problem of reality was attacked through the problem of knowing for the first time in the seventeenth century by Descartes. In India, however, it was an essential feature of every philosophical school from the earliest time to equip itself with an apparatus of the theory of knowledge (*pramāṇa-vāda*) on which its metaphysical structure was built. Buddhist thinkers laid great stress on the subjective standpoint. Dignāga enunciated his theory that there were only two kinds of objects, the real external unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) and the mental generalized images (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*). Consequently, the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) were also of two kinds, perception and inference. In his system, thus, epistemology becomes the principal branch of philosophy. After Dignāga, the realist schools also turned to epistemology. In order to meet the new exigencies arising from the onslaught of the Dignāga school against realism, they reshaped their epistemology, more particularly some of their theories of perception which have a direct bearing on the problems of realism. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, whose structure of the realistic

categories was adopted with slight modification by all other orthodox realist schools, was the main target of attack by the Dignāga school. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika did not so much change its theories; it rather evolved new devices to meet the objections of the opponent. But the two principal allies of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika against the Buddhist, viz., the two Mīmāṁsaka schools of Kumārila and Prabhākara, evolved many a new theory under the stress of the Buddhist attack, and thereby they made notable contributions to the epistemology of the realist schools.

It is not proposed here to deal with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology as such.[1] Some of the epistemological topics, for instance, the problem of recognition,[2] have already been dealt with in the course of discussion on other problems. The epistemology of the Dignāga school with which our present study is chiefly concerned, has also been treated at length in the chapter on the *universal*. So far as the Buddhist is concerned, the universal is exclusively an epistemological topic. Our present purpose is to show briefly what new features and new explanations were added to the epistemology of the realist schools as a result of their conflict with the Buddhist, and to examine the bearing of the epistemological theories of the two Mīmāṁsaka schools on the theory of realism. The following theories deserve special consideration:

I. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*

(i) Important modifications made in the theory of perception, and introduction of the distinction between determinate (*savikalpaka*) and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) perception.

(ii) Explanation of mental factors involved in determinate perception, and the emergence of a new theory of transcendental sense-object-contact (*alaukika-indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*).

II. *Kumārila School of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*

The theory that knowledge is not directly perceived but

1 Indian Epistemology has hitherto remained a neglected field. There are only two works dealing exclusively with Indian Epistemology in general. One of them is, *Indian Psychology—Perception* by Dr. J. N. Sinha, and the other is *Indian Epistemology* by Dr. Jwala Prasad.

2 *Supra*, VI. 23 and 31.

only inferred, and a new quality called 'manifestedness' (*jñātatā*) is produced in the external object.

III. *Prabhākara School of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā*

Explanation of error due to non-comprehension of difference between what is grasped by the sense and what is recollected by memory (*akhyāti-vāda*).

2. THE BASIC DIFFERENCE IN THE THEORY OF PRAMĀNAS

In the chapter on the universal, we have discussed at length the fundamental differences between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Dignāga school which cover the epistemology as well as the ontology of both. For the Buddhist, the external objective reality is in the form of isolated, discrete point-instants called moments (*kṣaṇas*) which are unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*). They are grasped by a flash of momentary sensation called indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*) which alone is regarded as pure perception by that school. The world of appearance is merely a construction of our intellect, and consists of generalized images (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇas*) which are negative in the sense that they are merely mental and objectively unreal. These generalized images are comprehended by our intellect, all operations of which are covered under inference (*anumāna*) used in a general sense. There being two kinds of objects, the *pramāṇas* are also only two, each having its separate and distinctive sphere. Further, the Buddhist holds that the point-instant, grasped by indeterminate perception, lends vividness to the mental image of the determinate perception, and also enables us indirectly to reach the reality. Inasmuch as a determinate perception comprehends only a generalized form which is unreal, and never grasps the point-instant which is real, and further it presents the generalized unreal as a real particular, it is not a genuine perception, but only a pseudo-perception.[3] Since a determinate perception grasps the generalized form, it may be regarded as inference in a broader sense.[4]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is opposed to this view. Uddyotakara says: "We do not accept that there are only two *pramāṇas*, or

3 *Supra*, IX. 12 and 13.
4 *Supra*, III. 11.

that there are only two kinds of objects, nor do we accept the view that there is no intermixture of *pramāṇas*."[5] And with equal emphasis, as we have already seen in the chapter on the universal, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika opposes the view that determinate perception is not a true perception. Objects comprehended by determinate perception are, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, complex objects in a way. For instance, substances are composed of parts (from which they are different), and they possess qualities, movements and universal residing in them by inherent relation, and different from them *in essence*. A substance possessing these attributes is comprehended by determinate perception which, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is as real and valid as indeterminate perception. All the elements grasped by the determinate perception have real objective existence; there is no mental factor involved in it. A determinate perception is preceded by an indeterminate perception in which all the elements of the determinate perception, the substance and its attributes, are grasped, but they are, at that stage, unrelated; they do not stand in the relation of substantive and attribute (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*). It is pointed out that a related or qualified knowledge is possible only when the qualification or attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) is previously comprehended.[6] That is why it is held that a determinate perception is preceded by an indeterminate perception in which both the substantive and the attribute are comprehended, but as they are unrelated, there is no conscious knowledge. No conscious knowledge is possible unless it is in the form of a judgment, i.e., presented in the relation of substantive and attribute.[7] In determinate perception, we have the cognition of a particular object as related to its universal (*sāmānya*). When, however, the object is not present before us and we have its knowledge only through inference (*anumāna*) or through some reliable person (*śabda-pramāṇa*), we know the object only 'in its general aspect', and not as a particular object. The theory of perception,

5 Na tāvat pramāṇa-dvayaṁ pratipadyāmahe, na viṣaya-dvayaṁ, nāpy asaṁkaram. NV. p. 13. line 5.

6 Viśiṣṭa-buddhau viśesaṇa-jñānasya kāranatvāt. NSM. on verse, 58.

7 Vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi jñānasya pratyakṣaṁ na bhavati. NSM. on verse, 58.

thus, constitutes a basic difference in the ontology and epistemology of the two schools, the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

There are some other points of difference in regard to the nature of *pramāṇas*. According to the Buddhist, each of the two *pramāṇas*, perception and inference, has its exclusive and distinctive sphere. A unique particular can only be grasped by perception, and never by inference; and *vice versa*, a universal (which is merely a mental entity) can be grasped only by intellect (inference) and never by perception. This restriction of each of the two *pramāṇas* to its own sphere is technically called *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*. This is opposed to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of *pramāṇa-saṁplava* or *pramāṇa-saṁkara* which means that the same object can be comprehended by perception, inference or any other means of knowledge. Uddyotakara,[8] Vācaspatimiśra[9] and other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers argue this point against the Buddhist. The Buddhist contention is that it is futile to comprehend by another *pramāṇa* the same object which has already been comprehended by one of the *pramāṇas*. Uddyotakara answers: "We do not hold that an object is comprehended by inference and other *pramāṇas* in the same way as it is comprehended by perception. By perception it is comprehended in a different way, i.e., through sense-contact. By inference it is comprehended without sense-contact (through inferential mark). By *upamāna-pramāṇa* the relation of a word with the object (denoted by the word) is comprehended, and by *śabda-pramāṇa*, the comprehension is by means of words."[10] It would, however, appear that this controversy between the two schools is due to their different metaphysical theories. To the Buddhist, the external reality is of an undivided unitary nature. It has not many aspects which may be comprehended by different *pramāṇas*. The Buddhist asks: "When once the nature of a unitary object has been directly

8 NV. p. 12 ff.

9 NVT. p. 12 ff.

10 Na brūmo yathā pratyakṣeṇārtho 'dhigamyate tathā 'numānādibhir apīti. Anyathā pratyakṣeṇendriya-saṁbaddhaḥ, indriyāsaṁbaddho 'numānena, saṁjñā-saṁjñi-saṁbandha-pratipattir upamānena, śabdollekhenāgameneti. NV. p. 14. line 7.

perceived, what other aspect of it remains which is to be perceived by other means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*)?"[11]

Another point of difference is that, according to the Buddhist, a *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) is always in the form of knowledge, and there is no difference between a *pramāṇa* and its resultant (*pramāṇa-phala*) called *pramā* (knowledge); they are identical. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, at least from the time of Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta, maintains the difference between the two—one being the 'means', and the other, the 'resultant knowledge.' Thus, the means of perception is *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, while the resultant perceptive knowledge is *pratyakṣa-pramā*. Similarly, the means of inference is different from the resultant inferential knowledge. The former is designated as *anumāna*, the suffix *ana* denoting instrumentality. The latter is designated as *anumiti*, the suffix *ti* denoting the resultant state.[12] It may be noted that in the case of inference, there are two words, *anumāna* and *anumiti*, the former in the sense of the means of inference (*pramāṇa*), and the latter in the sense of the inferential knowledge (*pramā*). But in the case of perception, the same word *pratyakṣa* signifies both, 'the means of knowledge' and the 'resultant knowledge', the difference being indicated by adding to it the word *pramāṇa* (viz., *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*) or the word *pramā* (viz., *pratyakṣa-pramā*). The *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge), being different from *pramā* (the resultant knowledge), it was held by Jayanta, Vācaspatimiśra and the later writers that *pramāṇa* might be in the form of 'knowledge' or 'non-knowledge.'[13] Thus, according to later manuals of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, when an indeterminate perception is taken as the resultant knowledge (*pramāṇa-phala* or *pramā*), the sense (*indriya*) is held to be *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge), the sense-object-contact being

11 Ekasyārtha-svabhāvasya pratyakṣasya satah svayam,
Ko 'nyo na dṛṣto bhāgaḥ syād yaḥ pramānaiḥ parikṣyate.
This is some Buddhist verse quoted by Jayanta. NM. Part I. p. 87.

12 The suffix 'lyut' (=ana) is used to denote instrumentality, and the suffix 'ktin' (=ti) to denote the abstract state.

13 Bodhābodha-svabhāvā sāmagri pramānam. NM. Part I. p. 12. line 7.
Tad eva jñānam ajñānam va upalabdhi-hetuḥ pramāṇam.
NVT. p. 16. line 21.

regarded as operation (*vyāpāra*), i.e., the intermediary process between an instrument and its result. Similarly, when a determinate perception is taken as the resultant, the sense-object-contact is regarded as the means (*pramāna*), and the indeterminate perception as the intermediary operation (*vyāpāra*). In both these cases, the *pramāṇa*, i.e., the sense or the sense-object-contact is in the form of non-knowledge. But when volition to accept or to reject an object or to be indifferent to it (*hānopādānopekṣā-buddhi*) is the resultant knowledge (*pramā*), the *pramāṇa* is in the form of indeterminate perception, the determinate perception being the intermediary operation.[14] Here the *pramāṇa* is in the form of knowledge. The Buddhist repudiates this view totally. Dharmakīrti says that only "knowledge is *pramāṇa*, and not non-knowledge like sense-object-contact."[15] This point has been discussed in most of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises.[16]

There is a third point of difference between the two schools. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the sense-object-contact is a necessary condition of perception. In the case of the senses of smell,[17] taste and touch, their objects naturally come in contact with the senses. In visual perception where an object is necessarily distant, it is held that our eye in the form of a visual ray moves to the object and seizes it at the place where it is situated. Similarly, a distant sound produces a series of sounds, the preceding sound dying after producing the next one. The sound which is heard by the ear is the one which has been produced in the cavity of the ear itself. It is, thus, held that the senses illumine or cognize their objects only by reaching or contacting them.[18] So far as the Buddhist is concerned, the sense and its object are only two simultaneous moments; and anything like the one reaching the other, or the visual sense moving to its object, is quite inconceivable.

Fourthly, the two schools differ regarding the nature of

14 Tarka-bhāsā, p. 33.

15 Jñānaṁ pramāṇaṁ nājñānam indriyārtha-sannikarṣādi. PV. I. 3. (p. 3).

16 NM. Part I. pp. 12. ff. and NVT. p. 16.

17 In the case of smell, very fine particles of an odorous substance come in contact with the olfactory nerve in the nose.

18 Indriyāṇāṁ vastu-prāpya-prakāśa-kāritva-niyamaḥ.

volition in respect of an object which has been perceived. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the volition is expressed in one of the three forms: (i) acceptance of the perceived object (*upādāna*), (ii) rejection of it (*hāna*), or (iii) indifference to it (*upekṣā*). The Buddhist, on the other hand, accepts only the first two forms, including the third (indifference) in the second. Jayanta takes pains to prove that the attitude of indifference to an object is different from the first two. because in it there is neither liking nor disliking for the object.[19] It appears rather strange that there should be so much controversy on this apparently minor matter. The reason is obvious; it has a bearing on the metaphysics of the two schools. For the Buddhist, the existence of an object consists in its producing some efficient result.[20] An object which has been perceived must produce some efficient result on the perceiver who would either accept it or reject it. Indifference means no efficient result which is tantamount to non-existence of the object. But according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the existence does not consist in producing an efficient result, but it is constituted by the universal (*sattā-jāti*). *Indifference* is therefore a third kind of volition, different from acceptance and rejection.

3. GOTAMA'S DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

Gotama's definition of perception is the starting point of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology. According to it, perception is a cognition produced by the sense-object-contact, which is (i) unnamable (*avyapadeśya*), (ii) uncontradicted (*avyabhicārin*), and (iii) definite or determinate (*vyavasāyātmaka*).[21] With regard to the interpretation of these three attributes of perception, particularly the first and the third, there is a good deal of discussion in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises. Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra have discussed at great length Gotama's definition. Jayanta has also written a lengthy thesis on its interpretation. On the interpretation of the word *avyapadeśya*, he has given a number of divergent views. It is not pro-

19 NM. p. 22. line 33.

20 Sattvam, artha-kriyā-kāritvam.

21 Indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhichāri vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam. NS. I. i. 4.

posed here to enter into a general discussion on the meaning of Gotama's aphorism. Our present purpose is merely to draw attention to some of the controversial points of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology *vis-a-vis* Buddhist epistemology.

From Gotama's definition of perception it is clear that he, in common with the Buddhist, holds *pramāṇa* to be in the form of knowledge. He expressly says: "A cognition or knowledge produced by the sense-object-contact is *pramāṇa* called perception." This statement of Gotama was a problem for Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta who both, as stated above, differentiated between *pramāṇa* and *pramā*, and maintained that *pramāṇa* might be in the form of knowledge as well as non-knowledge. They both got over the difficulty by twisting the language—a practice, unfortunately, typical of many of the Sanskrit commentators. They both declare, that in Gotama's definition of perception an additional word *yataḥ* (meaning 'by which') should be supplied. Vācaspatimiśra further says: "It will be found that the pronoun *yad* (which) is always relative to *tad* (that), and therefore, the word *yad* in its form *yataḥ* (denoting the reason expressed by the ablative case i.e., 'by which') having been supplied here, the pronoun *tad* will also have to be inserted; and it will be construed with the term *pratyakṣa*, which will thus denote a *pramāṇa* (i.e., means of knowledge)."[22] The definition would, thus, mean that "*pratyakṣa pramāṇa* is that (*tad*) from which (*yataḥ*) arises the knowledge born of sense-object-contact."[23] The words *yataḥ* and *tad* are here additional insertions. Jayanta says: "Merely by supplying a word *yataḥ*, the *aphorism* can be construed as capable of giving a flawless definition."[24] Obviously, he does not seem to feel the incongruity of inserting a new word in order to twist the meaning of the text. Vācaspatimiśra and Jayanta overlooked the simple fact that Vātsyāyana or Uddyotakara never felt the need of adding the word *yataḥ* to Gotama's definition. It is needless to com-

22 Atra ca *yata iti adhyāhṛtya yat-tador nityābhisaṁbandhāt tat pratyakṣam iti pramāṇa-vāci pratyakṣa-padaṁ yojanīyam.* NVT. p. 94. line 14.

23 Yataḥ indriyārtha-sannikarsotpannam jñānaṁ tat pratyakṣam.

24 Yataḥ-śabdādhyāhāra-mātreṇa niravadya-lakṣanopavarṇanasamartha-sūtra-pada-saṁgati-saṁbhavāt. NM. Part I. p. 61. line 30.

ment on this kind of twisting of the text simply with the object of imposing one's own views on the founder of the school. It is, however, clear that so far as Gotama is concerned, he held that *pramāṇa* was always in the form of knowledge, and he did not differentiate between *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) and *pramāṇa-phala* or *pramā* (the resultant knowledge).

In Vātsyāyana we have a vague idea of the differentiation between *pramāṇa* and *pramā*, and also of the *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa* being in the form of sense-object-contact, i.e., in the form of non-knowledge. Explaining the aphorism which enumerates the four kinds of *pramāṇas* (NS.I.i.3) he says: "The operation (*vṛtti*) of every sense which reference to its object is *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, and that operation may be in the form of sense-object-contact or knowledge. When it is in the form of sense-object-contact, *pramiti* (or *pramāṇa-phala*) would be in the form of knowledge called perception. When, however, *pramāṇa* is in the form of knowledge, the *pramāṇa-phala* would be expressed in the form of rejection, acceptance, or indifference to the object perceived."[25] It may be noted here that there is no mention of the *sense* being also a *pramāṇa*, or that of perceptive knowledge being of two kinds, indeterminate and determinate.

As for Praśastapāda, he also differentiated between *pramāṇa* and *pramā*, but he never regarded anything other than knowledge as *pramāṇa*. He points out that 'mere apprehension of the nature (*svarūpālocana-mātra*) of particular universals (*sāmānya-viśeṣas*)' is the *pramāṇa*, and the perception of the substance, etc., is the *pramā* (resultant knowledge).[26] He also gives another alternative that the true knowledge of all objects (which comes in the second stage) might be taken as *pramāṇa*, and the feeling of agreeableness, disagreeableness, or indifference in respect of the perceived object may be regarded as *pramā*.[27] The question arises as to what would be regarded as

25 Akṣasyāksasya prativiṣayaṁ vṛttiḥ pratyakṣaṁ, vṛttis tu sannikarṣaḥ jñānaṁ vā. Yadā sannikarṣas tadā jñānaṁ pramitiḥ, yadā jñānaṁ tadā hānopādānopekṣā-buddhayaḥ phalam. NBh. p. 86.

26 Tatra sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu svarūpālocana-mātraṁ pratyaksaṁ pramāṇam .. . pramitir dravyādi-viṣayaṁ jñānam. PP. p. 187. line 13.

27 Atha vā sarveṣv padārtheṣu . yaj jñānam utpadyate tat pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇaṁ.. pramitir guṇa-doṣa-mādhyasthya-darśanam. PP. p. 187. lines 18 ff.

pramāṇa when the knowledge which is mere apprehension of the nature of a particular universal (*which is referred to* above as *pramāṇa* in the cognition of a substance) is itself regarded as *pramā*. Obviously, it is not preceded by any knowledge which could be regarded as *pramāṇa*. Here Praśastapāda declares that in this case 'undivided pure apprehension' is the *pramāṇa*,[28] i.e., there is no distinction between *pramāṇa* and *pramā* here as in other cases. "There is no other *pramāṇa* for this, because it is not in the form of the result (of another *pramāṇa*)."[29] If Praśastapāda could ever think of the sense-object-contact (*indriyārtha-sannikarṣa*) as *pramāṇa*, he would surely have stated it in the present context. In the later period, as already noted, sense-object-contact was held to be a *pramāna* (means) of determinate perception, and the 'sense' that of indeterminate perception. It is interesting to note that Śrīdhara, under the influence of the ideology of a later period, actually declares: "*Ālocana* (mere apprehension) here means the sense-object-contact which is the *pramāṇa*, and the word *avibhakta* means *alone*, i.e., not dependent on knowledge (*jñānānapekṣa*)".[30] Udayana follows suit.[31] As for the explicit statement of Praśastapāda that there is no other *pramāṇa* in this case (*asmin nānyat pramāṇāntaram asti*), Śrīdhara says that it means: "In the knowledge of the universal there is no other *pramāṇa* in the form of knowledge."[32] One can hardly take Śrīdhara seriously in such twisted interpretations. This is, of course, clear that Praśastapāda did not conceive non-knowledge as *pramāṇa*.

Some minor points to be noted in connection with Gotama's definition of perception are: firstly here there is no trace of any idea that there is in the first moment an unrelated or undifferen-

28 Avibhaktam ālocana-mātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam. PP. p. 187. line 16.

29 Asmin nānyat pramāṇāntaraṃ asti aphala-rūpatvāt. PP. p. 187. line 16.

30 Ālocanam *indriyārtha-sannikarṣas tan-mātram avibhaktaṁ* kevalaṁ jñānānapekṣam iti yāvat. NK. p. 198. line 21.

31 Ālocanam indriyārtha-sannikarṣaḥ. Kir. p. 298. line 5.

32 Sāmānya-viśeṣa-jñāne nānyat pramāṇaṁ jñāna-rūpam asti. NK. p. 199. line 1.

tiated knowledge of an object, its universal or other attributes, and that they are related as substantive and attributes at a later stage. Thus, the essential point of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that there are two stages of perception is absent in Gotama's definition. Secondly, there is no reference to the six kinds of sense-object-contacts, *saṁyoga*, *saṁyukta-samavāya*, etc. Nor do they occur in Praśastapāda. This only shows that by that time, the theory of the *objective* existence of universals, qualities, or other attributes, as separate *in essence* from the substance in which they reside, had not been fully established to require a separate contact for each of the attributes as different from that of their substratum.

There is another interesting point with regard to the literal meaning of the term *pratyakṣa*. According to Uddyotakara, the compound word *pratyakṣa* means "what is related to the senses".[33] Praśastapāda who preceded him expounds the term to mean "knowledge which is dependent upon (*pratītya*) the sense".[34] Here the use of the term *pratītya* in expounding the compound word *pratyakṣa* irresistibly reminds us of the same term used in the designation of the Buddhist theory of causation called *pratītya-samutpāda*. We thus find that the term *pratītya* (dependent upon), which in the sense of causation is supposed to be exclusively Buddhistic, was used in that sense by orthodox writers as well.

4. MEANING OF THE WORD 'AVYAPADESYA'

Jayanta has given as many as six alternative interpretations of the word *avyapadeśya* which shows that the meaning of that key-word in the definition of perception was doubtful even then.[35] This term literally means *unnamable* and naturally suggests the idea of indeterminate perception in which there is no verbal element. The third qualification of perception, viz., *vyavasāyātmaka* meaning 'definite', on the other hand, suggests its affinity with the term *adhyavasāya* which is the designation of

33 Pratigatam aksam pratyaksam. NV. p. 86. line 15.

34 Akṣam akṣaṁ pratītya utpadyate iti pratyaksam. PP. p. 186. line 12.

35 NM. Part I. pp. 73-82.

determinate knowledge in Buddhist epistemology. Both these similarities led Vācaspatimiśra to interpret them as indicating the two kinds of perception, indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*savikalpaka*). According to him, part of the *sūtra*, viz., *indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyabhicāri* (the uncontradicted knowledge produced by sense-object-contact) is the definition of perception, and the two words *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka* indicate two kinds of perception. This interpretation does violence to the text of the *sūtra* where the word *avyabhicārin* (which, according to Vācaspatimiśra, is a part of the general definition) occurs in between the two words *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka*. Obviously, all the three are the attributes of perception. As the same knowledge which is held to be unnamable (free from verbal element) is also held to be *vyavasāyātmaka* definite or determinate, the former word can in no way suggest indeterminate perception. Secondly, this interpretation of Gotama's aphorism never occurred to Vātsyāyana, the earliest known commentator on the *Nyāya-sūtras* who was definitely earlier than Dignāga. Not even Uddyotakara is aware of this interpretation. Vācaspatimiśra remarks on their silence: "The authors of the *Bhāṣya* and the *Vārtika* have not given this interpretation because it is so very clear that the students (of the Nyāya) would themselves understand it."[36] As a matter of fact, the term *avyapadeśya* far from being clear has been a headache to all the commentators.

The authoritative interpretation of Vātsyāyana was not acceptable to Śrīdhara, Udayana or Vyomaśiva, each of whom gives his own interpretation of this word occurring in the work of Praśastapāda who has obviously borrowed this term from Gotama.[37] Of the six alternative interpretations of this term given by Jayanta, none agrees with that of Vācaspatimiśra. Vācaspatimiśra's interpretation is, therefore, his own innovation. He says that in this matter, he has followed the path

36 Tad etat ati-sphuṭatvāt śiṣyair gamyata eveti bhāṣya-vārtika-kārābhyām avyākhyātam. NVT. p. 114. line 27.

37 Atha vā sarveṣu padārtheṣu catuṣṭaya-sannikarṣād avitatham avyapadeśyaṁ yaj jñānam utpadyate tat pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇam. PP. p. 187. line 18.

shown by his teacher Trilocana.[38] The fact that Vācaspatimiśra felt the need of pointing to the source of the interpretation clearly indicates that he was conscious of its being an innovation. It appears that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika adopted the distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* perception under the influence of Dignāga who, as we shall presently see, was the first to introduce it in Indian philosophy. Vācaspatimiśra or his teacher Trilocana thought it fit to bring that distinction within the frame-work of Gotama's definition itself. Vācaspatimiśra's zeal for attributing every new idea to the founder of the Nyāya school got the better of his sense of being scrupulous in the interpretation of the text. Vācaspatimiśra's hold on the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers can be judged from the fact that his far-fetched interpretation was accepted without question by all of them including Gaṅgeśa.[39]

Now for the correct meaning of the term *avyapadeśya*, the interpretation of Vātsyāyana should be regarded, for obvious reasons, as trustworthy. Unfortunately, even with regard to what is exactly Vātsyāyana's interpretation, there is difference of opinion among the commentators of Vātsyāyana. Uddyotakara has left out this most important portion without comment. Vācaspatimiśra has construed even the words of Vātsyāyana to fit in with his own far-fetched interpretation. Vātsyāyana's interpretation of the term *avyapadeśya* is as follows: "Every cognition of an object produced by the sense-object-contact is (afterwards) denoted by words such as *colour, taste,* etc. These words are denotations of the object. By these very words a *cognition* (as distinguished from an object) is also denoted in such expressions as 'he cognizes colour', or 'he cognises taste.' Being denoted by words, the cognition in question may be taken to be produced by verbal testimony (*śabda-pramāṇa*). In order to preclude that possibility, the term *avyapadeśya* (non-verbal or unnamable) has been added to qualify perceptual knowledge."[40]

38 Trilocana-gurūnnīta-mārgānugamanonmukhaih,
yathā-mānaṁ yathā-vastu vyākhyātam idam īdṛśam. NVT. p. 114.

39 Gaṅgeśa quotes Gotama's definition of perception as mutilated by Vācaspatimiśra, i.e., Indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyabhicāri. TC. Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa, p. 539.

40 For the text "Tatredam.....avyapadeśyam iti." see Text Appendix.

Vātsyāyana further adds: "The cognition of an object, which has been brought about without bringing in the relation between a word and the object (denoted by it), is expressed (afterwards) by a word."[41] "Thus the word denoting the cognition in question does not operate at the time of the origination of cognition, but operates only at the time of the communication of that cognition."[42] Śrīdhara also follows Vātsyāyana when he says: "The term *avyapadeśya* means (knowledge) not produced by words."[43] The first of the six interpretations given by Jayanta, which has been ascribed by him to old Naiyāyikas, is similar to that of Vātsyāyana. According to that interpretation, "a cognition which is produced by sense-object-contact is designated by such words (denoting objects) as 'cognition of colour' or 'cognition of taste'. In order to preclude the possibility of such verbal designations of cognition being regarded as the perceptive cognition, the term *avyapadeśya* has been included (in the definition)."[44] It only means that the verbal expression intended for communicating a perceptive knowledge is not a part of that cognition. Be it as it may, it is certain that Vātsyāyana or any of the authors of the six interpretations quoted by Jayanta never ascribed to Gotama the idea of making a distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*. It may also be added that, according to Vātsyāyana, the words *avyabhicārin* (uncontradicted) and *vyavasāyātmaka* (definite) are added in order to exclude illusion and doubt from perceptive knowledge.[45]

5. NO DISTINCTION OF SAVIKALPAKA AND NIRVIKALPAKA BEFORE DIGNĀGA

The distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* perception is absent not only in the *Nyāya-sūtras* of Gotama, but

41 Yad idam anupayukte śabdārtha-saṁbandhe 'rtha-jñānaṁ tan nāmadheya-śabdena vyapadiśyate. NBh. p. 110.

42 Tad evam artha-jñāna-kāle sa na samākhyā-śabdo *vyāpriyate*, vyavahāra-kāle tu vyāpriyate. NBh p. 111.

43 Avyapadeśyaṁ śabdājanyam yad vijñānam. NK. p. 199. line 10.

44 Yad indriyārtha-sannikarṣād utpannaṁ sad viṣaya-nāmadheyena vyapadiśyate rūpa-jñānaṁ rasa-jñānam *iti tad vyapadeśyaṁ jñānaṁ* pratyakṣa-phalaṁ mā bhūd ity avyapadeśya-grahaṇam. NM. Part I. p. 73 line 18.

45 NBh. pp. 112-113 and 121.

also in other *sūtras* of the orthodox philosophical systems. The *Brahma-sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa, which are held to be the oldest philosophical *sūtras* do not give any definition of perception, and therefore, the question of that distinction does not arise. The definition of perception given in the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā-sūtras* of Jaimini is: "When the senses of a person come in contact with an object, a cognition produced therefrom is perception."[46] There is here absolutely no trace of the distinction in question. Similarly, in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* of Kaṇāda which make a reference to the nature of perception in the course of proving the existence of the soul,[47] there is no indication of that distinction. The Yoga-sūtras of Patañjali, which are of quite a late date, not only do not know the distinction, but use the term *vikalpa* in the sense of "knowledge caused by mere verbal usage and devoid of any reality,"[48] which is almost the Buddhist meaning of that term. The *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-sūtras* which are as late as the fourteenth century deserve no mention here; but even so the definition of perception as given there makes no reference to the distinction in question.[49] In Buddhist philosophy there is no clear reference to that distinction in the writings of Vasubandhu and his predecessors. Stcherbatsky, of course, thinks that "the definition of sense-perception as pure sensation which is so characteristic a feature of Dignāga's system is already found in a work of Asaṅga."[50] This might be so, because the germs of Dignāga's theory would naturally be found in the earlier Buddhist philosophy. But even then, Dignāga will have to be held to be the first thinker who formally promulgated that distinction, and laid his metaphysical structure on that basis. As far as the Jainas are concerned, they simply refuse even to accept the existence of *nirvikalpaka* perception.

Let us now see when there occurs the first indication of that distinction in the orthodox schools. The earliest term used

46 Sat-saṁprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṁ buddhi-janma tat pratyakṣam. MS. I. i. 4.

47 Ātmendriyārtha-sannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat. VS. III. i. 18.

48 Śabda-jñānānupātī vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ. YS. I. 9.

49 SPS. I. 89.

50 *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. p. 31. line 9.

for a sort of first stage of perception is *ālocana* which was later on used by Kumārila as the designation of *nirvikalpaka* perception as conceived by him. The earliest use of the term *ālocana* in this sense, so far as I have been able to trace, is met with in the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa which probably belongs to the first or second century A.D. The term, however, does not occur there in connection with the definition of perception.[51] But, describing the function of the senses, the author says that with reference to objects such as colour, etc., the function of senses is *ālocana-mātra*,[52] mere first apprehension by which the undifferentiated sensum is presented by the senses to *manas*, the internal sense (and not the mind as that term is usually, but quite erroneously, rendered in English). Further, it is said that the *manas* is *saṁkalpaka*, i.e., it differentiates or determines the undifferentiated sensum presented by the senses.[53] On the basis of this, Vācaspatimiśra, in his *Sāṁkhya-tattva-kaumudī*, introduces a full-fledged distinction between the two kinds of perception as if it were contained in the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* itself.[54] It is, however, clear that the distinction in question was not known to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, otherwise some reference to it must have been made in his definition of perception. As a matter of fact, Īśvarakṛṣṇa merely differentiates between the function of the senses and that of the *manas*, which is not the same thing as distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* perception.

The next stage, where there is a clear discernment of an earlier and a later stage of perception, is to be met with in Praśastapāda. Describing the nature of perception, Praśastapāda says: "In the case of three substances (earth, water and fire) which possess the dimension called *mahat* (gross), there arises a mere apprehension of form (*svarupālocana-mātra*) from such causes as (i) possession of many parts, (ii) manifested colour, (iii) light, and (iv) four kinds of contact, when there is presence of auxiliaries *dharma*, etc."[55] And further, "from the

51 SK. verse, 5.
52 Rūpādiṣu pañcānām ālocana-mātram iṣyate vṛttiḥ. SK. verse 28.
53 Manaḥ saṁkalpakam. SK. verse 27.
54 STK. on verse 27.
55 Dravye tāvat tri-vidhe mahaty aneka-dravyavattvodbhūta-rūpa-

contact of the *manas* with the soul, there arises a qualified perception from qualifications such as (i) the universal, (ii) a particular universal, (iii) substance, (iv) qualities, and (v) movement. And this qualified perception takes the form: 'a cow,' (i) which is existent, (ii) is a substance and possesses the universal *pṛthivītva*, (iii) has horns, (iv) is white, and (v) possesses movement."[56] Praśastapāda does not expressly say that 'mere apprehension' precedes the qualified perception. In this context, as already noted, Praśastapāda introduces a distinction between *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) and *pramā* (the resultant cognition), the earlier stage of knowledge being regarded as *pramāṇa* and the later as *pramā*.[57] He points out: "Mere apprehension in the case of the form of the universal and the particular-universal is the *pramāna* called *pratyakṣa*, and that the knowledge of substance, etc., is the *pramā*."[58] It means that in the first instance there is mere apprehension of the universal and the particular-universal, which is followed by the perception of the substance as qualified by the universal. Here we have, at least, the germ of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of a clear-cut distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*. The views of Praśastapāda are in a fluid state. In the first statement quoted above 'mere apprehension of the form' refers to the substance, and not to the universal or the particular-universal as it does in the second statement. It will appear that the word *ālocana* in Praśastapāda's work does not stand in a clear-cut way for the *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) perception as accepted by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. This is also indicated by the fact that both Śrīdhara and Udayana interpret the word *ālocana* in the first statement of Praśastapāda as *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*,[59] but

prakāśa-catuṣṭaya-sannikarsād dharmādi-sāmagrye ca svarūpālocana-mātram. PP. p. 186.

56 Sāmānya-viśesa-dravya-guṇa-karma-viśesanāpeksād ātma-manaḥ-sannikarṣāt pratyaksam utpadyate, sad dravyaṁ pṛthivī viṣāṇī śuklo gaur gacchatīti. PP. p. 186.

57 *Supra*, XII. 3.

58 Tatra sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu svarūpālocana-mātraṁ pratyakṣaṁ pramānam, ..pramitir dravyādi-visayaṁ jñānam. PP. p. 187. line 13.

59 Ālocana-mātraṁ grahaṇa-mātram vikalpa-rahitaṁ pratyakṣa-mātram iti yāvat. NK. p. 189 line 16

Ālocanaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ pratyakṣaṁ sāksāt-kāri. Kir. p. 278. line 6.

in the second statement, the same word has been interpreted by both of them to mean, as already noted, the 'sense-object-contact.'[60] This shows that the confusion regarding the sense of the word *ālocana* already existed in their time. We may, therefore, conclude that Praśastapāda had a vague idea of an earlier stage of perception which he called 'mere apprehension of the form' and also held, not quite unequivocally, that 'mere apprehension' was only of a universal or a particular universal. He had no positive theory of the undifferentiated and indeterminate perception which may 'invariably' be preceding determinate perception as accepted in the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school.

6. DIGNĀGA INTRODUCED THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NIRVIKALPAKA AND SAVIKALPAKA PERCEPTION

A clear-cut distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* perception was introduced for the first time in Indian Philosophy by Dignāga. According to him, *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* are not merely two kinds of perception with a difference of vividness and sequence, as was accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The difference between them is fundamental and qualitative. The *nirvikalpaka* is transcendental in the sense that it grasps a transcendental reality of which, although we have a sort of awareness, we are never conscious in terms of thought. The reason is that our intellect can never grasp the external reality which is in the form of the unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) and is transcendental. The scope of the intellect is restricted to the generalized form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*), i.e., the empirical or phenomenal. It would, thus, appear that the two types of knowledge, called *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka,* are quite different not only in their nature but also in the sphere of their operation. The orthodox realist and particularly the Nyāya-Vaiśesika never accepted that kind of distinction between them. But the qualitative difference in the nature of the two kinds of perception was accepted by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika,[61] and it was undoubtedly due to the influence of Dignāga school.

60 *Supra*, XII. 3.
61 *Infra*, XII. 7.

7. DISTINCTION BETWEEN NIRVIKALPAKA AND SAVIKALPAKA IN POST-DIGNĀGA PERIOD

The earliest use of the term *nirvikalpaka* in the orthodox camp in the sense of the stage invariably preceding *savikalpaka* (determinate) perception is met with in the *Śloka-vārtika* of Kumārila whose date is about 700 A.D. The knowledge called *ālocana* (which term is used, as we have already seen, in *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* to denote the functions of the senses, and in Praśastapāda in the sense of 'mere apprehension of the form') is declared by Kumārila definitely to be "*nirvikalpaka*, which is the first apprehension caused by a pure object and which is similar to that of the child or the dumb. At that stage the particularity or the universal is not experienced, but only the individual as their substratum is apprehended."[62] He further says: "After that (i.e., the *nirvikalpaka* perception), an object is determined by its attributes like the universal, etc., and that too is a perception."[63] The last words 'that too is a perception' are obviously addressed to the Buddhist who does not accept the determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*) as perception. The theory as put forward by Kumārila has clearly the stamp of Dignāga upon it, which is discernible even after its orthodox adaptation. Otherwise, what could be the sense of the words 'caused by a pure object'? According to the realist, even determinate perception is caused by a pure object, for even the attributes of an object like the universal, etc., are objectively real, and there is thus no admixture of any mental element even in determinate perception. The adjective *pure*, therefore, can have significance only in the theory of Dignāga who held that only indeterminate perception was caused by a pure object, while there was a mental factor involved in the determinate knowledge.

It appears that in Kumārila's description of *nirvikalpaka*, its essential and qualitative difference with the *savikalpaka* which was propounded by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has not

62 Asti hy ālocanaṁ jñānaṁ prathamaṁ nirvikalpakam,
Bāla-mūkādi-vijñāna-sadṛśaṁ śuddha-vastujam.
Na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṁ tadānīm anubhūyate,
Tayor ādhāra-bhūtā tu vyktir evāvasīyate. SV. IV. 112-113.

63 Tataḥ paraṁ punar vastu dharmair jāty-ādibhir yayā
Buddhyāvasīyate sā 'pi pratyakṣatvena sammatā. SV. IV. 120.

been fully brought out. Kumārila says that *nirvikalpaka* is like the apprehension of the child and the dumb. This appears like an answer to a theory of the old grammarians who held that all ideas were necessarily and invariably associated with words.[64] To them Kumārila says that there is no word-element at the *nirvikalpaka* stage. The transcendental nature of *nirvikalpaka*, which implies that we cannot be conscious of an indeterminate perception in terms of thought, as it was established by Dignāga and accepted by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, is missing in Kumārila's account. But even then Kumārila, amongst the orthodox writers, is the first who definitely recognized an earlier stage in the process of perception, and designated it by the term *nirvikalpaka*.

So far as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is concerned, the earliest introduction of the theory of *nirvikalpaka* is found, as already noted, in the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭikā* of Vācaspatimiśra, unless he is held to be posterior to Jayanta who is also conversant with that theory. It appears that at the time of Vācaspatimiśra, i.e., about the first part of the ninth century, when Jayanta and perhaps Vyomaśiva (a commentator of Praśastapāda) also flourished, and still later, during the tenth century when Śrīdhara and Udayana wrote their commentaries, the transcendental nature of *nirvikalpaka* was not definitely established. It was firmly laid down about the close of the twelfth century by Gaṅgeśa from whose time it has remained more or less in a fixed form.

Jayanta and Vyomaśiva hold that the main point of difference between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* is that in the former there is no word-element, and that it is therefore vague and indefinite.[65] This view has a slight affinity with the theory of

64 Na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte,
Anuviddham iva jñānaṁ sarvaṁ śabdena gamyate.
Quoted in NVT. p. 110.

65 Yat prathamākṣa-sannipāta-samaye eva jñānam anullikhita-śabdakaṁ śabdānusmaraṇe hetu-bhūtam upajāyate tad...avikalpakaṁ pratyakṣam. NM. Part I. p. 76. line 5.

Anyathā hi viśiṣṭārthānupalabdhau viśiṣṭasya saṁketa-smaraṇasyānupapatteḥ savikalpakaṁ jñānaṁ na syāt tasya tat-kāryatvāt VV. p. 557. line 27.

Dignāga, and also with that of Kumārila. Both of them lay stress on the absence of the word-element in the *nirvikalpaka*. Udayana in his Kiraṇāvalī says that at the *nirvikalpaka* stage, only the individual, i.e., the substratum of the universal, is apprehended, e.g., a cow is apprehended without the apprehension of cow-*ness*, etc.[66] In Vācaspatimiśra (although he flourished earlier than Udayana) and in Śrīdhara (who was the contemporary of Udayana), we find this theory in a slightly developed form. They hold that at the *nirvikalpaka* stage, the individual as well as its universal are both apprehended, but they are not related as substantive and attribute.[67] Both these authors have not, however, brought out clearly, as is done by Gaṅgeśa and later Naiyāyikas, that *nirvikalpaka* is beyond our cognizance (*atīndriya*).[68]

The nature of the two kinds of perception and their mutual distinction was established in a definite form by Gaṅgeśa. According to him, *savikalpaka* perception is a differentiated and qualified knowledge (*saprakārakaṁ jñānam*). It means that determinate knowledge is in the form of judgment like 'this is a jar'. In this, there are two elements, the substantive and the attribute, which are called in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terminology the *viśeṣya* (that which is qualified) and the *viśeṣaṇa* (that which qualifies). Here the pronoun 'this' which means jar is the substantive (*viśeṣya*), and the word *jar* which means jar-*ness*, the universal, is the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*). Both factors, jar and jar-*ness* (*ghaṭa* and *ghaṭatva*) stand in the relation of substantive and attribute (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva*). The *nirvikalpaka* perception, on the other hand, is devoid of the relation of substantive and attribute. It does not comprehend its object as qualified by some attribute, and therefore, it is *nirvikalpaka*, i.e., undifferentiated or unqualified.[69] It means that at the *nirvikalpaka*

66 Gotvādy-apratītāv api tad-āśrayasya pratīteḥ. Kir. p. 278. line 15.

67 Jātyādi-svarūpāvagāhi na tu jāty-ādīnām mitho viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāvāvagāhi. NVT. p. 108. line 27.

Sāmānyaṁ viśeṣam cobhayam api gṛhnāti yadi paraṁ idaṁ sāmānyam ayaṁ viśeṣa ity evaṁ vivicya na pratyeti NK. p. 189. line 21.

68 Nanu jñānatvaṁ savikalpaka-bhinna-vṛtti ity atra kiṁ mānaṁ, na pratyakṣam, asiddheḥ, atīndriyatvābhyupagamāc ca. TC. Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa, p. 809.

69 Tatra nāma-jāty-ādi-yojanā-rahitaṁ vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi niṣprakāraka ṁ nirvikalpakam. *Ibid.*

stage, although we have a cognition of both jar and jar-*ness*, the two factors are not related as the qualified (*viśeṣya*) and the qualifying (*viśeṣaṇa*).[70] It was, therefore, held by Gangeśa and the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholiasts that the *nirvikalpaka* perception was beyond the ken of consciousness (*atīndriya*). Any cognition which is unrelated, or in terms of western epistemology, which is not in the form of a judgment, is outside the pale of consciousness.[71]

8. SIGNIFICANCE OF SAVIKALPAKA PERCEPTION

The determinate (*savikalpaka*) perception which the Buddhist held to be presenting an unreal generalized mental image was regarded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as a real perception and the *sine qua non* of realism. The significance of upholding the determinate knowledge as true perception can be gauged from some of the statements of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers, especially those of Jayanta who was a Naiyāyika *par excellence*. When a Buddhist opponent suggests that the knowledge of 'hundred' is not a sense-perception, but only a mental construction (*vikalpa-mātra*), Jayanta retorts: "What is that which is not a mere thought-construction for you sir? (But remember) the upholders of the validity of determinate perception are yet alive."[72] Similarly, when it is suggested that the determinate knowledge produced by the sense-object-contact is communicated by a word, and that it should therefore be regarded as produced by a word, and not as a sense-perception, Jayanta exclaims: "The theory that determinate knowledge is a perception is the very life of the followers of the Nyāya."[73]

70 Viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāvānavagāhi jñānam.

71 Tathā ca prathamato ghaṭa-ghaṭatvayor vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhy eva jñānaṁ jāyate tad eva nirvikalpakaṁ, tac ca na pratyakṣam. NSM. on verse 58.

72 Vikalpa-mātraṁ śata-pratyaya iti ced, bho mahātman, kiṁ vā na vikalpa-mātraṁ kiṁ tu jīvanty amī savikalpaka-prāmāṇya-vādinaḥ. NM. Part II. p. 32. line 20.

73 Naiyāyikānāṁ ca savikalpa-pratyakṣamayāḥ prāṇāḥ. NM. Part I p. 81. line 25.

9. REFUTATION OF THE NYĀYA-VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF SAVIKALPAKA PERCEPTION[74]

Vācaspatimiśra has given an erudite discourse on this controversy between the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. As usual, he has put forth the Buddhist position quite faithfully and lucidly. The main Buddhist argument against determinate knowledge being regarded to be a sense-perception as stated by Vācaspatimiśra, which is also found in the works of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist writers, is this: "Determinate perception cannot be held to be (true) perception because the image (*pratibhāsa*) presented by it can be associated with a verbal expression. A cognition produced by the sense-object-contact which grasps a (pure) object can never be associated with a verbal expression, for neither there are words present in the object, nor are the words identical with the object. If it were so, a person ignorant of the meaning of words would also be capable of communicating through words like a person who knows their meaning. Neither could the verbal expression, which is in no way related to the real object, be explained as the attribute of cognition, because a verbal expression refers to the object and not to the cognition. And, therefore, a cognition produced by an object should present only the object and not the word denoting it. Never does a perception produced by colour present the cognition of colour along with that of taste.[75] Therefore determinate knowledge (which is merely a mental construction) is erroneously held to be a true perception. Determinate knowledge presents an object as associated with a name (*abhilāpa*), although in reality the object is independent of any association with a name. Determinate knowledge is caused by impressions of the past determinate knowledge (*vikalpa-vāsanā*), and it grasps an uncertain (*aniyata*) object, and not a fixed one; it differs with every individual, because it is not a real

74 This section and the next one may be read with the section 10 and 11 of the chapter IX where the same topic is discussed in connection with the theory of the universal.

75 In the text quoted in Text Appendix under n. 78 below, the correct reading 'rūpāj jāyamānam' (of the Calcutta edition) has been adopted in preference to 'rūpāj jñāyamānam' (of the Vizianagram edition).

object, and is caused by imagination.[76] The function of imagination remains concealed in determinate knowledge, but because that knowledge follows in the wake of direct sense-experience (*anubhava*), it puts the function of the latter, i.e., sensation (*darśana*) in the fore-front and, therefore,[77] determinate knowledge is supposed to be true sense-perception (*anubhava*)."[78]

Vācaspatimiśra continues the Buddhist argument: "It may be said that words are associated with the objects which they denote, and that when the objects are cognized, the words denoting them are remembered; then there arises the knowledge of the objects as associated with the words. The Buddhist replies that even if it be so, only the objects which are associated with the words could call those words to memory, and what is associated with the words is the generalised universal which is not grasped by the sense. It is the unique particular (*sva-lakṣaṇa*, the ultimate real and the cause of cognition) that is grasped by the sense, and not the universal which, being devoid of all efficient function, is unreal. Words, thus, do not denote what is grasped by the sense, and what they denote is not grasped by the sense. Moreover, if what is grasped by the sense could be denoted by words, i.e., the real object could be called forth by a word, then the fire expressed by a word should be felt hot like the real fire grasped by the sense. In that case, it should be capable of removing cold even when expressed by a word."[79]

Answering the Buddhist, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argues thus: "Inferential mark and the word (i.e., *anumāna* and *śabda-pramāṇa*),[80] comprehend the universal, but *sva-lakṣaṇa* (individual

76 Cf. Aniyata-pratibhāsatvaṁ ca pratibhāsa-niyama-hetor abhāvāt .....vikalpa-vijñānaṁ tu arthān notpadyate, tataḥ pratibhāsa-niyama-hetor abhāvād aniyata-pratibhāsam. Dharmottara's commentary on NB. p. 10 line 16.

77 The principal sentence translated in the beginning of the passage has been repeated at the end for the sake of clarity.

78 For the text "Na vyavasāyātmakam....anubhavatayābhimanyante pratipattāraḥ." see Text Appendix.

79 For the text "Saṁketa-vaśāt śabdānām.....śītāpanodana-prasaṁgaḥ." see Text Appendix.

80 'Śabda' in the text here refers to śabda-pramāṇa and not to the word (which is a factor in determinate perception) as taken by Stcherbatsky.

object) which is grasped by a sensation also contains in it the universal which is real (and not unreal as held by the Buddhist). Thus, an individual object with its universal is the cause of sensation, and therefore a sensation, which occurs in the very first moment of opening the eye, grasps an individual object as associated with the (real) universal. And then comes the remembrance of the word whose relation with the object (i.e., with the individual object accompanied by its universal)[81] has already been comprehended. In this way, there arises a determinate perception in the form 'this is a cow', produced by the sense-object-contact, which (perception) comprehends the substance (an individual object) associated with its universal denoted by that (remembered) word."[82] Here Vācaspatimiśra quotes Kumārila in support of the position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The Buddhist replies: "This is not tenable. The generalised image (universal) as discriminated from the individual object (*piṇḍa*) is never apprehended by indeterminate perception. Indeed, the universal and the individual possessing the universal, movement and the object possessing movement, and quality and the object possessing quality, or their inherent relation do not appear as discriminated (i.e., separate) entities, and they cannot be combined like milk and water by a person who comprehends those objects (the individual and the universal, etc.).[83] The truth, therefore, is that (the real) unique particular (*svalaksana*) is of indivisible unitary nature (without 'real' separate attributes); it has got super-imposed upon it the properties, universal, etc., by beginningless past impressions (of those properties) and it is thus determined as associated with those properties (universal, etc.). Furthermore, even if it be conceded that the two real objects (the particular and the universal) are cognized together, there cannot be the relation of the qualifier and the qualified between them. Two fingers comprehended by

81 Cf. Prathamato ghaṭa-ghaṭatvayor vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhy eva jñānaṁ jāyate. NSM. on verse 58.

82 For the text "Sāmānya-viṣayau.....jāyata iti" see Text Appendix.

83 In the text given in the Text Appendix (under n 84), 'tad-vedinā' has been adopted (in place of atad-vedinā) as suggested by Stcherbatsky. (*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II. p. 266. n. 5).

one and the same cognition do not stand in the relation of the qualifier and the qualified. The qualifier always does some service to the qualified; otherwise they cannot have that relation. Between two objects that are apprehended by one and the same cognition, there can be no relation of one of them indicating the existence of the other (*jñāpya-jñāpaka-bhāva*), nor the causal relation (*kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva*) because between two things which are simultaneous there can be no necessary sequence (as that of cause and effect)."[84]

The Buddhist argument in brief is that when two objects are apprehended by one single cognition, one of them cannot be the attribute of the other; and that the particular and the universal which are grasped, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, by a single cognition, cannot therefore stand in the relation of the qualifier and the qualified. The Buddhist continues, "Besides, if attributes like universals, etc., are held to be *real* attributes of an object, then (in the case of tree called (*śiṁśapā*), all the universals—existence (*sattā*), substance-*ness* (*dravyatva*), the universal of the earth (*pṛthivītva*), the universal of the tree (*vṛkṣatva*), and the universal *śiṁśapātva*—will be (real) attributes of the same object. When therefore a tree is comprehended from a distance as qualified by one of the attributes (say existence), there will arise the comprehension of the tree as qualified by all the (above-given) attributes (because its nature of having subsistence of one of the universals is the same as that of having the subsistence of the other universals).

"Moreover, the relation of the container and the contained (*ādhāra* and *ādheya*) implies some kind of service; for instance, a *badara* fruit which is likely to fall, when placed in a basket is prevented from falling, and therefore the basket does service to the *badara* as its container. Similarly, in the other instance, the substance (i.e., the tree which is the container) must render some service to the universals (which are contained in it). Nor can it be said that it renders service (not by its very nature but) by capacities which are different in the case of each universal (and therefore all the universals are not comprehended

84 For the text "Tan na piṇḍa-vivekena .....paurvāparyāniyamāt." see Text Appendix.

simultaneously). In that case even for containing one such capacity, another capacity (for containing that capacity) will have to be assumed, and the process will go on *ad infinitum*. It will, therefore, have to be admitted that the very nature of a substance produced therein by its causes is such that the substance renders service to its various attributes (by containing them in itself). When, therefore, a substance (tree) is being cognized as capable of rendering service to the universal 'existence' (*sattā*), it has the same nature with reference to all other universals, e.g., substance-*ness*, etc., and therefore, by the determination of the universal *existence* which relates to a real substance, all the attributes *dravyatva*, *pṛthivītva*, *vṛkṣatva* and *śiṁśapātva*, etc., conditioned by the nature of that object, will be comprehended, and there will be no need of (separate) determinations of other universals.

"It has been declared (by Dharmakīrti): Even he, who holds that there is comprehension of an object qualified by numerous attributes (i.e., universals, existence, etc.) and (therefore) it has a diversified nature (*bhedin*), may be asked: When the object, which is identical with the power to render service of containing numerous attributes has been grasped in entirety (*sarvātmanā*), which one of the universals will remain uncomprehended? (When one universal is comprehended, all the universals will be comprehended.) When an object (the substance) rendering the service (of containing attributes) has been comprehended, there remains no other service to be rendered apart from the object. The object, therefore, being cognized, all the attributes (universals) will be cognized.

"Now so far as we are concerned, whatever is cognized[85] or whatever is determined by the ideas (*vikalpas*) recalled by the beginningless impressions of past experiences, both these (what

85 Cognized (gṛhyate). There arises a real difficulty here. 'Grahaṇa' which, in Buddhist terminology, means grasping by the sense, cannot be possible by ideas (vikalpas) as stated here. In the course of discussion on the epistemology of the Dignāga school in the chapter on Universals (IX. 12), it was pointed out that in a perceptual judgment (adhyavasāya, vikalpa), e.g., 'this is a cow', the part *this* refers to a unique particular (sva-lakṣana) which can never be grasped by a perceptual judgment. It is, therefore, held, as explained there, that *this* refers not to the real sva-lakṣaṇa but to 'a sort of shadow' of sva-lakṣaṇa, i.e., an unreal sva-lakṣaṇa.

is cognized and what is determined) being in the form of exclusion of others, are unreal, and do not in the least comprehend the object which is the ultimate real (*sva-lakṣaṇa*). Indirectly, of course, the determinate ideas, having concomitance with the real objects (because determinate perception follows in the wake of sense-perception), do lead people to the real objects, enable them to reach those objects, and thus do not delude them. Ideas (*vikalpas* of numerous universals) not being real, there is no question of their being repeated"[81] (i.e., of being the same, because, according to the Buddhist, they are not separate realities, but mere ideas which are different from one another).

The Buddhist points out further: "Moreover, when an object has been grasped by a sensation, it cannot produce determinate perception, because the operation of the sense is interrupted by subsequent remembrance of the word. It has been said by Dharmakīrti: "If perception requires, even when the object has been contacted (*upayoge 'pi*) the association of a world recalled by memory, the object (in that case) would become interrupted."[87]

Further, it cannot be maintained that "the self-same sensation, which was produced by the sense, brings about the determinate perception when helped by remembrance. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika points out that the remembrance (being part of the act of perception) does not interrupt (determinate perception) because one's own limb offers no interruption. The Buddhist replies that the position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is untenable because (as Dharmakīrti has stated) the object, which did not produce the determinate perception in the first instance (i.e., when it produced the indeterminate perception) will not produce it even afterwards, because the contact (of the object with the sense) is the same in both the cases."[88] Moreover, "the past can never come within the range of the sense, and the sense cannot function even by thousand-fold efforts with reference to

86 For the text "Api ca.....paunaruktyam asti." see Text Appendix.

87 For the text "Api cālocito...vyavahito bhavet." see Text Appendix.

88 Na ca yad evālocanam ajñjanad indriyaṁ tad eva smaraṇa-sahakāri vikalpa-pratyayam ādhatte, na ca smṛtir vyavadhāyikā svāṅgam avyavadhāyakam iti nyāyāt. Yato yaḥ prāg ajanako buddher upayogāviśeṣataḥ sa paścād api iti. NVT. p. 116. line 31.

an object which is outside its range. Neither can memory, which grasps the past objects, grasp the present object which has not been experienced before. If memory could grasp past objects as present, there would arise the impossible situation that the blind would also perceive colour, and therefore it has been said (by Dharmakīrti) that in that case there would be a visual perception even when the visual sense has been lost."[89]

Concluding his argument the Buddhist declares: "It has thus been proved that knowledge which involves (as an attribute) a name, the universal, qualities and movements cannot be a sense-perception. Similar is the case with the knowledge which involves (as an attribute) a substance, as in the instance 'a man with a stick'. It has been said (by Dharmakīrti): The qualifier, the object to be qualified, the relation and the environment (of the object)[90]—all these factors are cognized and arranged (by the intellect); and then alone there is comprehension, and not otherwise.

"The entire series of operations which can be accomplished only by a thinking agent (intellect) cannot be sustained by the sense-perception which, being produced by the power of the present object, is not a thinking agent.[91] The Buddhist, therefore, concludes that the determinate knowledge cannot be held to be a sense-perception."

10. VĀCASPATIMIŚRA'S ANSWER

Answering the Buddhist, Vācaspatimiśra says: "As for your objection that there is a contradiction in determinate perception being produced by the power of an object and being an image capable of a relation with verbal expression, we submit that the contradiction would be there if the unique particular (*sva-lakṣana*) alone were a reality, but it is not so. It will be established[92] that the object is permanent and is qualified by universals, etc., which are also ultimate realities; and it is capa-

89 For the text "Na khalv..... netra-dhīr iti," see Text Appendix.

90 The meaning of the words, quoted in Text Appendix under n. 91 'laukikīm sthitim' (rendered here as "environment of the object") is not quite clear. Stcherbatsky renders it as foundation of our empirical knowledge. *Buddhist Logic*, vol. II. p. 273. line 6.

91 For the text "Tad evam.....pratyakṣam iti," see Text Appendix.

92 NV. and NVT. pp. 511-512 and NV. pp. 667 ff.

ble of relation with verbal expression. Therefore, a cognition produced by universals, etc., is also caused by the power of the object, and has an image capable of relation with verbal expression. There is, thus, no contradiction in it."[93]

Vācaspatimiśra then proceeds to point out that an individual substance and its universals are two different *real* entities which both produce determinate perception. "According to the Buddhist, determinate cognitions construct the universals, etc., as different from the substance, though in reality they are not different, and therefore those determinate cognitions are not produced by the power of a (real) object. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika rejoins that it is not tenable, because the difference of universals from the substance will be established hereafter.[94] It has already been explained how the universals are different from the substance, yet the words denoting the universals, etc., become identical with the substance (because a substance, say cloth, is denoted by the word *paṭa* which in reality means the universal *paṭatva*, i.e., cloth-*ness*)."[95]

Regarding the apparent identity between a word and the object denoted by it, Vācaspatimiśra explains: "The Buddhist argues that a determinate perception is not produced by the

93 For the text "Yat tāvad.....ceti na virodhaḥ." see Text Appendix.

94 See NV. and NVT. pp. 511-512.

95 Na ca dravyādy-abhinnaṁ jātyādi bhinnaṁ kalpayanto vikalpā nārtha-sāmarthya-janmāna iti sāṁpratam, dravyād api hi bhedaḥ sādhayiṣyate teṣām. Yathā ca bhede 'pi teṣāṁ, tad-vācakānāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ tathopapāditam adhastāt. NVT p. 117. line 15.

Cf. "Evaṁ paṭādi-śabdā api jātyādi nimittīkṛtya dravye 'pi vartanta iti sāmānādhikaraṇyam." NVT. p. 96. line 10. To this reference has been made in the above passage According to Stcherbatsky, the sentence 'Yathā ca bhede 'pi teṣām tad-vācakānāṁ sāmānādhikaraṇyaṁ tathopapāditam adhastāt' refers to the apparent identity between a word and the object denoted by it (e.g., in the sentence 'he is Devadatta'), but according to my interpretation, this refers to the apparent identity between the universal (or the word denoting the universal) and the individual object which is denoted by the same word. It is only out of this that the identity between a word and the object denoted by it arises, and has been introduced in the next sentence. Owing to his wrong interpretation, Stcherbatsky has misunderstood even the reference mentioned in the sentence. He thinks that it refers to NVT. p. 110 line 28 (Vizianagram edition p. 84. line 8), but as a matter of fact it refers to NVT. p. 96, line 10 (quoted above) as mentioned in Calcutta edition.

object, because in a determinate perception like 'this is *Ḍittha*', the identity of the object (bullock) is comprehended with the word (*Ḍittha*) which is different from the object. But this is not tenable because it has been pointed out in the course of explaining the term *avyapadeśya*[96] that an object is not presented by a determinate cognition (*vikalpa*) as identical with the word; but the word, while remaining aloof, indicates the object by means of the relation in the form of the power of a word to denote an object (*sva-vācyatayā saṁsargeṇa*). Besides, the word and the object are not comprehended by the same sense organ. A particular object covered under a universal (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*), when first grasped by a sensation, reminds of its past state when its connection with the word was first grasped, and (in that process) it also necessarily brings to memory the word which was experienced at that time. The remembrance of the word, however, plays no part in producing the determinate perception which is caused by the sense. If it were not so, there would be no determinate perception caused by the sense in the case of children and the dumb, because they can have no remembrance of words. Of course, remembrance of the past state of an object obtaining at the time when its connection with the word was established, does play a part (in producing the determinate perception). The very same object, which has two different states, one of *that* time (past) and the other of *this* time (present), is comprehended by the determinate perception which is, of course, produced by the sense. The word which appears there incidentally does not become the part of the determinate perception which is caused by the sense. As it has been said: 'The word, although recollected, does not obstruct the perception because it stands aloof, and it is incapable of concealing the form of the object.' It means that the word does not intervene in the operation of the sense and the object."[97]

Vācaspatimiśra then proceeds to meet the objection that "inasmuch as a determinate perception is dependent upon the recollection of a past state, it cannot be held to be caused by

96 NVT. p. 110.

97 For the text "Na ca bhinnena śabdena.....ity arthaḥ." see Text Appendix.

the sense-object-contact. This objection is not tenable, because the Buddhist also holds that nothing is born from one cause; everything is born from an aggregate of causes. If it were not so (i.e., if the perception produced by the sense and object *as dependent on* other factors were not accepted as a true perception), then the object and the visual sense, should not produce even indeterminate perception which they do (not alone but) with the aid of light and *manas*. As to why the sense-object-contact does not produce determinate perception in the very first instance, the answer is that it does not do so for want of its accessory, viz., remembrance. If a seed kept in a granary does not produce a sprout, that is no reason why it should not do so even when associated with the assemblage of its accessories like earth, etc.[98]

The Buddhist raises another objection: "The past condition of an object cannot be comprehended by the sense, because it is restricted to the present object. A present object, on the other hand, cannot be recollected by memory, because memory, being born of the awakening of an impression which has been caused by a previous experience, is confined to the object of past experience. Memory, therefore, having its object of a different kind (i.e., of the past) cannot be an accessory of the sense. Even a thousand eyes and lights which have colour as their object cannot be accessories of the ear which has sound as its object."[99] Here Vācaspatimiśra refers to a Buddhist epistemological theory according to which a previous idea is held to be the immediately preceding cause of a subsequent idea, and asks: "Do you not hold that in a case where a visual sensation immediately follows an olfactory one, the latter is the immediately preceding cause (*samanantara-pratyaya*) of the former?[100] In that case, the eye which has colour as its object

98 For the text "Na ca prāg-avasthā-smaraṇa-sāpekṣatayā.....asyājanakaṁ bhavati." see Text Appendix.

99 For the text "Atītāvasthā.....sahakāritām āpadyante." see Text Appendix.

100 *According to the Buddhist theory, there are four kinds of causes (pratyayas) of every event (moment). For instance, a visual sensation has (i) the visual sense as its cause which is called adhipati-pratyaya, (ii) the object concerned as its cause which is called ālambana-pratyaya, (iii) light as its cause which is called sahakāri-pratyaya, and (iv) the previous moment of consciousness as its cause which is called samanantara-pratyaya.*

cannot work as accessory (*sahakārin*) of the perception of the smell for the simple reason that both grasp different kinds of objects.[101] The Buddhist would explain that the relation of cause and effect depends on the law of the effect following the presence or absence (*anvaya-vyatireka*) of its cause; it does not depend on the fact of cause and effect being objects of the same sense. To this, the Nyāya-Vaiśesika could say that the same thing would apply to their case also."[102] And thus, according to this principle of causal relation, a determinate perception is caused by sense and memory, although they grasp different kinds of objects, viz., the present and the past respectively.

Then the Buddhist raises another objection: "The fact is that the past state of an object is not in contact with the sense; how can it then be cognized by the sense"?[103] Vācaspatimiśra answers: "Does it then mean that all that is in contact with the sense is perceived? If it were so, ether and atoms, etc., which are in contact with the sense, would also be perceptible.[104] The fact, therefore, is that whatever comes within the range of the knowledge produced by the sense is perceptible,[105] and not all that which is in contact with the sense. It may, however, be asked: if there be no contact with an object, how can the sense produce a knowledge with reference to that object, and how can that knowledge be held to be perception? And if that kind of knowledge be held to be perception, how will the definition of perception, viz., that which is produced by *sense-object-contact*, cover all the instances of perception? In that case, the

101 It would appear that the use of the word 'sahakārin' in this context is not quite appropriate That word is used for another kind of cause, such as light in the case of a visual sensation.

102 For the text "Tat kim..... api samānam." see Text Appendix.

103 Nanv atītāvasthā-viśiṣṭatvam asya nendriya-sannikṛṣṭam iti katham pratyakṣam. NVT. p. 118. line 15.

104 The reply of Vācaspatimiśra is fallacious. The Buddhist did not mean that whatever is in contact with the sense is perceptible, but he simply said that whatever is perceived must be in contact with the sense. The real reply (which just follows) is given by modifying the definitions of perception.

105 Perception is here defined as 'indriyajanya-jñāna-viṣayatvam' instead of 'indriya-janyam' or 'indriyārtha-sannikarsotpannam'. This departure was made necessary to meet the Buddhist objection.

above-quoted instance (the perception of the past state of an object) itself will not be covered by that definition."[106] Vācaspatimiśra meets the objection thus: "Although the past state of an object may not be grasped by the sense, yet that state is comprehended by the perceptive knowledge produced by the sense with the aid of the memory or impressions. It cannot be said that the knowledge which has been produced by the sense-object-contact with the help of memory, is not produced by sense-object-contact; and, thus, the definition of perception will cover all cases."[107]

The Buddhist objects again: "How can a reflective knowledge (*parāmarśa-jñāna*), which has past and present states as its object, be *one* unitary knowledge? It has two objects which are of different kinds, and it possesses the incompatible attributes of being mediate and immediate. Thus (in the reflective knowledge which takes the form *this is that* and which implies that the object in the present state is the same which existed in the past state), *that* factor is mediate, and *this* factor is immediate. Nor can it be said that, in spite of possessing incompatible attributes, an object can be identical because in that case, all the three worlds will become identical. There is also a difference of the object, because relation of the same object with a prior and a later time and place is contradictory."[108] The Buddhist here refers to the law of contradiction which has already been discussed.[109] He points out that existence at one moment, say the present moment, implies non-existence at another moment, i.e., the past moment, and *vice versa*, because any one of the two is concomitant with the non-existence of the other. Vācaspatimiśra answers: "Although the past and present places and times and relation of the object with them are two different entities, because one of them is concomitant with the non-existence of the other, and they are never comprehended as identical, yet an object, for instance, a ruby which is associated

106 For the text "Tat kiṁ yad.....lakṣaṇenāvyāpanāt." see Text Appendix.

107 For the text "Mā bhūd .... asya lakṣaṇam." see Text Appendix.

108 For the text "Nanu pūrvāparāvasthā-viṣayam.....ekasya virodhāt." see Text Appendix.

109 See chapter VI, sections 10 and 24.

with both is not so (not different at two times) because it is different from those two (places and times or their relations). Moreover, difference in a thing cannot cause difference in another thing (i.e., the difference of two times and places cannot cause difference in the identity of the diamond which is different from the former entities (viz., time and place) because that will involve an unwarranted stretch of the rule (*atiprasaṅga*)."[110]

The Buddhist raised the objection: if the same object which was grasped by the sense could also be denoted by a word, the fire expressed by a word should also remove cold. But the objection is not tenable because although both, the determinate perception and the word, refer to a real object, the knowledge in the two cases is not of the same kind. On account of the difference of the causes, there is a difference in the knowledge i.e., mediate and immediate. Removal of cold is caused by the contact with real fire (present only at the time of the immediate knowledge), and not by its mere (verbal) knowledge.[111]

"As to the objection that when one universal adjunct, viz., *existence* has been comprehended, other adjuncts like substance-*ness*, etc., should also be comprehended because the nature of an object of possessing one universal is the same as that of possessing another universal, Vācaspatimiśra gives the following answer: "When an object as qualified by one universal is comprehended, it does not denote its comprehension as qualified by other universals, because it is the *nature* of the substance which is qualified by the adjuncts, but the adjuncts (universals, etc.) or the fact of its being qualified by them is not its nature. It is not that whatever is related to the nature of an object becomes itself its nature. If that were so, it would not be held to be related to it, because a thing cannot be related to itself."[112]

110 For the text "Pūrvāpara-deśa-kālau ... āpādayati atiprasaṅgāt." see Text Appendix.

111 Na ca śabda-pratyakṣayor vastu-gocaratve saty api pratyayābhedaḥ kāraṇa-bhedena pārokṣyāpārokṣya-bhedopapatteḥ, na ca vahni-saṃyoga-janmā śītāpanodo vahni-jñānād bhavitum arhati. NVT p 119 line 24.

112 For the text "Na caikenopādhinā .. tena saṃbadhyate." see Text Appendix.

Answering to the Buddhist objection as to how a sense-perception which is not a thinking agent can arrange all the factors, the qualifier and the qualified, etc.,[113] Vācaspatimiśra rejoins: "Is even a mental knowledge capable of arranging (various ideas)? If it be said that it does so because the *manas* which is its cause can comprehend all kinds of things, it may be asked (there being no permanent thinking agent according to the Buddhist), if *manas* is in the form of the previous cognition, how will it comprehend all kinds of objects? So far as we are concerned, *manas* according to us, although capable of grasping all objects, is not a thinking agent because it is unconscious (*acetana*). That being so, the soul alone, as the substratum of all cognitions and impressions produced by them, recollects and arranges ideas."[114]

Now Vācaspatimiśra proceeds to answer the question as to how the two simultaneous ideas, of which one cannot render any service to the other, can be arranged in the relation of the qualifier and the qualified, and why that relation is not cognized at the very first moment of indeterminate perception. He says: "Although between two objects (the individual as well as the universal) comprehended by one single cognition, there can be no relation of one of them serving the other by making the other known,[115] yet the indeterminate sensation (in which the universal and the individual are cognized without mutual relationship) and remembrance of the past are the causes of the determinate knowledge which establishes the relation of the qualifier and the qualified between them. Therefore, indeterminate perception and remembrance render a service to determinate knowledge by producing it. The two objects (the universal and the individual), although standing in relation of 'form' and 'possessor of form' (*rūpa-rūpi-bhāvena*), have not been comprehended in that relation by the indeterminate percep-

113 Nanv avicārakam indriya-jñānam katham viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyādi sakalam samākalayet. NVT. p. 120. line 14.

114 For the text "Hanta bhoḥ.....pratisaṁdhātā ca." see Text Appendix.

115 'Upakāryopakāraka-bhāva' is of two kinds, viz., jñāpya-jñāpaka-bhāva and kārya-kārana-bhāva. Here only the former is possible and therefore referred to.

tion which occurs at the very first moment; they are comprehended by it in their own nature (as unrelated). It is not necessary that all that exists should be completely cognized. Therefore, although indeterminate perception has cognized the universal and the individual only partially (i.e., without their mutual relationship), it does not become invalid for that reason. The determinate perception, of course, produced by the causes referred to above (i.e., the indeterminate perception of the unrelated universal and individual, and the remembrance of the past), presents the universal, etc., as 'form' (*rūpatayā*) and the substance (individual) as 'possessor of form' (*rūpitayā*). And, although determinate perception arises at a later stage, it is undoubtedly a sense-perception because it has been produced by sense-object-contact."[116]

11. MENTAL FACTOR IN DETERMINATE PERCEPTION

Vācaspatimiśra has purposely been quoted above at some length. In this discourse, we meet with some of the later theories of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika in the process of their development. Meeting the Buddhist attack, Vācaspatimiśra evolved some ideas in order to establish that determinate perception was a real sense-perception. These ideas were further developed by Śrīdhara, Udayana and other writers of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika till they were crystallized by Gañgeśa, the founder of the Navya-nyāya school.[117]

As already stated, the theory that determinate perception is a *real* sense-perception is the *sine qua non* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology,[118] and it is based on the acceptance of objective reality of the universal. The theory of *samavāya* relation (inherence) was also evolved in order to establish the objective reality of the universal, the qualities, and movements. The whole structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics, thus, turns round the central point that determinate perception is a sense-perception. If determinate perception is not a real sense-perception, realism itself is forthwith doomed. The main line

116 For the text "Eka-vijñāna-vedyatve .....bhavaty eva." see Text Appendix.

117 *Supra*, the concluding portion of section 7 of this chapter.

118 *Supra*, section 8 of this chapter.

of argument of the Buddhist is: Inasmuch as there is a mental factor involved in the so-called determinate perception, it cannot be regarded as a real sense-perception. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika insists that there is no mental factor involved in a determinate perception, and, therefore, it is as much based on the sense-object-contact as indeterminate perception is. The following salient points emerge from the dispute between the two schools.

Dignāga points out that there is necessarily the association of a word[119] involved in determinate perception. Vācaspatimiśra rejoins that although there does occur remembrance of the word denoting the object cognized in determinate perception, that remembrance stands apart, and does not form a component part of the percept.[120] As for the association of the universal, quality, movement, or substance[121] with the substance-object of determinate perception, the answer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is that all those factors are not mental but are objective realities. When, however, all is said and done, there still remains some trace of mental factor in determinate perception which could not be denied even by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Vācaspatimiśra avers that the remembrance of a word has no part in producing determinate perception, but he has to admit that "remembrance of the past state of an object obtaining at the time when its connection with the word was established does play a part in determinate perception. The same object which has two different states, viz., of 'that time' (past) and 'this time' (present), is comprehended by determinate perception which, of course, is produced by the sense."[122]

Now one thing which emerges out of the above statement is that determinate perception is in the form of recognition, because there is in it the consciousness of a past state of the

119 *Nāma-kalpanā or nāma-yojanā.*

120 *Saṁjñinaḥ sā tatasthā hi. See under n. 97 of section 10 of this chapter.*

121 *Jāti-guna-karma-dravya-kalpanā jātyādi-yojanā vā.*

122 *See for the context n. 97 and section 10 of this chapter, especially note the words: saṁketa-samaya-varty-avasthā-smaraṇaṁ tūpayujyate vastuna tadānīntanedānīntanāvasthā-bhedavata ekasya indriyajena vikalpenākalanāt.* NVT. p. 117. line 22.

object. Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) is ordinarily regarded as a special kind of perception which takes the form: 'this is the same object which I saw before.' Although every determinate perception may not be expressed in that form, yet, according to Vācaspatimiśra, every determinate perception has always a reference to the past state of the object cognized, because it is the cause of calling forth the name of the object. The only difference between an ordinary perception and the perception called recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) is that there is in the latter a consciousness of a past experience expressed in language. But, as a matter of fact, there is some reference to the past experience in every determinate perception (although it may not be quite explicit). Every determinate perception is, in a way, of the nature of recognition. That every determinate perception has a reference to the past experience is in accord with the theory of apperception of Kantian epistemology.

If the past state of an object is comprehended in every determinate perception, it is clearly a mental factor. The past state can be comprehended only by memory, and never by the sense. This was, as a matter of fact, the core of the problem with which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had to grapple, rather desperately. So much was the impact of the Buddhist onslaught that a thinker of the calibre of Vācaspatimiśra had to meet it by giving more or less a fallacious reply.[123]

As already stated, Vācaspatimiśra, under the impact of the Buddhist onslaught, had to change the definition of perception, and to declare that *"whatever comes within the range of the knowledge produced by the sense is the object of perception, and not merely that which comes in contact with the sense."*[124] It means that there may be an object of perception which is not in contact with the sense, and yet it may have been comprehended by a perception produced by the sense. Vācaspatimiśra himself says in the same context: "Although the relation of an object with its past state is not grasped by the sense, yet that (relationship) is comprehended in the perceptive knowledge (produced

123 See *Supra*, n. 104 of section 10 of this chapter.

124 Yad eva indriyajasya jñānasya gocaras tat pratyakṣam, na tv indriya-saṁbaddham. NVT. p. 118, line 17.

by the sense) *with the aid of memory or impressions.*"[125] It appears that the Buddhist objection is met here only by giving up the original Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position (viz., that alone which is in contact with the sense is perceived), and by adopting a new theory that whatever comes within the range of knowledge produced by the sense is the object of perception.

Here we notice that a new factor is in the process of being introduced in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology. When perceptive knowledge is produced by sense-object-contact, it smuggles in something which is not in contact with the sense. How does it do so? The answer is given in the last part of the above statement that it is comprehended with the aid of memory or impressions. There are two alternatives that either (i) memory of the past experience or (ii) simply the impressions (*saṁskāra*) of that experience without awakening memory (*smṛti*) render aid to the sense, and the sense thus aided produces a perceptive knowledge which, in addition to cognizing the object in its present state, cognizes it as related to a past state as well. The main emphasis laid by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school, is that the perceptive knowledge of the object as related to both the states, present and past, is *one unitary knowledge*. As held by the Buddhist, it is not composed of two parts, viz., (i) sense-perception of the present state, and (ii) memory of the past. But if we hold that memory (and not *saṁskāra*) renders aid to the sense, it will mean that there is, in the first place, the memory of the relation of the object with a past state, and that secondly, the memory helps the sense, but itself disappears; it does not itself become part of the perceptive knowledge. For, otherwise the perceptive cognition would not be a unitary cognition. It is therefore held that the sense, aided by the memory, produces a unitary perceptive knowledge which comprehends an object as related to its present as well as to its past state. Even then the fact that perceptive knowledge is preceded by memory suggests a sort of alien element in the unitary perception. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers, therefore, gave up this alternative; and as we shall see, adopted the second alternative that the sense

125 *See Supra, n. 107 of section 10 of this chapter.*

was helped by the impression (*saṁskāra*) and not by memory (*smṛti*).

The question of impressions helping the sense is usually taken up in connection with the perceptive knowledge, called recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), which is held, by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers, to be a special kind of perception, and differentiated from ordinary determinate perception. A reference to the past state of an object is not accepted by them, as was done by Vācaspatimiśra, in the case of every ordinary determinate perception. It is tenaciously held by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that a recognition is not composed of two kinds of knowledge, viz., sense-perception grasping the present state of an object, and memory referring to its past state; but it is one unitary knowledge in which the past state is also apprehended by sense perception.[126] According to the later writers, apprehension of the past state by sense-perception is due to the aid of impressions (the second alternative of Vācaspatimiśra). It is held that the sense, unaided by impressions, grasps an object only in its present state, but when aided by impressions, it has the power to comprehend the past state also. The function of an impression (*saṁskāra*), as originally conceived, is that of bringing about remembrance. Praśastapāda, of course, mentions recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) as well as memory, both being produced by impression. He says: "The quality of the soul called impression (*bhāvanā*, i.e., *saṁskāra*)[127] is the cause of remembrance and recognition of the objects seen, heard, or experienced before."[128] It appears that Praśastapāda conceives recognition as a special kind of remembrance which occurs along with some kinds of perception. He does not seem to have conceived that recognition is a unitary perceptive knowledge in which impressions are capable of presenting a past state in a sense-perception. This theory seems to have developed only in the ninth or the tenth century.

126 *Supra*, VI. 23 and 31.

127 Although the term saṁskāra is a wider term which includes (i) velocity (vega), (ii) mental impression (bhāvanā) and elasticity (sthiti-sthāpakatva), it usually denotes mental impression (bhāvanā).

128 Bhāvanā-saṁjñakas tv ātma-guno dṛṣṭa-śrutānubhūtesv artheṣu smṛti-pratyabhijñāna-hetur bhavati. PP. p. 267.

Jayanta and Śrīdhara both hold that the past state of an object is revealed in a sense-perception when the sense is aided by impressions. They do not accept the other alternative that the sense is aided by remembrance. In fact, Śrīdhara differentiates between an object called forth by memory (*smṛty-upanīta*), which, according to him, is of the nature of thought, and the object called forth by an impression (*saṁskāropanīta*) which is of the nature of sense-perception. Śrīdhara says with reference to the cognition of a word that "at the time of cognition of the last letter, the previous letters, although destroyed, are brought forth by memory (*smṛty-upanīta*), and they become the *efficient cause* of the comprehension of the meaning. If the efficient causality of a past object is possible, the inherent causality of some (past) objects may also be possible."[125] But an object can be an inherent cause only if it were actually existent. The existence of a past object at the present time, contradictory as it may appear, is brought about through the power of impression. An impression is held to be the cause of a sense-perception also, as it is that of remembrance. Śrīdhara further says: "Just as the *manas* has the power of producing remembrance of an object, similarly, the *manas* aided by impression has the power of producing perceptive experience as well."[130]

The Buddhist objects that the sense always grasps a present object, that impression has always reference to a past object, and *vice versa*, the sense can never grasp a past object and that impression can never refer to a present object. Śrīdhara replies: "Although sense and impression, working separately, are incapable (of grasping past and present objects respectively), yet, when working in concert, they produce an effect in the form of recognition."[131] Jayanta repeats the same

129 Tathā cāntya-varṇa-pratīti-kāle pūrva-varṇānāṁ vinaṣṭānām api smṛty-upanītatvād artha-pratītau nimitta-kāraṇatvam asty eva. Yathedaṁ tathā samavāyi-kāraṇatvam api kesāñcid bhaviṣyati. NK. p. 119. line 15.

130 Yathā ca saṁskāra-sacivasya manaso bāhye smṛty-utpādana-sāmarthyam evaṁ pratyakṣānubhava-janana-sāmarthyam api. NK. p. 119. line 17.

131 Yady api pratyekam indriya-saṁskārāv asamarthau tathā 'pi saṁhatābhyām idam ekaṁ kāryaṁ pratyabhijñā-svabhāvaṁ prabhāvayiṣyate. NK. p. 80. line 19.

idea at several places.[132] The view of Jayanta with regard to the part played by impression in bringing about recognition has already been quoted in connection with the refutation of the Buddhist doctrine of evanescence.[133]

Before closing this topic, a passing reference may be made to a significant suggestion made by Udayana to explain the cognition of the past state by sense-perception. He says: "The past state is not altogether devoid of contact with the sense, because there is a relation between them in the form of 'qualification of a connected object' (*saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇatā*). As this relation like *saṁyukta-samavāya* produces a perceptive knowledge, it is included in the list of sense-object-contacts (*sannikarṣa*)."[134] It may be recalled that a storm of opposition was raised by opponents when that kind of contact was held to be the cause of the perception of inherence (*samavāya*) and non-existence (*abhāva*).[135] But Udayana goes a step further and proposes that even an altogether non-existent past state can be perceived through that relation. This, however, was never accepted by the other thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

12. MENTAL FACTOR EXPLAINED THROUGH TRANSCENDENTAL CONTACT

Vācaspatimiśra admits that there is apprehension of a past state of an object in every determinate perception; and although the past state is not in contact with the sense, its apprehension is caused by the sense and past impressions working jointly. Even the definition of perception was modified in that light,[136] which was accepted by the later writers. For instance, Śrīdhara says, "Although there is no contact (of the past state) with the

132 Saṁskāra-sahitam indriyam asyāḥ pratīteḥ karaṇam. NM. Part II. p. 31. line 15.

133 *Supra*, VI. 23 and 31.

134 Na tāvat sarvathaivātītāvasthā nendriya-sannikṛṣṭā saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇatāyāḥ sattvāt. Asyāpi saṁyukta-samavāyavat pratyakṣa-jñānotpādakatayā sannikarṣa-padena saṁgrahāt. Pariśuddhi, p. 612. line 1.

135 It is the sixth kind of contact which causes the perception of non-existence (abhāva) according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and of inherence (samavāya) according to the Nyāya school See X. 9. and I. 5.

136 See *supra*, n. 124 on section 11 of this chapter and its rendering above.

sense, the past state is indeed grasped by perception because it is the object of the knowledge produced by the sense."[137] Vācaspatimiśra thinks that there is a reference to the past condition of an object in the case of every ordinary determinate perception. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers, however, hold that apprehension of a past state occurs only in the case of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), and not in every determinate perception. Recognition is, however, not held by them to be a separate kind of perception as is sometimes erroneously supposed,[138] but only to be a special kind of determinate perception. The view that there is a reference to the past state of an object in every determinate perception was dropped in the later Nyāya-Vaiśesika treatises. Subtle and intricate factors involved in determinate perception noted by older writers were not taken into account at all. For instance, Śrīdhara, one of the old writers, says: "The universal is cognized when it is realized to be present in other objects of the same class."[139] There is, thus, according to him, a reference to other objects of the same class in a determinate perception. Both these points, viz., a determinate perception has a reference to (i) a past state and (ii) to other objects of the same class, appeared in the later period in the form of transcendental contacts called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa*, and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* respectively. There is an erroneous notion that the transcendental contacts and the transcendental perception produced by them constitute altogether a separate class, and they are different from an ordinary determinate perception. As a matter of fact, the transcendental contacts, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, operate in the case of every ordinary determinate perception, though this fact is totally ignored by the traditional scholars. The transcendental contacts are only the crystallized forms of some of the views which Vācaspatimiśra,

137 Indriya-sannikarsābhāve 'pi pūrva-kāla-pratyakṣataiva indriyaja-jñāna-viṣayatvāt NK. p. 80. line 26.

138 For instance Dr. S C. Chatterjee says: "The Naiyāyikas distinguish between three modes of ordinary perception, namely, nirvikalpaka, savikalpaka and pratyabhijñā" 'The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, p. 207). In no authoritative work of the Nyāya, pratyabhijñā (recognition) is held to be a third kind of perception side by side with nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka.

139 Piṇḍāntarānuvṛtti-grahaṇād dhi sāmānyaṁ gṛhyate. NK. p. 189. line 23.

Jayanta, Śrīdhara and others developed while meeting the Buddhist objections. Of course, the transcendental contacts (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) are not mentioned in their writings by name, because that theory had not been formulated in a clear-cut way in their time.

There are three kinds of transcendental contacts (*alaukika-sannikarṣa*) according to the later Nyāya-Vaiśesika school. One of them is the 'yogic vision' (*yogaja-sannikarṣa*) by which a Yogin can have perception of things beyond the reach of the senses. This is a supernatural power with which we are not concerned. The other two kinds of contact, although designated as transcendental or extraordinary (*alaukika*), and placed side by side with the yogic vision, belong to ordinary men and, what is not realized, operate in every ordinary perception. One of them is 'of the nature of the universal' (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). In this contact, we have a sort of extraordinary perception of all the objects of a class through the universal (or the generalized form) which serves as a contact. The other kind is 'of the nature of knowledge' (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa*). The stock example of the latter is: When I see a piece of sandal which is so distant that its fragrance cannot be smelt, still I have a perceptive judgment in the form that it is fragrant. In this case, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika, fragrance is not remembered or inferred as held by the Vedāntin, but it is a part of the visual perception. But fragrance cannot be grasped by the eye and, being distant, it is beyond the reach of the sense of smell. The contact with fragrance or its perception by the eye is, therefore, held to be transcendental or extraordinary.

It is interesting to note that these transcendental contacts are not known to any writer of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to the 10th century or even much later. Not only are they not known to Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta, Śrīdhara, Udayana, Bhāsarvajña, or Śivāditya, but they have not been mentioned even by Keśava-miśra of the thirteenth century. Without realizing this fact, some of the modern expositors of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika give the theory of transcendental perception side by side with the theories of Kaṇāda, Gotama, Vātsyāyana or Praśastapāda, although in their epistemological structure it has no place. The origin of the two types of transcendental contacts can, of course, be

traced in the discourses of Vācaspatimiśra, Jayanta, Śrīdhara and others. It would be quite illuminating to trace the beginning of this theory in the works of earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers. Let us first take the second contact, called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa*.

As already noted, Vācaspatimiśra, when confronted by the Buddhist, advanced a theory, perhaps for the first time in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, that the sense aided by past impressions could bring about a perceptive cognition of the past state of an object.[140] It was crystallized more and more in the course of conflict with the Buddhist. Of course, past impressions were held to be working in concert with the sense only in the case of recognition, and not in the case of ordinary perception. Vācaspatimiśra also does not explicitly say that our ordinary perception is of the nature of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), but it is implied in his statement that there is a reference to the past state in every ordinary perception. Is there any difference between the reference to the past state involved in the case of every ordinary perception and that in the case of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*)?

When I see my watch every day, there is in that ordinary perception always a reference to past experience, otherwise I should not recognize it as a watch much less as mine. Even for knowing its universal watch-*ness*, a reference to the past experience is necessary. But reference to the past experience is not consciously and explicitly made in the form 'it is the same watch which I saw before or which is mine'. But when I see a less familiar object, say a peculiar sort of watch, I am reminded of my past experience and declare that I saw the same watch some time back at a particular place. This is designated as *recognition* or *pratyabhijñā*. The stock example is—'It is the same Devadatta whom I saw at Patna'. There is here a conscious reference to a past experience, but still it is not regarded as a case of remembrance, because the object concerned is also present before me, and it is differentiated from a pure act of remembrance where the object is not present. Recognition is

140 The idea in its germinal form may be traced even in earlier writings, but its first clear expression, so far as I am aware, was made by Vācaspatimiśra.

thus held to be a sense-perception produced by the sense when it is aided by past impressions. But it may be pointed out that in the stock example of recognition given above, the act of remembrance (that I saw Devadatta at Patna) seems to be clearly involved. It would be more realistic to hold that there is in this case, in the first instance, a sense-perception aided by the past impression in which there is reference to the past state of the object. Here, there is just a bare reference to the past state, and not a conscious reference to it. Immediately after the sense-perception, the impression (which, working in concert with the sense, caused the sense-perception of both the states) is awakened (*udbuddha*) and brings about a conscious reference to the past experience which means remembrance.[141] The remembrance cannot, however, be said to have preceded the unitary sense-perception of both the states, because in that case the remembrance, coming necessarily after the indeterminate perception, would intervene between the latter and the unitary determinate perception. The main objection of the Buddhist is that a determinate perception is not a sense-perception because it is interrupted by remembrance. It was for this reason that although Vācaspatimiśra suggested remembrance also as an alternative with the past impression for aiding the sense, the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers discarded remembrance, and accepted only impressions as aiding the sense in the case of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*).

There are other instances besides that of recognition in which past experience seems to be blended with a sense-perception. Even before the theory of transcendental contact (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa*) was clearly formulated, its stock example (a piece of sandal wood being cognized as fragrant by visual perception) was very often quoted by the old Nyāya-Vaiśesika writers to uphold the theory that recognition is a kind of sense-perception. That kind of cognition (visual perception of sandal wood as fragrant) is quite similar to recognition. In that case also the fragrance, which was experienced in the past and which is not in contact with the sense, is presented in a sense-perception. Here the

141 According to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika theory, a past impression (saṃskāra) when working with the sense produces recognition. In this act, it is dormant. But when that impression is awakened, it produces remembrance.

citation of the stock-example by the old writers clearly shows the process of the formulation of the theory of the transcendental contact at work.

While meeting the Buddhist objection as to how in the case of recognition an object can be grasped as qualified by the past time which is not in contact with the sense, Jayanta has referred to this illustration of the grasping of fragrance by the visual sense. In the first instance, he says: "Although the sense may be incapable of grasping the past time independently, yet it is not incapable of grasping the past time as qualifying a present object which is in contact with it."[142] He then, proposes another alternative: "Or recognition may be accepted to be grasping an object as qualified by a previous experience like the cognition of a jasmine flower as qualified by fragrance. A jasmine flower perceived by the eye is qualified by fragrance which cannot be the object of the eye, and therefore the grasping of fragrance through an external sense being impossible, the knowledge of the flower as fragrant may be regarded as *mental* (so far as fragrance' is concerned). Similarly, the knowledge of a pillar, etc., as qualified by a previous experience in the form that this (pillar) is an object of the knowledge of the past moment, should be regarded as mental recognition (so far as its relation with the past time is concerned.)"[143] In the previous instance, the knowledge of fragrance is *mental*.[144] The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers who formulated the theory of *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* contact, however, declared that fragrance was grasped by the visual perception through a sort of transcendental contact, because fragrance was a qualification of the flower perceived by the visual sense.

Śrīdhara has also referred to the same stock example in a similar context. Replying to an objection as to how time, which is not at all perceptible but only inferable, becomes the quali-

142 Atīte kāle svatantre tasyāsāmarthyaṁ (not tasya sāmarthyaṁ as wrongly printed) na tad-grāhya-vartamāna-vastu-viśeṣaṇibhūte. NM. Part II. p. 33. line 9.

143 For the text, "Athavā pūrvābhijñāna.....mānasī pratyabhijñā." see Text Appendix.

144 Cf. the theory of the Vedāntin according to which this is a case of inference.

fication of a person perceived by the sense, he says: "When, on account of difference in the bodies of the young and the old, the connection of time as its cause is inferred, there comes about the perception of both of them (young and old) as qualified by time. Here, the knower being one, there is no contradiction in a qualification (time) being comprehended by a different means of knowledge (i.e., inference which is other than perception by which the two persons are cognized). This is similar to the instance where a piece of sandal wood is cognized as fragrant."[145] Thus, according to Śrīdhara, fragrance which is a qualification of the sandal wood is not grasped by the eye through some transcendental contact. It was grasped in the past by the sense of smell, but at present it is only inferred, and becomes the qualification of an object of visual perception. Another reference to this illustration occurs in connection with the perception of duality. This perception, in the form that there are two objects, should be preceded by the cognition of the number two (*dvitva*), which cognition, in turn, should be preceded by the cognition of the universal of the number two (i.e., *dvitvatva*), because the knowledge of the qualification must precede the knowledge of the qualified. It is held that knowledge of the qualification and the qualified cannot occur simultaneously. Against those who hold that the qualifier and the qualified should be comprehended by the same knowledge, the instance of 'the cognition of a flower as fragrant' is quoted. In that case nobody could say that the qualification *fragrance* was simultaneously grasped by visual perception along with the qualified object, i.e., the flower.[146] Little could Śrīdhara imagine that his successors of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school would actually declare that fragrance was grasped by visual perception through a transcendental contact.

There is the same underlying principle in all the three cases —(i) in the case of reference to the past state of an object in ordinary determinate perception, (ii) in the case of the special

145 Yuva-sthavirayoḥ śarīrāvasthā-bhedena tat-kāraṇatayā kāla-saṃyoge 'numite sati paścāt tayoḥ kāla-viśiṣṭatāvagatiḥ pratyetur ekatvāt pramāṇāntaropanītasyāpi viśeṣaṇatvāvirodhāt, yathā surabhi candanam iti. NK. p. 65. line 7.

146 NK. p. 116. line 25.

kind of determinate perception called recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), and (iii) in the case of the visual perception of sandal wood as fragrant through a transcendental contact called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa*. The knowledge of something which is not in contact with the sense is produced as a qualification of an object which is in contact with the sense, and the knowledge of the qualification and the qualified, being unitary knowledge, is held to be a sense-perception notwithstanding the fact that a part of the object (i.e., the past state) is not in contact with the sense. It is, therefore, obvious that in the case of reference to a past state in ordinary perception or in recognition, there is the same transcendental contact (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*) which brings about the visual perception of the sandal wood as fragrant. And although that contact is regarded as transcendental or extraordinary, it plays its part in every ordinary determinate perception. In other words, transcendental contact called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* explains the ideal or mental content of the sense-perception. It may also be added in this context that the perceptive knowledge of sandal wood as fragrant is something like what western psychologists like Stout, Ward and Wundt call *complication*, and illustrate by such judgments as 'ice looks cold' or 'armour looks hard'.[147]

The theory of transcendental contact through knowledge (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa*), once established, serves to explain the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of error also. In an illusory cognition of a shell as silver, the silver is supposed to be presented to the eye through that extraordinary contact.[148] It also serves the purpose of presenting a sensuous object in the apperception (*anuvyavasāya*, i.e., mental perception of a perception) in the form 'I know the jar' (*ghaṭam aham jānāmi*). Viśvanātha says that when a mass of dust is erroneously perceived as smoke, and there is afterwards the repudiation of that illusion, and apperception takes the form 'I cognized the mass of dust as smoke', the cognition of the mass of dust by mental perception is caused through the transcendental contact.[149] Similarly, it may be said that in the case of a valid perception also, an object like a jar

147 Dr. S. C. Chatterjee: *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 240.
148 *History of Indian Logic*, pp. 139-40.
149 NSM. on verse 65.

which is grasped by the eye will be grasped at the stage of mental perception (*ghaṭam aham jānāmi*) by transcendental contact, because the mind cannot have a visual perception of the jar through an ordinary contact.

The development of the theory of another kind of transcendental contact through the universal (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) seems to have been prior to that of *jñāna-lakṣaṇa*. The theory of *sāmānya-laksaṇa* obviously developed as a result of conflict with the Buddhist in the sphere of inference. Dharmakīrti declared: "Concomitance between the object to be inferred (*sādhya*, e.g., fire) and the inferential mark (*sādhana*, e.g., smoke) is based on the relation of cause and effect or that of identity, and not on the observation of the inferential mark (smoke) as associated with the object to be inferred (fire), and non-existence of the former in absence of the latter."[150] The Buddhist attacks the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that concomitance between smoke and fire is established by observing their association in many instances and by the knowledge that the association is not due to some adventitious cause (*upādhi*). The Buddhist points out that even if that association were observed in thousands of cases, there may remain a reasonable doubt that it may be absent in some case which might have remained unobserved. All the principal Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers have discussed this Buddhist contention. Jayanta says that some thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school met the objection by declaring that there might be a mental perception which could grasp concomitance directly, because the mind could comprehend *all* objects. It comprehends concomitance from the universals, smoke-*ness* and fire-*ness*.[151] Jayanta then gives another view according to which the perception of concomitance is similar to the yogic perception in which there occurs the perception of concomitance in respect of all the individuals at one moment.[152] Jayanta, who never spares his opponents, is liberal enough to let the Buddhist have a fling against his own school: "What need of inference is there for men of divine vision like you, who can

150 Kārya-kārana-bhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt,
Avinābhāva-niyamo 'darśanān na tu darśanāt. PV. III. 30.

151 NM. Part I. p. 110. line 32.

152 NM. Part I. p. 111. line 7.

see the whole universe through direct perception?"[153] Be it as it may, this controversy paved the way for the theory of *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*.

There are two main contentions of the Buddhist: (i) how can the past state of an object, or for the matter of that, how can the fragrance of sandal wood, which is not in contact with the sense, be cognized by sense-perception, and (ii) how can comitance between the inferential mark (*hetu*) and the thing to be inferred (*sādhya*) be established by the observation of their association in a large number of cases? After a prolonged controversy, the answers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to the two questions were ultimately crystallized in the form of the two kinds of transcendental contact, viz., *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* and *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* respectively. But is that a satisfactory explanation? Is the introduction of a transcendental element in explaining an epistemological phenomenon not tantamount to a declaration that the thing is inexplicable and unaccountable?

13. THEORY OF INFERENCE OF KNOWLEDGE

Both the schools of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā define *pramāṇa* as that "which brings about knowledge of what has not already been comprehended".[154] The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā definition seems to have been adopted under the influence of the Buddhist whose definition of *pramāṇa* is identical with it.[155] This definition fits in more with the philosophy of Dignāga where the object of perceptive knowledge, being a momentary flash of reality, is ever new. But in a realistic system where an object is permanent, there is a possibility that the same object may be grasped by sense-perceptions coming in quick succession. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, therefore, defines *pramāṇa* as the 'means of *pramā*',[156] i.e., a valid presentative experience.[157] And in order to exclude

153 Ye tu pratyakṣato viśvaṁ paśyanti hi bhavādṛśāḥ,
Kiṁ divya-cakṣusām esām anumāna-prayojanam.
NM. Part I. p. 109. lines 1-2.

154 Anadhigatārtha-gantṛ pramāṇam.

155 Ajñātārtha-jñāpakaṁ pramāṇam iti pramāṇa-sāmānya-lakṣaṇam.
The Ṭīkā of Jinendrabuddhi on Pramāṇa-samuccaya, p. 11.

156 Pramā-karaṇaṁ pramāṇam. TB. p. 27.

157 Yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā. TB. p. 28.

remembrance which is the knowledge of what has already been known, presentative experience (*anubhava*) is defined negatively, viz., 'that which is other than remembrance.'[158] Recourse to a negative definition is taken by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school so that the perception of an object coming in quick succession may be covered under sense-perception. Obviously, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position is helpful to the realistic theory. The definition of *pramāṇa* has therefore remained a bone of contention between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika criticised the definition of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā chiefly on the ground that it would not cover the case of perceptions coming in succession. The answer of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, which appears to be somewhat apologetic, is that the object at the time of every successive perception becomes new, inasmuch as it is qualified by a new moment of time. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika rejoins that the moment of time, being very minute, cannot be comprehended, and that the object of perception cannot be qualified by time which itself is not comprehensible. The object, therefore, cannot be held to be new in each successive moment. Controversy between the two schools on this topic is contained in almost all the principal Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises.[159]

With regard to the nature of knowledge (*pramā*) which, according to the Buddhist, is not differentiated from the means of knowledge (*pramāṇas*) and which, according to the realist schools, is the *result of the pramāṇa* (*pramāṇa-phala*), the theories of various schools provide us with a key for the understanding of their philosophy. We are here mainly concerned with four schools, (i) The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, (ii) the Buddhist, (iii) the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school of Kumārila, and (iv) that of Prabhākara. According to the Buddhist, knowledge is self-luminous. Of all the realist schools, Prabhākara's is the only one which agrees with the Buddhist on this point. According to Prabhākara, knowledge is self-luminous and illumines simultaneously (i) itself, (ii) its object, and (iii) the knower. The theory of Prabhākara is, therefore, known as that of tripartite perception (*tripuṭī pratyakṣa*). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and

158 Anubhavo nāma smṛti-vyatiriktaṁ jñānam. TB. p. 28.
159 NVT. p. 16; NM. Part I. p. 20; TB. p. 32.

Kumārila both agree in holding that knowledge is not self-luminous. Obviously, the acceptance of self-luminous nature of knowledge is calculated to help idealism rather than realism. Prabhākara is, therefore, accused of having adopted his theory under the Buddhist influence.

According to Kumārila, knowledge is never experienced directly but is only inferred. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, knowledge is directly experienced by a mental perception called *anuvyavasāya* (apperception). A determinate perception in the form 'this is a jar' (*ayaṁ ghaṭaḥ*) is followed by an apperception in the form 'I know the jar' (*ahaṁ ghaṭaṁ jānāmi*). According to these two schools, not only knowledge but even the knower, the soul, is not self-luminous. The soul is not in the form of self-consciousness. Knowledge, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, is only a quality of the soul which is different in essence from the nature of the soul. Hence, the well-known criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that, according to it, the soul in the state of final liberation (*mukti*), having no apparatus of knowledge and itself being of unconscious nature, is reduced to the state of a stone.[160]

Knowledge, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is formless. The form which appears in presentative knowledge belongs to the object which is directly grasped without any mediation. Perception has been defined by Gaṅgeśa and by some of the authors of the later manuals as 'the direct or immediate knowledge' of an object.[161] It may be noted here that the directness or immediacy, in a way, belongs to the object and not to knowledge. Thus, knowledge and the soul are both divested of their glory, luminosity or consciousness in order to invest the object, the focus of realism, with full-blooded reality. Another feature of the theory that an object is directly and immediately presented in perception is that the sense-object-contact is necessary. In the case of visual perception, where the object is usually at a distance, it is held that the eye in the form of a ray of light

160 Muktaye yaḥ śilātvāya śāstram ūce sacetasām.
Naiṣadha Mahākāvya, XVII. 74.
Varaṁ vṛndāvane 'raṇye śṛgālatvaṁ vrajāmy aham,
Na ca vaiśeṣikīṁ muktiṁ kāmaye 'haṁ janārdana.

161 Sākṣāt-kāri jñānam.

actually travels to the place where the object is situated. This is called the principle of illumination of an object by senses actually reaching and grasping it.[162] This also is one of the bones of contention between the Buddhist and the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika. The topic is discussed in the principal Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises.[163]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as the principal defender of realism laid great stress on the fact, as already noted, that knowledge is formless, and that the object of knowledge is directly and immediately presented by it. Kumārila went a step further in his theory of the *'manifestedness* of an object' (variously designated as *dṛṣṭatā*, *jñātatā* or *prakaṭatā*). As soon as the knowledge of an object is produced, that knowledge, in turn, produces in its object a new quality called 'manifestedness' (*prakaṭatā*), or the state of being known (*jñātatā* or *dṛṣṭatā*). There is a clear difference between the state of an object when it is known and the state when it is not known. Obviously, some new quality must have appeared in the object when it becomes known. It becomes illumined and manifested as it was not before. The new quality of 'manifestedness' has been produced in the object by its knowledge. This quality is directly perceived like the object itself. Knowledge, on the other hand, not being self-luminous, cannot be directly cognized. It is merely inferred from the new quality of 'manifestedness' produced in the object. The process is like this: when an object comes in contact with the sense, the knowledge of that object is produced in the soul. That knowledge, being formless and not self-luminous cannot be directly perceived, but produces a new quality called 'manifestedness' in the object. It is from this quality that the know ledge is inferred.

Apart from the fact that the quality of 'manifestedness' is directly experienced, there is another proof of 'manifestedness' being actually produced in the object. The point of contention between the Kumārila school and the Nyāya-Vaiśesika is: how a particular thing, say a jar, becomes the object of a particular knowledge. If it be said that a particular thing (jar) becomes

162 Indriyāṇāṁ vastu prāpya-prakāśa-kāritva-niyamaḥ.
163 NVT. p. 102; NK. p. 23.

the object of a particular knowledge because it produces that knowledge, then it may be contended that the sense also produces that knowledge, and that it should also, therefore, be the object of that knowledge. The Mīmāṁsaka points out that a particular thing is the object of a particular knowledge because the quality of 'manifestedness' has been produced by that knowledge in that particular thing, and not in the sense or any other object.[164] According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, although the sense goes out to the place of the object and seizes it there, yet knowledge is produced not at the place of the object but in the soul conditioned by the body (*dehāvachinna*). It means that knowledge is produced in the region of the body of the knower, and thus it illumines the object from a distance. According to Kumārila also, although knowledge is produced in the soul conditioned by the body, yet by producing the quality of 'manifestedness' in the object, the knowledge itself is transferred in a way to the object, and illumines it. Knowledge although not itself luminous, makes its object luminous. A very apt example is that of light which becomes luminous only when it illumines an object, though itself it is not perceptible.

Knowledge itself not being self-luminous cannot be experienced directly. Its existence is merely inferred from the quality it produces in the object. Kumārila thus throws knowledge farther in the background as compared with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, according to which, knowledge is directly experienced through a subsequent mental perception. It would thus appear that while the idealist Buddhist lays more and more stress on knowledge, the realist schools emphasize the predominance of the object as if with a vengeance. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Kumārila school disagree on two points. In the first instance, the former disputes the theory of manifestedness (*jñātatā-vāda*). Most of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works contain refutation of that theory.[165] Secondly, the Nyāya-Vaiśesika opposes the theory that knowledge is inferable, and not directly experienced. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika felt that Kumārila had gone too far in defend-

ing the external object against the attack of the idealist Buddhist, and in relegating knowledge to the background. In this connection Jayanta's sarcastic fling against the Kumārila school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā has already been quoted.[166] It may, however, be questioned whether the position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is materially different from that of Kumārila. The theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that knowledge is formless (*nirākāraṁ jñānam*) has not received due notice in the old Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises and manuals as well as in expositions of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in modern languages. Explicit mention of this theory occurs at very few places. Udayana says: "Difference in cognitions exists only on account of the difference of the objects cognized by them, because the cognitions are in themselves formless."[167] Similarly, Keśavamiśra says: "All knowledge is indeed formless. Nor can it be said that objects impart their form to knowledge, because the theory that knowledge has a form stands repudiated."[168] Such references are only stray and cryptic. This topic has not been dealt with thoroughly, and the implications of that theory have not been brought out fully. Be that as it may, the question may be asked: if knowledge is formless, and if it is not self-luminous, is there any material difference in holding that it is inferable or that it is directly perceived through a subsequent mental perception?

Let us now sum up the position of the four schools whose theories we have discussed above. When I see a jar, there is only one thing that is revealed to me, call it a jar or its cognition. There is no experience of the two simultaneously. The Buddhist and the Prabhākara school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā both regard knowledge as self-luminous. So far as the idealist Buddhist is concerned, there is no difficulty for him in holding that theory because, according to him, the two things (the object and its cognition) are identical. In fact, the identity of the two provides an argument to prove the theory of idealism. But Prabhākara is a realist for whom knowledge and its object are two separate entities, and it is difficult for him to maintain

166 *Supra*, IX. 17. n. 179.

167 Arthenaiva viśeṣo hi nirākāratayā dhiyām. Kusumāñjali, IV. 4.

168 Sarvaṁ jñānaṁ nirākāram eva, nanu jñāne 'rthena svasyākāro janyate, na, sākāra-jñāna-nirākaraṇāt. TB. p. 79.

that both of them and even a third one, the soul, are simultaneously revealed in knowledge. The other two realist schools, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and that of Kumārila discard the theory of knowledge being self-luminous, and emphatically uphold that what is revealed to us in our sense-perception is the external object itself. Kumārila goes to the extreme limit of declaring that knowledge is not directly experienced. His theory is thus diametrically opposed to idealism. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika stands midway. According to it, only the object is revealed at the time of sense-perception, but knowledge is cognized by a subsequent mental perception.

14. REPUDIATION OF ERROR BY PRABHĀKARA

Kumārila relegated knowledge wholly to the background. His is the singular instance of a thinker who denied the direct experience of knowledge, and held it to be inferable. His theory, in fact, is a remarkable contribution not only to Indian thought, but also to epistemology in general, and is a unique instrument for the defence of realism. In the epistemological sphere, Kumārila goes indeed ahead of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the principal champion of Indian Realism. Of equal, if not of greater, significance is the contribution of the other Mīmāṁsaka, Prabhākara.

All the idealist systems of Indian philosophy, whether orthodox or Buddhist, have a feature which is common to them all. In order to repudiate the world of reality, they start by propounding a theory to explain the phenomenon of illusion of every-day-life. The same theory of illusion is then extended, of course, on the transcendental level, to establish that the world of experience is also an illusion.

Saṁkara explains the illusion of a snake in the rope by declaring that the object of illusion, viz., the snake, is neither real nor unreal, but indefinable (*anirvacanīya*). In the same way, he holds the phenomenal world or its cause, the *māyā*, to be also indefinable, and merely an appearance (illusion) in the universal soul, Brahman. This explanation of illusion is, therefore, designated as *anirvacanīya-khyāti*. Saṁkara, of course, differentiates between the illusion of a snake in the rope and that of the phenomenal world in Brahman. The former, according to him, is pure illusion (*prātibhāsikī sattā*) on the

level of our worldly plane. But the latter is not an illusion on that level; it is an appearance (*vyāvahārikī sattā*). Śaṁkara even goes to the extent of declaring against the idealist that the world of appearance is not unreal or mere illusion. Inasmuch as the illusion of a snake in the rope is on the level of mundane existence, it is repudiated on the same level. But the illusion of the universe in Brahman is not repudiated on the mundane level, and therefore from that standpoint, the universe is real and not unreal. From the ultimate standpoint (*paramārthataḥ*), however, it is unreal (illusion) because when individual soul realises itself as identical with the universal soul (Brahman), phenomenal universe is repudiated.

According to the Yogācāra Buddhist, the snake of the illusion is only a form of self, viz., consciousness (*ātman*),[169] and therefore, his explanation of error is known as *ātma-khyāti*. The Mādhyamika Buddhist holds that the object of the illusion is unreal and, therefore, his explanation is known as *asat-khyāti*. In conformity with their theories of error, the external world is of the nature of consciousness according to the Yogācāra, and is unreal according to the Mādhyamika. Both the Buddhist schools, thus, like the Vedāntin, extend their theories of illusion to transcendental level.

It is, therefore, obvious that the theory of error plays an important part in all the systems of Indian philosophy, and every one of them, idealist as well as realist, has its own theory. Theory of error has a bearing on the theory of realism. If error is held to be ingrained in our nature, the citadel of realism is forthwith shaken. In that case, there can be no guarantee that the external world comprehended by our intellect is not an error. Of all philosophical thinkers of India and of the West, Prabhākara stands unique so far as this question is concerned. He goes deep into the analysis of error, and concludes that the so-called error is not at all an error *per se*. Before explaining that theory, let us briefly examine the theories of error of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Kumārila school of Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā.

There is another topic allied to the problem of error. It is

169 The Buddhist does not believe in the existence of soul and therefore, for him, the soul is mere consciousness.

the question of validity (*prāmāṇya*) of knowledge. When I have a sense-perception, say of a tree, is it valid *per se*, or does it require a further proof for its validity? Here again we find Indian philosophical schools divided in their views. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, knowledge by itself can neither be held valid nor invalid. The proof of validity or otherwise must come from subsequent experience.[170] The Mīmāṁsakas hold that knowledge as such is valid. It is invalid only in exceptional cases, viz., (i) when it is repudiated by a subsequent cognition as in the case of the knowledge of a snake in the rope which is removed by the knowledge of the rope as rope, or (ii) when there is some defect in the sense, as when a person perceives a white conch shell as yellow owing to bile in his eyes.[171] The Buddhist holds just the opposite view. Knowledge as such is invalid; its validity is established only when it leads to an efficient action (*artha-kriyā*).[172] The Jainas, in conformity with their theory of the various alternatives of truth (*syād-vāda*), maintain that knowledge as such is both valid and invalid.[173]

On the question of validity of knowledge, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of knowledge *as such* being neither valid nor invalid is primarily pitted against the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā theory that knowledge *as such* is always valid. The Mīmāṁsaka tenaciously maintains that theory in order to establish, in the last resort, the authority of the scripture (*Veda*). The scripture not being the work of any individual person, there can be no defect in it to vitiate its validity. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, even the validity of the *Veda* is not self-established; it should be proved only on rational grounds. The theory of the self-validity of knowledge and its acceptance by Mīmāṁsakas is ridiculed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers. Vācaspatimiśra criticizes Kumārila's school, and says that "in a system where a cognition, not being of self-luminous nature, does not grasp even itself, the question of its grasping its own validity is a far cry."[174]

170 Prāmāṇyam aprāmāṇyam ubhayaṁ parataḥ.
171 Prāmāṇyaṁ svataḥ aprāmāṇyaṁ parataḥ.
172 Aprāmāṇyaṁ svataḥ prāmāṇyaṁ parataḥ.
173 Prāmāṇyam aprāmāṇyam ubhayaṁ svataḥ.
174 Na khalu vijñānam anātma-saṁvedanam ātmānam api gṛhṇāti prāg eva tat-prāmāṇyam. NVT. p. 3. line 15.

is dependent on perception, but the validity of the latter is dependent on inference. There seems to be thus no escape from the flaw of interdependence in the theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Jayanta puts rather an offensive remark in the mouth of a Mīmāṁsaka critic against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. If validity has to be established in every case of perception by a further proof, there will remain a doubt with regard to the validity of all kinds of experiences in everyday life. "Even when embracing one's wife, a doubt may arise that the woman in question may be one's mother."[183] Further, the follower of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is reminded that even Vyāsa says: "one who always doubts is doomed to destruction."[184]

According to both the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā schools of Kumārila and Prabhākara, knowledge as such is always valid; its invalidity (error) results from some extraneous circumstance. But on the question of the nature of error, the two Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā schools part company. The theory of error held by the Kumārila school is the same as that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika which is known as *anyathā-khyāti* or *viparīta-khyāti*. *Anyathā-khyāti* literally means 'the knowledge of an object in a form which is not its own.' It is a simple statement of the phenomenon of illusion. "A thing is comprehended as something which it is not."[185] When one sees a conch-shell as silver, the reason of illusion is simple. Owing to some defect of the sense, only qualities which are common to the conch-shell and silver are noticed, but specific qualities of the conch-shell are not noticed. Then there comes remembrance of silver caused by the qualities which belong to the conch-shell as well as to silver, and owing to this remembrance, one perceives a piece of silver in place of the conch-shell.

183 Sva-bhāryā-parirambhe 'pi bhaven mātari saṁśayaḥ. NM. Part I. p. 153. line 8.

184 Vināśi saṁśayātmeti pārāśaryo 'py abhāsata. NM. Part I. p. 153. line 9. Here obviously reference is to the statement of Gītā: Saṁśayātmā vinaśyati.

185 Atasmiṁs tad-iti pratyaye viparyayaḥ. PP. p. 177. line 13.
Tad-abhāvavati tat-prakārakaṁ jñānaṁ bhramaḥ.
NSM. on verse 127.

So far as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is concerned, the above explanation of illusion fits in with its theory that knowledge as such is neither valid nor invalid. In that case, it is quite possible that sometimes knowledge may present an object as something which it is not. But its acceptance by the Kumārila school, which holds knowledge as valid by its very nature, is vehemently denounced by the followers of the Prabhākara school as put by Jayanta in the following words: "It is only fit that these pseudo-Mīmāṁsakas are driven far away by the wicked followers of the Nyāya like a heap of *kāśa* flowers by the wind. What credit can be given to the intelligence of those, who not knowing their own *śāstra* (fundamental theories of their system), hold the theory that knowledge can mispresent an object (*anyathā-khyāti*), and in the same breath declare also the self-validity of knowledge."[186] The Prabhākara school, on the other hand, declares that the phenomenon of so-called illusion is not at all due to knowledge mispresenting a thing. If it were the nature of knowledge to mispresent its object under certain conditions, all the worldly intercourse would end in a chaos.[187] Even the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers who do not uphold the theory of the self-validity of knowledge, have testified to the trustworthiness of knowledge. For instance, Śrīdhara says: "Right comprehension is the genetic trait of all cognitions."[188] And Vācaspatimiśra declares: "All knowledge by its very nature is disposed to truth."[189] Thus, the fact that knowledge is naturally of veracious nature is accepted by every school of philosophy. What Prabhākara did was to establish that veracity on *terra firma* by declaring that veracity being the very nature of knowledge, it could not be vitiated under any condition. He declared that even the so-called phenomenon of error was not

186 Yuktam yad amī mīmāṁsaka-pāśāḥ kāśa-kusuma-rāśaya iva śaradi marudbhir ati-dūrāt samutsāryante dusta-tārkikaiḥ, ye hi kila abhyupayanti ca viparīta-khyāti-vādam akṛta-śāstrāḥ prāmāṇyaṁ ca svata iti ca vadanti teṣāṁ kutaḥ kauśalam. NM. Part I. p. 161. line 3.

187 Cf. Api ca sva-gocare vyabhicāre vijñānānāṁ sarvatrānāśvāsa-prasaṅgaḥ NVT. p. 74. line 12.

188 Sarva-dhiyāṁ yathārtha-paricchedakatvasya kula-dharmatvāt. NK. p. 200. line 10.

189 Bhūtārtha-pakṣapāto hi buddheḥ svabhāvaḥ. NVT. p. 80. line 16

in fact an error. Let us now see how Prabhākara analyses and explains the phenomenon of error. The phenomenon of error, as part of human experience, has always been the most effective weapon in the armoury of all the idealistic schools.

In the first instance, Prabhākara repudiates the idea of something being ever presented by knowledge in the form of something which it is not. If it be suggested that the phenomenon of error occurs owing to some defect in the cause of cognition, viz., sense, etc., Prabhākara replies that defects of causes can only destroy the power of producing their own effects, but they cannot confer the power of producing other effects. A seed, say of wheat, when parched in fire may not be able to produce a wheat plant, but it can never acquire the power of producing a barley plant.

What is, then, Prabhākara's explanation for the phenomenon of illusion, occurrence of which cannot be denied. Prabhākara says that erroneous perception of a shell as silver is not a unitary cognition as maintained by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika. 'This is silver' is a composite cognition made of two component parts. 'This' part of the cognitive judgment which is the first component refers to the object, viz., the shell, actually perceived by the eye. In that perception, owing to some defect, the particular universal (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) of the object, viz., shell-*ness* (*śuktikātva*), is not comprehended, but only the object so far as it has the qualities in common with silver is perceived; and that perception by arousing the past impressions brings forth the remembrance of silver owing to similar qualities. The 'silver' part of the judgment refers to the silver of remembrance. But the nature of remembrance is to cognize what has previously been cognized (*gṛhīta-grahaṇa-svabhāva*). In this case, however, owing to some defect, one part of the nature of remembrance, viz., the consciousness of the object 'having been previously cognized' (*gṛhītatāṁśa*), is obliterated, and only consciousness of the 'cognizing part' (*grahaṇāṁśa*) remains. Thus, one does not comprehend the distinction between the nature of the remembrance of silver and the nature of the presentative cognition of the shell, nor the distinction between the object of remembrance, viz., silver, and the object of cognition, viz., the shell. The nature of the remembrance and the presentative cognition be

come similar because, as already noted, one part of the nature of remembrance, 'having been previously cognized', is obliterated, and only the 'cognition' part remains. The objects of the two experiences, the presentative cognition and the remembrance (viz., the shell and silver) appear similar, because only the qualities common to both have been cognized. Now, because of the non-comprehension of distinction (*bhedāgraha*) between the nature of the two cognitions and their objects, the judgment 'this is silver', although composed of two component parts (the presentative cognition and remembrance which are different), being similar to a real unitary perceptive judgment when silver is actually present, causes the notion of identity of the two component parts (*abheda-vyavahāra*) which are designated as co-existent (*sāmānādhikaraṇya-vyapadeśa*).[190]

In the process detailed above, not even in one case does knowledge present an object as something which it is not. Only owing to some defect, some part of the knowledge which is needed does not arise. In the presentative cognition, a part of it, viz., the knowledge of the particular universal, shell-*ness* does not arise; and in the remembrance part of it, the knowledge of it as having been previously cognized' is wanting. It is owing to this lack of knowledge that the so-called phenomenon of illusion occurs. But there is no misrepresentation by knowledge in any way. The theory of Prabhākara is therefore known as the 'theory of non-apprehension' (*akhyātivāda*) or the theory of the non-comprehension of distinction (*bhedāgraha*).

Prabhākara explains other cases of the so-called illusion in the same way. For instance, when a white conch-shell is perceived as yellow, there are, in that case, two presentative cognitions, (i) that of the conch-shell in which, owing to some defect, its white colour is not comprehended, and (ii) that of the

190 This account of the subtle and intricate psychological process involved in the theory of Prabhākara has been based on the exposition given by Vācaspatimiśra in the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭikā. It may justifiably be claimed that nowhere, not even in the treatises of the Prabhākara school itself, the theory has been presented in such a neat and lucid form as by Vācaspatimiśra in the passage given below:

For the text, "Tathā hi rajatam idam.....pravartayataḥ." see Text Appendix.

yellow colour of bile which is transparent like glass and is present in the outgoing ray of the eye, where, owing to some defect, the substance bile is not comprehended, and only its colour is comprehended. In this case, the absence of relation between the substratum of the quality (conch-shell) and the quality (yellow colour) is not comprehended, and the cognition being similar to the cognition of a yellow *cira-bilva* fruit (which is really yellow), there is the comprehension of the identity of the two (the conch-shell and the yellow colour) and also their designation as co-existent. In the former case (i.e., the illusion of silver in the shell), there is the non-comprehension of distinction between a presentative cognition and remembrance, but in the latter case, there is the non-comprehension of distinction between two presentative cognitions.[191]

There is an obvious similarity between the analysis of error made by Prabhākara, which is based on non-comprehension of the distinction (*bhedāgraha*) between the two cognitions, and the analysis of perceptive judgment made by the Dignāga school. A perceptive judgment like 'this is a jar' is made up of two factors.[192] 'This' part refers to the ultimate particular (*sva-laksaṇa*) as grasped by the sensation, and the other part, viz., 'jar' refers to the generalized form (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*). The perceptive judgment in question arises owing to the non-comprehension of distinction between the two factors. Jayanta quotes a Buddhist statement: "A person, having (falsely) identified the objects of sensation and perceptive judgment (i.e., the ultimate particular and the generalized form respectively), moves towards the object."[193] That Prabhākara propounded his theory of error on the Buddhist pattern did not escape the notice of the thinkers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Jayanta addresses the Prabhākara school with a sarcastic remark in connection with its *akhyāti* theory thus: "We know you have stolen this theory from the house of Dharmakīrti."[194]

191 For the text, "Kvacit punar-grahaṇe.....sāmānādhikaraṇya-vyapadeśaś ca." see Text Appendix.

192 *Supra*, IX. 12.

193 Dṛśya-vikalpāv arthāv ekikṛtya pravartate. Quoted in NM. Part I. p. 167. line 13. Buddhist source of the quotation is untraced.

194 Śrutam idam yad atra bhavadbhir Dharmakirti-grhād āhrtam. NM. Part I. p. 167. line 12.

The theory of Prabhākara was vehemently criticized by Vācaspatimiśra,[195] Jayanta,[196] and others, but we need not enter here into their polemic. Our present purpose was only to assess the theory of Prabhākara in its bearing on the theory of realism. And now in conclusion, it may be said with full justification that although Prabhākara might have been a bastard son of Buddhism as Stcherbatsky remarked,[197] and although he might have succumbed to the Buddhist influence in a number of his theories, he made a significant contribution to the theory of realism by repudiating the phenomenon of error. On that account, he occupies a unique place among the thinkers of India and the West who entered the arena of battle between Realism and Idealism.

Chapter XIII

A RÉSUMÉ

NYĀYA-VAIŚESIKA THEORIES IN A NEW PERSPECTIVE

As already noted, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories developed as a result of the conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga school. They have been presented in this work against the background of that conflict, and therefore not only do some of them acquire a new significance, but a number of implications of the basic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories have come to light for the first time. Such implications were not unknown to the scholiasts of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, but they were lost in the later tradition. A résumé of such theories is given in this concluding chapter together with those of the Buddhist and the two Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā schools which have a bearing on the problems of Realism *versus* Idealism. Only a bare statement of such theories is given here; for fuller discussion reference may be made to the pages of this work mentioned in this chapter under each head.

1. It has been suggested that the basic principle of the Nyāya-Vaiśesika metaphysics is that experience is the sole criterion of our acceptance of reality (*samvid eva hi bhagavati vastūpagame naḥ śaranam*. NVT. p. 506, see p. 15 of this work).

It has been pointed out, for the first time, that the earliest mention of this occurs in the *Nyāyavārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspatimiśra who may be its originator (pp. 15 and 113).

2. From the basic principle of experience noted above follows, as a natural corollary, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika dictum of *dharma-dharmi-bheda*—essential differentiation between the substratum and its properties—which is the corner-stone of the fabric of realism of that school. For instance, when we see a white cloth, our experience vouches two entities—a substratum, called cloth, and a property, white colour residing in the former. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school maintains that these two entities are different in their essence. Similarly, a movement in a substance is different from the substance itself, and the universal from the individuals in which it resides. Conception of the six categories of the school has been shown to be based on the basic principle of *dharma-dharmi-bheda* (pp. 15-17 and 77ff).

3. In regard to the relation of *dharma* and *dharmin*, the position of all the principal schools has been shown. Thus, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, (i) *dharmin* and *dharmas* are different; (ii) according to the Sāṁkhya school, *dharmas* are the changing phases of *dharmin*, the two, although different, are yet identical; (iii) according to the Vedānta, only *dharmin* (*Brahman*) exists, the *dharmas* being only the unreal superimpositions on the *dharmin;* and (iv) according to the Buddhist, only *dharmas* which are unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) exist, the *dharmin* being only a mental construction (pp. 77-80).

4. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that qualities are essentially different from the substance in which they reside was carried to the extreme limit, so much so that even two different sets of causes were postulated for qualities and their substances. For instance, threads are the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of cloth, and connections of the threads, its *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*. But in respect of the colour of that cloth, the cloth itself is the *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, and the colour of the threads, the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* (p. 20).

5. The causes of the substance and its qualities being different, and the substance itself being held to be the *samavāyi-*

kāraṇa of its qualities, the latter must exist prior to them. It had then to be postulated that a substance in the first moment of its production was without qualities. Although a substance devoid of all qualities may be inconceivable, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was forced, by its own logic, to that view. The same logic led the school to a still more queer position. When a substance was destroyed, its qualities being different from it could not be destroyed simultaneously. The destruction of the substance is held to be the cause of the destruction of its qualities, and cause being prior to effect at least by one moment, the destruction of qualities can take place only a moment after the destruction of the cloth, i.e., the qualities will exist for one moment even without the substance (p. 20).

6. Not only are the qualities and movements inhering in a substance different from it, but by the same logic of common experience, even the parts of a substance are different from that substance. Threads are experienced to be different from the cloth, of which they are the parts. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation, 'parts' (*avayavas*) are conceived as the cause of their 'whole' (*avayavin*) which is the effect. For instance, 'threads' (which are parts of the cloth) are held to be the cause of that cloth which is the 'whole' (*avayavin*) of those parts (threads). All the inherent causes (*samavāyi-kāraṇas*) are, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, necessarily in the form of 'parts', and *vice versa*, all effects are in the form of 'wholes' of those parts. The theory of 'parts-and-whole' (*avayavāvayavi-vāda*) is an essential feature of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation. Discourses on that theory —its refutation and its defence—have been fully presented (pp. 248-261).

7. Cause and effect, being in the form of 'parts' and their 'whole', exist simultaneously, i.e., when the cloth is produced from the threads, the latter are not destroyed, but continue to exist side by side with its effect, viz., cloth. As a matter of fact, the cloth is not produced 'OUT OF' the threads, but it is produced 'IN' the threads. The threads which retain their essence *intact* (as before) cannot impart essence to their effect,

and the question remains: where does the *essence* of cloth come from? According to the Buddhist theory of causation (*pratītya-samutpāda*), the preceding cause-moment is destroyed *in toto;* it does not and cannot impart essence to the subsequent effect-moment. The preceding moment is causal simply because it is the pre-condition of the later moment, i.e., the cause being there, the effect follows. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the threads are causal because their effect (cloth) resides in them. Both the schools, the Buddhist and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, hold in common that the cause does not impart or transfer its essence to its effect (pp. 241-243).

8. Cause and effect (or parts and their whole) being different *in essence*, their causes are also different. For instance, the threads are the cause of the cloth, and the threads, in turn, have their own parts, i.e., filaments of cotton as their cause, and the latter have the still finer parts as their cause, and thus we arrive at the atoms which are the final cause. As the cause and the effect both exist simultaneously, all these substances in the cause-effect-series—atom, *dvy-aṇuka, try-aṇuka,* intermediary finer parts, filaments of cotton, threads and cloth—all exist simultaneously, occupying the same space. There are thus *many* substances, all having separate qualities. For instance the colour of the thread is different from that of the cloth, and so on, although these qualities are never experienced by the sense to be separate. Not only such qualities as colour, etc., but even weight (which is also a quality) of the cloth and that of the threads and of other substances of the cause-effect-series, is separate. There is, an obvious difficulty in maintaining separate weights of cloth and threads and others in the cause-effect-series. Scholiasts of the school have made desparate efforts to get over the dilemma, and suggested a number of devices to explain the question of separate weights, but none of them is satisfactory (pp. 127-131). It may be pointed out that this aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation has for the first time come to light in the present work. It has not been noticed even by those modern writers who have made a special study of the school, nor even by the later manuals of the school. That material substances which have separate weight should occupy the

same space, militates against the very conception of matter. The Buddhist points out that the property called *sapratighatva* which means that two matters cannot occupy the same space is the essential nature of matter. Cloth, threads and others in the cause-effect-series cannot therefore be separate substances. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, when a new effect is born, its cause also continues to exist side by side, and there results a series of substances existing in one and the same object occupying the same space. It is a world in which there is constant birth but no death—a theory of realism with a vengeance (pp. 280-281). It has been shown above that according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as well as the Buddhist, the cause does not impart its essence to its effect. Now, if we bypass the absurd position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that the cause continues to exist even after producing its effect, we clearly arrive at the Buddhist theory of *pratītya-samutpāda*, according to which the cause is destroyed *in toto* without leaving any residue of its essence (pp. 272-273).

9. The theory of cause and effect existing simultaneously as two different substances, which is obviously outrageous to common sense, was forced upon the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It is interesting to note that the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśesika school had a different causal theory. According to it, the threads were not the cause of cloth, but the cause was the *bunch of threads* regarded as a different substance existing in the threads before they became cloth. The latter was destroyed before the effect was produced in the form of cloth. In the same parts, (i.e., threads), there had existed formerly the cause-substance in the form of a bunch of threads, which was destroyed when in the same parts (threads), there was produced later a new effect-substance, viz., cloth. It was realized by the later scholiasts that the parts (threads) were also separate substances; and therefore they could alone be the cause, and when the parts were accepted as the cause, it became inevitable to hold that the cause and effect continued to exist simultaneously. The nature of the earlier Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory and its difference from that of the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika have been brought to light for the first time (pp. 261-271).

10. Not only do the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tenets lead to the Buddhist theory of *Pratītya-samutpāda*, but also to its fuller implication, i.e., the theory of evanescence. A question arises: What would be the position if a new thread be added to a cloth? Obviously, it would be only a substance connected with another substance; it cannot be a constituent of the cloth. When, however, a new thread is added and becomes a constituent in the course of weaving, the process is like this: first, a cloth made by two threads is woven, and then in the process of weaving when a new thread is added, the old connection of the two threads is destroyed. Now, connection being the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of the cloth made of two threads, its destruction means the destruction of that cloth also; and thus with the addition of every thread, the old cloth is destroyed, and a new one is produced from the previous threads and the newly added thread as its constituents. It will thus be seen that the addition of anything as constituent means destruction of the old substance and the origin of a new substance in its place. This is the process that goes on every moment in organic substances which are growing, as in the case of a fœtus. An organic substance, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is thus being destroyed and replaced by a new one every moment, and its stability is only an illusion (pp. 226-227 and 274-276).

11. Similarly, even if one thread of a piece of cloth be removed, it means one of the parts in which cloth resided has disappeared, and consequently, the connection of that thread with other threads being destroyed, the original piece of cloth is also destroyed. The cloth which continues to exist is, in fact, another cloth which has come into existence after the destruction of the original cloth. Now, take the case of a jar. If it be weighed, say after a hundred years, it will be less in weight by at least a few grains. These few grains represent hundreds of thousands of atoms or particles, which have not been subtracted at one particular moment. Subtraction, in fact, has been going on all the time during those hundred years. It means the process of destruction of one object and its replacement by another has been going on continuously. This aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation has never been noticed in the modern

studies of that system. How closely it approximates to the Buddhist theory of constant flux can easily be seen (pp. 277-278).

12. Not only does the addition or the subtraction of a particle of an object, but even a change in the qualities like colour, taste, smell, etc., (which are held to be lasting as long as their substance lasts, i.e., *yāvad-dravya-bhāvin*) implies a change in the identity of the object (substance). It is so, because change of colour, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, is not possible as long as the substance lasts. When a jar changes its colour from blue to red, it is held that it dissolves into atoms because change of colour can take place only in atoms, and not in any effect-substance (p. 247). Now, if a piece of paper be exposed to the sun wind or rain for a long time, its colour will be changing constantly, which means that the paper in question has been incessantly in the process of being destroyed and replaced by a new one. Thus, an object which appears to be stable is in fact everchanging, i.e., being destroyed and replaced by a new one all the time, because its qualities like colour are changing. In the case of inorganic objects, it may somehow be said that they do not suffer addition, subtraction or change of qualities every moment, but in the case of organic objects, it goes on incessantly. Thus, stability or identity of an object, at least in the case of organic objects, becomes a myth in the house of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika itself (p. 247, pp. 276-278 and pp. 288-289).

13. When a number of parts (*avayavas*) are connected, there emerges a 'whole' (*avayavin*) of those parts as a new and separate substance. A new substance, however, does not emerge always, but only in some cases of connection of parts. In other cases, when a number of parts are connected, there is merely an aggregate (*samudāya-mātra*), which is not a new substance separate from its parts. For instance, when threads are connected on a loom in a particular arrangement, there emerges a new substance in the form of cloth; when however the same threads are just put together, the resulting bunch of threads is not a separate substance; it is merely an aggregate of threads. But there is here no definite criterion (*vinigamanā*) as to where there will emerge a new substance in the form of a 'whole' and

where there will be a mere aggregate. It is after all a question of experience which may differ with every individual. It follows logically therefore that whenever there is a connection, a new effect must be supposed to have emerged. Full implications of this theory lead to the Buddhist theory of causation, because, connections are taking place almost incessantly, and therefore things are being destroyed and new ones being born every moment (pp. 239-241 and 280-281).

14. Further, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, some effect-substances are regarded as 'ultimate wholes' (*antyāvayavins*) which cannot become parts of any further *avayavin* to be produced by them. For instance, a jar is held to be an ultimate *avayavin*, and therefore a number of jars cannot be parts of a new *avayavin*. Thus a small boat made by a number of jars is not a new *avayavin*, but only an aggregate of a number of jars. Here again there is no criterion (*vinigamanā*) as to which effect-substances should be regarded as 'ultimate wholes' and which not, except that of experience which would differ with every individual. Hence the inevitable conclusion would be that whenever and wherever there is a connection, new substances are born, and we are thus necessarily driven to the Buddhist position that things are being born every moment (pp. 241 and 280).

15. It is not clear from the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika treatises whether the parts in which a new whole as a new substance emerges should necessarily be of homogeneous type. Can threads woven on an wooden frame produce a new whole having the wooden frame and threads as its constituent parts, or will it be a case of mere aggregate of those parts? Of course, no *avayavin* can be produced out of the parts of two different elements (e.g., earth and water), because that would involve cross-division (*saṁkara*) which precludes the universal. Thus, the animal bodies (which are usually regarded as made of five elements) are, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, made of only one element, viz., earth, and therefore blood (which is mainly water) is not a constituent of the animal body, but only connected with it as an extrinsic element (pp. 279-280).

16. It has been shown above that according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, any addition or subtraction of parts, or appearance of new qualities would always involve destruction of the old substance and emergence of a new one in its place. Sometime the word 'change' is loosely used in such cases also; but the real meaning of change is emergence of new phases or qualities in a substratum which itself is abiding. Change, therefore, in its real sense is impossible according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as well as the Buddhist. The concept of change belongs only to the Sāṁkhya. This point was missed even by the great scholiasts (pp. 274-276).

17. Inherent relation (*samavāya*) is a peculiar concept of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, not shared by any other school. A separate chapter (X) has been given in this work to bring out the nature of this unique concept. Some of the queer propositions of the school become possible only by reason of the concept of the *samavāya* relation. For instance, the theories that qualities and movements have their *essence* separate from that of the substance in which they reside, that the universal which constitutes the very nature of a particular is an entity different and separate from it, that the threads and the cloth (cause and effect) are two separate substances, and that not only two but a number of substances of the cause-and-effect series occupying the same space—all this becomes possible on account of the efficacy of *samavāya* relation, which is thus a magic-wand for solving all the difficulties in the metaphysical structure of the school (pp. 374-375 ff.).

18. The theory of substance (*dravya-vāda*) is the hall-mark of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It has been pointed out that *ātma-vāda* of the orthodox school means *dravya-vāda*, and that the Buddhist *anātma-vāda* is *adravya-vāda*. As the soul (*ātman*) is the unifying principle of different mental states, the substance is the synthetic principle of numerous qualities (the Buddhist *kṣaṇas*). The theory of *ātman* or *dravya* is, thus, the line of demarcation between the orthodox schools and the Buddhist (pp. 154-157). A separate and fairl large chapter (No. VI) is devoted to the Defence of Substance.

19. The principle that whatever we experience must have its counterpart in the external world was carried to the extreme limit. For instance, when we experience the number, two (*dvitva*), with reference to two things, it is held that the number 'two' is objectively produced in the two objects by the simultaneous cognition of two 'onenesses' (*ekatva*) of those two objects. Here, as in many other cases, e.g., in the case of qualities like remoteness and nearness (*paratva* and *aparatva*), an external reality is held to be created by mental cognitions. Śrīdhara was therefore forced to say that there was nothing extra-ordinary in the production of an external object by knowledge. The idealists maintain that the external things do not exist; they are mere projections of ideas. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also says that external things are produced by ideas. Here we find extreme realism slipping quietly into idealism (pp. 141-146).

20. The significance of the theory of the universal as an external reality and the validity of determinate perception based thereon have been clearly explained (pp. 306-310). A separate chapter (No. IX) has been devoted to tracing the development of the theory of the universal and its comparison and contrast with the Buddhist theory of *apoha*. The nature of cross-division (*saṁkara*) has been explained as having a bearing on the theory of the external or objective reality of the universals (pp. 319-327). New light has been thrown on the development of the universal called 'existence' (*sattā*) and its differentiation from existence by nature, viz., *svarūpa-sattā* (pp. 146-152).

21. Validity of determinate perception being the basis of realism, it has been shown how vigorously the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika upholds it against the Buddhist (p. 441 ff.). It has been shown that distinction between determinate and indeterminate perception was not known to the orthodox schools before the period of Dignāga who introduced it into Indian philosophy (pp. 433-441). Kumārila referred to that distinction for the first time amongst the orthodox writers (pp. 438-39), but it was Vācaspatimiśra who made it clear-cut and definite, and also explained it as based on the Nyāya aphorism (NS.I.i.4) defining perception (pp. 430-433). The meaning of the term *avyapadeśya* occurring

in the aphorism has been discussed at length according to Jayanta and others (pp. 430-33). In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school it was, however, Gangeśa who pointed to the transcendental nature of indeterminate perception as was done before him by Dignāga (p. 440).

22. Validity of determinate perception being a bone of contention between the two schools, detailed arguments of the Buddhist to refute it and Vācaspatimiśra's answer to uphold it have been quoted and explained (pp. 442-456).

23. It has been shown that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was led even to accept mental factor in determinate perception, and this ultimately resulted in the formulation of the theory of transcendental contact (*jñāna-lakṣaṇa*) by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The process of the formulation of that theory has been traced, and it has been pointed out, for the first time, that transcendental contact called *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* operated not only in the case of apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) and recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), but also in the case of every determinate perception (pp. 456-471).

24. Full significance of the controversy between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of *pramāṇa-saṁplava* (i.e., comprehension of the same object by a number of *pramāṇas*) and the Buddhist theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* (i.e., restriction of the sphere of each of the two *pramāṇas*) has been brought out (p. 423). It has been shown why the Buddhist insists on refuting the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory that 'indifference' (*upekṣā*), in addition to acceptance (*upādāna*) and rejection (*hāna*), is also one of the forms of volition following a cognition (p. 426).

25. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of atom has been compared with the Buddhist *kṣaṇa*, and new material on the atomic theory has been presented. The subtle polemic by Uddyotakara and Vācaspatimiśra against Vasubandhu's arguments has been detailed, and the intricate process, as to how a partless atom can be connected with different space-quarters has been explained in the light of Vācaspatimiśra's treatment of it (pp. 171-179).

NEW MATERIAL ON SOME MINOR POINTS

26. Full significance of the qualities like 'measure' (*parimāṇa*), 'connection' (*saṁyoga*) and 'disconnection' (*vibhāga*) in the structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism has been brought out, and the intricate process in the case of 'disconnection' has been explained (pp. 295-303).

27. Much of confused thinking regarding the origin of the Nyāya system and the term *ānvīkṣikī* which was the earlier appellation of the system, found in the writings of Jacobi, and more particularly in those of Prof. Dasgupta, has been cleared (pp. 86-91).

28. New material has been collected to establish close affinity of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, especially of the latter, with the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school. It has been suggested that orthodox systems may be divided into two groups, one headed by the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā, and the other by the Uttara-Mīmāṁsā, viz., the Vedānta (pp. 66-73).

29. A more rational division of the periods of the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika based on the organic growth of ideas has been suggested, and some new material on the history of the school has been presented (pp. 93-95).

30. Erroneous ideas regarding the *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya* on the Vaiśeṣika, and the view of its posteriority to the *Praśastapāda-bhāṣya* held by Bodas and followed by Keith, H. Ui and others have been shown to be quite unwarranted (pp. 103-107).

NEW LIGHT ON SOME BUDDHIST THEORIES

As a result of the study of the system of Dignāga *vis-a-vis* the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system, not only has the latter been presented in a new perspective, but new light has been thrown on some of the Buddhist schools and their theories.

31. It has been pointed out that the presentation of the Buddhist Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika schools in *Sarvadarśana-*

saṁgraha, which has been blindly followed by most of the modern writers, is quite erroneous. A problem regarding Sautrāntika's theory of knowledge has been raised and discussed (pp. 54-65).

32. Dignāga's epistemology relating to the process involved in the judgment of determinate perception has been fully explained. Distinction between non-comprehension of difference (*bhedāgraha*) and comprehension of identity (*abheda-graha*), about which even great scholiasts like Śrīdhara were confused, has been pointed out in the light of Vācaspatimiśra's explanation (pp. 342-351).

33. Fresh material on the Buddhist theory of evanescence (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅga*) and its refutation by the principal orthodox scholiasts, culled from different treatises of both the camps, has been presented (pp. 187-233).

34. The obvious difficulty involved in the Buddhist theory that any one of the numerous causes (accessories) is capable of producing the effect has been pointed out, and explanations offered by the Buddhist writers examined, and a solution of the dilemma suggested (pp. 215-221).

BEARING OF THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE TWO PŪRVA-MĪMĀṂSĀ SCHOOLS ON REALISM

The two great writers of the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā school, Kumārila and Prabhākara, have made notable contribution to realism by their epistemological theories. The bearing of their theories on realism has been brought out in this work.

35. Kumārila's theory of 'manifestedness' (*jñātatā*) produced in an external object by its cognition, and the theory that knowledge is only inferable have been explained in relation to their bearing on the theory of realism (pp. 471-477).

36. Prabhākara's theory of the repudiation of the phenomenon of error has been fully explained, and it has been pointed

out that that theory is perhaps the greatest weapon in the armoury of the defence of realism (pp. 477-487).

* * * *

We have come to the end of our journey. The greatest problem of the thinking man, ever since he came to his own, has been to know the nature of the objective world with which he is confronted. The great Śaṁkara put it in his characteristic way: the subject self (*viṣayin*) and the objective world (*viṣaya*) are apprehended respectively in the form of the notions of *'I'* and *'You'* (*yuṣmad-asmat-pratyaya-gocara*). To bring out the contrast between the two more vividly, Śaṁkara refers to the objective world as *'you'* and not by the third person, *'it'*. The subject *'I'* confronts the objective world and asks *'what You are'?* That has been the fundamental problem of all philosophy, eastern or western. What is the nature of the objective world? Is it real or merely ideal or wholly unreal? Indian thinkers grappled with this basic problem of philosophy with earnestness and zeal which is all their own. There is perhaps no instance where this problem has been discussed with a sustained interest for such a long period as that of the conflict between the Buddhist Dignāga school and the orthodox realist camp led by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The latter fought a desperate battle, but exactly at the point when the battle seemed to have been lost, its adversary, the Buddhist, disappeared physically from the scene.

GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS

(Pages indicated are those where a brief explanation of a term is given. For a detailed study, reference may be made to Index).

Abhāva, non-existence, non-being. The seventh category (*padārtha*) of the N-V school added at a later period to the original six, *dravya,* etc., (see p. 395 ff.).

Abhāva-pramāṇa, Mīmāṁsakas of the Kumārila school hold that non-existence is comprehended not by perception as accepted by the N-V school, but by a separate means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) called, *abhāva-pramāna* (or *anupalabdhi*), i.e., 'absence of comprehension of the non-existent reality' (p. 387).

Abheda-graha, imposition of identity of two things, which is different from *bhedāgraha,* i.e., non-comprehension of difference between the two, the latter being the explanation of the Prabhākara school and the Buddhist in the case of error (p. 350-351).

Action (movement, *karman*), the third category of the N-V school (p. 16).

Adhipati-pratyaya, according to the Buddhist, one of the four causes of every mental event, e.g., in the case of a visual sensation, the visual sense as a cause. The other three are

ālambana-pratyaya, i.e., the object as a cause; *sahakāri-pratyaya*, i.e., the light as a cause, and *samanantara-pratyaya*, the previous moment of consciousness as a cause (p. 451).

Adhyavasāya or *vikalpa*, according to Dignāga, determinate knowledge that follows sense-apprehension (*grahaṇa*), and broadly speaking includes all forms of thought or intellection (pp. 1-2, 4).

Adravya-vāda or *anātma-vāda*, the Buddhist theory that apart from the flashes of reality, there is no 'substance' existing in the *external* world. *Substance* is only a mental synthesis. *Adravya-vāda* is equated with *anātma-vāda* (p. 51).

Advaita-vāda, the Vedānta theory of monism.

Akhyāti-vāda, Prabhākara's explanation of error by repudiating the phenomenon of error (p. 484).

Ālambana-pratyaya, object as a cause of its comprehension, (see *adhipati-pratyaya*).

Alaukika-sannikarṣa, the transcendental sense-object-contact which is of three kinds, viz., (i) *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* and (ii) *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* (q. v. i and ii), and (iii) yogic vision (pp. 209, 462 ff.).

Ālocana or *Ālocana-mātra*, the earliest term used for the first (indeterminate) stage of perception (pp. 435, 437).

Anātma-vāda, No-soul-theory of the Buddhist which is contrasted with the *ātmavāda* of the Vedic or orthodox philosophical schools, and implies the theory of no-substance (*adravya-vāda*, q. v. (p. 51).

Anirvacanīya-khyāti, Vedāntic explanation of error according to which the object of illusion is neither real nor unreal but indefinable (p. 477).

Antyāvayavin, ultimate whole, which, according to the N-V theory, cannot be a constituent of any other effect, e.g., a jar cannot be a part of some other substance to be produced by a number of jars (p. 267).

Aṇu or *paramāṇu*, both the terms are synonymous and denote an atom, i.e., an indivisible particle of matter (p. 158).

Anubhava, direct sense-experience opposed to *smṛti* (memory)

which is knowledge of what has already been known. *Anubhava* and *smṛti* are two kinds of knowledge (p. 443).

Anumāna, inference.

Anuvyavasāya, apperception, mental knowledge of perception in the form 'I know this jar', the form of perception being 'this is a jar' (p. 372).

Anvaya-vyatireka, the law of the effect appearing and non-appearing with the presence and absence of its cause (p. 452).

Anyathā-khyāti or *viparita-khyāti*, knowledge of a thing in a form which is not its own. This is the statement of the phenomenon of error according to the N-V school (pp. 482-483).

Anyonyābhāva, one of the kinds of non-existence (*abhāva*). Mutual non-identity of two things, e.g., non-existence of the jar in the cloth, and of the latter in the former in the sense that the two are not identical (p. 396).

Apoha, Buddhist term for the universal which is held to be negative. It means differentiation or exclusion of one thing from all others (also called *atad-vyāvṛtti*), e.g., exclusion of 'cow' from 'non-cows' (p. 44 and Chap. IX).

Apperception, see *anuvyavasāya*.

Ārambha-vāda or *asat-kārya-vāda*, the N-V theory of causation which holds that there is origination (*ārambha*) of an effect (*kārya*) which was non-existent (*asat*) before (p. 236).

Artha, the first three N-V categories, viz., substance, quality and action which are termed by Kaṇāda as *artha* (pp. 140-141).

Artha-kriyā-kārin, that which can produce efficient action; this is the sole test of existence according to the Buddhist.

Asamavāyi-kāraṇa, non-inherent cause, (one of the three causes, viz., *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, *asamavāyi-kārana* and *nimitta-kārana*, according to the N-V school, e.g., *connections* of threads are the non-inherent cause of cloth (p. 281).

Asat-kārya-vāda, see *ārambha-vāda*.

Asat-khyāti, according to the Mādhyamika Buddhist, the object

of illusion is unreal (*asat*) and hence his explanation of error is called *asat-khyāti*.

Āstika-darśana, orthodox or Vedic systems of philosophy (pp. 49-50. n. 1).

Atad-vyāvṛtti, see *apoha*.

Ātma-khyāti, according to the Buddhist Yogācāra school, the object of illusion is only a form of self or consciousness, and hence its explanation of error is called *ātma-khyāti* (p. 478).

Ātma-vāda, soul-theory of orthodox or Vedic schools of philosophy, which is contrasted with the theory of *anātma-vāda* of the Buddhist (q. v.), and implies the theory of substance (*dravya-vāda*) (p. 51).

Avayava, parts, which are conceived as cause and held to be separate from their 'whole' (*avayavin*) which is conceived as effect, e.g., threads (parts) are conceived as the cause, and its 'whole', viz., cloth, as the effect (pp. 238-241).

Avayavin, see '*Avayava*' above.

Bāhyārthānumeyatva-vāda, the theory, like that of representationism, holds that external objects are not directly perceived, but only inferred. The theory is ascribed to Sautrāntika school by orthodox writers (pp. 61-64).

Bhāva or *Bhāva-padārtha*, when in the later N-V school, the seventh category *abhāva* (non-existence) was introduced, the original six categories *dravya*, etc., were designated as '*bhāva*' or *bhāva-padārtha*.

Bhedāgraha, see *abheda-graha*.

Categories (*padārthas*), of the N-V school. Originally six categories—*dravya*, *guṇa*, *karman*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *samavāya* were accepted. *Abhāva* (non-existence) was added at a later stage.

Change (*vikāra or pariṇāma*), succession of different phases of an enduring stuff, and not replacement of one entity by another (p. 246).

Conceptualism, the theory that the universals have no independent objective existence, but exist only in the mind as general concepts.

Connection (*saṁyoga*), quality of relation between two substances which can also exist separately (p. 297 ff.).

Cross-division (*saṁkara*), nullifying the universal; if there are two generalizing attributes residing in an individual, the sphere of one of which crosses that of the other, such attributes cannot constitute the universal (p. 323 ff.).

Dependent origination, the Buddhist causal theory called *pratitya-samutpāda,* i.e., there being one thing, the other follows (pp. 78-79).

Determinate perception, savikalpaka-pratyakṣa, which is real perception according to the N-V school, but only pseudo-perception according to the Buddhist (p. 441 ff.).

Dharma (i), property according to the N-V school. Property may be in the form of quality, action, the universal, *viśeṣa,* or even substance as in the case of a 'whole' (*avayavin*) which is the property of its parts, e.g., a cloth is the property of threads (pp.15-16).

Dharmas (ii), according to Dignāga school, discrete moments (*kṣaṇas*) or unique particulars (*sva-lakṣaṇas*) are called *dharmas* (pp. 78, 137).

Dharmas (iii), Buddhist Mahāyāna *sūtras,* p. 52.

Dharma-dharmi-bheda, essential differentiation between the substratum and its properties. This is the corner-stone of the N-V realism (p. 15 ff.).

Dhvaṁsa or *Dhvaṁsābhāva,* consequent negation. One of the four kinds of non-existence (p. 402).

Disconnection (*vibhāga*), separation of two substances, which is not merely an absence of connection (*saṁyoga*), but an independent quality (p. 301).

Dravya (substance), first of the categories of the N-V school, the substratum of properties (pp. 15-16).

Dvaita-vāda, Dualism, opposed to Monism (*advaita-vāda*) (p. 47).

Grahaṇa, direct apprehension (p. 1).

Guṇa, quality, second category (*padārtha*) of the N-V school, see category (p. 16).

Idealism or *subjective idealism*, the theory that there are no external objects independent of thinking mind. Objective idealism means that the external world is only an expression of the universal mind (pp. 42-43).

Indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*), the first sense-apprehension, sensation (pp. 308-309).

Inherence (*samavāya*), inseparable relation between two things, one of which is such that it can exist only as subsisting in the other, e.g., between a substance and its qualities (pp. 374-375).

Jñāna-lakṣaṇa, one of the transcendental contacts with the object, which is an extra-ordinary contact, e.g., when a piece of sandal is experienced as fragrant through visual sense (p. 462 ff.).

Jñātatā (*prākaṭya*), manifestedness, according to Kumārila, quality of *manifestedness* is produced in an external object by its perceptive knowledge (p. 474 f.).

Kāraṇa-vāda or *kārya-kāraṇa-vāda*, theory of causation.

Karman (action or movement), see *action*.

Kārya-dravya, effect-substance or non-eternal substance (p. 133 ff.).

Khyāti-vāda, explanation of error, which differs in the case of different schools (p. 478).

Kṣaṇa, according to Buddhist, external reality which is in the form of momentary flashes called *kṣaṇas*. They are being born every moment and dying the very next (p. 5).

Kṣaṇa-bhaṅga-vāda, Buddhist theory of flux or evanescence (p. 189 ff.).

Mādhyamika, one of the four Buddhist schools (also known as *śūnya-vāda*), propounded by Nāgārjuna (pp. 44-45).

Manas, the internal sense which aids all external senses; not mind which is the thinking conscious agent or soul (p. 435).

Materialism, the theory that matter alone is real; there is no conscious mind or soul apart from the matter (pp. 40-41).

Nāstika-darśana, heterodox schools of Indian philosophy denying the authority of the Veda (pp. 49-50).

Nimitta-kāraṇa, efficient or instrumental cause, e.g., weaver, shuttle, etc., in the case of cloth (p. 281) (see also *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*).

Niranvaya-utpāda-vināśa, production or destruction of an effect without any continuity of its cause-stuff (p. 133).

Nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa, see indeterminate perception.

Nominalism, the theory that universals have no objective reality but are brought forth as general concepts by a name or word (see conceptualism).

No-soul-theory, see *Anātma-vāda*.

Objective qualities, e.g., colour, etc., while duality, etc., which, although held to be existing externally, have their origin in mind. These qualities and those of the soul, knowledge, etc., have been regarded as subjective qualities, while others are objective qualities, e.g., colour, etc.

Padārtha of the N-V school, see category.

Paramāṇu or *aṇu*, see *aṇu*.

Parimaṇḍala, atom or *aṇu*, q. v. (p. 162).

Pārimāṇḍalya, measure of atom (p. 162).

Pariṇāma-vāda or *vikāra-vāda*, Sāṁkhya theory of causation according to which an effect is not a new entity but only a changed phase of its cause. The theory is known as *sat-kārya-vāda*, q.v. (p. 74).

Paryudāsa, a special kind of negation (p. 357).

Perception, pratyakṣa, or *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*, first kind of the means of knowledge based on sense (p. 11).

Pīlu-pāka, according to the Vaiśeṣika theory, when a jar changes its colour from blue to red, it is dissolved (for a moment) into its atoms (pīlu), but the Nyāya holds that the change of colour takes place in the jar itself, i.e., without its dissolution into atoms. The Nyāya theory is called *piṭhara-pāka* (p. 247).

Piṭhara-pāka, see under *Pīlu-pāka* above.

Prāgabhāva, antecedent non-existence, e.g., the non-existence of the cloth in the threads before its production (p. 402).

Pramāṇa-saṁplava, intermixture of *pramāṇas*. According to the N-V school, the same object can be grasped by any one of the *pramāṇas* under different conditions. This theory is opposed to the Buddhist theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* which means the restriction of the sphere of *pramāṇas*, i.e., each one of the two kinds of *pramāṇas* comprehends only one kind of reality (p. 36 and 309).

Pramāṇa-vāda, theory of knowledge or epistemology (p. 419).

Pramāṇa-vyavasthā, see under pramāṇa-saṁplava above.

Prāmāṇya-vāda, validity of knowledge as explained by different schools (p. 479).

Prasajya-pratiṣedha, negation of something positive (p. 357).

Pratītya-samutpāda, see Dependent origination.

Pratyabhijñā, recognition, e.g., "He is the same Devadatta whom I saw at Patna". In this presentative knowledge, which is unitary according to the N-V school, knowledge of the past state is the part of the direct perception of the object. According to the Buddhist, however, the knowledge of the past state is remembrance and that of the present state, a presentative knowledge, the two being different. This is one of the most important bones of contention between the two schools (p. 144).

Pratyakṣa, see Perception.

Pratyaya, Buddhist term for causation (cf. *pratītya-samutpāda*), e.g., *ālambana-pratyaya*, etc.

Realism, the theory that the external world exists independent of its knowledge by mind; it is opposed to Idealism, (q.v.) (p. 39).

Representationism, the theory held by Locke in western philosophy (similar to *bāhyārthānumeyatva-vāda* ascribed to Sautrāntika, (q.v.). Representationism holds that the external objects are not apprehended directly and immediately, but through the cognition of those objects (p. 41).

Sabhāga-saṁtati or *sajātīya-saṁtati*, similar series in the flux of momentary objects (kṣaṇas); it is contrasted with *visabhāga-saṁtati* or *vijātīya-saṁtati*, i.e., dissimilar series (p. 201).

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Sabhāga-saṁtati or *sajātīya-saṁtati*, similar series in the flux of momentary objects (kṣaṇas); it is contrasted with *visabhāga-saṁtati* or *vijātīya-saṁtati*, i.e., dissimilar series (p. 201).

Sahakārin, accessory or accessory cause.

Sahakāri-pratyaya, one of the four causes of every mental event according to the Buddhist, see *adhipati-pratyaya*.

Sākāra-jñāna-vāda, the theory that cognitions have forms (p. 42).

Samanantara-pratyaya, see under *adhipatipratyaya*.

Sāmānya (the universal), one of the six categories of the N-V school. It means generalized idea, corresponding to Buddhist *'apoha'*.

Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa, Buddhist term for generalized reality which is only mental and not externally real (p. 3).

Sāmānya-lakṣaṇa, (N-V school) a kind of transcendental sense-object-contact (p. 321).

Samavāya, (see Inherence).

Samavāyi-kārana, Inherent cause, e.g., threads are the inherent cause of cloth inasmuch as the cloth resides in the threads by *samavāya* relation (p. 281).

Saṁkara, see cross-division.

Saṁskāra, (N-V school) one of the qualities which is of three kinds: (i) velocity (*vega*), (i) elasticity (*sthiti-sthāpakatva*) both of which are physical qualities and (iii) impression (*bhāvanā*) which is a quality of the soul and brings about memory (pp. 286-287).

Saṁskṛta- dharmas, according to the Buddhist, the point-instants (*kṣaṇas*) work as interrelated; they act and react upon one another and work in concert (p. 225). An effect is called a *saṁskṛta-dharma* inasmuch as it is a common effect of many causes (p. 194).

Saṁyoga, see connection.

Sannikarṣa, sense-object-contact.

Sapratighatva, impenetrability, i.e., the nature of matter to be resistent to another matter occupying the same space (p. 19).

Sārūpya, a relation between cognition and its object; it, however, does not mean similarity between them, but a sort of "co-ordination—a relation which makes it possible that

the complex phenomenon—the resulting cognition—is a cognition of colour and not of the visual sense"—Stcherbatsky (p. 58).

Sarvāsti-vāda, one of the oldest schools of the Hinayāna sect of the Buddhist (p. 52-53).

Satkārya-vāda, the Sāṁkhya theory of causation according to which an effect is already existent (*kāryaṁ sat*) in its cause in an unmanifested state, see also *pariṇāma-vāda* (p. 74).

Sautrāntika, one of the four Buddhist schools of philosophy (p. 53).

Savikalpaka-pratyakṣa, see determinate perception.

Sva-lakṣaṇa, unique or ultimate particular, external reality in the form of fleeting flashes or bits of reality according to the Dignāga school (pp. 2-3).

Transcendental Idealism, a theory (held by Kant) that formal element in experience, the categories of thought, are transcendentally ideal, i.e., subjective (p. 44).

Transcendental contact, see *alaukika sannikarṣa*.

Tripuṭi-pratyakṣa, Tripartite perception; according to Prabhākara, every perception has three parts, i.e., it is the perception (i) of the object, (ii) of the cognition of that object, and (iii) of the knower.

Upādāna-pratyaya, previous moment as the cause of the subsequent moment, corresponding to *upādāna-kāraṇa* of the orthodox schools (p. 128).

Upādhi, a generalization which is only mental, and not objectively real like the universal, e.g., citizenship of a town (pp. 320-321).

Vaibhāṣika, one of the four schools of the Buddhist philosophy (p. 52).

Vibhāga, disconnection, q. v.

Vijātiya-saṁtati, or *visabhāga-saṁtati*, see *sabhāga-saṁtati*.

Vijñāna-vāda, one of the four Buddhist schools of philosophy, also called *yogācāra* which holds the theory of subjective idealism.

Vikalpa, see *adhyavasāya*.

Vikāra-vāda, see *pariṇāma-vāda*.

Viparīta-khyāti, see *anyathākhyāti*.

Viśeṣa, also called antya-viśeṣa; fifth category of the N-V school, which is accepted for the purpose of differentiating one atom from another of the same class, and also an *eternal* substance, e.g., one soul from the other (p. 314 ff.).

Vivarta-vāda, the Vedāntic theory of causation, according to which, change of a cause into its effect is unreal and illusory; it is contrasted with the Sāṁkhya theory of causation (*vikāra-vāda*) which holds the change to be real (p. 243 ff.).

Yogācāra, see *Vijñāna-vāda*.

TEXT APPENDIX

Long Sanskrit texts translated or explained in this work from chapter VI onward are given below in serial order with reference to chapters and pages. References to the sources of the texts are given after each passage.

CHAPTER VI

P. 173. n. 45. मध्यस्य हि परमाणोरुपर्यधःपार्श्ववर्तिभिः परमाणुभिर्ये संयोगास्तत्र मध्यस्य पूर्वेण परमाणुना यः संयोगो नासौ मध्यपश्चिमपरमाण्वाश्रितः एवं मध्यपश्चिमपरमाणुसंयोगो नैव मध्यमपूर्वपरमाण्वाश्रय इति। एवमन्यत्रापि द्रष्टव्यम्। षडपि भिन्नदेशा एवेति समानदेशत्वमसिद्धम्। अथ परमाणूनां संबन्धिनं परमाणुं मध्यम् अधिकृत्योच्यते तदाश्रिता हि संयोगाः षडपि भवन्तीति तत्राह-न किञ्चिद् बाध्यत इति।

स्यादेतत्, संयोगसमानदेशत्वेन परमाणवोऽपि संयुक्ताः समानदेशा इति। पिण्डस्याणुमात्रत्वप्रसङ्ग इति परोक्तमनुवदति—यत्पुनरेतदिति। तद् दूषयति—तन्नेति। यत्र यत्समवेतं स तस्य देशो यथा रूपादीनां द्रव्यम्। न च परमाणवः क्वचित्समवयन्ति, किं तु तत्संयोगाः, तेन देशवतां संयोगानामस्तु समानदेशता, न तु परमाणूनामदेशत्वादित्यर्थः। *NVT. p. 1069. line 8.*

P. 176. n. 99. समवायेन हि समानदेशता, स्थौल्यपरिपन्थिनी, यथा गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शाः समानदेशा न स्थौल्यमारभन्ते । तत्कस्य हेतोः ? एषाममूर्त्तानां समानदेशसमवायात् । मूर्त्तास्तु स्पर्शवन्तः समवायेनासमानदेशाः परस्परसंयोगिनो यदि स्थौल्यमारभन्ते किं बाध्यते ? तस्मात् संयोगेन समानदेशता न प्रतिषिध्यते, समवायेन तु प्रतिषिध्यते, सा हि स्थौल्यविरोधिनीति सिद्धम् ।

NVT. pp. 1069-1070. *line* 22.

P. 177. n. 52. स्वरूपेणैका दिक् सर्वगता च, नास्या भेदोऽस्तीत्यर्थः । यद्येकैव दिक्, क्व तर्हि परमाणावस्मादयं परमाणुः पूर्वोऽयं पश्चिम इत्यादयो बुद्धिव्यपदेशभेदा इत्यत आह-एकत्वेऽपि दिशः आदित्योदय-देशप्रत्यासन्नदेशसंयुक्तो यः स इतरस्माद्विप्रकृष्टदेशसंयोगात् परमाणोः पूर्वः, एवमादित्यास्तमयदेशप्रत्यासन्नदेशसंयुक्तो यः स इतरस्मात् विप्रकृष्टदेशसंयोगात् परमाणोः पश्चिमः, तौ च पूर्वपश्चिमौ परमाणू अपेक्ष्य यः सूर्योदयास्तमयदेशविप्रकृष्टदेशसंयोगः स मध्यवर्ती ।

NVT. p. 1070. *line* 12.

P. 177. n. 54. एकस्यापि परमाणोः परमाण्वन्तरसंयोगा अव्याप्य-वृत्तय एव भागाः । एवं दिशोऽप्येकस्या अपि संयोगा एव भागाः, सोऽयं परमाणोः षट्केन युगपद्योगो मूर्त्तत्वमात्रप्रयुक्तो न सावयवत्व-प्रयुक्त इति न सावयवत्वं गमयितुमर्हतीति ।

NVT. p. 1070. *line* 20.

P. 199. n. 107. तथा हि यद्येषां ध्रुवभावि तत्र तेषां कारणान्तरापेक्षा नास्ति यथा शरकृपाणादीनां लोहमयत्वे, ध्रुवभावी च कृतकानां विनाश इत्यनुमानं विनाशस्य हेत्वन्तरायत्ततां प्रतिक्षिपति, ये हेत्वन्तरसापेक्षा न ते ध्रुवभाविनः यथा वाससि रागादयः ।

NK. p. 78. *line* 9.

P. 200. n. 108. तथा यदि भावा अपि स्वहेतुभ्यो विनाशं प्रति हेत्वन्तरमपेक्षन्ते तदा हेत्वन्तरस्य प्रतिबन्धवैकल्ययोरपि सम्भवे कश्चित्कृतकोऽपि न विनश्येत् स्वहेतुतश्च विनश्वरस्वभावा जायमाना उत्पत्त्यनन्तरमेव विनश्यन्तीति सिद्धं क्षणिकत्वम् । अपि च भावस्या-

विनश्वरस्वभावत्वे विनाशोऽशक्यकरणो वह्नेरिव शीतिमा । विनश्वरस्वभावत्वे वा नार्थो हेतुभिः, न च भावादभिन्नस्य विनाशस्य हेत्वन्तरजन्यता कारणभेदस्य भेदहेतुत्वात्। भिन्नस्य हेत्वन्तरादुत्पादे च भावस्योपलब्ध्यादिप्रसङ्गः, अन्योत्पादादन्यस्वरूपप्रच्युतेरभावात्; घटो नष्ट इति च भावकर्तृको व्यपदेशो न स्यात् किन्त्वभावो जात इति व्यपदिश्येत । तथा च सति घटः किमभूदिति वार्ताप्रश्ने तस्य निवृत्तौ प्रस्तुतायामप्रस्तुतमेव कथनं स्यात् तस्माद्भावस्वभाव एव विनाश इति । *NK. p. 78. line 12.*

P. 200. n. 114. नन्वेष प्रत्ययो न भावस्य पूर्वापरकालावस्थानं शक्नोति प्रतिपादयितुं, न ह्येतदेकं विज्ञानं कारणाभावाद् इन्द्रियसन्निहितविषयं न पूर्वकालत्वमवगाहते, संस्कारोपि पूर्वानुभवजन्मा तद्विषये नियतो नापरकालतां परिस्पृशति न च ताभ्यामन्यदुभयविषयं किञ्चिदेकमस्ति यदेतद्विज्ञानं प्रसुवीत । *NK. p. 80. line 8.*

तस्माद् द्वे एते ज्ञाने स इति स्मरणम् अयम् इत्यनुभवः ।
NM. Part II. p. 21. line 20.

P. 202. n. 115. इतोपि नैतदेकं विज्ञानं स्वभावभेदात्-इदमिति हि प्रत्यक्षता तदिति हि परोक्षत्वम्; प्रत्यक्षतापरोक्षत्वे च परस्परविरोधिनी नैके युज्येते तस्माद् ग्रहणस्मरणात्मके द्वे इमे संवित्ती भिन्नविषये । *NK. p. 80. line 12.*

P. 203. n. 117. अथोपजननापायरहितवस्तुस्वरूपग्राहिणी प्रत्यभिज्ञेत्युच्यते, तदप्ययुक्तम्, वर्तमानैकनिष्ठतायाः प्रदर्शितत्वाद्, भावानां च विनाशजन्मनोर्वर्त्तमानो वा कालः स्यादन्यो वा ? तदन्यस्तावत् ग्रहीतुमशक्य इत्युक्तम्, वर्त्तमाने तु तदुत्पादविनाशकाले कथ्यमाने तद्ग्रहणात्तदविनाभूतौ भावानामुत्पादविनाशावपि गृहीतौ स्याताम् । *NM. Part II. p. 22. line 9.*

P. 203. n. 119. क्षणिकं प्रत्यक्षं ज्ञानं स्वसमानकालवर्तिनीमर्थस्य सत्तां परिच्छिन्दत् तत्कालासम्बद्धतां व्यवच्छिन्दत् तत्कालभावाव्यभिचारिणः कालान्तरसम्बन्धमपि व्यवच्छिन्दत् तदेकक्षणावस्थायित्वं क्षणिकत्वं गृह्णातीति । *NK. p. 81. line 19*

P. 205. n. 125. नन्वविच्छिन्नदृष्टीनां न हि त्रुट्यदवस्थितिः ।
स्तम्भादिरवभातीति कथमेतस्य भङ्गिता ॥

नैतदेवम्, तत्राप्येकक्षणवृत्तित्वाज्ज्ञानस्य, क्षणान्तरे तु ज्ञानमेव नास्ति, कस्याविच्छिन्नसत्ता, कस्यात्रुटितसत्ता, कस्य वा बोधकम् ?

नन्वस्त्येव क्षणान्तरे तत् ज्ञानमविच्छिन्नत्वाद् दृष्टेरिति चेद्, मैवम्—बुद्धेरदीर्घकालत्वाज्ज्ञानान्तरोत्पाद एवासावित्यवधारयत्वा-युष्मान्,

तस्माद्यथैव सन्तानवृत्त्या ज्ञानक्षणोदयः ।
तथैवोत्पाद्यतामेष स्तम्भक्षणपरम्परा ॥

सोऽयमविच्छिन्नदृष्टीनामत्रुटितपदार्थसत्ताग्रहणाभिमान इत्थमुत्थितः ।

NM. Part II. pp. 23-24. *line* 26.

P. 206. n. 127. पूर्वापरदेशकालौ तत्सम्बन्धौ वा कामं भिद्येयाताम्, परस्पराभावाविनाभावात् तयोरेकदापि तादात्म्येनाप्रतिभासनात् । न तु तदालिङ्गितस्वभावः पद्मरागमणिः तस्य ताभ्यामन्यत्वात् । न चान्यभेदोऽन्यभेदमापादयति ।

NVT. p. 119. *line* 13.

P. 207. n. 132. ननु भूतकालस्येदानीमभावात्तद्विषयं ज्ञानमनर्थजं स्यात्, न, धर्मिणस्तदवच्छिन्नस्य ज्ञानजनकस्य भावात्, भूतः कथमवच्छेदक इति चेत्तया प्रतिभासात्, प्रतीतिमवमृशतु भवान्स एवायमिति यः पूर्वमासीत्स इदानीमप्यस्तीति सोऽयमतीतकाल-विशिष्टोऽर्थः, एतस्यां बुद्धाववभासते, नन्वसता भूतकालेन विशेषितमर्थं कथमिन्द्रियजप्रतीतिरालम्बनीकुर्य्यात्, उच्यते—

अन्त्यसंख्येयसंवित्तिकाले प्रागवलोकिता
यथा शतादिज्ञानानि जनयन्ति घटादयः ।
अतीतकालसंसर्गो भवन्नेव विशेषणं
स्तम्भादिप्रत्यभिज्ञायाः कारणत्वं प्रपत्स्यते ॥

संख्येयाः घटादयः सन्त्यतीतकालो नास्ति इति चेत्कपित्थेषु भक्ष्यमाणेषु किं वक्ष्यति देवानां प्रियः, शतं कपित्थानां भक्षित-

वान्वाहीक इति प्रतीतिदर्शनात्, न च नवनवतावनुपयुक्तेषु कपित्थेष्वत्रैव शततमे शतमिति भवति, यथा तत्रातिक्रान्तान्यपि नवनवतिः कपित्थानि शतप्रतीतिहेतुतामुपयान्ति प्रतिभासोपारूढत्वादेवमतीतकालयोगोऽपि प्रतिभासमानः प्रत्यभिज्ञामाधास्यतीति। विकल्पमात्रं शतप्रत्यय इति चेद् भो महात्मन् किं वा न विकल्पमात्रम्।

NM. Part II. p. 32. line 5.

P. 208. n. 134. वर्तमानकालयोगिनाऽर्थेन तत्प्रत्ययजननात्तस्य वर्त्तमान इवातीतोऽपि कालोऽवच्छेदकतां प्रतिपद्यते स च तदवच्छिन्नोऽर्थं इदं ज्ञानमादधातीत्यर्थजमेतदिन्द्रियजमपि भवति तद्भावाभावानुविधानात्।

NM. part II. p. 32. line 27.

P. 208. n. 135. अतीते काले स्वतन्त्रे तस्य सामर्थ्यं न, तद्ग्राह्यवर्तमानवस्तुविशेषणीभूते संस्कारसचिवस्य चास्य सामर्थ्यं, न केवलस्येत्युक्तम्, तस्मादतिक्रान्तकालविशेषितपूर्ववर्त्तिस्तम्भादिपदार्थविषयमिन्द्रियादिसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नमेवेदं प्रत्यभिज्ञाज्ञानमिति सिद्धम्।

NM. part II. p. 33. line 9.

P. 208. n. 136. अथ वा पूर्वाभिज्ञानविशिष्टग्राह्यमाणमिष्यतां प्रत्यभिज्ञानं गन्धवत्कुन्दबुद्धिवद, यथा हि लोचनगोचरेऽपि कुन्दकुसुमे तदविषयगन्धविशेषिते बाह्येन्द्रियद्वारकग्रहणमघटमानमिति मानसमेव सुरभि कुसुममिति ज्ञानम् एवं पूर्वज्ञानविशेषितस्य स्तम्भादेर्विशेषणमतीतक्षणविषय इति मानसी प्रत्यभिज्ञा।

NM. part II. p. 33. line 13.

P. 213. n. 146. अथोच्यते — किमनभ्युपगतपक्षोपमर्दनेन, बहुभ्यो बहुसंभव इत्येष एव नः पक्षः, सन्तानवृत्त्या वर्तमानपूर्वसामग्रीसारूप्यमुत्तरसामग्रीमारभते विजातीयकारणानुप्रवेशे तु विरूपाम्— इति,

अथ केयं सामग्री नाम ? न समग्रेभ्यो भिन्ना पृथगनुपलम्भादव्यतिरेके तु समग्र एव सामग्री, तत्र पूर्वसमुदायेनोत्तरसमुदायारम्भे

तदन्तर्गतं समुदायिनमेकमेव एक उत्पादयेदेकं वा संभूयेति, तत्राद्ये पक्षे सैवेयमेकस्मादेकोत्पत्तिरुक्ता स्यात्सा च प्रतिषिद्धा।

अथैकैकफलसमुदायिनिष्पत्तौ सर्वसमुदायिनं व्यापारयेत्, क्रमेण वा यौगपद्येन वा? तत्र क्रमपक्षे क्षणिकत्वहानिः, ये हि तत्र पञ्चदश समुदायिनः क्षणं तत्र वर्तन्ते ते तत एकं तमुत्पाद्य पुनरपरमारभेरन् पुनरन्यमिति तावत्कालप्रतीक्षणादक्षणिकत्वम्।

अथ युगपदेव सर्वनिष्पत्तौ सर्वे व्याप्रियन्ते, तर्हि निकुरुम्बरूपादेव कारणादुत्पन्नमिति कारणविवेकनियमाभावाद्रूपरसादिप्रविभागो न स्यात्, इदं रूपमेष रस इति कथं निश्चीयते, चित्रमुत्पादितमिति सर्वं रूपं स्यात्सर्वो रसो, यद्वा न रूपं न रसोऽन्यदेव किंचिद्वस्त्वन्तरं स्यात्।

अथोच्यते—यद्यपि रूपरसादिसामग्री तत्सामग्र्या एव जनिका तथाऽपि क्वचित्किंचिदुपादानकारणमिति, इतरत् सहकारिकारणं, तत्र रूपक्षणनिष्पत्तौ रूपस्योपादानकारणत्वादितरेषां च सहकारिकारणत्वान्न पदार्थसंकर इति, एतदयुक्तं सर्वथा कारणत्वानपायात्, अपि च येन रूपेण रूपस्य रूपं प्रत्युपादानकारणता तेनैव यदि रसं प्रति सहकारिकारणता तदा पुनरपि रूपरसयोरविशेषः, अथान्येन रूपेण रूपस्य रूपोपादानताऽन्येन च रससहकारितेति, तर्हि स्वभावभेदान्नानात्वं.....

अथ नास्त्येतयोः किंचिद्विरुद्धत्वं स्वभावयोः।
कथं बौद्धगृहे जातस्त्वमेवमतिभाषसे॥

भावानां परस्परपरिहारव्यवस्थितरूपत्वमस्त्येवैषां लाक्षणिको विरोधः, अपि च क्षणिकत्वे पदार्थानामिदमत्रोपादानकारणमिदं सहकारिकारणमिति विशेषोऽपि दुरवगमः।

NM. Part II. pp. 27-28. *line* 9.

P. 214. n. 147. अथ वा तिष्ठतु तावदुपादानसहकारिकारणभावः, कारणभाव एव भदन्तसिद्धान्ते दुरुपपादः, परोत्पत्तावव्याप्रियमाणमेव यदि कारणमुच्यते सर्वं सर्वस्य कारणं स्यात्—

न चालब्धात्मनस्तस्य व्यापारः परजन्मनि ।
लब्धात्मनस्तु व्यापारे स्थितिः सिद्धा क्षणान्तरे ॥

अथ ब्रूयादिदं प्रतीत्येदं प्रतीयते इतीदम्प्रत्ययतामात्रमेव कार्यकारणभाव इति, तथाऽपि लब्धात्मनः क्षणस्य प्रतीतिरिति द्वितीयक्षणावस्थानमपरिहार्यमेव,

न चानन्तर्यमात्रेण कार्यकारणताग्रहः ।
अहेतुफलभावेऽपि तथाऽऽनन्तर्यदर्शनात् ॥
व्यापारस्तु परोत्पत्तौ नास्त्येव क्षणभङ्गिनः ।
न वर्तमानकालस्य न भूतस्य न भाविनः ॥

NM. Part II. p. 28. line 21.

P. 214. n. 148. अथवा लब्धात्मनः पदार्थस्य परोत्पत्तौ व्याप्रियमाणत्वेन कारणत्वावधारणाद् द्वित्रक्षणस्थायित्वमवश्यमनन्तरनीत्या भवेदिति प्रत्युत सत्त्वादक्षणिकत्वसिद्धे विरुद्धोऽयं हेतुः ।

NM. part II. p. 29. line 13.

P. 214. n. 150. अपि च सर्वदा कार्यानुत्पादात्कारकावस्था नूनमेकक्षणस्थायिनी भावानामुपगन्तव्या, व्यापारावेशवशेन वा श्रोत्रियादिपक्षे, सहकार्यादिसन्निधानापादनेन वा नैयायिकादिपक्षे, कारकत्वं नाम वस्तुनो रूपमेकक्षणवृत्त्येव कार्योत्पत्त्यैव तत्कल्पनात्, ततः पूर्वमुत्तरकालं वा कारकायोगात् ।

NM. part II. pp. 19-20. line 26.

P. 217. n. 156. ननूत्पत्तावप्यस्य जागर्त्ति स्वसंतानवर्ती पूर्व एव निरपेक्षः क्षणः, एवं तस्य पूर्वः पूर्वः क्षणः स्वसन्ततिपतित एवानपेक्षो जागर्त्युपजनन इति कुशूलनिहितबीज एव स्यात् कृती कृषीवलः कृतमस्य कृषिकर्मणा दुःखबहुलेन ।

NVT. p. 841. line 19.

P. 218. n. 158. नन्वेकत्र क्षेत्रे निष्पत्ति-लवनादिपूर्वकमानीयैकत्र कुशूले क्षिप्तानि सर्वाण्येव बीजानि साधारणरूपाण्येव प्रतीयन्ते तत् कुतस्त्योऽयमेकबीजसंभवी विशेषोऽन्येषामिति चेत्; उच्यते, कारणं

खलु सर्वत्र कार्ये द्विविधं दृष्टमदृष्टं च सर्वास्तिकप्रसिद्धमेतत् । ततः प्रत्यक्षपरोक्षसहकारिप्रत्ययसाकल्यमसर्ववित्रा प्रत्यक्षतो न शक्यं प्रतिपत्तुं, ततो भवेद् अपि कारणं सामग्रीशक्तिभेदात्, तादृशः स्वभावभेदः केषाञ्चिद् एव बीजक्षणानां येन त एव बीजक्षणाः आद्यातिशयमङ्कुरं वा परम्परया जनयेयुर्नान्ये बीज-क्षणाः ।

Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi (SBNT.) pp. 49-50.

P. 218. n. 159. तथा हि द्विविधं सहकारित्वमेकार्थक्रियाकारितया परस्परोपकारितया च । तत्राव्यवहितकार्यापेक्षया एकार्थक्रियाकारित्वमेव, न परस्परोपकारित्वम्, एकस्मिन् क्षणे निर्विभागतया विशेषस्याधातुमशक्यत्वात् । व्यवहितकार्यापेक्षया तु परस्परत उत्तरविशिष्टक्षणोत्पत्तेः संतानापेक्षया परस्परोपकारेण व्यवहितकार्यजनकत्वात् परस्परोपकारित्वलक्षणं सहकारित्वम् ।

TS. Vol. I. pp. 154-155.

P. 221. n. 163. उत्पत्तावपि तुल्योऽयं प्रलापः, भवनस्वभावश्चेद् घटः स्वत एव भवति किं दण्डादिसामग्र्या, अभवनस्वभावस्तु कर्तुमशक्यः खरविषाणवदिति, कारकव्यापारकार्यत्वदर्शनादपर्यनुयोग एष इति चेद्विनाशेऽपि समः समाधिः ।

NM. Part II. p. 30. *line* 21.

P. 222. n. 164. उत्पन्नो भावः किमेकक्षणावस्थायी किं वा क्षणान्तरेऽप्यवतिष्ठते, क्षणान्तरावस्थितिपक्षे तावत्क्षणिकत्वव्याहतिरनेककालावस्थानात्, एकक्षणावस्थायित्वे तु क्षणान्तरे स्थित्यभाव इति न भावाभावयोरेकत्वं कालभेदात् । अथ मतं, न ब्रूमो भावः स्वस्यैवाभावः किन्तु द्वितीयक्षणः पूर्वक्षणस्याभाव इति । तदप्यसारम्, पूर्वापरक्षणयोर्व्यक्तिभेदेऽपि स्वरूपविरोधस्याभावात्, यथा घटो भिन्नसन्ततिवर्तिना घटान्तरेण सह तिष्ठति एवमेकसन्ततिवर्तिनापि सह तिष्ठेत् द्वितीयक्षणग्राहिप्रमाणान्तरस्य तत्स्वरूपविधेश्चरितार्थस्य प्रथमक्षणनिषेधे प्रमाणत्वाभावात् ।

NK. pp. 78-79. *line* 22.

P. 222. n. 165. अभावस्तु भावप्रतिषेधात्मैव घटो नास्तीति प्रतीत्युदयात्, ततस्तस्योत्पत्तिर्भावस्य निवृत्तिः, तस्यावस्थानं भावस्यानवस्थितिः, तस्योपलम्भो भावस्यानुपलम्भ इति युक्तम् परस्परविरोधात् ।

NK. p. 79. line 5.

P. 222. n. 166. अन्योत्पादे कथमन्यस्य स्वरूपप्रच्युतिरित्यपर्यनुयोज्यम् वस्तुस्वाभाव्याद्, घटो विनष्ट इति च व्यपदेशः तदवयवक्रियादिन्यायेनाभावोत्पत्त्यैव । अत एवायं तस्यैवाभावो न सर्वस्य ।

NK. p. 79. line 16.

P. 223. n. 167. एवं च सति न भावस्य क्षणिकत्वं पश्चाद्भाविनस्तदभावस्य हेत्वन्तरसापेक्षस्य भावानन्तर्यनियमाभावात् । तथा च दृश्यते घटस्योत्पन्नस्य चिरेणैव विनाशो मुद्गराभिघातात् ।

NK. p. 79. line 7.

P. 224. n. 171. सावयवाश्रितस्य कार्यस्य च नूनमवयवविभागादाश्रयविनाशाद्वा यदा कदाचिद्भवितव्यमेव विनाशेनेति कस्तन्नित्यत्वशङ्कावसरः, तथा हि न हि रामाभिषेककलशमद्य यावदनुवर्तमानमीश्वरवेश्मस्वपि पश्यति लोक इत्यवश्यम्भावी तस्य विनाशे हेतुः ।

NM. Part II. pp. 30-31. line 32.

P. 225. n. 174. अथ ध्रुवभाविनी, तस्यामेव तर्हि विभागसंततौ ध्रुवभाविन्यां मुद्गरादिहेत्वपेक्षेत्यनैकान्तिकं ध्रुवभावित्वं नानपेक्षत्वव्याप्तमिति न हेत्वन्तरापेक्षित्वं निषेद्धुमर्हतीति ।

NVT. p. 837. line 19.

P. 227. n. 175. तत्र मातुराहाररसो मात्रया संक्रामति, अदृष्टवशात्तत्र पुनर्जठरानलसम्बन्धात् कललारम्भकपरमाणुषु क्रियाविभागादिन्यायेन कललशरीरे नष्टे समुत्पन्नपाकजैः कललारम्भकपरमाणुभिरदृष्टवशादुपजातक्रियैराहारपरमाणुभिः सह सम्भूय शरीरान्तरमारभ्यत इत्येषा कल्पना शरीरे प्रत्यहं द्रष्टव्या ।

NK. pp. 33-34. line 26.

P. 228. n. 176. प्रतीयते तावदेतस्माद्विज्ञानात् पूर्वापरकालावच्छिन्नमेकं वस्तुतत्त्वं; तदप्यस्य विषयो न भवतीति संविद्विरुद्धम्। ग्रहणस्मरणे च नैकं विषयमालम्बेते तस्मादेकमेवेदं विज्ञानमिति प्रतीतिसामर्थ्यादुभयविषयमास्थेयम्। प्रतीयमानकार्योत्पत्तये चाप्रतीयमानमपि कारणं कल्पयन्ति विद्वांसो न तु कारणाप्रतीत्या विशदमपि कार्यमपह्नुवते जगद्वैचित्र्यस्याप्यपह्नवप्रसङ्गात्। तेन यद्यपि प्रत्येकमिन्द्रियसंस्कारावसमर्थौ तथापि संहताभ्यामिदमेकं कार्यं प्रत्यभिज्ञास्वभावं प्रभावयिष्यते, भविष्यति चैतदुभयकारणसामर्थ्यादुभयविषयं प्राप्स्यति च प्रत्यक्षतां विषयेन्द्रियसामर्थ्यानुविधानात्। न च यत्रैकैकमसमर्थं तत्र मिलितानामपि तेषामसामर्थ्यं प्रत्येकमकुर्वतामपि क्षित्युदकबीजानामन्योन्यसन्निधिभाजामङ्कुरादिजननोपलब्धेः। यत्र विलक्षणा सामग्री तत्र कार्यमपि विलक्षणमेव स्यादिति सुप्रतीतम्, तेनास्य सन्निहितासन्निहितविषयतालक्षणे प्रत्यक्षतापरोक्षते न विरोत्स्येते। अतएव चेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावेऽपि पूर्वकालप्रत्यक्षतैव इन्द्रियजज्ञानविषयत्वात् तन्मात्रानुबन्धित्वाच्च प्रत्यक्षतायाः।

NK. p. 80. line 15.

P. 231. n. 185. मा नाम भूदतीतानागतकालग्रहणं वर्तमान एव तत्रानिमेषदर्शनस्य कियान्काल इति चिन्त्यताम्, निमेषकृतस्यापि दर्शनविच्छेदस्यानवकाशाद्यावद्धि दर्शनं न विच्छिन्नं तावान्वर्तमानः काल इति तद्ग्रहणे स्थैर्यं गृहीतं भवति न क्षणिकत्वम्।

NM. Part II. p. 35. line 6.

P. 233. n. 191. निमेषकृतोऽपि विच्छेदोऽस्य नास्ति अथ च न स्थिर इन्द्रियव्यापार इति साहसिकतामात्रम्, सन्निकर्षश्चास्य विषयग्रहणे व्यापारः स च स्थिर एव तस्माद्विततकालस्य वस्तुनः प्रत्यक्षेण ग्रहणमिति स्थितम्।

NM. Part II. p. 36. line 2.

TEXT APPENDIX

CHAPTER VII

P. 250. n. 22. यस्य परमाणवो घटादिबुद्धिहेतवो भवन्ति स चेदं प्रष्टव्यः किं परमाणव उपजातविशेषा बुद्धिभेदं कुर्वन्ति उतानुपजातविशेषा इति। किं चातः ? यद्युपजातविशेषाः, योऽसौ विशेषः सोऽवयवीति प्राप्तम्, अथानुपजातविशेषा त एवातीन्द्रिया ऐन्द्रियकाश्चेति महान् विरोधः। विशेषः संयोगः परमाणूनां, ते परस्परप्रत्यासत्तौ सत्यां संयोगोपकरणा उपलप्स्यन्त इति न, अतीन्द्रियत्वादणूनां, नातीन्द्रियाणां संयोगः प्रत्यक्षो भवितुमर्हति।

NV. p. 502. *line* 5.

P. 257. n. 42. को विरोधो नीलादीनां न तावदितरेतराभावात्मको भावस्वभावानुगमात्, अन्योन्यसंश्रयापत्तेश्च; स्वरूपान्यत्वं विरोध इति चेत् सत्यमस्त्येव तथापि चित्रात्मनो रूपस्य नायुक्तता विचित्रकारणसामर्थ्यभाविनस्तस्य सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धेन प्रत्यक्षेणैवोपपादित्वात्।

NK. p. 30. *line* 15.

P. 257. n. 43. अचित्रे पार्श्वे पटस्येव तदाश्रयस्य चित्ररूपस्य ग्रहणप्रसङ्गः तस्यैकत्वादिति चेन्न अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां समधिगतसामर्थ्यस्यावयवनानारूपदर्शनस्यापि चित्ररूपग्रहणहेतुत्वात् तस्य च पार्श्वान्तरेऽभावात्।

NK. p. 30. *line* 18.

P. 260. n. 51. न गोत्वमवयवि न समुदायः, समुदायस्य भाग एकदेशशब्दः अवगविनश्चावयवे; यदा न किञ्चित्परिहायाशेषमभिधीयते तदाऽवयविनोऽवयवानपेक्ष्य कृत्स्नशब्दः समुदाये च समुदायिनोऽपेक्ष्य। न च गोत्वमवयवि न समुदायः, तस्मान्न कृत्स्नैकदेशशब्दौ स्तः।

NV. p. 669. *line* 1.

P. 268. n. 65. न च मूर्तानां समानदेशतादोषः, यावत्सु तन्तुषु एकोऽवयवी वर्तते तावत्स्वेवान्यूनानतिरिक्तेषु परस्य समवायानभ्युपगमात्, द्वितन्तुकं द्वयोस्तन्त्वोः समवैति त्रितन्तुकं तु तयोस्तन्त्वन्तरे चेत्युत्तरोत्तरेषु कल्पनायां कुतः समानदेशत्वम्।

NK. p. 148. *line* 4.

CHAPTER VIII

P. 284. n. 2. ये तु रूपद्रव्ययोस्तादात्म्यमिच्छन्तो द्रव्यकारणमेव रूपस्य कारणमाहुस्त इद प्रष्टव्याः—किं परमाणुरूपं रूपान्तरमारभते न वा; आरभमाणमपि किं स्वात्मन्यारभते किं वा स्वाश्रये परमाणौ। यदि नारभते यदि वा स्वात्मनि स्वाश्रये चारभते द्व्यणुके रूपानुत्पत्तौ तत्पूर्वकं जगदरूपं स्यात्। अथ तद् द्व्यणुके आरभते अविद्यमानस्य स्वाश्रयत्वायोगादुत्पन्ने द्व्यणुके पश्चात् तत्र रूपोत्पत्तिरित्यवश्यमभ्युपेतव्यम्, निराश्रयस्य कार्यस्यानुत्पादात्। तथा सति तादात्म्यं कुतः पूर्वापरकालभावात्।

NK. pp. 104-105. *line* 24

P. 294. n. 30. संख्या नास्तीति ब्रुवता एकानेकप्रत्ययानां विधीयमानं प्रतिषिध्यमानं वा निमित्तमुपादेयम्। कस्मात्? एकानेकप्रत्ययानामप्रत्याख्येयत्वात्, विशिष्टाश्च प्रत्यया भवन्तो न निमित्तप्रत्याख्यानेन भवितुमर्हन्ति। किं कारणं कुम्भप्रत्ययनिमित्तान्यनिमित्तक एकानेकप्रत्ययः कुम्भप्रत्ययविलक्षणत्वात् नीलादिप्रत्ययवत्, तस्माद् यत्तत्प्रत्ययनिमित्तं सा संख्येति।

NV. p. 210. *line* 8.

P. 299. n. 45. न ब्रूमः, अस्ति संयोगः कार्योत्पत्तेः, अपि तु क्षेत्रोदकबीजाग्नीन्धनानि सापेक्षाणीति। यदि च निरपेक्षं किञ्चित्कारणं सर्वदाऽऽरम्भकं स्यात् भवेदनैकान्तिको हेतुः, तत्तु न केनचिच्छक्यं प्रतिपादयितुम्, शब्दः शब्दान्तरमारभमाणः स्वकारणपरिच्छिन्नाकाशप्रत्यासत्त्यपेक्ष आरभते शब्दस्याव्यापकत्वात्। अयस्कान्तोऽप्ययः समाकर्षति स्वाश्रयप्रत्यासत्त्यपेक्ष एव। यदि च निरपेक्ष आकर्षेत् न क्वचिदयांस्यवतिष्ठेरन् तस्मान्न निरपेक्ष इति। कर्मापि स्वाश्रयप्रत्यासत्त्याभिमुख्यापेक्षं संयोगं करोति न निरपेक्षं कर्म।

NV. p. 481. *line* 17.

P. 299. n. 47. न च मूलाग्रयोरेव संयोगतदभावौ तत्प्रदेशावच्छेदेन वृक्षे एव पुरुषस्य भावाभावप्रतीतेः। यदि प्रदेशस्य संयोगो न

प्रदेशिनस् तदा प्रदेशस्यापि स्वप्रदेशापेक्षया प्रदेशित्वान्निष्प्रदेशे परमाणुमात्रे संयोगः स्यात् तद्वृत्तिस्तु संयोगो न प्रत्यक्ष इति संयोग-प्रतीत्यभाव एव पर्यवस्यति ।

NK. p. 102. *line* 22.

CHAPTER IX

P. 319. n. 45. इहातदात्मकेष्वन्यनिमित्तः प्रत्ययो भवति यथा घटादिषु प्रदीपात् न तु प्रदीपे प्रदीपान्तरात् । यथा गवाश्वमांसादीनां स्वत एवाशुचित्वं तद्योगात् अन्येषां, तथेहापि तादाम्त्यादन्त्यविशेषेषु स्वत एव प्रत्ययव्यावृत्तिः तद्योगात् परमाण्वादिषु ।

PP. p. 322. *line* 11.

P. 328. n. 62. यदिदं सामान्य-साधनमनुमानमभिधीयते परैः । यदनुगताकारं ज्ञानं तदनुगतवस्तुनिबन्धनं, यथा बहुषु पुष्पेषु स्रक् स्रगिति ज्ञानम् । अस्ति च परस्परसम्पर्कविकलकलासु कार्यादिव्यक्तिष्वनुगताकारं विज्ञानं, तदनैकान्तिकतादोषाक्रान्तशरीरत्वात् न तद्भावसाधनायालम् । यतो भवति बहुषु पाचकेषु पाचक पाचक इति एकाकारपरामर्शप्रत्ययः न च तेष्वनुगतमेकं वस्तु समस्ति । तद्भावे हि प्रागेव तथाविधप्रत्ययोत्पादप्रसङ्गो दुर्वारप्रचारः । क्रियोपकारापेक्षाणां स्वलक्षणानां सामान्यव्यञ्जकत्वादयमदोष इति चेद्, नैतद् अस्ति । नित्यानामनाधेयातिशयतयानुपकारिणि सहकारिण्यपेक्षायागात् । सातिशयत्वे वा प्रतिक्षणं विशरारुशरीरत्वात् क्रिया कुत इति दोषो दुष्परिहरः ।

SBNT. pp. 94-95.

P. 329. n. 63. क्रियानिबन्धनत्वात् पाचकेष्वनुगताकारप्रत्ययस्य नानैकान्तिकतादोषः इत्यपि वार्तम्। प्रतिभेदं भिद्यमानानां कर्मणां तन्निबन्धनत्वायोगात् । भिन्नानामप्यभिन्नाकारज्ञाननिबन्धनत्वे व्यक्तीनामपि तथाभावो न राजदण्डनिवारितः । ततश्च सामान्यमेव नोपेयं स्यात् इति मूलहरं पक्षमाश्रयता देवानांप्रियेण सुष्ठु अनुकूलमाच-

रितम्। अनेनैव न्यायेन क्रियाकारकसम्बन्धमभिन्नज्ञाननिबन्धनम् उपकल्पयन् प्रतिक्षिप्तः। पाककृमात्वनिबन्धनः पाचकेष्वनुगताकारः प्रत्ययस्ततो नानैकान्तिकतादोष इत्यपि न मन्तव्यं, न ह्यर्थान्तर-सम्बन्धिनी जातिरर्थान्तरप्रत्ययोत्पत्तिहेतुः, अतिप्रसङ्गात्। स्यादेतत् समवेतसमवाय-सम्बन्ध-बलात् पाक-क्रिया-सामान्यं पाचकेष्वभिन्नाकारं परामर्श-प्रत्ययमुपजनयति ततो न यथोक्तदोषः। तदिदमप्यसारं यत् उदयानन्तरापवर्जिततया* कर्मणामेवासम्भवात्, विनष्टे कर्मणि तत् सामान्यं न कर्मणि तदभावाद् एव, नापि कर्त्तरीति सम्बद्ध-सम्बन्धोऽप्यस्य नास्तीति नाभिन्नप्रत्ययहेतुः। तस्मात् स्थितमेतत् तदनैकान्तिकतादोषदुष्टत्वान् नेदमनुमानं सामान्य-सत्त्व-साधनाय पर्याप्तमिति।

SBNT. pp. 95-96.

P. 332. n. 70. अत्रैके वदन्ति भिन्नेष्वनुगता बुद्धि. सामान्यं व्यवस्थापयति सा च प्रतिपिण्डं दण्डपुरुषाविव न स्वातन्त्र्येण सामान्यविशेषलक्षणे द्वे वस्तुनी प्रतिभासयति नापि तयोर्विशेषण-विशेष्यभावं गोत्वी गोत्ववानित्येवमनुदयात्। किन्तु तादात्म्यग्राहिणी प्रतीतिरियम् गौरयमित्येकात्मतापरामर्शात्, उभयोरन्योन्यप्रहाणेन स्वरूपान्तराभावाच्च।

NK. p. 315. *line* 8.

P. 333. n. 74. यत्पुनर्गौरित्ययमविभागेन संवेदनं तत्समवायसामर्थ्यात्, संयोगे हि द्वयोः संसर्गावभासः, समवायस्य पुनरेष महिमा यदत्र सम्बन्धिनावयःपिण्डवल्लिवत् पिण्डीभूतावेव प्रतीयेते जातिरेव न च व्यक्तेः स्वरूपम्, तेन सत्यपि भेदे बदरादिवत् कुण्डस्य जातितो व्यक्तेः स्वरूपं पृथङ् न निष्कृष्यते, परस्परपरिहारेण तूपलम्भोऽस्त्येव दूरे गोत्वाग्रहणेऽपि पिण्डस्य ग्रहणात् पूर्वपिण्डाग्रहणेऽपि पिण्डान्तरे गोत्वग्रहणात् तस्माद् व्यक्तेरत्यन्तं भिन्नमेव सामान्यमिति तार्किकाणां प्रक्रिया।

NK. p. 316. *line* 13.

P. 338. n. 97. संयोगो ह्यन्यतः समागतस्य भवति तत्रैवावस्थितस्य वा भवति तस्माद्विलक्षणस्तु समवायो यत्र यत्रैव पिण्डोत्पत्तौ कार-

* Wrongly printed as 'अपवर्जितया'

णानि व्याप्रियन्ते तत्र तत्रैव कारणानां सामर्थ्यात् पिण्डेऽन्यतो-
नागतस्य तत्रास्थितस्यापि सामान्यस्य भवति वस्तुशक्तेरपर्यनुयोज्य-
त्वात् ।

NK. p. 317. line 20.

P. 339. n. 101. किं प्रतिपिण्डं कात्स्न्र्येन वर्तते जातिरुतैकदेशेनेति द्वयमपि चानुपपन्नम् ।

पिण्डे सामान्यमन्यत्र यदि कात्स्न्र्येन वर्तते ।
तत्रैवास्य समाप्तत्वान्न स्यात्पिण्डान्तरे ग्रहः ॥
एकदेशेन वृत्तौ तु गोत्वजातिर्न कुत्रचित् ।
समग्राऽस्तीति गोबुद्धिः प्रतिपिण्डं कथं भवेत् ॥

जातेश्च निरवयवत्वान्न केचिदेकदेशाः सन्ति यैरेषा प्रतिपिण्डं वर्तते । न चैकत्र पिण्डे समाप्त्या वर्तमाना पिण्डान्तरे समाप्त्यैव वर्तितुमर्हति, समाप्तस्य पुनरुत्पत्ति विना समाप्त्यन्तरानुपपत्तेः ।

NM. Part I. p. 272. line 10.

P. 340. n. 102. प्रतिपिण्डं कात्स्न्र्येनैव जातिर्वर्तते इति पिण्डान्तरे तदुपलम्भो न स्यादिति चेत् किं कुर्मः कमुपलभामहे, पिण्डान्तरेऽपि तदुपलम्भोऽस्त्येव, कथञ्च भवन्तमेनं निह्नुमहे, एकदेशास्तु जातेर्न सन्त्येव यैरस्या वर्तनं ब्रूमः, क्वेदमन्यत्र चेद् अहो निपुणता तव दृष्टान्तं याचसे यस्त्वं प्रत्यक्षेऽनुमानवत् ।

NM. Part I. p. 284. line 27.

(The printed word "प्रत्यनुमानवत्" is wrong)

P. 340. n. 103. यद्यनेकानुवृत्ति गोत्वं तत्किं प्रतिपिण्डं परिसमाप्त्या वर्तते अथैकदेशेनेति । किञ्चातः ? यदि प्रतिपिण्डं परिसमाप्त्या वर्तते पिण्डवदसाधारणत्वान्न सामान्यं भवितुमर्हति । अथैकदेशेन वर्तते, तथापि नैकमनेकत्र वर्तते किन्त्वनेकमनेकत्रेति, ...तस्मान्नानेकवृत्ति सामान्यमिति ।

NV. p. 668. line 18.

P. 341. n. 106. न गोत्वम्, गव्यगवि वृत्त्यभावादिति चेत्—अथं मन्यसे यदिदं गोत्वं गोष्वनुवृत्तिप्रत्ययकारणं तत्किं गवि वर्तते आहोस्विदगवि। यदि तावद्गवि, प्राक् गोत्वयोगाद् गौरेवासाविति व्यर्थं गोत्वम्; अथागवि, न, अश्वाद्यपि गोत्वयोगाद् गौः प्राप्नोति। न चान्या गतिरस्ति। तस्मान्न गोत्वादनुवृत्तिप्रत्यय इति।

NV. p. 669. *line* 8.

"न गोत्वम्" which is not found in the printed text has been adopted from the reading given in the footnote.

P. 341. n. 108. न विकल्पानभ्युपगमात्—न गवि गोत्वम्, नागवि, प्राग् गोत्वात् नासौ गौः नाप्यगौरिति। किं कारणम्? उभावेतौ विशेष्यप्रत्ययौ न विशेषणसम्बन्धमन्तरेण भवतः। न च प्राग् गोत्वयोगाद्वस्तु विद्यते। न चाविद्यमानं गौरित्यगौरिति च शक्यं व्यपदेष्टुम्। यदैव वस्तु तदैव गोत्वेनाभिसम्बध्यत इत्यनास्पदो विकल्पः।

NV. p. 669. *line* 11.

P. 347. n. 121. अथ हि मूलवर्तिनमुपलभ्य प्रवर्तमानस्तम् आप्नोति अपवरक-निहितमणिप्रसृतायां कुञ्चिकाविवरनिर्गतायामिव प्रभायां मणिबुद्ध्या प्रवर्तमानः। यत्र तु मूलेऽप्यर्थो नास्ति तत्र व्यामोहात् प्रवर्तमानो विप्रलभ्यते, दीपप्रभायामिव तथैव मणिबुद्ध्या प्रवर्तमानः, एवञ्च बाह्यवस्तुसंस्पर्श-शून्येष्वपि विकल्पेषु समुल्लसितेषु बाह्योऽर्थो मया प्रतिपन्नः तत्र चाहं प्रवृत्तः स च मया प्राप्त इति अभिमानो भवति लौकिकानाम्।

NM. Part I. p. 281. *line* 31.

P. 353. n. 137. यथा ह्यामलवयादयः परस्परमत्यन्तविभिन्नमूर्तयोऽपि प्रत्येकं समुदिता वा नानाविधव्याधिव्यावर्तनसामर्थ्याध्यासिता भवन्त्यन्तरेणाप्यनुगामिनम्, न हि तत्र सामान्यमेव तथाविधामर्थक्रियां संपादयतीति युक्तं वक्तुम्। यतस्तेषु विविधार्थक्रियासम्पादनयोग्यं न सामान्यमस्ति। यदि स्यात्तदा येयं क्वचित् कदाचित्

कासाञ्चिद् धात्र्यादीनां चिरक्षिप्ररोगाद्युपशमनसामर्थ्योपलब्धिः सा न स्यात्, सामान्यस्यैकरूपत्वात्। न च क्षेत्रक्षीरावसेकादिसंस्कारविशेषवशादासादितातिशयं सामान्यमेवैतामर्थक्रियां विचित्रां सम्पादयतीति युक्तम्, तस्य नित्यतया परैरनाधेयविकारस्य क्षेत्रादिभेदतोऽपि नातिशयः कश्चिदेकरूपत्वात्। धात्र्यादीनां त्वनित्यानां सोऽतिशयः क्षेत्रादिभेदतो भिद्यत इति, अतस्त एव रोगाद्युपशमनसामर्थ्योपेताः। ततश्च तद्वद् एवान्येऽपि घटादयो भावाः स्वहेतुप्रत्ययेभ्यस्तथोत्पत्तेः प्रकृत्यैवैकाकारप्रत्यवमर्शादिहेतवो भविष्यन्ति।

TSP. pp. 239-40.

P. 356. n. 145. यादृशमेको गोविकल्पो बाह्यात्मतया स्वप्रतिभासमारोपयति गोविकल्पान्तरमपि तादृशमेवारोपयति विकल्पाश्च प्रत्येकं स्वाकारमात्रग्राहिणो न परस्परारोपितानामाकाराणां भेदग्रहणाय पर्याप्नुवन्ति, तस्योभयग्रहणाधीनत्वात् तदग्रहणाच्च विकल्पारोपितानामाकाराणामेकत्वमारोप्य विकल्पानामेको विषय इत्युच्यते, तदेव च सामान्यं बहिरारोपितेभ्यो विकल्पाकारेभ्योऽत्यन्तभेदाभावेनाभावरूपम्।

NK. p. 318. *line* 25.

P. 356. n. 147. तेषां च विकल्पविषयाणां न तैरेव विकल्पैः परस्परतो भेदो गृह्यते, नापि विकल्पान्तरैरिति भेदाग्रहादभेदमभिमन्यते पुरुषः, तदभेदाच्च अवमर्षाणामभेदः, तदभेदाच्च तद्धेतूनामविकल्पधियामभेदः, तदभेदाच्च स्वलक्षणानामविकल्पधीविषयाणामप्यभेदः।

NVT. p. 682. *line* 30.

P. 360. n. 157. यद् भावाभावसाधारणं तद् अन्यव्यावृत्तिरूपमेव यथाऽमूर्त्तत्वं, तत् खलु विज्ञाने च शशविषाणे च साधारणम्। तथा च विवादाध्यासिता विकल्पविषयाः घटपटादयः इति स्वभावहेतुः। गौरस्ति गौर्नास्तीति हि भावाभावसाधारणो गवादिविकल्पविषयो विधिरूपस्वलक्षणवद् भावासाधारण्ये नास्तीत्यनेन न संबध्यते विरोधात्, अस्तीत्यनेनापि न संबध्यते पौनरुक्त्यात्।

NVT. p. 683. *line* 6.

Here the correction suggested by Stcherbatsky, viz, स्वलक्षणवद् भावसाधारण्ये for स्वलक्षणवद् भावासाधारण्ये (Buddhist Logic, Vol. II. p. 415. n. 1.) is not necessary.

P. 360. n. 159. अपि चात्यन्तविलक्षणानां सालक्षण्यम् अन्यव्यावृत्तिकृतमेव। यथा गवाश्वमहिषमातङ्गानामत्यन्तविलक्षणानामपि सिंहव्यावृत्त्या सालक्षण्यम्। तथा च बाह्यस्य स्वलक्षणस्य विधिरूपस्य परमार्थसतोऽपरमार्थसताऽत्यन्तविलक्षणेन सालक्षण्यमिति स्वभावहेतुः। बाह्यं हि विधिरूपमपि अगोव्यावृत्तम्, विकल्पविषयोऽपि चेदगोव्यावृत्तस्ततः सालक्षण्यं, नान्यथा।

NVT. p. 683. *line* 14.

P. 361. n. 160. अपि चानुभूयत एव विकल्पविषयो व्यावृत्तिरूपः। तथा हि तदप्रतिभासने गां बधानेति देशितोऽश्वं बध्नीयाद् गोरश्वाद् भेदेनाप्रतिभासनात्। प्रतिभासे वा कथं नागोव्यावृत्तिप्रतिभासः? तस्मादन्यापोहगोचरौ शब्दविकल्पाविति।

NVT. p. 683. *line* 19.

P. 363. n. 162. सिद्धश्चेद् गौरपोह्येत गोनिषेधात्मकश्च सः।
तत्र गौरेव वक्तव्यो नञा यः प्रतिषिध्यते॥
स चेदगोनिवृत्त्यात्मा भवेद् अन्योन्यसंश्रयः।
सिद्धश्चेद् गौरपोहार्थं वृथापोह-प्रकल्पनम्॥
गव्यसिद्धे त्वगौर्नास्ति तदभावे तु गौः कुतः।

SV. Aphorism 5, *Apoha-vāda, verses* 83-85.

P. 366. n. 169. अथास्य अतदर्थक्रियासामर्थ्यारोपः किं दृष्टार्थक्रियास्वलक्षणसालक्षण्येन आहोस्विदनादिवासनावशात्? तत्रस्वलक्षणेन सर्वतो व्यावृत्तेन समर्थेन समस्तसामर्थ्यविरहिणोऽन्वयिनो न किंचिदस्ति सारूप्यम्, अन्यव्यावृत्त्या तु सारूप्ये विधिरूपेणापि प्रसङ्गः तस्यास्ततो भेदाभावादित्युक्तम्। अनादिवासनावशात्तु तदारोपे प्रथमदर्शनेऽपि नालिकेरद्वीपादागतस्य वह्नौ दाहपाकादिसामर्थ्यज्ञानप्रसङ्गः। वह्निस्वलक्षणाद्दाहपाकादिकारिणो भेदाग्रहादलीकस्य तद्रूपसमारोप इति चेत् किं स्वलक्षणे गृह्यमाणे अथागृह्यमाणे,

न तावद् गृह्यमाणे, तस्य विकल्पज्ञानगोचरत्वाभावादित्युक्तम् । तत्समयभावि-त्वविकल्पकं तत्त्वं गृह्णदपि न विकल्पे स्वविषयं निवेशयति तस्य ततोऽन्यत्वेन तद्वार्त्तानभिज्ञत्वात् । एवं विकल्पज्ञानमपि समनन्तरोत्पन्ननिर्विकल्पकव्यापारपारम्पर्येऽपि न स्वलक्षणं गोचरयितुमर्हति तस्याभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यप्रतिभासविषयत्वात् ।

NVT. p. 685. *line* 5.

P. 366. n. 172. अपि चेदमलीकमगोव्यावृत्तिरूपं वा तद्धर्मो वा ? अगोव्यावृत्तिरूपं चेत् न तदसिद्धे गवि शक्यं ग्रहीतुम् । अगौश्च गोनिषेधात्मेति गोसिद्धिमपेक्षत इति दुरुत्तरमितरेतराश्रयत्वम् । तद्धर्मत्वे वा गोत्वमेवास्तु भाविकं तद्धर्मो विधिरूपः कृतमलीकेनाविधिरूपेण ।

NVT. p. 686. *line* 16.

The text 'तद्धर्मो वा' means अगोव्यावृत्तिरलीकस्य धर्मः ।

P. 367. n. 174. ते सर्वं एवापोहवाचित्वाविशेषात्पर्यायाः स्युः, अपोहभेददोष इति चेन्न, अपोहानां भेदाभावात्, भिद्यमानत्वे वा स्वलक्षणवदेषां वस्तुत्वप्रसक्तिः, भवत्पक्षेऽपि सामान्यमात्रवाचित्वाविशेषात्पर्यायत्वं समानो दोष इति चेन्न, सामान्यानां विधिरूपत्वात् परस्परसंरहितस्वभावतया नानात्वावगमात्, अपोहस्त्वभावमात्ररूपविशेषान्न परस्परं भिद्यते ।

NM. Part I. p. 278. *line* 4.

P. 368. n. 175. न चापोह्यभेदाद्भेदोऽपोहस्यावकल्पते । यो हि सम्भाव्यमानसंसर्गैराधारैरपि न भेत्तुं पार्यते स दूरवर्त्तिभिरलब्धसंबन्धैरतिबाह्यैः कथं भिद्येत । अभ्युपगम्यापि ब्रूमः यद्यपोह्यभेदादपोहभिन्नत्वमपोह्यैक्यात्तर्हि तदैक्येनापि भवितव्यम् । अतश्च गवाश्वयोरन्यापोहेन व्यवस्थाप्यमानयोरगावोऽनश्वाश्च हस्त्यादयोऽपोह्यास्तुल्या, भूयांसो वा भवन्ति, असाधारणस्तु एको गौरश्वे गवि चाश्वोऽतिरिच्यते । तत्रैहापोह्यभेदाद् गवाश्वयोर्भेदो भवतु भूयसामपोह्यानामभेदादभेदो भवत्विति विचारणायां विप्रतिपिद्धधर्मस्य समवाये भूयसां स्यात् सधर्मत्वमित्यभेद एव न्याय्यो भवेत् ।

NM. part I. p. 278. *line* 13.

CHAPTER X

P. 382. n. 13. अवयवावयविनौ गुणगुणिनौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ जातिजातिमन्तौ च मिथः सम्बद्धावनुभूयेते, नान्यथा तन्तुषु पट इति शुक्लः पट इति पट स्पन्दत इति च पटो द्रव्यमिति च बुद्धिव्यपदेशौ स्याताम् । शुक्लः पट इत्यादि सामानाधिकरण्यज्ञानं नहि सम्बन्धज्ञानमिति चेत्, किं पुनरिदं सामानाधिकरण्यम् ? तादात्म्यमिति चेत्, न, द्वितीयबुद्धिव्यपदेशयोः पौनरुक्त्यात् अपौनरुक्त्यं चाभिमन्यन्ते प्रतिपत्तारः, येनान्यतरदुपलभ्यान्यद् बुभुत्सन्ते । न चैकं वस्तु द्व्यात्मकमिति युक्तम्, भेदाधिष्ठानस्य तन्नान्तरीयकस्य द्वित्वस्यैकात्मनि विरोधेनासंभवात् । तस्माद्भिन्ने एव वस्तुनी सम्बद्धे सामानाधिकरण्येन प्रतीयेते, असम्बन्धे गौरश्व इतिवत्तदनुपपत्तेः ।

NVT. pp. 95-96. *line* 25.

CHAPTER XI

P. 406. n. 31. सन्निकर्षो हि संयोगसमवायस्वभावः तत्प्रभवभेदो वा संयुक्तसमवायादिरिह नास्त्येव । संयुक्तविशेषणभावोऽपि न संभवति कुम्भाभावस्य भूप्रदेशविशेषणत्वाभावात्, न ह्यसंयुक्तसमवेतं वा किंचिद्विशेषणं भवति संयुक्तस्य दण्डादेः समवेतस्य शुक्लगुणादेस्तथाभावदर्शनाद् अभावश्च न केनचित्संयुज्यते अद्रव्यभावात्, न क्वचित्स समवैति गुणादिवैलक्षण्यादिति ।

NM. Part I. p. 46. *line* 13.

P. 410. n. 45. सविकल्पकस्य प्रत्यक्षत्वसिद्धौ यथा शब्दस्मरणपूर्वंगृहीतपिण्डानुसंधानादयो नेन्द्रियव्यापारं व्यवदधतीति । न च शब्दस्मरणादीनाम् अनुयोगिता, भूतलविकल्पकं प्रत्यङ्गत्वात् स्वाङ्गमव्यवधायकमिति न्यायाद्, घटस्य तु प्रतियोगितेति सांप्रतम् । कस्य पुनः प्रतियोगी घटः । तदभावस्येति चेद् भवतु घटाभावानुभवस्य तु घटस्मरणं हेतुरिति न प्रतियोगि, किं तु अनुयोग्येव ।

NVT. p. 97. *line* 13.

P. 412. n. 49. प्रतियोगिना सह नतरामभावस्य संबन्धोऽसमानकालत्वात्, यदा हि घटो न तदा तदभावः यदा वा तदभावो न तदा घट इति, विरोधाख्यसंबन्धो भविष्यतीति चेत्को विरोधार्थः, यदि हि प्राक्सिद्धो घटाभाव आगत्य घटं विरुन्ध्याद् भवेदपि तद्विरोधी घटमुद्गरयोरिव, न त्वेवमस्ति तयोरसमानकालत्वात् ।

NM. Part I. p. 51. *line* 27.

P. 412. n. 50. अपि चायमभावो भवनधर्मा वा स्यादभवनधर्मा वा भवनधर्मत्वे भावोऽसौ भवेद् घटादिवद्, अभवनधर्मा तु यद्यभावोऽस्ति स नित्य एवासौ तर्हि भवेत्, स चायमेकपदार्थसम्बन्धी वा स्यात् सर्वपदार्थसम्बन्धी वा तत्रैकभावसम्बन्धित्वे न तस्य नियमकारणमुत्पश्यामः, सर्वभावसम्बन्धित्वे तु सर्वपदार्थप्रतिकूलस्याभावस्य नित्यत्वान्नित्यः सन्नित्यो वा कश्चिदभावो नामास्ति ।

NM. Part I. p. 52. *line* 14.

The last line which reads as :— 'नित्यः सन् नित्यो वा कश्चिदभावो नामास्ति' does not give any sense. It should be—'नित्यः अनित्यो वा कश्चिद्भावो न समस्ति ।'

P. 413. n. 52. अभावस्वभावतायाश्च सर्वान् प्रत्यविशेषात्प्रतिषेध्यनिबन्धन एव तद्भेदः प्रतिषेध्याश्च भावाः परस्परेण भिद्यमानास्तं भिन्दन्तीति प्रत्युत भावाधीनमभावानामसाङ्कर्यं वक्तुमुचितं न तु विपर्ययो युक्तः ।

NM. Part I. p. 53. *line* 1.

P. 413. n. 56. इदं तावत्सकलप्राणिसाक्षिकं संवेदनद्वयमुपजायमानं दृष्टम् । इह घटोऽस्ति इह नास्तीति तत्र विकल्पमात्रसंवेदनमनालम्बनमात्मांशावलम्बनं वेत्यादि यदभिलप्यते तन्नास्तिताज्ञानेवास्तित्वज्ञानेऽपि समानमतो द्वयोरपि प्रामाण्यं भवतु द्वयोरपि वा मा भूत्, यत्त्वस्तीति ज्ञानं प्रमाणमितरदप्रमाणमिति कथ्यते तदिच्छामात्रम् ।

NM. Part I. p. 54. *line* 21.

P. 414. n. 58. तदिह् घटो नास्तीति घटविविक्तभूतलालम्बनतायामस्याः स्वसंविदः इहेति तावदस्मिन् संविदंशे देश आलम्बनमित्यविवाद एव, इह घटोऽस्तीति भावप्रतीतिसमयेऽपि तत्र तदवभासाभ्युपगमात्, घटो नास्तीत्यत्र तु यदवभासते तन्न भूतलमात्रमेव भावप्रतीतिसमयं तदतिरिक्तप्रतिभासस्यावश्यम्भावित्वात्, तदतिरिक्तं तु प्रतिभासमानं घटविविक्ततेति वा कथ्यतां घटाभाव इति वा नात्र वस्तुनि विशेषः ।

NM. Part I. p. 55. *line* 1.

(भावप्रतीतिसमयं means भावप्रतीतिः समयः कालः यस्य तत्)

P. 415. n. 59. वस्तुप्राप्त्या विधिविकल्पानां प्रामाण्यव्यवहार इति चेद् इहापि तत्प्राप्त्यैव निषेधविकल्पानामस्तु प्रामाण्यव्यवहारः किमत्र वस्तु प्राप्यते इति चेत्तत्रापि किं प्राप्यते, नीलमिति चेत् सेयमभावस्यापि प्राप्तिर्भवत्येव, नीलं हि प्राप्यमाणं तदभावाविनाभूतपीतादिव्यवच्छिन्नरूपं प्राप्यते सा चेयं तथाभूतनीलप्राप्तिर्भवन्तीतराभावप्राप्तिरपि भवत्यन्यथा हि नीलप्राप्तिरेव न स्यात् ।

NM. Part I. p. 55. *line* 15.

P. 416. n. 62. यत्तु भवनधर्मा अभवनधर्मा वेति विकल्पितं तत्राभवनधर्मैवाभावोऽभ्युपगम्यते, भवनधर्मत्वेऽपि चाभावो न भावान्न भिद्यते प्रतिभासभेदस्य रूपरसादिषूपदर्शितत्वात्, भवनधर्मत्वं चास्य हेत्वन्वयव्यतिरेकित्वाद् भवति घटो हि मृत्पिण्डदण्डादीनिव जन्मनि विनाशेऽपि मुद्गरादीननुवर्त्तते हेतून् ।

NM. Part I. p. 57. *line* 1.

P. 416. n. 63. अथ मन्यसे भाव एवैकाकी सद्वितीयश्चेति द्वयीमवस्थामनुभवति तत्रैकाकी भावः स्वरूपमात्रमिति केवल इति चोच्यते तादृशस्य तस्य दृश्ये प्रतियोगिनि घटादौ जिघृक्षिते सत्युपलब्धिर्घटाद्यभावव्यवहारं प्रवर्तयतीति ।

NK. p. 229. *line* 8.

P. 417. n. 64. घटादेरभावाद् भूतलं च व्यतिरेच्यैकाकिशब्दस्यार्थः कः समर्थितो भवद्भिर्यो हि नास्तीति प्रतिषेधधिय आलम्बनम्। नहि विषयवैलक्षण्यमन्तरेण विलक्षणाया बुद्धेरस्त्युदयः नापि व्यवहारभेदस्य संभवः, स्वाभाविकं यदेकत्वं भावस्य तदेवैकाकित्वमिति चेत्, किमेकत्वम् ? प्रतियोगिरहितत्वम् एकत्वसंख्या वा। एकत्वसंख्या तावद्यावदाश्रयभाविनी भावस्य सद्वितीयावस्थायामप्यनुवर्तते। अथ प्रतियोगिरहितत्वं स्वाभाविकमेकत्वमुच्यते सिद्धं प्रमेयान्तरम्।

NK. p. 229. line 11.

P. 417. n. 65. नन्वभाववादिनोऽपि भूतलग्रहणमभावप्रतीतिकारणम्। अप्रतीते भूतले तत्राभावप्रतीतेरयोगात्। तत्र न तावत् कण्टकादिसहितभूतलोपलम्भात् कण्टको नास्तीति प्रतीतिः। अभावविशिष्टभूतलग्रहणस्याभावप्रतीतिहेतुत्वे, तदभावग्रहणे तदभावविशिष्टभूतलग्रहणम्। तदभावविशिष्टाद् भूतलग्रहणाच्चाभावग्रहणमिति स्वयमेव स्वस्य कारणमभ्युपगतं स्यात्। तस्मादभावव्यतिरिक्ता प्रतियोगिसंसर्गव्यतिरेकिणी भूतलस्य त्वयापि काचिदेकाकित्वावस्थाभ्युपगन्तव्या यस्याः प्रतीतावभावप्रतीतिः स्यात् सैवास्माकं नास्तीति व्यवहारं प्रवर्तयतीति।

NK. p. 229. line 17.

P. 418. n. 66. तदप्ययुक्तम्। भूतलस्वरूपग्रहणस्यैवाभावप्रतीतिहेतुत्वात्। न च सद्वितीयग्रहणेऽप्येतत्प्रतीतिप्रसङ्गः भूतलग्रहणवदभावेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षोऽप्यभावग्रहणसामग्री कण्टकादिसद्भावे तदभावो नास्तीति विषयेन्द्रियसन्निकर्षाभावात् सत्यपि भूतलग्रहणे नाभावप्रतीतिः।

NK. p. 229. line 24.

CHAPTER XII

P. 432. n. 40. तत्रेदमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षादुत्पन्नमर्थज्ञानं "रूपम्" इति वा "रसः" इत्येवं वा भवति, रूपरसशब्दाश्च विषयनामधेयम्, तेन व्यपदिश्यते ज्ञानं-रूपमिति जानीते रस इति जानीते, नामधेयशब्देन व्यपदिश्यमानं सत् शाब्दं प्रसज्यते, अत आह अव्यपदेश्यमिति।

NBh. p. 109. *line* 2.

P. 443. n. 78. न व्यवसायात्मकं प्रत्यक्षं भवितुमर्हति, अभिलाप-संसर्गयोग्यप्रतिभासं (not संसर्गायोग्यप्रतिभासं as wrongly printed) हि तत्। न चेन्द्रियार्थाभ्यां लब्धजन्मविज्ञानमर्थावभासं शक्यमभिलापेन योजयितुम्। न ह्यर्थे शब्दाः सन्ति अर्थात्मानो वा तथा सत्यव्युत्पन्नस्यापि व्युत्पन्नवद् व्यवहारः स्यादित्युक्तम्। न चाभिलापोऽर्थासंस्पर्शी संवेदनधर्मोऽर्थेषु तन्नियोजनात् तस्मादर्था-दुपजायमानं ज्ञानमर्थमेवादर्शयेन्नाभिलापम्। न हि रूपाज्जायमानं प्रत्यक्षं रससहितमेतदादर्शयति। तस्मादभिलापसंसर्गानपेक्षमभिलाप-संसर्गिणमादर्शयद्विकल्पविज्ञानं विकल्पवासनोत्थापितमनियतार्थग्राहि मानसमात्मीयमुत्प्रेक्षालक्षणं (not उपेक्षालक्षणम् as wrongly printed) व्यापारं तिरस्कृत्यानुभवप्रभवतयाऽनुभवव्यापारं दर्शनं पुरस्कृत्य वर्त्तमानमनुभवतया ऽभिमन्यन्ते प्रतिपत्तारः।

NVT. p. 115. *line* 2.

P. 443. n. 79. संकेतवशाच्छब्दानामर्थसम्बन्धेनार्थोपलब्धौ तत्स्मर-णात् तत्संसृष्टवेदनमिति चेत् यत्र एव (not "य एव" as wrongly printed) तर्हि ते कृतसंकेताः तदेव स्मारयेदेतान्, तत्रैव च ते कृतसंकेता यदनुगतं सामान्यं न च तद् दृष्टम्, किन्तु स्वलक्षणं दर्शनगोचरः तदेव हि परमार्थसत् (not "सतः" as wrongly printed) विज्ञानस्य कारणम्, न तु सामान्यं सर्वसामर्थ्यरहितं हि तद् अलीकत्वात्। तस्माद् यद् दृष्टं न तेन शब्दानां सम्बन्धो येन तु सम्बन्धो न तद् दृष्टम्। अपि च दृष्टस्य शब्दवाच्यत्वे दर्श-नादिव वह्निरुष्ण इति वाक्यादपि प्रतीयेत। तथा च शब्दादपि तस्मिन्प्रतीते शीतापनोदनप्रसङ्गः।

NVT. p. 115. *line* 18.

P. 444. n. 82. सामान्यविषयौ लिङ्गशब्दौ वस्तुभूतसामान्यवच्च स्वलक्षणं, तादृशं च तद्दर्शनकारणमिति। निर्विकल्पकेन प्रथमाक्षसन्निपातजन्मना जातिमद्वस्तुवेदनात्तत्रोपलब्धचरसम्बन्धस्य शब्दस्य स्मरणं, तथा च तच्छब्दाभिधेयजातिविशिष्टद्रव्यावगाहीन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्मविकल्पप्रत्ययो गौरयमित्येवमाकारो जायत इति। (Here the emendation suggested by stcherbatsky viz "तत्रोपलब्धचरसम्बन्धस्य" for "तत्रोपलब्धे च न सम्बन्धस्य" has been adopted) *NVT. p.* 115. *line* 34.

P. 445. n. 84. तन्न। पिण्डविवेकेन जात्यादेरविकल्पकेनाग्रहणात्। न हि जातिजातिमन्तौ क्रियाक्रियावन्तौ गुणगुणिनौ तत्समवायौ वा विवेकेन चकासति। न च विवेकेनाप्रतिभासमानाः शक्या मिथो योजयितुं क्षीरोदकवदतद्वेदिना। तस्मादेकमविभागं स्वलक्षणमनादिविकल्पवासनासमारोपितजात्यादिभेदं तथा तथा विकल्प्यत इति युक्तमुत्पश्यामः। अपि च परमार्थसद्वस्तुद्वयवेदनेऽपि कुतो विशेषणविशेष्यभावः न ह्यङ्गुल्यावेकविज्ञानविषयौ मिथो विशेषणविशेष्यभावमापद्येते। विशेषणं खलूपकारकम् उपकार्य्यं च विशेष्यं नान्यथा तयोस्तद्भावः। न चैकविज्ञानसमारूढयोर्ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकभावः कार्य्यकारणभावो वा सम्भवी समानकालयोस्तयोरुभयोरपि पौर्वापर्यानियमात्। *NVT. p.* 116. *line* 4.

P. 447. n. 86. (wrongly printed 81) अपि च वस्तुस्वभावनिवेशे जात्यादीनामुपाधीनामेकस्य वस्तुनः सत्त्वं च द्रव्यत्वं च पार्थिवत्वं च वृक्षत्वं च शिंशपात्वं चोपाधय इति दूरादेकोपाधिविशिष्टग्रहे सर्वोपाधिविशिष्टग्रहप्रसङ्गः तथा ह्याधाराधेयभाव उपकारगर्भो भवति। पतनधर्म्मणो हि बदरस्य कुण्डमधरं प्रत्यासन्नमपतनधर्म्मकं बदरं विदधदाधारःतद्वदिहापि द्रव्येण जात्यादीनामुपकर्त्तव्यं, न च शक्त्यन्तरैरुपकरोति शक्त्यन्तरोपकारेऽपि शक्त्यन्तरकल्पनायामनवस्थापातात्। तस्मात्स्वभाव एव स्वकारणाधीनजन्मा द्रव्यस्य स ताद्दशो येन बहूनामुपाधीनामुपकरोतीति वाच्यम्। तथा च सत्त्वोपकारसमर्थे तस्मिन् द्रव्ये गृह्यमाणे द्रव्यत्वादावपि स एवास्य

स्वभाव इति तत्स्वभावावच्छिन्नाः सत्त्वविकल्पकेन परमार्थसद्द्रव्यावगाहिना सर्व एव द्रव्यत्वपार्थिवत्ववृक्षत्वशिंशपात्वादयो विषयीकृता इति विकल्पान्तराणामानर्थक्यम् ।

यदाह :—

" यस्यापि नानोपाधेर्ग्राहिकाऽर्थस्य भेदिनः ।
नानोपाध्युपकाराङ्गशक्त्यभिन्नात्मनो ग्रहे ॥
सर्वात्मनोपकार्यस्य को भेदः स्यादनिश्चितः ।
एकोपकारके ग्राह्ये नोपकारास्ततोऽपरे ॥
दृष्टे तस्मिन्नदृष्टा ये तद्ग्रहे सकलग्रहः " ॥ इति

अस्माकं तु अनादिविकल्पवासनोपादाना विकल्पा यच्च गृह्णन्ति यच्चाध्यवस्यन्ति तयोरुभयोरप्यन्यनिवृत्तिरूपतया अवस्तुत्वान्न मनागपि परमार्थसद् वस्तु गाहते पारम्पर्येण तु वस्तुप्रतिबन्धात्तत्र प्रवर्तयन्तः प्रापयन्तश्च न विसंवादयन्ति लोकमतो वस्तुस्वभावाविनिवेशाद्विकल्पानां न पौनरुक्त्यमस्ति ।

NVT. p. 116. *line* 10.

The reading of the last line of the verses quoted above " दृष्टे तस्मिन्नदृष्टेऽपि" (as found in the printed text) is wrong. It has, therefore, been corrected to दृष्टे तस्मिन्नदृष्टा ये which is the reading found quoted elsewhere (p. 682) in the NVT. itself. The verses in question are quoted from *Pramāṇa-vārtika* of Dharmakīrti. But the reading in *Pramāṇa-vārtika* with the commentary of Ācārya Manorathanandin edited by Śri Rahula Smkrityayana (III. 51, 52 only first half and 54), is somewhat different. It is, however, interesting to note that the commentary of Manorathanandin follows the text as quoted by Vācaspatimiśra (in the form as corrected above).

P. 447. n. 87. अपि चालोचिते वस्तुनीन्द्रियेण तदनन्तरोत्पन्नशब्दस्मरणव्यवहितव्यापारमिन्द्रियमर्थश्च न सविकल्पिकामपि धियमुपजनयितुमर्हतः । यथा ऽऽह—

'अर्थोपयोगेऽपि पुनः स्मार्तं शब्दानुयोजनम् ।
अक्षधीर्यद्यपेक्षेत सोऽर्थो व्यवहितो भवेत् ।'

NVT. p. 116. *line* 27.

(This stanza is quoted from 'प्रमाणविनिश्चय' of Dharmakirti. Reference traced by Stcherbatsky).

P. 448. n. 89. नो खल्वतीतं भवति गोचरोऽक्षस्येति। न चागोचरे सहस्रेणाप्युपायैरेतत्प्रवर्तयितुमर्हतीति। न च स्मृतिरतीतविषयाऽननुभूतपूर्वं वर्तमानं गोचरयितुमर्हति। तद्गोचरत्वे चान्धानामपि रूपसाक्षात्कारप्रसङ्गः। यथाऽऽह—

"तेन स्यादक्षापायेऽपि नेत्रधीरिति"

NVT. p. 117. *line* 3.

P. 448. n. 91. तदेवं नामजातिगुणकर्मकल्पना च प्रत्यक्षत्वेन परास्ता, द्रव्यकल्पनापि—दण्डीति।

"विशेषणं विशेष्यं च सम्बन्धं लौकिकीं स्थितिम्।
गृहीत्वा संकलय्यैतत्तथा प्रत्येति नान्यथा॥"

न चैतावन्तं व्यापारकलापं विचारकनिर्वर्तनीयमिन्द्रियज्ञानं सहते तस्य सन्निहितविषयबलेनोत्पत्तेरविचारकत्वाद् इति।..."तस्मान्न सविकल्पकं (not" तद्विकल्पकम् as printed) प्रत्यक्षमिति।

NVT. p. 117. *line* 5.

P. 449. n. 93. यत्तावदुक्तमर्थसामर्थ्यजत्वाभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यप्रतिभासत्वयोर्विरोध इति, तत्र ब्रूमः स्याद्विरोधो यदि स्वलक्षणमेवार्थः, न त्वेतदस्ति। उपपादयिष्यते च परमार्थसज्जात्यादिमन्तमर्थं स्थेमभाजमभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यम्, तेन तज्जनितं ज्ञानमर्थसामर्थ्यज़ं चाभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यप्रतिभासं चेति न विरोधः।

NVT. p. 117. *line* 12.

(Not 'संसर्गायोग्य' as printed at both the places in the text is wrong. It should be 'संसर्गयोग्य' as corrected above.)

P. 450. n. 97. न च भिन्नेन शब्देन डित्थोऽयमित्यभेदकल्पनाद् अर्थस्य विकल्पानामनर्थजत्वमिति युक्तम्। उक्तमेतद् अव्यपदेश्य-पदव्याख्यानावसरे यथा न शब्दाभेदेन अर्थो विकल्पैरुपदर्श्यते किन्तु तटस्थ एव शब्दः स्ववाच्यतया ससर्गेण सञ्जिनमुपलक्षयति न च शब्दार्थयोरेकेन्द्रियग्राह्यता किन्तु प्रथममालोचितोऽर्थः सामान्य-विशेषवान् सङ्केतसमयवर्तिनीमात्मनोऽवस्थां स्मारयन् तत्कालभाविनं शब्दमपि स्मारयत्यवर्जनीयतया, न त्विन्द्रियजविकल्पोत्पादं प्रत्युपयोगः कश्चिच्छब्दस्मरणस्य। अन्यथा बालमूकादीनां नेन्द्रियजः स्याद्विकल्पः शब्दस्मरणाभावात्। सङ्केतसमयवर्त्यवस्थास्मरणं तूपयुज्यते, वस्तुनस्तदानीन्तनेदानीन्तनावस्थाभेदवत एकस्येन्द्रियजेन विकल्पेनाकलनात्। शब्दस्तु संपातायातो न निवेशयत्यात्मान-मिन्द्रियजे विकल्पे.....।

तथाह—

संज्ञा हि स्मर्यमाणाऽपि प्रत्यक्षं तु न बाधते।
संज्ञिनः सा तटस्था हि न रूपाच्छादनक्षमा॥

नार्थेन्द्रियव्यापारं व्यवधत्त इत्यर्थः।

NVT. p. 117. *line* 18.

The *underlined* portion without which the text will be meaningless, is missing in both the Vizianagram and Calcutta editions. Stcherbatsky has restored it without mentioning the source.

P. 451. n. 98. न च प्रागवस्थास्मरणसापेक्षतया नेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षः कारणं विकल्पस्येति साम्प्रतम्, यतो "न किञ्चिदेकमेकस्मात् ('एकस्याः' wrongly printed in the text) सामग्र्याः सर्व-सम्भव" इति भवन्तोऽप्याहुः। अन्यथाऽऽलोकमनस्कारसापेक्ष-मर्थेन्द्रियं निर्विकल्पकमपि न जनयेत्। यत्तु प्रथमं नाजीजनत्तत्

स्मरणसहकारिविरहात् । न हि नाजीजनत्कुशूलस्थं बीजमङ्कुरमिति न समवहितक्षित्यादिसहकारिग्राममप्यस्याजनकं भवति ।

NVT. p. 118. line 4.

P. 451. n. 99. अतीतावस्था नेन्द्रियगोचरस्तस्य वर्तमानार्थे नियमात् । न च वर्त्तमानोऽर्थः स्मरणगोचरः स्मरणस्यानुभवजनित-संस्कारोद्बोधजन्मनः पूर्वानुभवगोचरं प्रति नियमात्, तस्माद्भिन्न-विषयतया नेन्द्रियसहकारिता स्मरणस्य, न हि रूपविषयाः सहस्रमपि नयनप्रदीपादयः शब्दविषयस्य श्रवसः सहकारितामा-पद्यन्ते ।

NVT. p. 118. line 9.

P. 452. n. 102. तत्किं भवतां यत्र गन्धबुद्ध्यनन्तरं चाक्षुषरूप-विज्ञानं तत्र गन्धज्ञानं न समनन्तरप्रत्ययः ? तत्रापि चक्षू रूप-विषयं न गन्धविषयस्य ज्ञानस्य सहकारि भवितुमर्हतीति, भिन्न-विषयत्वादेव । अथान्वयव्यतिरेकनिबन्धनः कार्य्यकारणभावो न समानविषयत्वमनुविधीयत इत्युच्येत, तदस्माकमपि समानम् ।

NVT. p. 118. line 12.

P. 453. n. 106. तत् किं यदिन्द्रियसंबद्धं तत् प्रत्यक्षम् ? तथा सत्याकाशपरमाण्वादयोऽपि तत्संयुक्ता इति तेऽपि प्रत्यक्षाः प्रसज्येरन् । तस्माद् यदेवेन्द्रियजस्य ज्ञानस्य गोचरस्तत्प्रत्यक्षम्, न त्विन्द्रियसंबद्धम् । नन्वसंबन्धे इन्द्रियं कथं तत्र ज्ञानं जनयति ? तद्वा ज्ञानं कथं प्रत्यक्षम् ? प्रत्यक्षं चेत् कथमिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षो-त्पन्नमिति लक्षणं प्रत्यक्षं व्याप्नोति, अस्यैव प्रत्यक्षस्य लक्षणेना-व्यापनात् ?

NVT. p. 118. line 16.

(In the phrase 'न त्विन्द्रियसम्बद्धम्' the printed text gives 'न' twice which is wrong)

P. 453. n. 107. मा भूदर्थस्य पूर्वकालवर्त्तितेन्द्रियगोचरः, तथाऽपि स्मरणसहकारिणा संस्कारसहकारिणा वेन्द्रियेण यज्जनितं ज्ञानं तेन

सा विषयीक्रियत एव। न च यत्स्मरणसहकारिणेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षेणोपजनितं तदिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षेणोत्पन्नं न भवति। तथा च नाव्यापकमस्य लक्षणम्।

NVT. p. 118. *line* 20.

(The reading 'तद्विषयीक्रियते' as found in all the editions should be सा विषयीक्रियते because it refers to पूर्वकालवर्त्तिता)

P. 453. n. 108. ननु पूर्वापरावस्थाविषयं परामर्शज्ञानं कथमेकम्, विषयभेदात् पारोक्ष्यापारोक्ष्यलक्षणविरुद्धधर्म्मसंसर्गाच्च ? तथा हि तदिति परोक्षम्, इदमिति साक्षात्कारः, न च विरुद्धधर्म्मसंसर्गेऽप्येकत्वम् त्रैलोक्यस्यैक्यप्रसङ्गात्। विषयभेदश्च पूर्वदेशकालपरदेशकालसंबन्धयोरेकस्य विरोधात्।

NVT. p. 118. *line* 23.

P. 454. n. 110. पूर्वापरदेशकालौ तत्संबन्धौ वा कामं भिद्येयाताम्, परस्परभावाविनाभावात् तयोरेकदाऽपि तादात्म्येनाप्रतिभासनात्। न तु तदालिङ्गितस्वभावः पद्मरागमणिः, तस्य ताभ्यामन्यत्वात्। न चान्यभेदोऽन्यभेदमापादयति अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

NVT. p. 119. *line* 13.

P. 454. n. 112. न चैकेनोपाधिना सत्त्वेन विशिष्टे तस्मिन् गृहीते उपाध्यन्तरविशिष्टतद्ग्रहप्रसङ्गः, स्वभावो हि द्रव्यस्योपाधिभिर्विशिष्यते, न तूपाधयो वा तैर्विशिष्टत्वं वा तस्य स्वभावः, न च यत् स्वभावसम्बन्धि स स्वभावः, तथा सत्यसम्बन्धित्वमेव, न हि तदेव तेन सम्बध्यते।

NVT. p. 119. *line* 26.

P. 455. n. 114. हन्त भोः किं मानसमपि ज्ञानमाकलयितुमर्हति ? संकलयति, मनसस्तत्कारणस्य सर्वविषयत्वाद् इति चेत्, यदि पूर्वकं विज्ञानं मनः, कथं तस्य सर्वविषयता ? अस्माकं तु मनः

सर्वविषयमपि अचेतनतया न विचारकं तस्मादात्मैव सकलज्ञान-तज्जनितवासनाधारः स्मर्ता च प्रतिसन्धाता च ।

NVT. p. 120. line 15.

P. 456. n. 116. एकविज्ञानवेद्यत्वे यद्यपि ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकभाव उपकार्यो-पकारकभावो नास्ति, तथापि तदर्थालोचनाऽनुगतस्मरणयोर्विशेषण-विशेष्यभावावगाहिविज्ञानं प्रत्युत्पादकत्वमेवोपकारकत्वमस्ति । अर्थौ हि रूपरूपिभावेन स्थितावपि नापातजन्मना ज्ञानेन तथा गृहीतौ अपि तु स्वरूपमात्रेण, न हि यावदस्ति तावद् ग्रहीतव्यं, तेन तदेकदेश-ग्रहणेऽपि नाप्रमाणता । सविकल्पकं तूक्तसामग्रीजन्म जात्यादि रूपतया द्रव्यं च रूपितया कल्पयेत् । पश्चाज्जायमानमपीन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष-प्रभवतया प्रत्यक्ष भवत्येव ।

NVT. p. 121. line 10.

P. 467. n. 143. अथवा पूर्वाभिज्ञानविशिष्टग्राह्यमाणमिष्यतां प्रत्यभिज्ञानं गन्धवत्कुन्दबुद्धिवद्, यथा हि लोचनगोचरेऽपि कुन्दकुसुमे तदविषयगन्धविशेषिते बाह्येन्द्रियद्वारकग्रहणमघटमानमिति मानस-मेव सुरभि कुसुममिति ज्ञानम् एवं पूर्वज्ञानविशेषितस्य स्तम्भादेर्विशे-षणमतीतक्षणविषय इति मानसी प्रत्यभिज्ञा ।

NM. part II. p. 33. line 13.

P. 480. n. 175. परं हि तद्गोचरं वा ज्ञानमभ्युपेयेत, अर्थक्रिया-निर्भासं वा ज्ञानान्तरं, तद्गोचरनान्तरीयकार्थान्तिरदर्शनं वा । तच्च सर्वं स्वतोऽनवधारितप्रामाण्यमाकुलं सत् कथं पूर्वं प्रवर्तकं ज्ञानम् अनाकुलयेत् । स्वतो वाऽस्य प्रामाण्ये किमपराद्धं प्रवर्तकज्ञानेन येन तस्मिन्नपि तन्न स्यात् ।

NVT. p. 3. line 18.

P. 485. n. 190. तथा हि रजतमिदमिति द्वे ज्ञाने स्मृत्यनुभवरूपे, तत्रेदमिति पुरोवर्त्तिद्रव्यमात्रग्रहणम्, दोषवशात् तद्गतशुक्तिकात्व-सामान्यविशेषस्याग्रहणात्, तावन्मात्रं च गृहीतं सदृशतया संस्कारोद्-बोधक्रमेण रजते स्मृतिं जनयति, सा च गृहीतग्रहणस्वभावापि

सा विपयीक्रियत एव। न च यत्स्मरणसहकारिणेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षेणोपजनितं तदिन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षेणोत्पन्नं न भवति। तथा च नाव्यापकमस्य लक्षणम्।

NVT. p. 118. *line* 20.

(The reading 'तद्विपयीक्रियते' as found in all the editions should be सा विपयीक्रियते because it refers to पूर्वकालवर्त्तिता)

P. 453. n. 108. ननु पूर्वापरावस्थाविपयं परामर्शज्ञानं कथमेकम्, विपयभेदात् पारोक्ष्यापारोक्ष्यलक्षणविरुद्धधर्म्मसंसर्गाच्च ? तथा हि तदिति परोक्षम्, इदमिति साक्षात्कारः, न च विरुद्धधर्म्मसंसर्गेऽप्येकत्वम् त्रैलोक्यस्यैक्यप्रसङ्गात्। विपयभेदश्च पूर्वदेशकालपरदेशकालसंबन्धयोरेकस्य विरोधात्।

NVT. p. 118. *line* 23.

P. 454. n. 110. पूर्वापरदेशकालौ तत्संबन्धौ वा कामं भिद्येयाताम्, परस्पराभावाविनाभावात् तयोरेकदाऽपि तादात्म्येनाप्रतिभासनात्। न तु तदालिङ्गितस्वभावः पद्मरागमणिः, तस्य ताभ्यामन्यत्वात्। न चान्यभेदोऽन्यभेदमापादयति अतिप्रसङ्गात्।

NVT. p. 119. *line* 13.

P. 454. n. 112. न चैकेनोपाधिना सत्त्वेन विशिष्टे तस्मिन् गृहीते उपाध्यन्तरविशिष्टतद्ग्रहप्रसङ्गः, स्वभावो हि द्रव्यस्योपाधिभिर्विशिष्यते, न तूपाधयो वा तैर्विशिष्टत्वं वा तस्य स्वभावः, न च यत् स्वभावसम्बन्धि स स्वभावः, तथा सत्यसम्बन्धित्वमेव, न हि तदेव तेन सम्बध्यते।

NVT. p. 119. *line* 26.

P. 455. n. 114. हन्त भोः किं मानसमपि ज्ञानमाकलयितुमर्हति ? संकलयति, मनसस्तत्कारणस्य सर्वविपयत्वाद् इति चेत्, यदि पूर्वकं विज्ञानं मनः, कथं तस्य सर्वविपयता ? अस्माकं तु मनः

सर्वविषयमपि अचेतनतया न विचारकं तस्मादात्मैव सकलज्ञान-तज्जनितवासनाधारः स्मर्ता च प्रतिसन्धाता च ।

NVT. p. 120. *line* 15.

P. 456. n. 116. एकविज्ञानवेद्यत्वे यद्यपि ज्ञाप्यज्ञापकभाव उपकार्यो-पकारकभावो नास्ति, तथापि तदर्थालोचनाऽनुगतस्मरणयोर्विशेषण-विशेष्यभावावगाहिविज्ञानं प्रत्युत्पादकत्वमेवोपकारकत्वमस्ति । अर्थौ हि रूपरूपिभावेन स्थितावपि नापातजन्मना ज्ञानेन तथा गृहीतौ अपि तु स्वरूपमात्रेण, न हि यावदस्ति तावद् ग्रहीतव्यं, तेन तदेकदेश-ग्रहणेऽपि नाप्रमाणता । सविकल्पकं तूक्तसामग्रीजन्म जात्यादि रूपतया द्रव्यं च रूपितया कल्पयेत् । पश्चाज्जायमानमपीन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्ष-प्रभवतया प्रत्यक्षं भवत्येव ।

NVT. p. 121. *line* 10.

P. 467. n. 143. अथवा पूर्वाभिज्ञानविशिष्टग्राह्यमाणमिष्यतां प्रत्यभिज्ञानं गन्धवत्कुन्दबुद्धिवद्, यथा हि लोचनगोचरेऽपि कुन्दकुसुमे तदविषयगन्धविशेषिते बाह्येन्द्रियद्वारकग्रहणमघटमानमिति मानस-मेव सुरभि कुसुममिति ज्ञानम् एवं पूर्वज्ञानविशेषितस्य स्तम्भादेर्विशे-षणमतीतक्षणविषय इति मानसी प्रत्यभिज्ञा ।

NM. part II. p. 33. *line* 13.

P. 480. n. 175. परं हि तद्गोचरं वा ज्ञानमभ्युपेयेत, अर्थक्रिया-निर्भासं वा ज्ञानान्तरं, तद्गोचरनान्तरीयकार्थान्तरदर्शनं वा । तच्च सर्वं स्वतोऽनवधारितप्रामाण्यमाकुलं सत् कथं पूर्वं प्रवर्तकं ज्ञानम् अनाकुलयेत् । स्वतो वाऽस्य प्रामाण्ये किमपराद्धं प्रवर्तकज्ञानेन येन तस्मिन्नपि तन्न स्यात् ।

NVT. p. 3. *line* 18.

P. 485. n. 190. तथा हि रजतमिदमिति द्वे ज्ञाने स्मृत्यनुभवरूपे, तत्रेदमिति पुरोवर्त्तिद्रव्यमात्रग्रहणम्, दोषवशात् तद्गतशुक्तिकात्व-सामान्यविशेषस्याग्रहणात्, तावन्मात्रं च गृहीतं सदृशतया संस्कारोद्-बोधक्रमेण रजते स्मृतिं जनयति, सा च गृहीतग्रहणस्वभावापि

दोषाद् गृहीततांशभ्रमोषेण ग्रहणमात्रमवतिष्ठते । तथा च रजतस्मृतेः पुरोवर्त्तिमात्रग्रहणस्य च मिथः स्वरूपतश्च विषयतश्च भेदाग्रहणात् सन्निहितरजतविषयविज्ञानसारूप्येण इदं रजतमिति भिन्ने अपि ग्रहणस्मरणे अभेदव्यवहारं सामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशं च प्रवर्त्तयतः ।

NVT. p. 74. line 14.

P. 486. n. 191. क्वचित् पुनर्ग्रहणे एव मिथोऽगृहीतभेदे । यथा पीतः शङ्ख इति । अत्र बहिर्निर्गच्छन्नयनरश्मिवर्त्तिनः पित्तद्रव्यस्य काचस्येवातिस्वच्छस्य पीतत्वं च गृह्यते, पित्तं तु न गृह्यते, शङ्खोऽपि दोषवशाद् गुणरहितः स्वरूपमात्रेण गृह्यते । तदनयोर्गुण-गुणिनोरसंसर्गाग्रहात् सारूप्यात् पीतचिरबिल्वप्रत्ययाविशेषेणाभेद-व्यवहारः सामानाधिकरण्यव्यपदेशश्च ।

NVT. p. 74. line 19.

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